CONTENTS

Articles
Holly, Karol: Princess Salomea and Hungarian – Polish Relations in the Period 1214 – 1241 .................................................................................................................. 5
Rabík, Vladimír: The Ruthenian and Wallachian Population of Eastern Slovakia in the Middle Ages ......................................................................................... 33
Fundárová, Anna: Palatine Paulus Pálfy’s Conflict with Archbishop Georgius Lippay of Esztergom .................................................................................................. 61
Matuša, Vladimír: Ludovít Štúr and the Beginnings of the Formation of the Generation of Young Sons of Slovakia .......................................................................... 79
Hallon, Ludovít: The Role of Milan Hodža in Slovak Commercial Banking (1918 – 1938) ............................................................................................................. 97
Katuniec, Milan: The society of Saint Adalbert from the End of the Second World War to its Change into a “Special Purpose Facility” (1945 – 1954) .......... 113
Michálek, Slavomír: Czechoslovakia against William Nathan Oatis .......................................................... 137
Mihálková, Silvia: Festivals in Slovakia as Part of Political Rituals ................................................................. 161

Reviews
Avenarius, Alexander: The Byzantine Struggle over the Icon (Miroslav Daniš) ......................................................................................................................... 177
Zemko, Milan – Bystrický, Valerián (eds.): Slovakia in Czechoslovakia 1918 – 1939 (Elena Mannová) .................................................................................. 182
Déák, Ladislav: The Vienna Arbitration, 2nd November 1938. Documents I., II., III. (Valerián Bystrický) ................................................................. 186
Dear readers of the Historický časopis

In 2007, the Historický časopis is entering its 55th anniversary year. The periodical originated in 1953 at the same time as the Institute of History of the Slovak Academy of Sciences. It was established as the central scholarly periodical of the Slovak historical community. Its role from the beginning was to present new results of research in Slovak historiography and interesting papers by foreign authors.

It has passed through various periods in its history. The period of communist totalitarianism was not very favourable for the development of a free and independent historical science. This situation was naturally reflected in the Historický časopis. The communist period included hard-line phases, but also periods of softening, when historians could publish articles, which were not in harmony with the official line of the Communist Party. Above all the second half of the sixties was such a period and so was the second half of the eighties.

The principle of free historical research was renewed in Slovakia only after the social change of 1989. We believe that we have succeeded in publishing many interesting materials on the pages of the Historický časopis in recent years. These were interesting to you and they testify to the rising trend in the quality of Slovak historiography.

One of the greatest problems of Slovak historiography is that, in spite of the important results it has achieved, it remains little known in the world. The main reason for this is the language barrier. In the Historický časopis we publish articles in the Slovak language, and under the heading Archív we print previously unpublished documents in the original language with a Slovak translation. This is not only a matter of tradition. We are aware that the Historický časopis has its place among the Slovak public, that we do not address only the narrow circle of experts, but also teachers, students, journalists and the wider public of people with an interest in history. We want to continue this trend. However, we are also aware of the fact that the results of Slovak historiography deserve to be known to the world expert public, which cannot read the Slovak language. We have seen increased interest in Slovak history in recent years. We have decided to satisfy this interest by publishing an English supplement to the Historický časopis, starting in the 55th year. In it, we will offer the world public a selection of the most interesting studies and articles, recently produced by Slovak historians.

We believe that the English supplement will be the instrument needed to enable the world scholarly public to inform itself about the wide range of recent results of Slovak historiography. Apart from articles, we will also provide important information about the most recent publications. We have no doubt that it is a step in the right direction, because after the disappearance of the periodical Studia Historica Slovaca, Slovak historiography will again have the possibility to present the results of its research to the world public.

Dušan Kováč
The Byzantine Struggle over the Icon

On the Problem of Eastern European Symbolism

Alexander Avenarius
ARTICLES

PRINCESS SALOMEA AND HUNGARIAN – POLISH RELATIONS IN THE PERIOD 1214 – 1241

KAROL HOLLÝ


Princess Salomea (1211/12 – 1268, canonized in 1673) was the daughter of Prince Leszek the White, and married Prince Koloman, son of the Hungarian King Andrew II. Since her early childhood, she was intricately involved in the decision-making process of Southwestern Poland and Hungary. Scepusia was the site of the meeting in 1214, at which Salomea’s marriage with Koloman was arranged. Koloman later became the King of Galicia. They changed their residence and came to Scepusia in 1221. In 1226, their influence spread to Southern parts of Hungary and they settled there at that time. Koloman and Salomea were also fighting heresy in the Balkans, an activity highly regarded by the Pope of the time. They were awarded an exemption from the interdict in 1234. Salomea is referred to in this text as regina. Even after her marriage Salomea remained deeply involved in the life of her homeland.

After Koloman’s death in 1241, Salomea returned to Southwestern Poland.


Princess Salomea, 1211/12 – 1268, beatified in 1673, daughter of Prince Leszek the White of Krakow and Princess Grzymisława, elder sister of Bolesław the Shy and wife of the Hungarian prince Koloman, son of Andrew II, became famous especially in the framework of the expansion of the second Franciscan Order. As the first Polish member of the Damianite/Clarist Order from 1245\(^1\) and a woman with a saintly reputation, the only beatified member of the Piast dynasty, she occupies a distinguished place in the history of medieval Poland. This aspect of Salomea is relatively well studied. On the other hand, less is known about her life and political role up to 1241, namely in the period when Salomea was active in Galicia and Hungary. It is necessary to say at the beginning that almost all works devoted to Salomea come from the pens of Polish historians.\(^2\) Slovak and Hungarian historiography has devoted little attention to her, in spite of the fact that she played a part in the history of the Kingdom of Hungary. Similarly, the works devoted

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to placing her in her wider context are scarce. In the context of a review of literature, it is necessary to mention a precise Serbian work by Đ. Hardi, which mentions Salomea in the framework of the history of Galicia in the 13th century. It is characteristic of Polish works that they do not devote enough attention to the period until 1241. Our ambition is partly to fill in this gap, and to draw attention to the fact that apart from representing the new female spirituality of the 13th century, Salomea played a significant role in the politics of the time. From early childhood, her destiny was strongly influenced by political decisions and reverses. Therefore, we conceive our work not only as a biography of a medieval woman, but also as an analysis of Hungarian – Polish – Kievan – Rus relations in the given period. The basic source on the person of Salomea is her *Life – Vita sanctae Salomeae reginae Haliciensis auctore Stanislawo Franciscano* (hereinafter VSS).


5 And to attempt a different interpretation of some events connected with Salomea to that offered to us in recent Polish literature.

hagiographic work written in the 13th century by the Franciscan Stanislav, is composed of two essentially independent parts: Vita and Miracula. Since we are not concerned here with analysis of the cult of Salomea, we will work only with the shorter Vita, which does not contain many positive facts, but gives some information of a basic character. Therefore, we take this source seriously, and in contrast to the majority of recent Polish literature, we consider it trustworthy with appropriate interpretation. Salomea is also mentioned in the Vita Sanctae Kyngae Ducissae Cracoviensis (hereinafter VSK) and in Polish annalist and diplomatic materials of the time. The annalist Jan Długosz must also be mentioned among the medieval sources connected with Salomea. Apart from the sources already mentioned, the basic sources for Hungarian – Polish relations in the


9 The part about the miracles originated earlier than the Vita and its author was clearly not Stanislav. Salomea’s confessor Adalbert or lector Borislaw are possibilities. See GĄSIoRoWSKA, ref. 8, p. 3. A precise analysis of the miracles from the VSS, including comparison with similar hagiographic works is found in WITKOWSKA, Aleksandra. Miracula Małopolskie z 13 i 14 wieku: Studium źródłoznawcze. (Little Polish Miracles from the 13th and 14th centuries: Source studies); In Roczniki Humanistyczne, 1971, 19, no. 2, p. 29-268. Also: Zagadnienia mentalności religijnej w świetle „Miracula” z 13/14 wieku. (Problems of religious mentality in the light of the “Miracles” from the 13th and 14th centuries). In Kościół w Polsce: średniowiecze, tom 1, ed. J. Kłoczowski. Kraków: Znak, 1983, p. 159-181.


matter of Galicia are especially the *Galician-Volynian Chronicle*\(^{13}\) and the *Hustynian Chronicle*\(^{14}\) Both chronicles also mention Salomea.

At the beginning of the 13\(^{th}\) century, Hungarian and Polish interests met especially in the area of ambitions to dominate Galicia.\(^{15}\) Apart from Hungary and Poland, local, Kievan-Rus claimants were especially interested in rule over these attractive territories. However, it was clear to them that without the support of a stronger ally, that is especially of either the Kingdom of Hungary or the Principality of Krakow, they had little hope of successfully gaining the throne of Galicia. This reality became topical especially after 1205, when Roman Mstislavovič\(^{16}\) was killed in the battle of Zawichost.\(^{17}\) He had succeeded in uniting the principalities of Vladimir and Galicia to create a strong political centre in south-west Ruthenia. Conflict with Little Poland cost him his life, when he died in battle against the armies of the sons of Kazimir the Just, Leszek the White and Konrad of Mazovia. These events created a power vacuum in Galicia, which naturally only strengthened Hungarian – Polish rivalry concerning rule over this region. The interests of Roman’s sons Daniel and Vasilko were represented by his widow Maria (or Anna), originally from the Byzantine Empire.\(^{18}\) Wanting to secure the throne of Galicia for her sons, Maria sought support from Prince Leszek the White of Krakow or from King Andrew II of Hungary alternately according to the political situation.

As a result of the fact that our research is directed mainly towards events directly connected with Princess Salomea, we will not devote attention to events between 1205


\(^{15}\) M. Font has analysed the cause of the frequent and mostly unsuccessful expeditions to Galicia by Andrew II, and pointed to the following factors: a) raising the personal prestige of Andrew II and experiences from 1188-1189, when he was driven out of Galicia as a child; b) a change in the attitude of the nobility, which is more substantial than the first reason. The nobility was willing to support Andrew II in his expeditions of this period, in the interest of increasing their own influence; c) the need for fiefs for the king’s sons. For more details see: FONT, II. András, ref. 3, p. 134-137. We should add that Slovak historiography mostly evaluates these expeditions negatively, with the justification that they exhausted the royal treasury. See e.g.: MANNOVÁ, Elena et al. *Krátké dejiny Slovenska*. (Concise History of Slovakia, Chronicle of Slovakia 1). Bratislava : Academic Electronic Press, 2003, p. 45. However, it is not necessary to underestimate their secondary result, which was the “growing importance of the north-eastern area of Slovakia, which served as the base for all the expeditions to Galicia”. See: KOVÁČ, Dušan et al. *Kronika Slovenska 1*. Bratislava : Fortuna Print, 1998, p. 127.


\(^{18}\) Roman’s widow is named Anna in literature, but recent research inclines to the view that she was Maria of Byzantine descent. See: DĄBROWSKI, ref. 16, p. 34-44.
and 1213. Therefore, we rely especially on the work of B. Włodarski and from the Slovak side on the study of M. Klatý. We find in them analysis of the basic events of this period, such as the meeting of Andrew II with Maria in Sanok, the agreement between Leszek the White and Andrew II in 1206, the activity of the voivode Benedict in Galicia, the power-political situation in Galicia and Vladimir and so on.\(^\text{19}\)

Another war over control of Galicia began in 1213. Andrew II organized an expedition with the aim of fulfilling the ambitions of Maria and her son Daniel.\(^\text{20}\) However, during a stop in the monastery of Leles, Andrew II learnt of a conspiracy, which resulted in the murder of his wife Gertrude.\(^\text{21}\) Therefore, he immediately turned back and appointed the pro-Hungarian Galician boyar Vladislav Kormilovič as his deputy on the expedition. After a successful campaign, Vladislav took control of Galicia as Hungarian governor.\(^\text{22}\) Since under the influence of the internal crisis in Hungary caused by the murder of Gertrude, Andrew II had not acted according to the demands of Maria, she and Daniel, in the words of the chronicle, asked for permission to seek support in Poland. Leszek received them with great honour. We soon observe Daniel, with the support of the Ruthenian princes Alexander from the Principality of Vladimir and Vševold from the Principality of Belz, and especially with the help of Leszek the White, on an expedition against the boyar Vladislav, who had the support of Hungarian and Czech troops. Daniel and Leszek’s army won the decisive battle on the river Bóbrka and many of Vladislav’s soldiers were killed, but the boyar himself escaped and Galicia was not conquered. Thus, apart from loot for Leszek and smaller territorial gains for Daniel and Vasilko, the expedition did not bring the desired result.\(^\text{23}\)

Andrew II reacted to Leszek’s campaign in Galicia with a military campaign against Krakow.\(^\text{24}\) Apparently he already had the plan to place his second son Koloman in Galicia. We can read in a letter from Andrew II to Innocent III that this idea came from the


\(^\text{21}\) The conspiracy of the Hungarian magnates was caused by generous donations for the German associates of Queen Gertrude. For more details see: *Kniha kráľov: Panovníci v dejinách Slovenska a Slovákov*. (The book of kings. Rulers in the history of Slovakia and the Slovaks). Eds. V. Segeš a F. Višváder, Bratislava : Kleio, 1998, s. 111-112. According to the *Bratislava Chronicle*, the Palatine Bánk was guilty and it also states that Gertrude was buried in a monastery in the Pilis hills. However, the event is mentioned under the year 1212. See: Chronicon Posoniense. Ed. A. Domanovszky. In *Scriptores Rerum Hungaricarum* 2. Ed. E. Szentpétery. Budapestini 1938, p. 42. J. Dlugosz also mentions this event under the year 1212. See: *Annales 5-6*, ref. 12, p. 217-218. The monastery in the Pilis hills was Cistercian and dedicated to the Virgin Mary. *Annales 5-6*, p. 370, note 8. The *Galician – Volynian Chronicle* states that during this expedition, Andrew II stopped in the monastery at Leles, where they attempted to kill him. They succeeded in killing his wife, the Patriarch of Aquileia and many Germans. See: GVCH, p. 23.

\(^\text{22}\) GVCH, p. 23.

\(^\text{23}\) GVCH, p. 23-24.

\(^\text{24}\) GVCH, p. 24.
Galician boyars. This is confirmed by Jan Długosz, who writes that two parties were formed in Galicia. One sought protection from Poland and the other from Hungary. The pro-Hungarian faction gained dominance and demanded the establishment of Koloman in Galicia. This shows the dissatisfaction of the domestic elite, not with Hungarian hegemony, but more with the person of the boyar Vladislav.

Leszek the White was not in an enviable situation. Andrew II attacked Krakow and also had control of Galicia. Two views on the question of co-operation with Hungary over eastern policy, had existed for some time at the court in Krakow. According to one view, they should not pay attention to Hungary, as in the case of Leszek’s expedition from the beginning of 1214. According to the other view, they should cooperate with Hungary and deal with Galicia jointly. In the given situation, the second conception, represented by the voivode Pakoslaw from the Awdaniec family, prevailed. In autumn 1214, (dated by B. Włodarski), Andrew II and Leszek the White met and made an agreement in Scepusia. This was a turning point event according to our research. The voivode Pakoslaw came to Hungary to request a truce. Apart from agreeing on a meeting between Leszek the White and Andrew II, he stated Leszek’s ideas on their future agreement: “It is not proper for a boyar to reign in Halyč; marry my daugther to your son Koloman and let him rule in Halyč.” Thus, he actually expressed the wishes of the pro-Hungarian Galician boyars. In Scepusia, Leszek and Andrew II agreed on Koloman as an acceptable candidate for the Galician throne, for which Leszek would receive the castles of Przemysł and Lubaczów with their surroundings. According to the chronicles, the monarchs sent the boyar Vladislav into exile. However, the most important part of the agreement was the raising of the Principality of Galicia to the status of a kingdom. The royal crown was expected to bring stability to this region. However, the main thing for our research is that King Andrew II of Hungary accepted Leszek’s condition and engaged his son to Salomea, daughter of Prince Leszek of Krakow. We assume that agreement to this unequal union was a concession by Andrew II and an advantageous diplomatic move from the side of Leszek. The logic of further events suggests that Leszek could also have set the condition of the coronation of Salomea as Queen of Galicia.


26 Annales 5-6, p. 204.


28 WŁODARSKI, ref. 19, p. 52, note 2.


31 Ref. 30.


Thus, Salomea appears on the stage of history for the first time in this complex political situation. Since from this point she will be the main figure in our research, it is necessary to stop the description of political events and look at the main sources concerning the question of her origin and date of birth. Salomea was the daughter of Leszek the White and the Ruthenian Princess Grzymislawa (daughter of Prince Ingvar of Luck) and elder sister of Boleslaw the Shy. Her origin is documented by various sources, for example, the Franciscan Annals of Krakow, Little Polish Annals in the Szamotulski codex, Sędziwoj Annals, Traski Annals, VSS, and VSK. The sources mostly agree on the question of the origin of Salomea. The exceptions are sources from later periods. The Hustynian Chronicle from the 17th century regards her as the sister of Leszek. Jan Długosz also mentions Salomea as the sister of Leszek. Gerard Labuda explains this by the too generally formulated source from which J. Długosz drew information on this specific question. It also enabled this erroneous interpretation. The date of birth of Salomea is more problematic. The sources vary on this question. The Traski Annals give the year 1202. The Little Polish Annals give the same year in the Szamotulski codex, but in the Kuropatnickiego codex they give the year 1207, and in the Królewiecki codex even 1231. Ján Długosz states the year 1224 and already does not describe her as the sister of Leszek, but correctly as the daughter of Leszek the White and Grzymislawa. All the dates given up to now are inaccurate, especially because the date of the marriage of Leszek and Grzymislawa has been reliably identified as 1207. Oswald Balzer’s Genealogy of the Piasts from 1895, which is still unsurpassed in many areas, especially in precise study of sources, states that the only reliable information about the birth of

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34 Naturally also her husband Koloman, since the sources are frequently silent about Salomea, we have to research her activity through him. She remained with him until 1241.
39 VSS, p. 776.
40 VSK, p. 127.
41 Latopis hustynski, p. 182. In another place, it entirely wrongly identifies the mother of Salomea, namely the wife of Leszek the White. Instead of Grzymislawa, it gives the daughter of Jaroslav Igorević. It even dates the marriage to 1221. Latopis hustynski, p. 185.
42 Annales 5-6, p. 205.
44 Ref. 38.
45 Ref. 36.
48 Annales 5-6, p. 240.
Salomea is in the VSS.\textsuperscript{50} It states that Salomea was three years old, when she came to the Hungarian court because of her engagement with Koloman.\textsuperscript{51} Since the engagement with Koloman happened in 1214, the date of the Scepusian agreement, O. Balzer dates the birth of Salomea to 1211 or 1212,\textsuperscript{52} and this date is generally accepted in the literature. Therefore, Salomea was born four or five years after the marriage of Leszek the White and Grzymislaw. From this point of view, the data of J. Długosz also appears to be more trustworthy. He dates the marriage of Leszek and Grzymislawa to 1220.\textsuperscript{53} G. Labuda explains that it was a mechanical mistake by Długosz’s assistants, who categorized his work.\textsuperscript{54} We mention it because Długosz’s information that Salomea was born in 1224 is trustworthy in the sense that she actually was born four years after the marriage of Leszek and Grzymislaw.

Now let us turn to the Scepusian agreement. It was the second agreement between Andrew II and Leszek the White on the question of Galicia, following an earlier agreement from 1206. The VSS interprets this event in the sense that Andrew II forced Leszek to give up his daughter Salomea, a servant of Christ, because of her engagement to Koloman. In the case of refusal, he threatened to destroy Leszek’s principality. According to the VSS, Leszek replied to this threat: “\textit{We cannot give up our daughter Salomea because of the wish of the King of Hungary that she should marry his son, because she has made a promise to God and the power of the King of Hungary is not greater than the power of the Almighty, from whose will everything happens.}” However, after urging from his barons and advisers, he finally agreed to the engagement of Salomea and Koloman.\textsuperscript{55} In this interpretation, we see the clear intention of the hagiographer to depict Salomea as destined for the religious life even from childhood.\textsuperscript{56} However, in reality the initiative for the Scepusian agreement came from Leszek. In relation to his position in Galicia at the time, this had its logic. The conditions of the Scepusian agreement were at first sight advantageous to Andrew II. Leszek would gain only two castles and their surroundings in the western part of Galicia, in return for which he would renounce his claims to Galicia. The expert literature also often gives such an interpretation.\textsuperscript{57} However, if we look at the conditions of the Scepusian agreement from a different point of view, we can come to the

\begin{enumerate}
\item BALZER, ref. 49, p. 275-276.
\item VSS, p. 777.
\item BALZER, ref. 49, p. 275-276.
\item Annales 5-6, p. 232.
\item LABUDA, ref. 43, p. 48.
\item VSS, p. 776-777.
\item O. Balzer already pointed to this. See: BALZER, ref. 49, p. 276. In spite of this, the influence of the barons and advisers on Leszek’s decision in relation to the activity of the voivode Pakoslav, cannot be denied. B. Włodarski already pointed to this. WŁODARSKI, ref. 19, p. 53, note 3. On the other hand, we do not suppose that Andrew II would have demanded Salomea for Koloman, even with the threat of a campaign against Leszek. However, the fact is that Andrew II was carrying on a campaign against Leszek at the time, but certainly not with aim of gaining the hand of Salomea. Her marriage to Koloman was actually a success for Leszek. However, we can also see that this apparently entirely erroneous information in the VSS is mixed with various pieces of true information.
\item For example: WŁODARSKI, ref. 27, p. 66-67. KANJOR, ref. 10, p. 41, or PROCHÁZKOVÁ, Postavenie haličského, ref. 3, p. 66.
\end{enumerate}
opposite interpretation. The engagement of Koloman the son of a king with Salomea the daughter of a prince was not so advantageous for Andrew II. By getting Salomea married to the son of a king, Leszek may have been pursuing the raising of his status among the Polish princes. Since it was an unequal union, we can speak more of the success of Leszek the White. The fact that in the period 1138 – 1214, the House of Arpád had made only one genealogical connection with the Piasts, supports our view.

At the turn of the years 1214 – 1215, Koloman was placed on the throne of Galicia and awaited coronation. Leszek and the voivode Pakoslav received the area of Przemysł and Lubaczów in western Galicia. Both the above cited chronicles also give information about the fates of Maria and Daniel in connection with the change in the power-political situation after the meeting in Scepusia. With the support of Leszek and the voivode Pakoslav, they forced Alexander of Belz, ruler of the Principality of Vladimir at the time, to hand over the position of ruler of Vladimir to Roman’s sons. According to Hardi, this could have been part of the Scepusian agreement. According to the Hustynian Chronicle, this happened against the will of Andrew II. However, the Galician-Volynian Chronicle also enables a different interpretation.

In 1214, Andrew II sent a letter to Innocent III. Andrew II started by informing the Pope about the situation in Galicia, especially the request of the local boyars for the placing of Koloman in Galicia. They had to recognize the union of Koloman with the Holy See, but also wanted to retain their own Orthodox rite. For this reason, the Archbishop of Esztergom was more appropriate than the Papal Legate, whose presence in Galicia could bring problems in this area. Therefore, he asked permission for the Archbishop of Esztergom to anoint (inungat) Koloman as King of Galicia. We have no mention of Salomea here or of the agreement with Leszek, so it is probable that Andrew II already formulated the content of the letter before the meeting in Scepusia. A second letter from Andrew

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58 Unwillingness to conclude such a morganatic union from the side of Hungary appeared a few years later, when the royal parents did not want their daughter Kinga to marry the Boleslaw the Shy son of Leszek the White. It happened only because of the intervention of Salomea.

59 HOMZA, Vzťahy Spiša a Malopoľska, ref. 3, p. 94.

60 According to our interpretation, Salomea may already have been in Galicia with Koloman.

61 HARDI, ref. 4, p. 134.

62 The Hustynian Chronicle states that King Andrew II departed from Galicia, leaving only Koloman and a small retinue. Leszek placed Daniel in Vladimir against the will of Hungary. It does not mention either Vasilko or Alexander of Belz. See: Latopis hustyński, p. 182.

63 The Galician-Volynian Chronicle mentions the voivode Pakoslav as the initiator of the expedition against Alexander of Belz, after which he placed Daniel and Vasilko on the throne of Vladimir. See: GVCH, p. 24. However, in the part where the chronicle describes the division of spheres of influence in Galicia after the meeting in Scepusia, it states that Andrew II gave Lubaczów precisely to the voivode Pakoslav with the justification that Pakoslav is a friend of Roman’s widow and sons. See: GVCH, p. 24. In relation to this, we do not suppose that Polish support for Daniel and Vasilko would have been a cause of the later dispute between Hungary and Little Poland.

64 THEINER 1, nr. 1, p.1-2. See also: RRSA 1, nr. 294, p. 96.

65 THEINER 1, nr. 1, p. 1.

II to Innocent III from 1215 gives us more information. The first positive fact we notice in this document is that Koloman had been crowned as King of Galicia. Andrew II thanked Innocent III for permission to perform this act ("coronado filio nostro in regem Galicie"). Andrew II wrote further about the fate of Koloman in Galicia. The people of Galicia violated their oath of allegiance to the new king and besieged the castle where Koloman and his retinue were living. Therefore, he urgently needed help. In the further text, he explained that because of these problems, he had not adequately fulfilled ("non solum honorandi") his mission of bringing Ruthenian bishops to the Fourth Lateran Council, although he was making an effort to fulfil this obligation ("onus transmictendi ad consilium episcopos Ruthenorum"). The letter gives the additional interesting information that Andrew II asked the Pope to send a legate to Leszek. He reminded the Pope that Leszek’s daughter Salomea was married to his son Koloman ("filii nostri et filie sue matrimonio contractum"), and so he was asking Leszek for help with the defence of Galicia. Finally, he asked Innocent III to send with his legate a gold crown for King Koloman, which would strengthen his position in relation to the neighbours.

A letter of Honorius III from 1222 informs us for the first time about the coronation by the Archbishop of Esztergom with the blessing of the Holy See (Strigoniensem archiepiscopum auctoritate Sedis Apostolice coronato in rege). The coronation of Koloman is also mentioned in a letter from Andrew II to Magister Demeter from the Aba family, the chief royal dapifer (one of the officers who administers kitchen utensils) at Koloman’s court. Andrew II richly rewarded him in 1234 and recalled his service since the time of Koloman’s childhood. On this occasion, he also mentioned Koloman’s ceremonial anointing and coronation as King of Galicia with the blessing of the Holy See.

J. Długosz also mentioned these events. He wrote that Koloman was anointed and crowned as King of Galicia by the Bishop of Krakow Vincent Kadlubek, together with the chancellor Ivon and other bishops. Salomea was crowned at the same time. In a critical analysis of Długosz’s work, G. Labuda wrote that Koloman was certainly not crowned by Vincent Kadlubek, but by the Archbishop of Esztergom John, although it is more than probable that the Bishop of Krakow assisted with the act of coronation. However, he did not think that Salomea was crowned because she was still too young. Długosz did not have to observe this because he regarded her as Leszek’s sister. On the other hand, the

68 MPV 3, nr. 3, p. 2.
70 CDAC 6, nr. 345, p. 546.
71 J. Długosz dated these events to 1208. Annales 5-6, p. 204. In the same place he wrote about the attack of Mstislav on Galicia, after which Koloman allegedly fled with Kadlubek and Ivon. He also dated the marriage of Koloman and Salomea to this time. Annales 5-6, p. 205.
72 LABUDA, ref. 43, p. 54. Most recently, R. Grzesik has agreed with G. Labuda’s view. See: GRZESIK, ref. 10, p. 92.
73 LABUDA, ref. 43, p. 54-55.
possible presence of the Bishop of Krakow Vincent Kadlubek at Koloman’s coronation supports the hypothesis of the possible coronation of Salomea. The present of the Bishop of Krakow is more understandable at the coronation of Salomea of Krakow, than at the crowning of the Hungarian Koloman alone.

It is not simple to reconstruct events on the basis of the sources cited above.74 The fact that soon after the occupation of Galicia, Koloman was crowned king of this territory granted to him by the Scepusian agreement, is shown most clearly. There were probably two coronation ceremonies. The first was probably done with a crown from Hungary. We can date it to the period between the Scepusian meeting and the writing of the above cited letter from 1215, which already mentions Koloman as a king. At the second they probably used the crown from the Pope, according to a letter from 1234 (“ex indulgencia sedis apostolicae dyademate... coronari”).75 M. Font stated that it happened while Innocent III was still Pope, that is not later than 16th July 1216. She placed the coronation in Galicia.76 U. Kállay distinguished between the anointing and the coronation. He dated the anointing of Koloman to 1215 and the coronation to the turn of the years 1215 and 1216. He placed the coronation in Hungary.77 Based on the sources he studied, Kállay correctly observed that there were two acts of coronation, but it remains to us to add that to distinguish between anointing (inungō) and coronation (corōnātiō) is not adequate, because both acts were part of the one ceremony.78

B. Włodarski thought that the coronation definitely occurred in the territory of Hungary,79 probably thinking of Esztergom, the archbishop’s see. N. Procházková also placed the coronation of Koloman in Hungary.80 These works argued mainly from later events, especially the uprising of the boyars against Koloman (see the letter from 1215) and his alleged departure to Hungary. However, G. Labuda refuted this theory with the statement that the coronation of Koloman as King of Galicia outside the territory of Galicia would have lost its meaning.81 He pointed to the letter of Andrew II to Innocent III from 1215, where the part asking the Pope to send a gold crown explained that a crown from the Pope would provide Koloman with greater stability in relation to his neighbours. In this light, a coronation in Esztergom appears to be meaningless.

However, reconstruction of the life of Salomea is more complicated, because mentions of her in the sources are weak in comparison with those of Koloman. The date of her departure from Krakow to be with Koloman and the question of her possible coronation as Queen of Galicia appear to be problematic. The majority of works on Salomea agree

74 Ď. Hardi worked out a complete review of the basic literature on the given events. See: HARDI, ref. 4, p. 133-141.
75 CDAC 6, nr. 345, p. 546.
76 FONT, II András, ref. 3, p. 126-127.
77 KÁLLAY, Ubil. Mikor koronázták meg Kálmánt Halics felkent királyát a pápától küldött koronával? (When was Koloman crowned King of Galicia with a crown sent by the Pope?) In Századok, 1903, 38, no. 7, p. 672-673.
78 I thank R. Marsina and J. Lukačka for clarification of these matters.
79 WŁODARSKI, ref. 19, p. 58.
80 PROCHÁZKOVÁ, Postavenie halickeho, ref. 3, p. 67.
81 LABUDA, ref. 43, p. 54.
that she was not sent to the Hungarian court or to Koloman in Galicia after the Scepusian meeting and neither to her coronation. As a representative study holding this view, we have taken the work of B. Włodarski, who is cited by the majority of other authors. We can summarize his arguments into three points. 1. Salomea was too young to be sent away from her native Krakow. 2. Leszek initially did not intend to observe the conditions of the Scepusian agreement, so at first he did not intend to send Salomea to Koloman. 3. Salomea was not crowned, among other things, especially because we do not have any document describing her as regina. We can react to the first objection with the question of whether the six year old Koloman was not too young to be sent to Galicia, since the atmosphere there was anything but safe and peaceful. Was St. Elizabeth, daughter of Andrew II too young, when she was sent to Thuringia at the age of four? M. Michalski most recently cast doubt on Włodarski’s argument. He stated that the practice of sending small girls to the courts of their future husbands was usual in this period, mentioning the case of St. Kinga, as well as St. Elizabeth.

Concerning the second objection, it is necessary to consider the character of the Scepusian agreement. As we already mentioned above, it was not advantageous for Leszek from the geopolitical point of view. However, the fact that Leszek strengthened his line with royal blood, was a permanent success for him. Apart from this, our findings up to now show that it was actually Andrew II, who first violated the conditions of the agreement. Cooperation between Andrew II and Leszek was a reality at least until the turn of the years 1215 and 1216. This is shown by a request of Andrew II for help from Leszek in a letter from 1215, which also reminds him of the marriage of Koloman and Salomea. Therefore, the first two objections concern Salomea’s presence with Koloman immediately after the meeting in Scepusia.

In connection with this problem, we cannot avoid the mention in the VSS, that Salomea was sent at the age of three to the Hungarian court, because of her engagement to Koloman. As we mentioned above, this passage was relevant for O. Balzer in connection with the dating of Salomea’s birth. This derives from the fact that if we recognize the birth of Salomea in 1211 or 1212, in the interest of consistency of argumentation, we would have to recognize her coming to Hungary or Galicia in 1214. It is appropriate to evaluate Włodarski’s argumentation in this sense. Since, in his view Salomea was at Leszek’s court in this period, he also leaves open her date of birth. On the other hand, in another place, he states that in 1214 Salomea was too young, by which he indirectly accepts Balzer’s dating or does not offer another possibility. Since he dates the coming

82 WŁODARSKI, ref. 27.
83 WŁODARSKI, ref. 27, p. 67-68.
84 WŁODARSKI, ref. 27, p. 71.
85 On St. Elizabeth see e.g.: KLANICZAY, ref. 3, p. 202-203.
86 MICHALSKI, ref. 2, p. 74.
87 FONT, II. András, ref. 3, p. 126.
88 VSS, p. 777.
89 WŁODARSKI, ref. 27, p. 65-68.
of Salomea to Hungary to the turn of the years 1218 and 1219, it would be appropriate, as M. Michalski observed, to also revise the dating of Salomea’s birth.90

For example, the solution of C. Niezgoda is inconsistent in this context. He accepted Balzer’s dating of her birth on one side, but he did not recognize her coming to Hungary in 1214,91 although both facts are based on one and the same passage in the VSS. Since the majority of more recent Polish literature has written similarly on this question, it is necessary to appreciate M. Michalski for noticing the inconsistence in such argumentation. In our view, Salomea was present with Koloman immediately after the meeting in Scepusia. With this, we continue the older historiography on the Blessed Salomea, as found in the works of O. Balzer92 and A. Karwacki.93 This enables us to consider further the possible coronation of Salomea. We know of no mention of Salomea’s coronation ceremony in the sources. However, since we suppose that she was in Galicia with Koloman in 1215, and the Bishop of Krakow Vincent Kadlubek assisted at the coronation of Koloman, the coronation of Salomea is not excluded.94 In contrast to the previous two, the third of Włodarski’s objections to be analysed by us is not only doubtful, but can be refuted on the basis of the sources. He wrote that the letters from the Pope, well-known for their accuracy, never called Salomea a queen. He referred to the bull of Gregory IX from 1234, where, according to Włodarski, the Pope does not call her queen, but only the wife of the king – *uxor Colomani regis*.95 However, when we abandon mechanical citing of the secondary literature and look at the cited letter, we find that it simply is not true. Salomea is mentioned in this letter as “*Salomee regine uxori Colomani regis*”.96 The fact that Salomea is mentioned in this

90 MICHALSKI, ref. 2, p. 74, note no. 174.
91 NIEZGODA, Między historią, tradycją, ref. 10, p. 234.
92 BALZER, ref. 49, p. 275.
94 The study by Attila Zsoldos of the coronations of the wives of kings from the house of Arpád is interesting in this context. The queens were mostly crowned by the bishop of Veszprém, and although we learn of this privilege only in 1216, when the bishop of Veszprém and the archbishop of Esztergom had a judicial dispute on this privilege, it is probable that this practice had existed for a long time, perhaps since the foundation of the bishopric. A further fact is interesting for our account. In 1215, the archbishop of Esztergom crowned the new wife of Andrew II, Jolanta, which led to the dispute with the bishop of Veszprém. See: ZSOLDOS, Attila. *Koruna a kráľovná: korunovácia arpádovských manželiek*. (Crown and Queen: the coronations of wives of the kings from the house of Arpád.), Slovak translation by D. Valachová. In *História*, 2004, 4, no. 5-6, p. 5-6. For us, this means that there is a real possibility that Salomea was crowned by the archbishop of Esztergom at the time he crowned Koloman in Galicia, or that it was done by another bishop in the retinue of the archbishop. We can be almost certain that this act was secondary in comparison with the coronation of Koloman and was not done with the blessing of the Holy See. However, it corresponded to the general position of the wives of the kings from the house of Arpád in the power-political system of Hungary. This would also explain the lack of mentions of the coronation of Salomea in the sources. As A. Zsoldos mentioned, the wives of the kings from the house of Arpád were crowned from early times by the bishop of Veszprém, although our first mention of this dates from 1216.
95 WŁODARSKI, ref. 27, p. 71.
letter as a *regina* is a strong argument for the view that she had probably been crowned. We should mention one of the few experts, who supports the coronation of Salomea. M. Font claimed that Salomea was crowned, but only in 1219. She places the coming of Salomea to Galicia in the same year. However, in a later study, she stated that Salomea was crowned at the same time as Koloman. In our opinion, it happened at Koloman’s first coronation, because Salomea’s coronation was less important in comparison with Koloman’s, and did not require the consent of the Holy See. We know from the cited letter from Andrew II to Innocent III that after his first coronation, the domestic boyars, apparently from the anti-Hungarian faction, rebelled against Koloman. Andrew II came to help and asked for assistance from Koloman’s father in law Leszek. The sources do not say whether Leszek actually gave help. According to Włodarski, Andrew II took Koloman with him back to Hungary in 1215 and left the voivode Benedict in Galicia. For this reason, he places Koloman’s coronation in Hungary. U. Kállay and N. Procházková argue similarly. On the other hand, M. Font and Gy. Kristó think that Koloman was in Galicia without interruption up to 1219. This view is also more acceptable for us, since the Hungarian – Polish alliance still continued in 1215, and Andrew II was waiting for the coronation of Koloman with the golden crown from Rome. M. Font dates the beginnings of the interruption of the Hungarian – Polish alliance to the turn of the years 1215 – 1216. It was manifested by Leszek being deprived of the west Galician territory granted by the Scepusian agreement. This was caused, according to our view, by the increased power of Andrew II, who was receiving support from the Holy See for his ambitions in Galicia at this time.

Since Rome recognized Koloman as the legal King of Galicia, Andrew II considered it legitimate to deprive Leszek of Przemyśl and Lubaczów. The *Galician-Volynian Chronicle* states that Leszek then made an alliance with Mstislav Mstislavovič (Mstislav Udalyj) of Novgorod and organized an expedition against Galicia. Benedict and the boyar Sudislav fled to Hungary. The problem lies in the dating of Mstislav’s expedition.

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97 FONT, II. András, ref. 3, p. 128.
99 WŁODARSKI, ref. 19, p. 60. In this work, the author thinks that Leszek did not give help to Andrew II in Galicia, but admits that we cannot express an unambiguous conclusion on this. However, in later studies on Salomea he already stated that Leszek’s failure to provide assistance to Andrew II was a violation of the Scepusian agreement. See: WŁODARSKI, ref. 27, p. 69. In this interpretation, therefore, Leszek was the first to break the agreement from 1214, which supports Włodarski’s argument that Leszek did not intend to observe the conditions of the Scepusian agreement from the beginning. In our view, we do not have evidence for such a claim, as was recognized by Włodarski in his earlier works (see the beginning of this note), and we regard Andrew II as the first to break the agreement from 1214, by depriving Leszek of the territories of Przemyśl and Lubaczów granted to him by the Scepusian agreement.
100 WŁODARSKI, ref. 19, p. 60-61.
101 KÁLLAY, ref. 77, p. 673. PROCHÁZKOVÁ, Postavenie haličského, ref. 3, p. 67.
103 FONT, II. András, ref. 3, p. 126, see also GVHC, p. 24.
104 GVHC, p. 24.
M. Font and Gy. Kristó date it to 1219, B. Włodarski to 1216, and D. Dąbrowski to 1217. We cannot solve this problem in the given state of our knowledge, but in our view, the alliance between Leszek and Mstislav was a natural defensive reaction to the violation of the Scepusian agreement by Andrew II. The fact that Salomea was with Koloman may also have influenced the defensive reaction of Leszek. However, his situation got worse, when he also lost the territory between the rivers Wieprz and Bug, called “Ukraine” by the Galician-Volynian Chronicle. It was taken by his former ally Daniel, who made an alliance with another former ally of Leszek, Mstislav by means of marriage with his daughter Anna. Leszek attempted to reconquer this territory, but the expedition ended in fiasco. This unfavourable geopolitical situation, but certainly also the presence of Salomea with Koloman, stimulated Leszek to renew talks on cooperation with Hungary. Apart from this, Leszek also had internal political problems. He was in conflict with Vladislav Spindleshanks, and he also came into conflict with the voivode Pakoslav, who was removed from his function and replaced by Marek from the Gryfits family. Thus, Leszek gradually became inclined again to cooperation with Hungary, and the fact that Salomea was with Koloman certainly played a role in this, apart from the geopolitical reasons.

However, Andrew II could not concentrate on Galicia at this time, because he was preparing for a crusade, which actually happened in 1217. He appointed John Archbishop of Esztergom as his representative. The letter from Honorius III from 1217, confirming the hereditary claims of Andrew’s sons, is also interesting for us. Béla was confirmed as Andrew’s heir, but for us it is interesting that Koloman’s claim to Galicia was confirmed by Honorius III. Andrew’s expedition did not achieve its aim. The King of Hungary devoted more attention to other activities such as collecting holy relics, than to his military duties. However, we can identify as an important political success, the engagement of his eldest son Béla to Maria, daughter of Theodore Laskaris Emperor of Nikaia, agreed during the return from the expedition. When he returned from the crusade, Andrew II found his country in a chaotic state. The Hungarian nobles had not

105 Ref. 102.
106 WŁODARSKI, ref. 19, p. 62-63.
107 DĄBROWSKI, ref. 16, p. 70-71.
108 Ref. 107. The author dates this alliance to 1217. The Galician-Volynian Chronicle specifies the territory gained by Daniel. See: GVCH, p. 25. B. Włodarski situated “Ukraine” from the Galician-Volynian Chronicle between the rivers Wieprz and Bug. See: WŁODARSKI, ref. 27, p. 69. In the original Slovak version the river Dniepr has mistakenly been substituted for the river Wieprz.
109 GVCH, p. 25.
111 On the crusade see: e.g. Kniha kráľov, ref. 21, p. 114-115.
113 THEINER 1, nr. 6, p.5. See also: SSRA, nr. 313, p. 102.
114 Chronicon Posoniense, ref. 21, p. 42.
115 Kniha kráľov, ref. 21, p. 113.
respected Archbishop John of Esztergom, they had driven him out of the country and appropriated all the royal property.\textsuperscript{116}

Meanwhile, Mstislav had undertaken his already mentioned expedition against Koloman in Galicia. Without regard for the date, we suppose that sometime between 1216 and 1219, after his second coronation, Koloman and Salomea were expelled from Galicia and returned to Hungary. In 1218 or 1219, Leszek expressed his willingness to cooperate with Hungary. He did this through his envoy, who offered cooperation with Andrew II. Leszek gave up his claim to Galicia,\textsuperscript{117} including Przemyśl and Lubaczów. He was concerned with the return of the territories Daniel had taken from him.\textsuperscript{118} B. Włodarski places the coming of Salomea to Hungary at this time,\textsuperscript{119} which is a natural result of his conception, in which he states that Salomea was not sent to Hungary after the Scepusian meeting. C. Niezgoda even states that Andrew II demanded that Salomea should come to Hungary, and this happened only after Leszek agreed.\textsuperscript{120} It is a pity he does not cite a source, since such an interpretation appears to be inadequate to us.

In autumn 1219, there was a great Hungarian – Polish expedition to Galicia under the leadership of ban File. A coalition of Ruthenian princes, specifically Daniel, Mstislav Mstislavovič and Alexander of Belz, initially defended Galicia, but they had to retreat before the superior force and Koloman was successfully put back on the throne of Galicia.\textsuperscript{121} However, Leszek did not succeed in regaining the part of “Ukraine“ taken by Daniel, either then or in a second attempt in 1221.\textsuperscript{122} Mstislav invaded Galicia in 1221 with the support of other Ruthenian princes and the Polovzan.\textsuperscript{123} Therefore, Leszek attacked Daniel, who was in the Principality of Vladimir, to prevent him joining forces with his father in law Mstislav Mstislavovič. Ban File prepared for the military encounter, so he put Koloman and Salomea in the church of the Most Holy Virgin Mary in Halicz’ Castle, which he fortified for this purpose. However, ban File together with the Hungarian and Polish armies were defeated in the battle with Mstislav. File himself was captured, but thanks to the boyar Žiroslav, he was able to escape. The remaining Hungarians retreated to the fortified church of the Most Holy Virgin Mary. Meanwhile, Mstislav’s forces took their horses. Imprisoned in the castle, they defended themselves by throwing stones at the inhabitants of the town, but after a time they had to surrender because of lack of water.\textsuperscript{124} According to Długosz, Mstislav then imprisoned Koloman and Salomea in Torczesk Castle and ordered that they be carefully guarded. Then Mstislav occupied Galicia.\textsuperscript{125} It is necessary to emphasize here that at this time Salomea was aged ten and Koloman

\textsuperscript{116} Ref. 112, p. 228.
\textsuperscript{117} GVCH, p. 25.
\textsuperscript{118} WŁODARSKI, ref. 19, p. 66-67. The Galician–Volynian Chronicle does not speak directly about this condition from Leszek, but B. Włodarski suggests it from the course of the further events.
\textsuperscript{119} WŁODARSKI, ref. 27, p. 70.
\textsuperscript{120} NIEZGODA, Między historią, tradycją, ref. 10, p. 237.
\textsuperscript{121} WŁODARSKI, ref. 19, p. 67.
\textsuperscript{122} SZCZUR, ref. 32, p. 261.
\textsuperscript{123} WŁODARSKI, ref. 27, p. 70.
\textsuperscript{124} GVCH, p. 27.
\textsuperscript{125} Annales 5-6, p. 209. J. Długosz places this under the year 1209.
was thirteen. Honorius III’s letter from 1222 tells us about these events. It confirms that Salomea also participated in the events described above. The Pope wrote to Andrew II that King (Koloman – K. H.), his wife (Salomea – K. H.) and many other noblemen had suffered an unhappy fate and were threatened by Andrew’s enemies.\(^{126}\)

As a result of the complicated internal political situation, Andrew II could not intervene militarily in defence of the royal couple. He had to negotiate with Mstislav, who could set the conditions because he had valuable prisoners in his hands. J. Długosz wrote about this agreement,\(^{127}\) but mentioned different conditions from those agreed in reality.\(^{128}\) The only reliable, although indirect, source is the already cited letter from Honorius III to Andrew II from 27\(^{th}\) January 1222. The conditions of the agreement were as follows: Mstislav’s daughter Maria would marry the third son of Andrew II, also called Andrew, Koloman would give up the title King of Galicia in return for his freedom, and after the death of Mstislav, Prince Andrew would rule Galicia.\(^{129}\) The royal dignity would be transferred from Koloman to him, and he would have his temporary seat in Przemyśl. In the circumstances of the moment, the agreement was advantageous to Andrew II. The release of Koloman and Salomea would be an immediate success and after Mstislav’s death, a son of Andrew would rule Galicia. However, after Andrew II achieved the return of his son and daughter in law to Hungary, he started activities aimed at cancelling this agreement. Honorius III’s above-cited letter was a reply to Andrew’s request to cancel the agreement with Mstislav. Honorius III cancelled the part of the agreement speaking of the transfer of the royal dignity from Koloman to Andrew with the argument that the question of coronation lay within the power of the Papacy and so the first agreement was valid. On the question of the marriage of Prince Andrew and Maria, Honorius III did not want to issue a decision because the couple were still too young.\(^{130}\) The introductory passage of this letter, where Honorius III calls the union of Koloman and Salomea *matrimonium*, is interesting to us.\(^{131}\) The same term was also used in this context in the above-cited letter of 1215 from Andrew II to Innocent III. It is probable that, since the couple were children, the marriage concluded in 1214 was only an engagement (*sponsalia pro futuro*), but the sources only use the expression *matrimonium*. Koloman and Salomea were released from imprisonment in Galicia only thanks to the prudent diplomacy of Andrew II, whose agreement with Mstislav enabled their return to Hungary. Koloman retained the title *rex Galicie*, but to the end of his life he never returned to Galicia. However, apart from further events such as Koloman’s relations with his younger brother Andrew, the hagiographic sources, especially the *Hungarian-Polish*
Historický časopis, 55, Supplement, 2007

The Hungarian Polish Chronicle is not analysed in our study because of the complexity of the problem (see note 216), but the VSS is a basic source about the person of Salomea, so it is necessary to devote attention to it.

The majority of literature on Salomea – especially the most recent – agree on a negative evaluation of the VSS, as a result of the factual errors found in it. Especially the following part is pointed out: “Then when King Andrew of Hungary died, Koloman and his above mentioned brother Béla divided the kingdom as follows: Béla received the Kingdom of Hungary after his father, while Koloman gained the Kingdom of Galicia in the Ruthenian territories and ruled there together with the Blessed Salomea, for 25 years, until he departed to the Lord.”

We immediately observe here several clear contradictions of the known facts of the 13th century. We know that Salomea was in Galicia in the period from 1214/1215 to 1221, and not for twenty-five years. We also know that she was in Galicia during the life of Andrew II and not after his death. We do not think that Stanislav, author of the VSS, would not have known about Salomea’s presence in Hungary, including its southern part. In our view, therefore, the placing of Salomea and Koloman in Galicia has a motive other than the factual. It is necessary to consider the fact that hagiographic works often do not describe a given person as she was, but more as she should have been, although we do not claim that hagiographic works are not relevant from the factual point of view. For Salomea to be described in the VSS in the most positive light, which was certainly the aim of the Franciscan Stanislav, it was appropriate to emphasize her position as a queen. This could explain the placing of Koloman and Salomea in Galicia. Salomea was after all Queen of Galicia – she had very probably actually been crowned and was certainly remembered by tradition as the Queen of Galicia. How would Salomea have appeared in the Life of Saint Salomea, Queen of Galicia (VSS) if she reigned in Hungary? The cited passage in the VSS legitimizes this tradition by placing Koloman and Salomea in Galicia. In our view, this is more deliberate than mistaken.

Now let us attempt to deal with the chronological information of twenty-five years. It is necessary to take it seriously, because in the context of the whole VSS it is not so imprecise as it might appear at first sight. J. Wyrozumski derives interesting conclusions


133 VSS, p. 779.

134 We also find a very similar structure of story telling in the Hungarian-Polish Chronicle. According to it, after the death of King Béla, his sons divided his territories so that Ladislav ruled in Galicia and Salomon in the Slavonic territories of Hungary. See: Chronica Hungaro-Polonica, ref. 132, p. 67-69. In the VSS there was a similar division after the death of Andrew II, when Béla ruled in Hungary and Koloman in Galicia. If we interpret Ladislav from the Hungarian-Polish Chronicle as the historical Koloman (see ref. 216) and consider the fact that Stanislav, author of the VSS, could have consulted the chronicle while writing his work (Compare: GĄSIOROWSKA, ref. 8, p. 3), it is possible that the Hungarian-Polish Chronicle influenced the VSS.

135 In later sources she appears mostly as quondam regina – “former queen”. See: BALZER, ref. 49, p. 276.
from the information that Salomea and Koloman ruled in Galicia for twenty-five years. Naturally, he admits that this passage from the VSS does not correspond to the facts of the 13th century, but he considers it trustworthy, if it is understood as the duration of the marriage of Salomea and Koloman.\footnote{WYROZUMSKI, Jerzy. Salomea. In \textit{Polski słownik biograficzny}, zeszyt 34, 1993. Kraków : Polska Akademia Umiejętności, 1993, p. 366.} Since Koloman died in 1241, it appears to him that the marriage could have been concluded in 1217.\footnote{Ref. 136.} Although we understand that Wyrozumski did not count one of the years, either 1241 or 1217, we could also come to the conclusion that it was 1216, but this is not very significant here.\footnote{Apart from this, the year 1217 is not probable. We do not think that Salomea would have married Koloman while Andrew II was on the crusade.} To Wyrozumski, this consideration probably means shifting the coming of Salomea to Koloman to the period after 1214. J. Wyrozumski combines the empirical information of Koloman’s death in 1241 with the statement in the VSS that Koloman and Salomea ruled in Galicia for twenty-five years. However, if we start only from what is written in the VSS itself, we come to a different interpretation. The VSS is placed in a sort of chronological vacuum. The first year to be unambiguously designated is the date of the beginning of the illness of Salomea in 1268, which lasted a week before Salomea died.\footnote{VSS, p. 779-780.} We take the year 1268 as the starting point for our calculations because it is the only positively identified chronological fact in the VSS. Another known fact is that after the death of Koloman and the departure of Salomea to Poland, she lived a chaste life for twenty-eight years, founded monasteries and so on.\footnote{Ref. 139, p. 779.} If we subtract 28 years from 1268 we get the year 1240. From this year, we can subtract 25 years, in spite of the fact that Koloman was still alive in 1240 so that it does not correspond to the facts, and we get the year 1215. Thus, we come exactly to the year of Koloman and Salomea’s first coronation by John Archbishop of Esztergom, and so the supposed date of the coming of Salomea to Koloman not long after the Scepusian meeting.

Koloman and Salomea returned to Hungary in 1221. They settled in Scepusia and from 1226 their sphere of influence was widened to the southern part of Hungary. In spite of the undoubtedly interesting circumstances concerning the situation of the royal couple, we will not consider them now, because the historian N. Procházková has done it in detail and convincingly.\footnote{PROCHÁZKOVÁ, Koloman Haličský, ref. 3, p. 243-249. PROCHÁZKOVÁ, Postavenie haličského, ref. 3, p. 69-73.} However, it is worth mentioning in this context that with the exception of R. Grzesik,\footnote{GRZESIK, R. \textit{Błogosławiona Salomea – pierwsza klaryska polska. Życie między polityką a religią w 13 w.} (The Blessed Salomea – the first Polish Clarist. Life between politics and religion in the 13th century). Manuscript, p. 2. I thank M. Homza for providing the manuscript.} the Polish biographies of Salomea ignore her activity in Scepusia. At the same time, Scepusia as a frontier territory near Galicia was an entirely logical place of residence for Koloman and Salomea, who had not given up the ambition...
to rule Galicia. M. Homza also supposes the influence of Koloman in Scepusia until his death. A letter written by Queen Elizabeth widow of Stephen V in 1279 speaks clearly of this. It mentions that Koloman held the land of Scepusia for as long as he lived. Andrew II did not give up his ambitions in Galicia, but after the marriage between his son Andrew and Maria daughter of Mstislav Mstislavović in accordance with the agreements from 1221, he pursued them more through Andrew and at the expense of the legal King of Galicia Koloman. In 1226, Andrew II redistributed the fiefs of his sons. The eldest Béla was deprived of Slavonia and given Transylvania. The youngest son Andrew waited in Przemyśl for a chance to occupy Galicia. Koloman and Salomea were placed in Béla’s former domain in southern Hungary – Slavonia; apparently with the aim of turning his attention away from Galicia. The activity of Koloman and Salomea in southern Hungary was characterized especially by the struggle against heretical movements. The fact that Koloman was extraordinarily active in this field is shown especially by his rich correspondence with the Pope, in which Koloman is often praised for his success and zeal in this question, in one case also jointly with Salomea.

143 Apart from this connection, N. Procházková also analyses the family connotations, which probably influenced the placing of Koloman and Salomea in Scepusia. For more details see: PROCHÁZKOVÁ, Koloman Haličský, ref. 3, p. 245.

144 HOMZA, Martin. Svätá Kunigunda a Spiš. (Saint Kunigunda and Spiš). In Terra Scepusiensis, ref. 3, p. 383.

145 FEJÉR, Georgius (ed.). Codex diplomaticus Hungariae V/2. Budae 1840, p. 582.

146 GVCH, p. 31. The Hustynian Chronicle contains a mistake here, since he replaces Andrew with Béla, who is said to have got engaged to Maria in 1225 and was supposed to marry her the next year. See: Latopis hustynski, p. 187.

147 PROCHÁZKOVÁ, Koloman Haličský, ref. 3, p. 247. We know that he initially wanted to revise the agreements with Mstislav in Koloman’s favour, but only did so when the Pope confirmed Koloman’s title as king.

148 This was preceded by a conflict with his father Andrew II because of Andrew’s second wife Jolanta and an ill-considered grant policy. Béla found refuge in Austria in 1223 because of the conflict with his father, but they were reconciled through the intervention of Pope Honorius III. See: Kniha kráľov, ref. 21, p. 118. A. Karwacki mentions a dispute with his wife Maria as one of the reasons for Béla’s departure to Austria. He further writes that Salomea contributed to the reconciliation between Béla and Maria. See: KARWACKI, ref. 93, p. 32-34. C. Niezgoda mentions the same developments. See: NIEZGODA, Błogosławiona Salomea, ref. 10, p. 92-93. We do not know the source of A. Karwacki’s information on Salomea’s “peace-making function” in settling the disputes between Béla and Maria. It cannot be excluded that it was invented by the author in an effort to present Salomea in the most positive light.

149 For further details on Hungarian – Galician relations in this period and the question of the placing of Andrew on the throne of Galicia see e.g.: KRISTÓ, ref. 102, p. 197-198 and GRZESIK, R. Książę węgierski żonaty z córką Mścisława halickiego. (A Hungarian Prince married to a daughter of Mstislav of Galicia). In Kwartalnik Historiczny, 1995, 102, no. 3-4, p. 31.

150 According to N. Procházková his influence in the south of the Kingdom of Hungary extended over the Principality of Slavonia-Croatia-Dalmatia and over Bosnia. PROCHÁZKOVÁ, Koloman Haličský, ref. 3, p. 249.

151 Ref. 150, p. 247. On the redistribution of fiefs in 1226 see: KRISTÓ, ref. 102, p. 190-191.

152 We will not devote detailed attention to this problem in our research for reasons of space. It is an important area, but in relation to the large number of letters between Koloman and the Pope and the complexity of the problem, an independent study should be devoted to this theme. Therefore, we refer to the studies, which have considered this theme: PROCHÁZKOVÁ, Postavenie haličského, ref. 3, p. 70-75. KARWACKI, ref. 93, p. 37-42.
We can observe sources of latent conflicts in the family of Andrew II. The eldest son of Andrew II, Béla already came into conflict with his father in the first half of the 1220s. Apart from the ill-considered grant policy, he criticized his father’s remarriage to Jolanta. According to the VSS Salomea also had ideas on way of life different to those of Jolanta. Over time, Béla became ever more critical of the ill-considered policy of Andrew II and gradually endeavoured to gain a position of independent power, for example, he revised some of the grants of his father.

Koloman’s court also had reasons for a confrontational relationship with Andrew II. The King of Hungary gave his son Andrew, who lived at Przemyśl, priority over Koloman where ambitions to rule Galicia were concerned. This made Koloman, the official King of Galicia, and his younger brother Andrew natural competitors. N. Procházková supposes warm relations between Béla and Koloman, but her arguments are unsatisfactory. The fact that Béla was also interested in Galicia, a region neighbouring Transylvania, is not consistent with good relations with Koloman.

In 1227, a Hungarian – Polish expedition to Galicia aimed to place Andrew there. It ended like most of its predecessors with the defeat of the Hungarians. Mstislav wanted to hand over power in Galicia to Daniel son of Roman, but the Galician boyars Gleb Zeremejevič and Sudislav persuaded him to hand over Galicia to Andrew, pointing to his weakness in comparison with Daniel. Mstislav listened to their advice, and so Andrew received Galicia after six years of waiting (since 1222). However, after the death of Mstislav in 1228, Daniel took Galicia from Andrew in 1230. Next to Andrew, Daniel was the most important claimant of the throne of Galicia.

In 1230, Béla undertook a campaign in Galicia to restore Andrew to power, but it was unsuccessful. Andrew came to rule Galicia again as a result of a successful campaign in 1231 by Andrew II with his sons Béla and Andrew. Andrew had to fight Daniel from 1233 and he died at the beginning of 1234. The fact that Koloman was the only son of Andrew II not to participate in these campaigns and that Andrew attempted to solve his unfavourable situation by attacking his brother Koloman in Slavonia supports our thesis of confrontational relations between Koloman and his father and brothers. This was

153 Kniha kráľov, ref. 21, p. 112. On the marriage with Jolanta and the international political connections of this union (it was concluded before the crusade) see: KRISTÓ, ref. 102, p. 177-178.
154 The VSS states that Jolanta invited Salomea to worldly entertainments. Salomea resisted, especially when this involved contact with men. See: VSS, p. 778-779.
155 Ref. 112, p. 228.
156 She takes this view on the basis of the fact that Béla and Koloman addressed each other as charissimus frater noster (our dearest brother), which did not occur in relation to the other siblings. See: PROCHÁZKOVÁ, Postavenie haličského, ref. 3, p. 71. However, this argument is not really satisfactory, because mutual enemies also addressed each other like this.
157 FONT, II. András, ref. 3, p. 131.
158 GVCH, p. 32.
159 FONT, Ungarn, Polen, ref. 3, p. 30.
160 FONT, II. András, ref. 3, p. 131-132.
161 KRISTÓ, ref. 102, p. 198.
162 PROCHÁZKOVÁ, Koloman Halický, ref. 3, p. 247. The author cites a reliable source for Andrew’s attack on Koloman’s Slavonia.
naturally caused by the unfulfilled Galician ambitions. The death of his brother Andrew may have encouraged Koloman’s ambitions to achieve the content of his kingly title. N. Procházková already observed that after the death of Andrew, there was a warming of relations between Andrew II and Koloman, as is shown by the already cited grant to Koloman’s officer who administers kitchen utensils at his court (dapifer) Magister Demeter from the Aba family. 163 D. Hardi supposes that Koloman was no longer interested in Galicia, because he was fully occupied with the struggle against heresy in the Balkans, while unpleasant memories from childhood of the problems associated with his stay in Galicia, further dissuaded him from this aim. 164

In our opinion, this is an over-simplified view. Since Koloman still appears in documents as King of the Ruthenians 165 and his sphere of influence included Scepusia, which bordered on Galicia, we should suppose that he was still interested in Galicia. In our view, the Hungarian-Polish Chronicle originated at Koloman’s court in precisely this period, with the aim of legalizing his Galician ambitions. 166 However, we also observe a strong Hungarian-Polish dimension at Koloman’s court. The cooperation of Koloman with Grzymisława and Henry the Bearded was a very clear reflection of Salomea’s influence. It is necessary to direct our attention to the situation in Poland. Leszek the White’s long awaited male heir Bolesław, who went down in history as the the Shy (Pudicus), was born in 1226. 167 However Leszek was killed in 1227 during disturbances following a parliament at Gąsawa. 168 Struggles over the throne of Krakow broke out after his death. Grzymisława fulfilled her “widow’s task” of securing the throne for Bolesław. It is necessary to emphasize that her task was not easy, because she found herself “between the millstones” of the Polish princes. At the same time, we must add that Grzymisława proved to be an able politician and diplomat. Events in Poland in the period 1227 – 1233 have still not come into our research, so we refer to S. Zachorowski 169 and especially B. Zientara. 170 Grzymisława finally succeeded in gaining the support of Henry the Bearded. However, in 1233 Konrad of Mazovia exploited the absence of Henry the Bearded, who was fighting Vladislav the son of Odon (Odonic) in Great Poland. Konrad captured Grzymisława and the young Bolesław and imprisoned them in Mazovia. Clement of Ruszczaka from the Gryfit family liberated them. 171 Clement and his associates would continue to defend the rights of Grzymisława and after 1241 also of Salomea.

The Pope began to intervene in these disputes. Gregory IX called on the Polish bishops to make peace between the princes and pointed especially to the involvement of Ruthe-

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163 PROCHÁZKOVÁ, Postavenie haličského, ref. 3, p. 73.
164 HARDI, ref. 4, p. 155.
165 PROCHÁZKOVÁ, Postavenie haličského, ref. 3, p. 73.
166 See ref. 216.
167 BALZER, ref. 49, p. 279-280.
168 BALZER, ref. 49, p. 264.
171 SZCZUR, ref. 32, p. 262.
nians and pagans in Polish affairs, mostly as allies of Konrad of Mazovia. Therefore he recommended that they seek support also in Rome. Gregory IX placed himself on the side of Henry the Bearded and so also of Grzymislawa and the young Boleslaw. The influence of the clergy on princely politics culminated at precisely this time. For example, a bishop had the right to excommunicate a prince for breaking an oath, and to intervene in economic affairs. In 1233, the Archbishop of Gniezno together with the bishops of Krakow and Wroclaw appealed to Konrad of Mazovia to release Grzymislawa and Boleslaw from prison. Gregory IX also took Grzymislawa under his protection and simultaneously appointing her Princess of Sandomierz. The interesting thing for us is that Koloman was also involved in these complex disputes. It is not especially necessary to emphasize that this was due to Salomea, the daughter of Grzymislawa. Koloman was authorized to order the return of territory belonging to Grzymislawa, apparently the Sandomierz region, while Henry the Bearded was ordered to defend the interests of Grzymislawa against Konrad of Mazovia and his son Boleslaw. We know that at the end of 1233, Pope Gregory IX asked Koloman to intervene in favour of Grzymislawa, who was already under the protection of the Papacy. Good relations with the Holy See were characteristic of Koloman’s rule. Koloman was involved in the Papal policy in Poland precisely because of the efforts of Salomea, but this also applied in reverse. Salomea certainly had an interest in her mother Grzymislawa, who found herself “between the mill stones” of the Polish princes after the death of Leszek the White. Therefore, we can suppose that she used her influence on Koloman so that he would use his good relations with Rome in favour of Grzymislawa. Salomea appears in the documentary material under her own name for the first time in 1234. The mention of Salomea in the bull from Gregory IX granting Koloman and Salomea exemption from an interdict in the Kingdom of Hungary at precisely this time is not accidental. In our view, it is a result of the preceding activity of Salomea. In Poland, the situation of Salomea’s mother Grzymislawa had been stabilized, and an agreement had been reached between Henry the Bearded and Konrad of Mazovia at Chelm. According to it Konrad withdrew from the Krakow and Sandomierz regions, while the Bearded assisted Konrad

172 ZACHOROWSKI, ref. 169, p. 27. At this time, Gregory IX was attempting to prevent the marriage of Polish women to Ruthenians, because their husbands were turning them away from Catholicism. See: PASZKIEWICZ, Henryk. Początki Rusi. (The beginnings of Ruthenia). Kraków : Nakładem Polskiej Akademii Umiejętności, 1996, p. 114.

173 BP 1, nr. 303, p. 64.
174 BP 1, nr. 301, p. 64.
175 BP 1, nr. 302, p. 64.
176 ZIENTARA, ref. 170, p. 310.
177 From the many Papal statements praising Koloman, let us mention at least, that in 1234 Gregory IX granted him the title „crusader for St. Peter”, for his contribution to the struggle against heresy. See: Smičiklas 3, nr. 362, p. 417-418.
178 Smičiklas 3, nr. 360, p. 415-416.
179 In summer 1234, the Bosnian bishop John declared an interdict in Hungary. For more details see: KRISTÓ, ref. 102, p. 196.

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in his struggle with the Prussians. Grzymisława had a claim to Sandomierz, but after a time. Henry the Bearded relocated to Skala castle because of the continuing danger from Konrad. In general, we can state that the intervention of the Papacy, to which Salomea and Koloman made a not insignificant contribution, bore fruit thereby stabilizing the unstable situation caused by the death of Leszek the White. This could be the reason why Salomea appeared in the bull from 1234. She does not appear in documents under her own name either before or for a long time after. The next document known to us, which mentions Salomea, after that from 1234, dates from 1252. It is interesting that Grzymisława also engaged in the affairs of Galicia. One of the explanations of her interest in Galicia may be the fact that Salomea had probably been crowned as Queen of Galicia and was called regina in the bull from 1234, while Koloman King of Galicia had only recently worked in her favour.

However, the central figure here is Daniel son of Roman. After the death of Andrew in 1234, the important candidate to rule Galicia Daniel again sought control of this territory. The Galician boyars did not support him, and they chose Michael of Czernigov as their candidate. Daniel’s former ally Konrad of Mazovia also supported Michael. When Daniel sought support for his plans, he actually turned to Grzymisława, mother in law of King Koloman of Galicia. It was Grzymisława and Boleslaw the Shy, who supported Daniel after 1234. We also know that Daniel received support from Hungary as well as from Grzymisława’s court.

We do not know whether Grzymisława mediated an agreement between Daniel and Koloman, certainly also with the participation of Béla, but if we trace the further developments this appears possible. Andrew II died in 1235 and his son Béla was crowned King of Hungary. The Bratislava Chronicle states that at Béla’s coronation, Daniel led the new king’s horse, while Koloman carried his brother’s sword. D. Hardi comments on this ceremony and notices especially the relationship of Daniel to Béla. In his view, Daniel leading the horse meant subordination, but also reconciliation and honour. N. Procházková interprets the division of tasks at the coronation as an indication that Koloman was superior to Daniel where Galicia was concerned, in spite of the fact that

182 For further details on Grzymisława and Boleslaw the Shy in 1234 – 1239, see: ŁODYNSKI, ref. 181, p. 1-34
183 RZYSZCZEWSKO, Leon and MUCZKOWSKI, Anton (eds.). Codex Diplomaticus Poloniae 1. Warszawa : Drukiem Stanisława Strąbskiego, 1847, nr. 45, s. 65-66.
184 Ref. 173, p. 166.
185 Ref. 184.
186 GVCH, p. 43.
187 Chronicum Posoniense, ref. 21, p. 42. The presence of Daniel at Béla’s coronation was also mentioned in the Hustynian Chronicle, which dates it to 1236. See: Latopis hustynśki, p. 190. H. Suszko interprets this event as meaning that Daniel was seeking the support of Béla IV for his political ambitions. Latopis hustynśki, p. 286, note no. 902.
188 HARDI, ref. 4, p. 156.
Béla IV supported Daniel in Galicia.\textsuperscript{189} It suggests the existence of an otherwise unknown, agreement between Béla, Koloman and Daniel. Grzymisława and Salomea could have played a mediating role here. Henry the Bearded died in 1238 and was followed in Krakow by his son Henry the Pious. He supported Grzymisława and Bolesław, who held the Sandomierz region.\textsuperscript{190} Meanwhile, an ambitious plan emerged for a marriage between Bolesław and Kinga, daughter of Béla IV. We know little about this key event. It certainly had mainly political motives with the aim of strengthening the position of Bolesław in Sandomierz and his prospects in Krakow.\textsuperscript{191} It is interesting that the \textit{Polish Annals} also reflect the birth of Kinga in 1234 and her coming to Poland in 1239.\textsuperscript{192} As R. Grzesik showed, the first event reflecting Hungarian-Polish relations in the 13\textsuperscript{th} century in the \textit{Polish Annals} is the death of St. Elizabeth of Hungary.\textsuperscript{193} According to the VSK, especially Salomea was involved here. She selected Kinga as a wife for her brother Bolesław. Salomea informed Grzymisława that she was secretly sending Kinga. Then she hid the five year old child in a chest and secretly sent her out of Hungary to her mother Grzymisława.\textsuperscript{194}

The VSK also informs us of the unusually large dowry of 40 thousand marcare of silver sent to Poland with Kinga, with the additional statement that her parents valued her more than the dowry.\textsuperscript{195} J. Długosz also provides information about these events. He mentions the members of the Kraków elite Clement of Klimuniów and the Palatine of Kraków John,\textsuperscript{196} who asked Béla for Kinga as a bride for Bolesław, and the role of Salomea in caring for Kinga.\textsuperscript{197} As we stated above, this union was mainly initiated by Grzymisława and her circle – Bishop Visław of Kraków and Bolesław’s courtiers.\textsuperscript{198} Apart from the legendary elements, namely the sending of the five-year old Kinga to Poland hidden in a cupboard and the unusually large dowry in silver, these sources interest us especially for their mentions of Salomea.

As a result of the close contacts of Salomea with Grzymisława, her participation in these events is truthful in our view. Salomea must have undertaken an important peace-making mission here. In a letter to Pope Innocent IV, Béla IV mentioned his daughters, two of them married to Ruthenian princes and one to a Polish prince, the latter being Kinga. He wrote that he arranged these marriages to gain new information about the Mongols (or Tartars), but he did not forget to mention that these unions humiliated his

\textsuperscript{189} PROCHÁZKOVÁ, Koloman Haličský, ref. 3, p. 247.
\textsuperscript{190} ZACHOROWSKI, ref. 169, p. 30.
\textsuperscript{191} ZACHOROWSKI, ref. 169, p. 31.
\textsuperscript{192} See the analysis in: GRZESIK, ref. 10, p. 41-42.
\textsuperscript{193} GRZESIK, ref. 10, p. 41.
\textsuperscript{194} VSK, p. 127.
\textsuperscript{195} VSK, p. 130-131. “Marca” is a Latin term for a particular monetary unit of account.
\textsuperscript{196} This is Clement of Ruszea. See: LABUDA, ref. 43, p. 134.
\textsuperscript{197} For more details about him see GRZESIK, ref. 10, p. 95.
\textsuperscript{198} Annales 5-6, p. 284-285.
\textsuperscript{199} HOMZA, ref. 144, p. 383. The author cites a reliable source on the role of Bishop Vislav and the barons of Little Poland.
In this context, A. Karwacki mentions especially Béla’s wife Maria, who was against the marriage of Kinga with Boleslaw. Maria, by origin from the imperial family, certainly did not like the departure of her daughter to the court of a mere prince. Especially Salomea must have been responsible for Béla and Maria agreeing on a morganatic marriage. We know of no other reason why Béla and Maria would agree to this morganatic union. More detailed research may bring further details about Salomea’s participation in this story. Let us add that Salomea’s spiritual formation probably happened in the Kingdom of Hungary. The VSS informs us about her asceticism during her life in Hungary. However, this information is more relevant to setting the topos of the medieval saintly woman.

However, the positive fact remains that at the time of Salomea’s life in Hungary, a new female spirituality was coming into fashion. It was represented by personalities such as St. Clare of Assisi, St. Agnes of Bohemia and in the Hungarian context especially St. Elizabeth of Hungary. Since an independent Franciscan province of Dalmatia existed in the southern part of the Kingdom of Hungary in 1235 and the presence of Franciscans fighting heresy in Bosnia is recorded at the same time, their influence on the later spiritual orientation of Salomea is possible. In this context, the VSS mentions the Franciscan Adalbert, who was responsible for the spiritual formation of Salomea in Hungary. It is interesting that Salomea’s confessor Adalbert appears as one of the witnesses of her

200 FEJÉR, Georgius (ed.). *Codex diplomaticus Hungariae IV/2*. Budae 1829, p. 220-221. Fejér’s dating of this letter to 1254 is probably not accurate. D. Dąbrowski dates the origin of the letter to the period 1248 – 1254. The author devotes detailed attention to the marriage of Constance daughter of Béla IV to Lev, son of Daniel of Galicia, which is mentioned in the letter. See: DĄBROWSKI, ref. 16, p. 111-114 and note 423.

201 KARWACKI, ref. 93, p. 44-46.

202 Apart from the above mentioned Mongol threat, but this would relate more to the marriages of their daughters with the Ruthenian princes.

203 For example, the story about Koloman’s unexpected return from hunting at a time when Salomea was “dressed up” in girl’s clothes. After that she allegedly wore only widow’s clothes. She made herself suffer by wearing clothes with a rough surface, either of horse hair or hemp, and, above all, she observed a vow of chastity. According to the VSS she also preserved her virginity during her marriage with Koloman. The VSS mentions that Salomea made great progress in education and could even interpret the Gospels. Compare: VSS, p. 777-779.

204 J. Wyrozumski and most recently M. Michalski have done comparative analyses of hagiographic works, including the VSS, from the point of view researching spirituality. WYROZUMSKI, Jerzy. Świętość kobiet w małżeństwie w Polsce 13 wieku w świetle źródeł hagiograficznych. (Saintliness in married women in 13th century Poland in the light of the hagiographic sources). In *Saeculum Christianum*, 1996, 3, no. 1, p. 21-31 and MICHALSKI, ref. 2.


207 VSS, p. 777-779.
We should add that the first monastery of Damianites in the Kingdom of Hungary was founded at Trnava before 1238, that is during the activity of Salomea in Hungary. The Mongol invasion brought fundamental change to Salomea's life. Koloman was injured in the battle of the river Slaná and soon died as a result. After this event, Salomea returned to her native Poland. We have attempted to prove that Salomea was an important figure in political history during her Hungarian period. The fact that the sources are mostly silent about her does not mean that she played the passive role of the wife of Koloman. Her cooperation with her mother Grzymislawa and contacts with Béla IV and Maria, at least in connection with Kinga, is clearly documented. In our view, she was a key figure in Polish – Hungarian relations from 1214 to 1241. As a result of Salomea’s efforts, Kinga maintained these relations after 1241. After the death of her husband, Salomea returned to Poland as a personality with rich political experience, which she used in her further activities. The phenomenon of the Hungarian-Polish

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210 PROCHÁZKOVÁ, Postavenie haličkého, ref. 3, p.73-74.

211 We have two possible variants of Salomea’s return to Poland: 1) She joined Boleslaw, Grzymislawa and Kinga in their flight from the Mongol threat into Hungary and went with them to Moravia and then back to Poland. 2) She stayed in Hungary until 1243, when Boleslaw the Shy gained power in Little Poland, and she returned to a relatively stabilized situation. The second variant is a presented by R. Grzesik as a probable hypothesis. GRZESIK, Ryszard: Węgierskie księźce panowie na polskim dworze – rozkwit nowej duchowości w 13 w. (Hungarian Princes at the Polish Court – the development of a new spirituality in the 13th century). In Studia Archaeologica Slovaca Mediaevalia 3-4, 2000–2001. Eds. D. Čaplovič and M. Slička. Bratislava : Veda, 2001, p. 222. Salomea probably took with her the Hungarian-Polish Chronicle (see ref. 215) and a reliquary of French origin, which was researched by J. Pietrusiński in the Church of St. Andrew of the Clarist monastery in Krakow. For more details see: PIETRUSIŃSKI, Jerzy.Hugo z Oogens i ostensoria u klarysek w Krakowie i w Sączu. (Hugo of Ogens and monstrances among the Clarists in Krakow and Sącz). In Białyty Historii Sztuki. Warszawa : Polska Akademia Nauk i Instytut Sztuki, tom 42, 1980, p. 15.

212 Although in the first years, this was not her own work, because she was still a child.

213 For more details see: HOMZA, ref. 144, p. 381-407.

214 A document from 1257, in which Salomea is mentioned as one of the initiators of a mission to Christianize the Lithuanians, may testify to Hungarian influence on her later activities. The Templers participated in this mission, and a father superior of the Templers in Slavonia is specifically mentioned. See: THEINER, Augustinus (ed.). Vetra Monumenta Poloniae et Lithuaniae 1, 1217 – 1404. Rome : Typis Vaticanis 1860, p. 72. In relation to the close contacts between Koloman and the Templers in Slavonia, it is very probable that Salomea played a mediating role. For more details see: PROCHÁZKOVÁ, Postavenie haličkého, ref. 3, p.72-74.
Historický časopis, 55, Supplement, 2007

*Chronicle* is an independent phenomenon, which has not been analysed in our study. However, research into the circumstances and motivations for its origin based on the political circumstances outlined here, will certainly bring interesting results.

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215 Salomea probably took this work from Hungary to Poland, which was one of the reasons it was ignored by the Hungarian tradition of historiography. See: GRZESIK, R. *Kronika węgiersko-polska. Z dziejów polsko-węgierskich kontaktów kulturalnych w średniowieczu.* (The Hungarian-Polish Chronicle. From the history of Polish – Hungarian cultural contacts in the Middle Ages). Poznań : Wydawnictwo Poznańskiego Towarzystwa Przyjaciół Nauk, 1999, p. 211-212 and GRZESIK, ref. 10, p. 48. The view was recently expressed that Stanislav, author of VSS could have consulted the *Hungarian-Polish Chronicle* while writing the Life of Salomea) Compare: Gąsiorowska, ref. 8, p. 3. Thus, there is a real possibility that the Hungarian – Polish Chronicle was among the books – which she valued most of all her possessions – she entrusted to the Franciscan brothers according to her Testament. Compare: KDM 1, nr. 76, p. 91-93.

216 According to the Polish medievalist R. Grzesik, the *Hungarian-Polish Chronicle* originated at the court of Koloman, but it served mainly the interests of placing Koloman’s younger brother Andrew in Galicia. Therefore, in his view, the chronicle originated while Andrew was still alive. He came to this conclusion mainly on the basis of the similar fates of Ladislav in this chronicle and the historical Andrew. See: GRZESIK, ref. 149, p. 33-34; GRZESIK, *Kronika węgiersko-polska*, ref. 215, p. 211-212. N. Procházková also accepts this theory. See: PROCHÁZKOVÁ, Koloman Haličský, ref. 3, p. 248. In our view, this is illogical in the context of the internal political situation in Hungary, because the relationship between Koloman and Andrew was confrontational, as we attempted to prove in the preceding text. We incline to the view of M. Homza, who pointed to the fact that the writing of this work served mainly Koloman and not Andrew. This specifically concerns the figure of Ladislav in the work. Salomea is connected with Adele the mother of St. Stephen in this chronicle. For more details see: HOMZA, Úvahy nad systémom, ref. 3, p. 149-150, 154-155. R. Grzesik also accepted the idea that Salomea could have been a model for the figure of Adelaide. See: GRZESIK, Ryszard. HOMZA, Martin. *Pokus o interpretáciu úlohy kňažnej Adelajdy v uhorsko-poľskej kronike* (An attempt to interpret the role of Princess Adelaide in the Hungarian-Polish Chronicle (see the translation in note 3, K. H.). In *Historický časopis*, 47, 3, 1999, p. 357-382. Artykuly recenzjne i recenzje. In *Studia źródłoznawcze*, 2000, 38, p. 127. “The view of Martin Homza, that Salomea could have served as the model for the figure of Adelaide will become part of the scientific canon”. In our view, when the *Hungarian-Polish Chronicle* originated at Koloman’s court, it mainly served him. On the basis of the analysis of the internal situation in Hungary and the comparison of the key passage about Ladislav from the end of this chronicle concerning the permanent possession of Galicia, and gaining the crown of Hungary, we come to the conclusion that the chronicle must have originated after the death Andrew, and so in the period 1234 – 1241. During the life of Andrew it would have done more to legitimize Andrew’s interests, which would not have been Koloman’s intention.
THE RUTHENIAN AND WALLACHIAN POPULATION OF EASTERN SLOVAKIA
IN THE MIDDLE AGES

VLADIMÍR RÁBIK


Ruthenian inhabitants had their significant role in the national, social and legal, as well as religious structure of the medieval Kingdom of Hungary. There were two waves in their settlement. At the beginning of the 14th century they entered the territory according to German law, but at the same time the Wallachian element could be recorded as well. The Wallachian element was fully dominant later. On the other hand, at the beginning the resident territory of Wallachian inhabitants, who claimed to be of Ruthenian nationality, in East Slovakia was the same as the older locations settled according to German law. The Ruthenians and Wallachians used the regressive development in the 15th century. Later they moved into new territories and established new settlements.


There is not the slightest doubt that the ethnic group called “Rutheni” in contemporary sources played an important role in the ethnic, socio-legal and religious structure of the medieval Kingdom of Hungary. In the territory of Slovakia it was mainly in the east that many districts acquired a special ethnic and religious character as a result of the Ruthenian penetration, and they have kept it until today. Above all, it is necessary to state that in relation to the local Slovak population, the Ruthenians differed in two very basic ways: ethnic origin and membership of the Eastern Christian rite. It was only later, in the course of the 14th and especially the 15th and 16th centuries, that the Ruthenians came to be characterized by a specific socio-legal position, originally held by people of Rumanian nationality in the Kingdom of Hungary. However, the Rumanian ethnic group had a very minimal involvement in settlement of the territory of Slovakia, and the Ruthenians became the main bearers of Wallachian law in our territory. They had adopted this socio-legal system very early in their original homes in Galicia and present-day Trans-Carpathian Ukraine.¹ The Ruthenians in our territory shifted the originally ethnic meaning of the word “valachus” towards a socio-legal classification. However,

the actual principles of Wallachian law underwent a special development in the territory of Slovakia and were strongly influenced by the older German law, according to which dozens of communities were established in eastern Slovakia. This was most significantly expressed in the names of some of the organizational units of the Wallachians, especially where there was an equivalent in German law. For example, the original name kenez for the hereditary mayor of a Wallachian village soon faded away, although it survived as a personal name. Already in the Middle Ages it was replaced by the term scultetus borrowed from German law. However, as we will see, this also had its settlement justification, because it is no accident that the settlement area of the Wallachian population in eastern Slovakia initially coincided to a large extent with the territory settled earlier according to German law. Wallachian settlement took advantage of the decline of German settlement in the 15th century and only later expanded into new settlements in new areas.

It is necessary to emphasize at the beginning that the non-autochthonous origin of the Ruthenian inhabitants of eastern Slovakia was already described reliably and in detail in the existing literature. Evidence of it is already found in the oldest Hungarian chronicles, which describe eastern Slovakia as the frontier district with Poland and „Ruthenia“, which is already not only a territorial, but also an ethnic definition, as can also be seen in 14th century documents. For example, the territory of the Lordship of Makovica in northeastern Šariš is still mentioned in 1367 as lying “in confinibus Rutenicalibus, ubi pridem... lustra et saltus existerant” and the population penetrating from that region is described as new and following a “pagan rite”. Place name evidence is even more reliable. It points to the increased concentration of ethnic names of the type “Ruská Ves” in eastern Slovakia, mostly dated before the 13th century. Such evidence is reliable because such names could only arise in a region where another linguistic and ethnic group, in this case the Slovaks, prevailed. Settlements are recorded of the Russian Varjags (so called in Slavonic language) doing guard service for the Hungarian monarchs in the 11th and 12th centuries. This was the origin of the surviving village names of Ruská, Ruskov, Veľký and Malý Ruskov, established in the Slovak linguistic environment, and of the present village of Göncruszka in Hungary. In areas with continuous ethnic Hungarian or Magyar settlement in the 10th – 12th centuries, village names such as Oroszi appe-
However, our study will not devote attention to such villages, but to more detailed consideration of the Ruthenian inhabitants, who penetrated into the territory of eastern Slovakia in large numbers only from the beginning of the 14th century, and whose settlement already had a different character and legal basis. The territory of the County of Užhorod, where the properties of the lords of Michalovce were concentrated, was the natural starting point for the penetration of Ruthenians into eastern Slovakia, so it is not surprising that we find the oldest evidence of this ethnic group precisely here, although the Ruthenians settled in the central part of Šariš at almost the same time. The initial penetration of the Ruthenians into the territory of the County of Užhorod was a result of the remarkable land improvement activities and extensive reorganization of the lands of the lords of Michalovce. Its moving force starting about the beginning of the 14th century, was the German population of Michalovce, which we find in the old settlements of the County of Užhorod, namely Tibava, Trnava nad Laborcom and Vinné, and at the village of Staré in Zemplín. In their surroundings, settlements administered by German law and with inhabitants classified as guests (*hospites*) were gradually formed. However, the whole improvement movement required a larger population, so as the process continued, Magyars and Ruthenians as well as local Slovaks and apparently all who fulfilled the economic and legal conditions, were accepted into the socio-legal group of guests. The mandate of Queen Elizabeth from 1343 already provides reliable evidence of this increased demographic movement. At the request of Laurence son of Andrew of Tibava, Queen Elizabeth authorized any free person to move to his property in the counties of Užhorod, Zemplín and Szatmár. These people were granted freedom from all duties for the first three years. In 1358, when the Chapter of Eger distinguished a girl’s quarter for Euphrosine daughter of John of Michalovce, as an extensive lordship composed of 20 villages in the counties of Zemplín and Užhorod with inhabitants classified as guests. They included the villages of Vinné, *Greča, Jasenov and Trnava nad Laborcom, where we also find individuals of Ruthenian nationality at an early date. When the lords of Michalovce divided their property in Vinné in 1337, we learn that there were guests here of Ruthenian nationality, including a certain Ozyph Rutenus, although other names of gu-


ests point more to local Slovak origin of their bearers. Similarly in the village of *Greča, which later merged with Michalovce, guests of Ruthenian origin were also mentioned when the girl’s quarter was assigned to Euphrosine in 1358. They included “Johannes Oruz” (= Russian or Ruthenian) and Dymith (= Dimitrij from Greek Demetrios). According to all indications, Ruthenians also penetrated to Jasenov in the 14th century, as is shown by the protest of George and Ladislav of Tibava to John of Michalovce in 1356. John had attacked their village of Jasenov and had one of the local inhabitants, a man named Makzey (= Maxim), whipped. Therefore, in the case of Jasenov it is necessary to suppose that its establishment according to German law occurred not only with the participation of Slovak, but also of Ruthenian inhabitants, as happened in other villages of the lords of Michalovce, and especially in the neighbouring village with the clearly ethnic name of Ruskovce. Individuals of Ruthenian nationality also penetrated into Trnava nad Laborcom, as is shown by a list of inhabitants produced by the monastery of Leles in 1449 on the occasion of a division of the lordship. Therefore, it is not surprising that we already find individual Ruthenians in the centre of the lordship – Michalovce – in the first half of the 15th century. The above mentioned Ruskovce appears in written sources for the first time only in 1418 and 1419, but there is no doubt that it was founded almost exclusively by Ruthenian inhabitants, as a result of which it was named after the nationality of its population in an environment with a Slovak ethnic and linguistic character. The settlement must have been founded according to German law, as is shown mainly by the fact that in 1427 it was listed among the taxed villages of the County of Užhorod. However, in 1576, the Ruthenian population fled from the village to the Ruthenians (perhaps meaning Polish Galicia) because of the murder of two servants of Stephen of Humenné, and so the tithe-collector of the County of Užhorod found only an abandoned village in

8 Sztáray okl. I, p. 123-138, no. 74: “Ozyph (= Joseph) Ruteni hospitis de eadem Vynna... hospitium Cher- nuch et Peter vocatorum... Kochk et Mike hospitum de eadem”.

9 Sztáray okl. I, p. 299-303, no. 163: “in... possesione Geredche Johannem Oruz et Dymith hospites... inter sessiones Michaelis dicti Baynuk et Stephani fyllatoris”.

10 Sztáray okl. I, p. 255-256, no. 148. ULIČNÝ, Ferdinand. Dejiny osídlenia Užskej župy (History of the settlement of the County of Užhorod). Prešov 1995, p. 309, also supposes the presence of Wallachian population in Jasenov on the basis of information from a document from 1348 (Sztáray okl. I, p. 209-210, no. 112), which mentions a Wallachian named Michal, apparently from Jasenov. However, this Wallachian only dealt with some unspecified business of his landlord in Jasenov, and when he left that village, he was attacked on the public highway by John son of James of Michalovce and imprisoned. A mandate from King Louis I entrusted Spiš Chapter with investigating the incident, but it is said that Michal the Wallachian came from Michalovce and the attack happened there. It is worth mentioning that the King appointed as his representative to investigate the case “Ladislaus filius Kenez”, that is the son of a Wallachian hereditary mayor undoubtedly from the native village of Michal the Wallachian, which in this period could only be Koromľa.


which only the hereditary mayor remained. The vanished village of *Orozfalw*, which lay outside the properties of the lords of Michalovce in the southern part of the County of Užhorod, must have had a similar origin. It is first mentioned in a document of the monastery of Leles from 1400, according to which it lay near Lekárovce and the Drugeth family exchanged it and Močiar with the prior of Leles for part of Veľké Kapušany. In 1419, Paul and Thomas, guests from Orozfalw, were among the witnesses in the case of an attack on Matthew Zelek a canon of Eger by Martin, parish priest of Pavlovce nad Uhom and his accomplices, guests from Ruská. According to the portal register from 1427 there were 14 farm grounds in the village in 1427, but the protest of the prior of Leles from 1478 about its unauthorized collection by the Dóob family from Ruská, is already the last known record of its existence. But let us return to the properties of the lords of Michalovce, where Koromľa must also be regarded as an originally Ruthenian village, also originally founded according to German law in the first quarter of the 14th century. The surviving epentetic “ľ” in the name of the village is evidence of the Ruthenian origin of the original population, while its original foundation under German law in the context of the improvement programme of the lords of Michalovce is shown by the position of the inhabitants in the socio-legal position of guests in 1373 and information from 1454 about the original mill of the former hereditary mayor (scultetus). However, Koromľa is mainly known in literature as the village associated with the oldest record of the penetration of Wallachians, still meaning people of Rumanian nationality, into our territory. At the joint assembly of the counties of Užhorod, Bereg and Szabolcs in 1337, James son of Andrew and Ladislav son of James of Michalovce protested against the fact that the deputy sheriff of the County of Užhorod and Villerm Drugeth’s castellan magister Gwd from Nevícky Castle had settled Wallachians in the territory of Koromľa. This

14 MOL, Kamara, E 158, A 2669, Connumeratio portarum comitatus Ung, fol. 372: “Ruskoch: Nullus, nec colonus nec inquilinus praeter unum scultetum... tota possessio est deserta, nam coloni propter homicidium, eo quod duo servitores Stephani Homonnay occiderunt, ad Rutenos fugerunt.”


led to a dispute lasting several decades. However, the mandate of the Palatine Villerm Drugeth from 8th August 1337 also provides evidence of the existence of Koromľa before the settlement of the Rumanian Wallachians. On the basis of the above mentioned protest of the lords of Michalovce, this mandate ordered the Chapter of Eger to define, on the basis of oaths by the parties to the dispute, the boundary between the Nevický lordship of the Drugeth family and the Tibava lordship of the lords of Michalovce, who were the first to found a settlement, as the document emphasizes, on the disputed land by the Orechovský potok stream, where the Wallachians were settled. Therefore, the Wallachian element is a secondary phenomenon in Koromľa. However, it is clear from the documentary evidence that precisely the development of the property situation at Koromľa was especially important for the further penetration of the Wallachian population towards the west. We learn from a document of Louis I from 1365 about the complaints of George of Michalovce, according to which the Wallachians from the part of Koromľa occupied by the Drugeth family, namely John known as Stroya, Dragomer son of Roman, Kalyman, Buna and Kalym, whose names point to Rumanian origins, attacked Tibava, from which they drove away a herd of pigs. They left behind three better pigs and repeated the attack a week later. Already earlier, in 1363, the assembly of the nobility of the County of Užhorod charged various criminals including a certain Ladislaus known as “Olah” or by another name “Vayas” but also Dragomer son of the Wallachian duke Stanislav and Michael, also called “Olah”. Their origin also needs to be sought in the environment of Koromľa, and a Rumanian element is also involved. Only the verdict of the Palatine Imrich from 1373 definitively granted the lords of Michalovce possession of the whole of Koromľa, which became a permanent part of the lordship of Tibava. This made Koromľa the first village with Wallachian organization of the life of the inhabitants in the properties of the lords of Michalovce. It was also a stimulus for the origin of further similar villages in the lordship. Up to the end of the 14th century, the villages of Ko-


23 Sztáray okl. I, p. 138-140, no. 75: “quod cum iidem nobiles primitiales in sua fundati existant possessori,... in qua (terra litigiosa) nunc per vos (i.e. by the Palatine) olahi essent locati”.  

24 Sztáray okl. I, p. 344-345, no. 197: “Johannes dictus Stroya, Dragomer, filius Romani de Korumle cum Kalyman, Buna et Kalym olachis”. In 1366, the monastery of Leles again investigated the complaint according to which the Druget family had taken 15 cattle and 60 sheep “ratione collecte in iobagionibus suis Korumlyaiensisibus”, certainly as Wallachian duties. Ministry of the Interior of the Slovak Republic, Štátny archív (State Archive – hereinafter: SA) Prešov, Archive of the Druget family from Humenné (hereinafter: Druget-I), I-97 (sign. A-11), Nr. 61.  

25 The special expression “vojvod(a)” (translated as duke) in medieval charters relating to the life of wallachian inhabitants cannot be considered as being a noble dignity, it only represents the officer of their special administration. This verb comes from the Slavonic language and means, in fact, someone who leads.  

26 Sztáray okl. I, p. 330-332, no. 186: “Ladislaum dictum Olah... Dragomer, filium voyvode Zanyzlai... Michaelem dictum Olah”. 

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ňuš, Beňatina, Podhoroď, Priekopa and Choňkovce in the lordship of Tibava and of Vyšná Rybnica in the lordship of Jasenov originated according to Wallachian law. In the 15th century, Wallachian inhabitants also penetrated into other older villages in the lordships of Tibava and Jasenov, as will be mentioned in detail.

In Koromľa itself, the Wallachian, but actually already Ruthenian population gradually became the dominant national and socio-legal element, when the original population was supplemented with settlement of guests. In 1437, when the monastery of Leles divided the lordship of Tibava between the sons of Edmund of Tibava and Albert of Michalovce on the orders of the land judge, Koromľa had 31 inhabited households and the monastery also recorded the names of the heads of the families. According to the list of names, Koromľa was a mainly Ruthenian village headed by a Wallachian hereditary mayor or Kenez called Zan. The village also had a Ruthenian, that is Orthodox priest.

Vyšné Remety was originally founded sometime in the second half of the 14th century according to German law and with the participation of German inhabitants. It first appears in the sources in 1400, but when the lordship of Tibava was divided in 1437, 28 of the 65 households in Vyšné Remety were abandoned and some of the inhabitants still had German names. However, there was already a strong presence of the Ruthenian element, which probably penetrated to Vyšné Remety from nearby Vyšná Rybnica, which was actually founded according to Wallachian law. Indirect evidence of the penetration of the Wallachian and ethnic Ruthenian population is provided by the mandate of the land judge Simon of Rozhanovce for the monastery of Leles in 1413. The mandate ordered investigation of the complaint of Peter of Michalovce, according to which the Wallachians Nicholas and John Drugeth from Humenné, living in the province of Gyepüelve, that is in the boundary area within the lordship of Humenné, raided the Vyšné Remety forest with the agreement of their landlords and took away 442 sheep belonging to the local inhabitants and to the inhabitants of Úbrež, but when the servants of Peter of Michalovce caught them at Pichne, the Wallachian dukes Stephen and Stan Drugeth prevented the return of the herd of stolen sheep. At Vyšné Remety, the Wallachian and ethnic Ruthenian element later prevailed over the original Slovak and German inhabitants, and in 1449 the village appeared under the name “Olahremethe” (Valašské Remety). Secondary Wallachian population similarly penetrated into Porúbka, a village recorded for the first time in 1412, with its name clearly indicating a settlement founded under German

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29 Sztáray okl. II, p. 336-343, no. 237. The Wallachian origin of the majority of the population is also documented by the portal list from 1427, in which Wallachians are not recorded, so that only six farm grounds were finally taxed. MOL DL 32 382: “Remethe”. ULIČNÝ, ref. 10, p. 285.
law in a Slovak linguistic environment. At the time of the division of the Lordship of Tibava in 1437, 18 of the 35 households in this village were abandoned, and according to a document from the monastery of Leles from 1454, the mill of the local hereditary mayor had also been abandoned and burnt. This documents the rapid decline of Porúbka, which the landlords endeavoured to reverse by settlement of new inhabitants with a different, Wallachian socio-legal organization and Ruthenian nationality. The Wallachian element in Porúbka gradually prevailed, as was reflected in its late medieval name of “Olahporvbka” (Valašské Porúbka), already recorded in 1497. The village of Hlinik, now part of Hlivišť and Úbrež were undoubtedly also founded according to German law. The portal registers from the 16th century record the institution of hereditary mayors, but the Wallachian and ethnic Ruthenian element already penetrated here during the 15th century. However, their original foundation according to German law is shown by the fact that in 1427 both villages were recorded among the taxed settlements of the County of Užhorod, which would not have happened in the case of Wallachian villages. The penetration of Wallachian inhabitants into Úbrež is indirectly documented by the above mentioned complaint of Peter of Tibava from 1413 about the theft of pigs in the forest of Vyšné Remety by the Wallachians of the Drugeth family. The portal registers from 1567 and 1588 document both villages as mainly Ruthenian and the register from 1588 records a Wallachian hereditary mayor called a kenez at Hlinik. It was typical of Wallachian villages that up to the middle of the 16th century they were not taxed according to the usual laws of the state, and so the Wallachian villages in the County of Užhorod were not recorded in the oldest portal register, that from 1427, which is an important sign of their distinction from the villages based on German law, since their foundation documents are not preserved. However, there is also further evidence of the Wallachian origin of such villages in the territory of the County of Užhorod. In 1414, the county officer and deputy sheriff of the County of Užhorod investigated the destruction of the newly built village of Koňuš by the Wallachians of the Drugeth family from Ubľa with accomplices from Porhorod. Koňuš itself must have been built by Wallachians, although the medieval

32 SNA Bratislava, Metals comitatus de ung, Nr. 43. CSÁNKI, ref. 13, p. 399. ULIČNÝ, ref. 10, p. 187.
34 Sztáray okl. II, p. 513-532, no. 360.
35 SNA Bratislava, Archív Hodnoverného miesta pri Leleskom konvente (Archive of the authentic place at the Monastery of Leles – hereinafter: Leles HM), Acta anni 1497, Nr. 31. ŽUDEL, ref. 22, p. 78.
36 MOL Kamara, E 158, A. 2669, fol. 95, 364, 671, 848 (Hlynnyk / Hlinik scultetus, from 1571, 1576, 1582, 1588), 139, 182, 360-361, 671, 853 (Wbrys scultetus; from 1571, 1572, 1576, 1582, 1588).
37 MOL DL 32 382: “Hlynyk” ; “Ubrys” . CSÁNKI, ref. 13, p. 391, 399. ULIČNÝ, ref. 10, p. 80, 244.
41 Sztáray okl. II, p. 142-143, no. 112. ULIČNÝ, ref. 10, p. 181, 120.
records are very limited. However, reliable records from the first half of the 16th century indicate the presence of Ruthenians and Wallachians in the village.\textsuperscript{42}

The Wallachian hereditary mayor called a kenez is already recorded in writing at Podhorod in 1476, when the villeins of Master Imrich drove away 14 of his cattle. The landlord Simon of Tibava protested against this.\textsuperscript{43} There was still a Wallachian kenez here at the time of collection of the portal tax in 1588.\textsuperscript{44} The origin of Beňatina is directly connected with the origin of Podhorod. It already appears in the oldest documents with Podhorod as the second village below Tibava Castle (in 1418: \textit{utramque Waralya}), so it is also necessary to suppose the Wallachian origin of its population, to which its ethnic development as a Ruthenian village also corresponds.\textsuperscript{45} A Wallachian kenez named Nyeg is known from Choňkovce in 1409, when together with Laurence son of Berchen he testified about a quarrel and struggle of the inhabitants of Choňkovce Benedict, Andrew and Stanislaw son of Balka with Matthew a villein of Peter of Tibava. This record is also the first written mention of the existence of the village.\textsuperscript{46} The village of Priekopa is also of Wallachian origin. It appears in the sources for the first time only in 1418 and 1419,\textsuperscript{47} but at the time of the division in 1437, there was already a numerous Ruthenian population and the monastery of Leles also recorded the name of the local Wallachian hereditary mayor – Blasius kenez.\textsuperscript{48} Therefore it does not appear in the portal register of the County of Užhorod from 1427. The villages of Jovsa and Vyšná Rybnica in the territory of the lordship of Jasenov, first mentioned in writing only in 1418 and 1419,\textsuperscript{49} must also be identified as being of Wallachian origin, as is indirectly shown by their absence from the portal register of 1427. The portal register from 1588 recorded the existence of Wallachian hereditary mayors called kenez in both villages.\textsuperscript{50} All the above mentioned Wallachian villages in the territory of the Slovak part of the County of Užhorod had mainly Ruthenian populations according to the portal registers from 1567 and 1588, so it is remarkable that in the course of modern history the Slovak element prevailed in them. Already according to the official dictionary of settlements from 1773, no language other than Slovak was spoken in any of them.\textsuperscript{51} In the territory of the County of Zemplín, the beginnings of the settlement of Ruthenians were also associated with the widespread mo-

\textsuperscript{42} ULIČNÝ, ref. 10, p. 120, according to data from the urbarium from 1549. The portal registers from 1578 describe the inhabitants of Koňuš as Ruthenians. MOL Kamara, E 158, A. 2669, fol. 315: “\textit{Konyus Ruteni}.”

\textsuperscript{43} SNA Bratislava, Leles HM, Acta anni 1476, Nr. 21: “\textit{cuisdam kenezy in... possessione... Waralya comorantis}.” ŽUDEL, ref. 22, p. 78.

\textsuperscript{44} MOL Kamara, E 158, A. 2669, fol. 843: “\textit{Warallia: Stephanus kenez scultetus (!)}”.

\textsuperscript{45} MOL Kamara, E 158, A. 2669, fol. 59, 843 (from 1567 and 1588). Compare also ULIČNÝ, ref. 10, p. 31-32.

\textsuperscript{46} Sztáray okl. II, p. 58-59, no. 49: “\textit{ad possessionem Hunkolch... presente Nyegh kenezius}”.

\textsuperscript{47} Sztáray okl. II, p. 200-212, nos. 150, 152 and 153.


\textsuperscript{50} MOL Kamara, E 158, A. 2669, fol. 850-851 (\textit{Kis Rybicze: Stephanus kenezyk! scultetus!}), 855-856, (\textit{Josza: Roman kenez scultetus!}).

vement of settlement according to German law, for which the nearby Galician and Polish regions were available as a natural source of population. Therefore, it is not surprising that already in 1361 we have specific information about the arrival of such population, in the form of a mandate from Louis I. At the request of Ladislav and Laurence of Rozhanovce, the monarch forbade his castellans and officials to charge tolls on people coming to settle in the lands of these noblemen. The document explicitly emphasized that this included settlers from Poland and Galicia. This especially involved the territory of the lordship of Čičava with its centre in Vranov, where there was an intensive, directed and systematic settlement programme from the middle of the 14th century.

When the lordship of Čičava was divided between the lords of Rozhanovce in 1363, the properties included the village with the ethnic name Ruský Kazimír. Among the newly built villages in the valley of the Ondava, where the period of freedom from all duties still applied to the inhabitants, the village of *Urusuagasa* (meaning as Russian worked out place) appears, a name also reflecting the Ruthenian origin of the population. However, *Ruská Voľa* does not appear in further sources. It soon disappeared, like some other villages mentioned as newly built in 1363, and so its site cannot be reliably identified with the present settlement of Ruská Voľa in the vicinity of Lomné, although the geographical context does not exclude it. Ruský (today Vyšný) Kazimír remained a permanent part of the lordship and the name of the founder of the village – Kazimír points to a Polish – Galician context. However, Zemplín also contained an older village with the name Kazimír situated south-west of Trebišov. After the building of the new village in the Ondava valley by the Ruthenians, it received the ethnic name of Maďarský Kazimír (in 1773: *Magyar Kazmer*). However, the village of Ruský Kazimír preserved its ethnic character in modern times. This was also under the influence of a new influx of Ruthenians in the mid 15th century and in the 16th century, who did not have the characteristic duties of Wallachians, but had the position of free men, who performed services in the Vranov noble curia, as recorded by the portal register from 1567 and the urbarium from 1585, which describe it as an old obligation. In the settlement area of the Ondava

52 MOL DL 5 061: “possessiones... populous numerositate et multitudine decorate intendamus... manda- mus, quatenus ab omnibus populis et iobagionibus... de partibus Polonie et Rutenie... commorandi causa ad eorum possessiones venire volentibus nullum tributum... petere et exigere... presumpanatis”.

53 MOL DL 5 191: “Kazmer Rutinicalis... novis villis sub libertatibus adhuc gavisis... Urusuagus”.

54 BEŇKO, ref. 30, p. 256. It is necessary to observe that the present settlement of Ruská Voľa is a more recent settlement, about which we have information only from the official lexicon of settlements from 1773, but it was also a village in which the population spoke Ruthenian. See: Lexicon 1773, p. 301.


56 Lexicon 1773, ref. 51, p. 299.

57 MOL Kamara, E 158, A. 2677, fol. 25: “Kazmir... omnes sunt libertini inquilini et... laborant in curia Varanovienisi a temporibus multis”. Compare also the data in ULIČNÝ, ref. 55, p. 443. According to an urbarium from 1648, there was some amendment of settlement conditions (certainly as a result of colonization) by Sebastian of Rozhanovce (died 1461) around the middle of the 15th century. The free position of the people of Kazimír and their duties were apparently fixed then and recorded in a document, which still existed in 1648. HIDEGPATAKI, Antal. (ed.). Adalékok Csicsva vára és tartozékai történetéhez. A vár és tartozékai 1585-i (magyarnyelvű) urbáriuma. In Adalékok Zemplén-vármegye Történetéhez, 1904, Vol. 10, p. 308.
valley, where Ruthenian population was mainly concentrated as we have seen, the village of Bžany was established according to German law sometime after 1363. It is first documented in writing in 1372, and it must have been a village settled by Ruthenians from the beginning. However, Bžany almost perished during the Hungarian – Polish war of 1491 – 1492, since in 1493 four of the five farms here were abandoned, and the only inhabited farm belonged to the hereditary mayor of the place Ignath, whose name reliably documents the older Ruthenian ethnic environment of the village.

A settlement called “Palyon” is also recorded in 1372 among the new villages in the lordship. We have no later information about it, but it is probable that, as a result of its soft structure, this name is of East Slavonic origin and so this was also a Ruthenian village, which corresponds to the fact that it is mentioned together with Ruský Kazimír in the 1372 document and could have been situated close to it in the valley of the Ondava.

The origin of the village of Nižná Oľšava, which can also be reliably identified as a Ruthenian settlement, can also be placed in this context, while the older village of Vyšná Oľšava had only Slovak inhabitants at first. This Vyšná Oľšava is already mentioned in 1382 and only one settlement with the name „Oľšava“ existed here. However, Ruthenians must soon have begun to settle in its territory, and they built a new village, already recorded in 1391. Such ethnic correlation of the two settlements is also illustrated by a document from the Chapter of Buda in 1493, according to which Vyšná Oľšava already had only three inhabited farms and one of them was occupied by a certain Blasius Pethryk, undoubtedly of Slovak origin, while in Nižná Oľšava, the representatives of the chapter similarly recorded only three inhabited farms, one of them inhabited by a certain Alexius, whose name was already Ruthenian. Thus, only Ruthenian and Wallachian inhabitants penetrated into both abandoned Oľšavas in the first half of the 16th century, but the urbarium from 1585 recorded a tradition that the village of Vyšná Oľšava was originally Slovak. The writer emphasized that this village originally had a Slovak population and the Ruthenians only came later, while Nižná Oľšava was always a Ruthenian village.

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58 MOL DL 5 999: “Bozpatak”.
59 MOL DL 19 963: “Bozyas... una sessione populosa... Ignath solthez”.
60 MOL DL 5 999: “Palyon, Kazmer”.
61 MOL DL 6 962: “Olcwa”.
62 MOL DL 7 661: “inferior Olswa”.
63 MOL DL 19 963: “Item in villa Felsewolchwa... Blasius Pethryk resideret... Item in villa Alsoolchwa... Alexius resideret”.
64 HIDEG PATAKI, ref. 57, p. 307: “Also Olswa... mert az oroz faluk (!) ... Ez az Felseö Olsva előszeör thott falu volt es totok laktanak benne. Immor orozok szallottak rea”. Vyšná Oľšava was also recorded as a Ruthenian village in a tithe register from 1571. MOL E 159, X. 4214, part 17, Regesta decimarum – Districtus Waranno et Ztropko: “Felseo Olsua Rutteni”.

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Polish invasion of eastern Slovakia in 1491 – 1492 significantly influenced the further development of the settlement and demographic situation. This significantly complicates the problem of researching the ethnic origin of the inhabitants of the settlements in the lordship of Čičava in the Middle Ages. However, it is from precisely this lordship that we have the most detailed data about the results of this war, because in 1493, the Chapter of Buda had a register compiled for the purpose of distinguishing the girl’s quarter in the property of the whole lordship. This record shows that more than 54 % of the total number of farms were abandoned. However, it is important for the further development of ethnic relations, that if we compare the document from 1493 with the ethnically Ruthenian villages of the lordship of Čičava as we know them from the 16th century, we come to the reliable conclusion that sometime in the first half of the 16th century, the Wallachian and Ruthenian population penetrated exclusively into the villages that were most depopulated. The urbarium from 1585 records the following as Wallachian villages with mainly Ruthenian populations: Valkov, Bžany, (Ruský) Kručov, Lomné, Benkovce, Dobrá nad Ondava, Vyšná and Nižná Oľšava, Ruský Kazimír, Davidov, Banské and Rudlov. It was only sometime in the first half of the 16th century that they built a new village of Jusková Voľa.

However, the Polish invasion of eastern Slovakia had a similarly strong impact on the lordship of Stropkov, which appears in the mid 16th century as a territory much settled by Ruthenian inhabitants. It is necessary to say that in the 14th and 15th centuries, the surroundings of Stropkov were a strong area for the foundation of villages according to German law. When King Sigismund granted the lordship to Imrich of Perín in 1408, it included 30 villages, at least ten of them with names recorded in connection with this settlement movement. Thus, earlier and more permanent settlement of Wallachian and Ruthenian inhabitants in the territory of the lordship of Stropkov cannot be securely documented from medieval sources, rather the opposite. In 1442, the magistrate of Stropkov complained to Bardejov about the Wallachians from the neighbouring Lordship of

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67 HIDEGPATAKI, ref. 57, p. 299-320. However, there was also Ruthenian population at Remeniny and Matiaška, and Orthodox priests were active in them in 1601. MOL Kamara, E 158, A, 2677, fol. 748. The document of the Chapter of Buda from 1493 shows the following situation in the villages where we find Ruthenian and Wallachian inhabitants in the 16th century: Valkov – 2 (occupied farms) / 5 (abandoned farms); Bžany – 1/4; Kručov – 1/7; Lomné – only generally mentioned; Benkovce – 5/3; Dobrá nad Ondava – 8/5; Vyšná Oľšava – 3/8; Nižná Oľšava – 3/5; Ruský Kazimír – 3/3; Davidov – not mentioned; Banské – 2/7; Rudlov – 1/14; Veľký Remenín – 5/6; Malý Remenín – 3/7; Matiaška – not mentioned. The villages mentioned only generally or not at all in the list were undoubtedly entirely abandoned. MOL DL 19 963.

Makovica, who were freely and without restraint moving in the territory of the Lordship of Stropkov and causing damage there.\footnote{47}

However, in spite of the absence of medieval documents, it can be considered almost certain that the Ruthenians also came here as secondary settlers in older settlements sometime in the last quarter of the 15th century, as is indirectly shown by the case of the village of Staškovce, already documented in 1408 as “Staskenhaw” and in 1430 as “Staswagasa”.\footnote{48} From the earliest times, possession of Staškovce was divided with the western part of the village, also called Veľké Staškovce belonging to the neighbouring Lordship of Makovica, where it appears in the sources from 1414 as “Staskwagasa”,\footnote{49} while the eastern part – Malé Staškovce remained the property of the Lordship of Stropkov. Especially in the Makovica part of Staškovce we can see clearly that the village underwent gradual ethnic and social change, and sometime in the second half of the 15th century it was settled by Ruthenian and Wallachian inhabitants. We know specifically that the urbarium of the Lordship of Makovica from 1507, which actually describes the situation before 1490, describes Staškovce as a Ruthenian village.\footnote{50} The Stropkov part of Staškovce must have undergone a similar development. However, the urbaria of the Lordship of Stropkov from 1557, 1567 and 1569 distinguish in detail between the Slovak and Ruthenian villages of the lordship. The latter did not pay the landlord’s ninth or the church tithes. The Ruthenian villages included Pravrovce, Varechovce, Staškovce, Bukovce, Brežnička, Vojtovce, Potočky, Solník, Pucák, Závada, Kajňa, Rohožník, Piskorovce, Tokajík, Hrabovec, Mrázovce, Miňovce, Krišlovce and Jakušovce. Only Poruba had a mixed population of Ruthenians and Slovaks.\footnote{51}

However, the influence of the Ruthenian and especially of the socially Wallachian population on the socio-ethnic character of the territory of the County of Zemplín was especially significant in the Lordship of Humenné, a holding of the Drugeth family. Already in the 16th century it had a special position in the administrative organization of the

\footnotesize{\textbf{References}}


\footnote{48} MOL DL 9 404/1-6 (1408); 70 857 (1430).


\footnote{50} Egyetemi Könyvtár Kézirattára, Budapest (hereinafter EKK), Litterae et epistolae originales, Nr. 7, fol. 8v-9r, 10r: “Possessiones Ruthenorum... Sthaskocz”. Compare also: ŠA Prešov, Druget H, I-66: “possessionibus Ruthinorum... Sthaskowcz” (from 1514).

county using the originally Wallachian term “krajňa” for administrative divisions of the northern and north-eastern part of the lordship.  

The oldest specific data about Ruthenians settled in the territory of the Lordship of Humenné is found in a document from the Palatine Nicholas of Gorjan from 1379, according to which the judgement of a property dispute about the ownership of villages in the valley of the Laborec between the Drugeths and noblemen from Zbudské Dlhé, also included the village of Radvaň nad Laborcom with 23 occupied and two abandoned farms. The village also had a mill on the river Laborec and a wooden church for Ruthenian members of the Orthodox Church. However, it still appears to have been a settlement under German law, as is suggested by the mill, which indicates an agricultural rather than a Wallachian orientation of the population. More reliable evidence is provided by the origin of the neighbouring village of Volica, which is also Ruthenian by origin and appears in the sources already in 1415 as “Vokycha (!)”. The name of this village comes from the Eastern Slavonic appellative “Volja”,” which corresponds to the Slovak appellative “lehota” (meaning the period during which its are inhabitants free from all duties). The form Volica (similar meaning as “lehota”) is already Slovakized, which testifies to the Slovak ethnic environment of the district. All the medieval villages with the name Voľa arose in eastern Slovakia in the context of settlement under German law with the participation of Ruthenian, but also Polish population, as we will see in other cases. Only the younger wave of names of this type, which appear only in the 16th and 17th centuries, is associated with the settlement of a Wallachian, although also Ruthenian population, but by then its settlement conditions were already significantly modified compared to the primary medieval Wallachian population.  

However, where the Lordship of Humenné is concerned, Ruthenian, already Wallachian inhabitants penetrated here in the 14th century, mainly from the neighbouring County of Užhorod, where, as we already mentioned, the Drugeth family already endeavoured to settle Wallachians in the territory of Koromľa, belonging to Tibava, in

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74 MOL Kamara, E 158, A. 2677, 2678, fol. 67, 73, 83, 88, 95, 266, 354, 417, 531, 1157, 1155-1157, 1160: “Krajna dominorum Homoniensium”, “Kraynya nobilium de Zbugia” (1567); “Cranya” (1570); “Bona nobilium in Krayna” (1578, 1582); “Bona nobilium in krayna Homoniensium” (1596); “processus... krainik vocato” (1635). ULIČnÝ, ref. 55, p. 705. For a review of ideas on the institution of the krajňa see: STA VRoVSKÝ, Emil. Makovické panstvo v 16. – 18. storočí (The Lordship of Makovica in the 16th – 18th centuries). (A contribution to the settlement, ethnic and confessional organization of the population of north-eastern Slovakia). In Zborník FFUK – Historica, 1987, Vol. 37, p. 72-75.  
75 MOL DL 658: “Radwanya... unam capellam Rutinorum legneum”.  
76 BEŇKO, ref. 30, p. 261. However, no later than sometime in the 15th century, there must have been changes in the social structure of the population, because in the urbarium from 1560, we find a Wallachian population here, and the Wallachian form of administration – the krajňa. Urbáre I, p. 217, no. 5.  
79 The neighbouring village of Hrabovec nad Laborcom, also founded according to German law, was the last Slovak village in the Laborec valley. Urbáre I, p. 217, no. 5.
1337. Before 1402, a certain Wallachian kenez Iwchw escaped to the territory of the lordship with 300 cattle and horses belonging to the villein Michael of Vojnatina and he demanded his return from the Drugeths.\textsuperscript{80} We already mentioned the Wallachians and Wallachian dukes Stephen and Stan from the lordship of Humenné, who prevented the servants of Peter of Michalovce restituting stolen sheep of the Wallachians from Vyšné Remety and Úbrež. However, an especially noteworthy point in the description of these events by the monastery of Leles is that both dukes were appointed to their function with authority in the whole Lordship of Humenné, precisely by the Drugeth family,\textsuperscript{81} which corresponds to the above mentioned orientation of this family to the economic organization of the lordship on the basis of Wallachian population. In 1479, Ladislav Drugeth of Humenné, expecting an early death, divided the property of the lordship in front of the Monastery of Leles, setting aside a girl’s quarter for his sister Catherine. He described the villages in the lordship as being inhabited by native “Hungarian”, meaning Slovak, and by “Wallachian”, meaning Ruthenian, inhabitants.\textsuperscript{82} We learn more specific information about some of these Wallachian and Ruthenian villages from the investigation of the deeds of the band of outlaws of the Wallachian Fedor Hlaváty, who attacked various villages in the Lordship of Makovica in 1492. The members of his group included Ruthenians and Wallachians from Krásny Brod, Hostovice, Pčoliné, Starina, Kolbasov, Ulíč, Snina, Ruská Volová, Stakčín, Svetlice and a place called *Vološinec* somewhere near Starina.\textsuperscript{83} Jakub Piecz from Tarnowá Góra also wrote of Svetlice as a Wallachian village. He captured three members of Hlavatý’s group there, as they were escaping to Poland and informed Bardejov about this.\textsuperscript{84}

\textsuperscript{80} Sztáray okl. II, p. 28, no. 23.
\textsuperscript{81} Sztáray Okl. II, p. 125-126, no. CI: “Stephanus et Sthan vaivode per prefatos filios Drugeth in dicto districctu Gepel constituti”. The name of the duke Sthan (= Stanislav) points to a Ruthenian origin of the Wallachians here.
\textsuperscript{82} MOL DL 18 253: “castrum suum Barko vocatum cum singulis tam Hungaricalibus quam volahalibus possessionibus ad idem castrum pertinientibus”. The fact that the wife of Ladislav Drugeth was Hedviga, daughter of the Galician duke Stanislav, undoubtedly stands behind the special mention. After the death of Ladislav in 1484, she declared that she felt like a foreigner in Hungary and wanted to return to Poland. MOL DL 18 934: “generosa domina Adviga relicto condam Ladislai de Homonna, filia scilicet condam magnifici Stanislai waywode de Homonna... ipsa defuncto prefato Ladislao de Homonna tanquam advena relicta fuerit... in suam propriam, puta regnum Polonie reverti proposuerit”.
\textsuperscript{83} ŠA Prešov, Pobočka Bardejov, Magistrát mesta Bardejov (Bardejov Branch, Bardejov town administration), nr. 2878, 3031, 3070: “filius sculteti de Crasnibrod Iwan... Lphur de Crasznibrod... Luccacz scultetus de Crasznibrod... Senko Rutheni de Crasni Brod... Michno, Jazcko and Maczko fratres de Hostowicz... de Pczelina Hermi Stecz, Coporow Fedwr... de Starina Waszl... de Kobassowa Sacha fílius Iwan... de Ulicz Stecz, Roman, Climo... de Swina Brenga... de Wolowa Simko... capitaneus supremus Fjedur Hlawathihi, Kopacz fraterHlawathi, Danko de Wolowa... Alexius de Wolowa... Steffko Schestrynecz de Wolowa... de Staccyn fílius Hricz Micha... Czigan (!) de Suetnicza... Roman de Wolessencz”. Compare: HUŠČAVA, Alexander. O činnosti zbojníckych družín na severovýchodnom Slovensku na konci 15. storočia (On the activity of bands of outlaws in north-eastern Slovakia at the end of the 15\textsuperscript{th} century. In Historické štúdie, 1956, Vol. 2, p. 181-182. BEŇKO, ref. 30, p. 267-268.

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However, the sources also document a higher concentration of Ruthenian inhabitants around Michalovce. We already stated above that some Ruthenians penetrated there from the beginning of the 14th century, and they gained the socio-legal status of guests in the lordship. We learn from a document of the Chapter of Eger from 1335 about the division of the property of noblemen from Naciná Ves, that west of Michalovce there were two villages with the name Voľa, the present village of Voľa in the valley of the Laborec north of Naciná Ves, and the former village of *Volica, a place situated somewhere in the present territory of Lesné and also originally called Volica.\(^85\) This village already appears under the Slovakized name of Volica in 1405, but in 1448 it was only an abandoned settlement.\(^86\)

The origin of the nearby settlement with the ethnic name of *Oroszfalva also undoubtedly fits into this context. It already existed in the property of the noblemen of Budkovec in 1366, and according to the definition of the properties of Pozdišovce and Suché by the monastery of Leles in 1437, it lay south of Suché on the road connecting the two villages.\(^87\) However, this Ruthenian village was already abandoned by 1454.\(^88\) Further evidence of the presence of a Ruthenian element in this area in the 14th century is provided by an investigation document of the monastery of Leles from 1371, according to which various serfs of Pongráč of Michalovce living in Zbudza and including a certain John known as “Oroz” (the Ruthenian), attacked the village of Úbrež in the County of Užhorod and stole a number of pigs.\(^89\) However, this was only a matter of an individual as in the various properties of the lords of Michalovce. However, it is noteworthy that the oldest data about Wallachian inhabitants from the territory of the County of Zemplín does not come from the northern areas, where this population was mainly concentrated, but from the south, where we find the complaints of the noblemen of Čejkov from 1374, according to which serfs of noblemen from Vojka took more than 300 hundred of the pigs of their Wallachians from the forests in Brehov and *Kucany (today part of Oborín).\(^90\) Only a few years later, in 1387, Wallachians are mentioned again in the villages of Veľké Trakany and Biel.\(^91\) In 1320, Veľké Trakany was already one of the villages where Thomas son of Korard was allowed to settle new inhabitants, according to an authorization

\(^{85}\) Sztáray okl. I, p. 261, no. 151: “Wolya iuxta fluivium Laborch.. Wolya nuncupata iuxta metas... possessio Lezna existens”. In the letter of the state judge Nicholas of Seč from 1357, the two villages are designated as “Volja et alia Volya” (Sztáray okl. I, p. 267, no. 151).


\(^{88}\) MOL DL 14 780: “predium Orozfalu”. ULIČNÝ, ref. 55, p. 376.

\(^{89}\) Sztáray okl. I, p. 373-374, no. 224: “Johanne dicto Oroz”.

\(^{90}\) SNA, Bratislava, Leles HM, Acta anni 1374, Nr. 4: “porcos... olachorum eorum... porci olachorum”.

\(^{91}\) SNA, Bratislava, Leles HM, Acta anni 1387, Nr. 1. ULIČNÝ, ref. 55, p. 701.
from the Sheriff of Spiš Philip Drugeth.\textsuperscript{92} The presence of Wallachians at this place appears to have been directly connected with this. The engagement of the Drugeth family in the whole affair deserves special attention. However, we do not have information about a more continuous presence of Wallachians in this area. The penetration of Ruthenian inhabitants can also be documented relatively early in the case of the County of Šariš, and its earliest phase here is also part of the extensive settlement movement according to the principles of German law. We learn from the sale document of the extensive property of Križovany by Dominic of Trsťany to Nicholas of Perin in 1318 that a village called “Voľa” was situated very close to the property.\textsuperscript{93} We have no other information about this village, but it is entirely possible that it appears later under the name of Volica, which is mentioned as an abandoned settlement in 1454 in connection with a new grant among the properties of noblemen from Šíroké, Bertotovce and Fričovce.\textsuperscript{94} As we already mentioned, the name Voľa of which Volica is a Slovakized form, is of Polish and Galician origin, and in eastern Slovakia it is an import from that area, found among the names of villages established by Ruthenian inhabitants according to German law. We have concrete evidence from as early as 1340 of the presence of Ruthenians somewhere in the property of Križovany, and they were probably inhabitants of the above mentioned village of *Voľa – Volica. In that year, Pope Benedict XII at the request of Nicholas of Perin authorized the Archbishop of Esztergom Csanád to organize a visit to the new monastery of the Friars Minor built in Križovany at the expense of Nicholas. He also informed the Pope about the complicated religious situation in his property, since the inhabitants of Križovany and the neighbouring villages included Ruthenians, who were schismatics, that is they belonged to the Eastern Christian rite.\textsuperscript{95} The presence of Ruthenians is also confirmed by a record from 1358, when a certain Nicholas “called Oroz” (Ruthenian)\textsuperscript{96} appears in a dispute about a girl’s quarter from the property of Križovany and Hrabkov, as the servant and representative of the noblemen of Bertotovce, Fričovce and Šíroké. He could have come only from the above mentioned village of *Voľa.

However, another village of Voľa existed in the first half of the 14\textsuperscript{th} century somewhere in the surroundings of Sabinov. In 1358 Nicholas called Apród (varlet) from Šarišské Sokolovce with his sons authorized Dominic son of Laurence and George son of


\textsuperscript{93} RDSI II., p. 164, no. 333: “que via dividit et separat metas Vola a metis predicte possessionis ita, quod Vola manet ab aquilone, Zenthkereysz vero a parte meridionali”.

\textsuperscript{94} MOL DL 25 210; 38 991: “atque predia... Wolicza appellata”. *Volica still appears as a predium in 1510. MOL DL 39 086: “predia... Wólyca”. The village must have disappeared before 1427, because it does not appear in the portal register of the County of Šariš from that year. MOL DL 32 690.


Andrew to settle their property with the name “Wolya” according to the freedoms of the burghers of Sabinov. Again, no further information about the new settlement has survived, which testifies to failure of the project, but the name of the property is evidence of an older Ruthenian settlement, founded according to German law. The settlement of Ruthenians on properties of the Mičkbán family in the upper part of the Ondava valley also undoubtedly falls into the context of settlement according to German law. When Nicholas son of Lorand and grandson of the Bán of Slavonia Mičko defended his property rights before the state judge against the Tekule family, which involved their extensive property of Smilna, he also mentioned “a certain village in which the inhabitants were Ruthenians.” It is very probable that this concerned the Ruthenian village included among the properties of the Makovica lordship under the ethnic name Orozfalu in 1414. This village is also mentioned in further documents about the properties of the lordship of Makovica, appearing for the last time in 1470.

The village of *Orozfalw* is also recorded in the portal register of the County of Šariš from 1427, when 28 farm gates (portals) were taxed here, which shows that this Ruthenian community could not have settled here under Wallachian law. However, we also find such communities in the properties of Magister Lorand in the mid 14th century. Later, in the first quarter of the 15th century a much larger Ruthenian and already Wallachian population must have penetrated into this region. Already in 1356 we have information that Lorand son of Mičko Bán with his serf Wallachians, Ruthenians and other servants attacked the village of Lomné in the County of Zemplín. They looted it and the hereditary mayor of the village Peter was killed. It is not known whether these Ruthenians were identical with the inhabitants of the village of *Orozfalva*, but if we also admit this possibility, they could not have been Wallachian, since the document from the state judge Nicholas of Sečany (Szecsen), which solved Lorand’s excesses in 1357, specifically distinguishes Lorand’s Ruthenian accomplices at Lomné from the Wallachian population, although the latter were undoubtedly also of Ruthenian nationality, and from Lorand’s other servants. Therefore, it appears that these Wallachians should be sought in another locality of the Mičkbán, or more probably they were not a Wallachian element with fixed settlements.

Strong penetration of Ruthenian population was already characteristic of the territory of the Makovica Lordship in the Middle Ages, and a Wallachian organization of life is already recorded from these villages in the Middle Ages. The partial penetration of Orthodox Ruthenians into this region is recorded in an agreement between the Bishop

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97 DCS, p. 571-572, no. 6.
99 MOL DL 10 187.
100 On the documents compare: ULIČNÝ, ref. 71, p. 273-274. Ferdinand Uličný reliably locates this village in the territory of Jurková Voľa with the local name Rusinec.
101 MOL DL 32 690: “Orozfalw Johannis eiusdem (Zudar) porte 28”.
102 CDHA VI., p. 626-631, no. 410: “Lorandus... quosdam iobagiones videlicet olahos, Rutenos et alios famulos suos ad quandam possessionem eorum Lona vatatam... potencia destinando”. BEŇKO, ref. 30, p. 255. ULIČNÝ, ref. 55, p. 282.
103 CDHA VI., p. 626-631, no. 410.
of Eger Michael and the Cudar family in 1367, according to which the bishop gave up the collection of tithes from the properties of the Makovica and Kurima lordships in return for an annual payment of 200 florins, which was justified by the fact that these territories were too distant and lay on the frontier with the schismatics, and because of the pagan (that is Orthodox) rite used by the people, tithes could not be consistently collected.\textsuperscript{104} We can see from this, that Ruthenian inhabitants penetrated into the Lordship of Makovica from the neighbouring Polish part of Galicia, and from the 15\textsuperscript{th} century we have relatively numerous mentions of them as Wallachians. In 1442, the town council of Stropkov complained to Bardejov about a foray of these Wallachians into their district, where they caused damage.\textsuperscript{105} The captain of Lubovňa Castle John of Masłov addressed a similar complaint to Bardejov in 1449, with information that the Makovica Wallachians had stolen horses from inhabitants of Krompachy.\textsuperscript{106} Another captain of this castle, John Socha asked Bardejov for help in 1452 with the hunt for a Wallachian named Staník, who was accused of stealing sheep.\textsuperscript{107} However, these Wallachians often also raided the territory of Poland. In 1444, the captain of the small town of Biecz Nicholas Pieniążek complained to the captain of Makovica Castle, that the Wallachians from Zborov had raided the forest near the village of Siary, where they stole 22 pigs.\textsuperscript{108} But it is necessary to observe that this relates to the Wallachians in the Lordship of Makovica generally and not to Zborov, in the territory of which Makovica Castle stood. Zborov itself never had a Wallachian and Ruthenian population.

A Wallachian was already imprisoned in Bardejov in 1435 for counterfeiting coins, and the town council of Krakow encouraged the people of Bardejov to impose the strictest punishment and requested that they be immediately informed if he revealed the names of his accomplices during torture.\textsuperscript{109} In 1463, the captain of the Polish castle of Muszyna John Wolski asked the town council of Bardejov to send an executioner, because he had condemned to death by hanging a certain Wallachian, who had caused much damage to the people of Bardejov.\textsuperscript{110} Two Wallachians were burnt at Vranov in 1479 for counterfeiting coins. Bardejov informed Oswald of Rozhanovce about this, and we learn that they came from the territory of the Lordship of Makovica, at that time belonging to the Rozhanovský family.

In the 1480s, the captain of Plaveč Castle asked Bardejov town council to hunt down a Wallachian named Hawrylla, who had evaded paying tolls.\textsuperscript{111} Thus, we can see from

\begin{footnotes}
\item[104] MOL DL 24 482: “quod quia de quibusdam districtibus nostre dyoecesis confinibus scismaticorum existentibus propter nimiam localem distanciam et gentis novelle ritum paganisinum decime nobis et ecclesie nostre predicte provenientes satis indecenter actenus sunt aministrate”. Compare also note 4.
\item[105] IVÁNYI, ref. 69, p. 69, no. 386: “wolahi de Macowicza”.
\item[106] IVÁNYI, ref. 69, p. 94, no. 542.
\item[107] IVÁNYI, ref. 69, p. 111, no. 676.
\item[109] IVÁNYI, ref. 69, p. 55, no. 288: “quendam walcham falsarium monete”.
\item[110] IVÁNYI, ref. 69, p. 222, no. 1 459: “quia valachum unum suspendemus, qui multa mala vobis fecit”.
\item[111] IVÁNYI, ref. 69, p. 324, no. 2 154.
\end{footnotes}
these records that the Wallachians often appear in the written sources as perpetrators of violence and crime, which caused considerable problems for the royal borough of Bardejov. As a result, the town council often adopted repressive measures against the Wallachians in the district.\textsuperscript{112} It is not surprising that in 1472, the Sheriff of Spiš Imrich Zápol’šký asked Bardejov not to persecute his spies – Wallachians named Buda and Myhno. They and their associates were often sent to Poland to obtain information for the king, because they were experts on the Polish frontier region.\textsuperscript{113} Bardejov itself used the Wallachians of the Makovica Lordship for intelligence services,\textsuperscript{114} and the people of Bardejov also employed Wallachians for the pasturing of cattle and as guides on the forest roads, especially on the way to Poland.\textsuperscript{115}

It is noteworthy that the above mentioned reports are very unspecific about the places of residence of the Wallachians in the Makovica Lordship, but this information can be relatively reliably reconstructed from the overall development of settlement in the district. It is necessary to observe that the Ruthenian population with Wallachian socio-legal organization penetrated into the Lordship of Makovica in large numbers already from the beginning of the 15\textsuperscript{th} century, as can be seen by comparing the state of the settlements from 1414 to 1417,\textsuperscript{116} when all the villages in the lordship were included, to the state of the settlements according to the tax records from 1427, in which the Wallachian and so ethnically Ruthenian villages do not appear. From the total number of 65 villages in the Lordship of Makovica, only 52 appear in the portal register from 1427.\textsuperscript{117} Among the missing settlements, the village of *Thurospathak had probably already disappeared, since it appears in no later sources, and it is possible to suppose temporary abandonment or natural disasters in the case of some other villages such as Poliakovce, Cernina and Tisinec, but in these continuity of Slovak population was maintained, and they appear as Slovak villages in the urbarium from 1507.

\begin{thebibliography}{99}
\item \textsuperscript{112} The town books of Bardejov from 1418 – 1444 contain various minutes on the capture of Wallachians. Compare: FEJÉRPATAKY, László (ed.). Magyarországi városok régi szamadáskönyvei. Budapešť 1885, p. 344a, 491b: “Item pro expensis captivis Walachis”.
\item \textsuperscript{113} IVÁNYI, ref. 69, p. 281-282, no. 1 867.
\item \textsuperscript{114} FEJÉRPATAKY, ref. 112, p. 343a: “Item olachs pro exploratione ad Beeczh” (from 1433), p. 506b “Item uni walacho exploratori”, p. 507b: “Item wolachis exploratoribus” (from 1440).
\item \textsuperscript{115} FEJÉRPATAKY, ref. 112, p. 491b: “Item uni olacho, qui conduxit dominum Stephanum et ostendit ei viam per silvam” (from 1439), p. 392b: “Item solvimus Bartes walach, quos concessit Antil et Jacobo in Cracoviam equitantes cum Augustino” (from 1438). About the payment and provisions for Wallachians in the services of Bardejov compare also further data from the town books: FEJÉRPATAKY, ref. 112, p. 344a-b, 346a, 347a, 391a, 483b, 486b, 506b, 507b, 518a, 601b, 602a, 606a.
\item \textsuperscript{116} MOL DL 10 187 (1414); 10 333 (1415); 10 335 (1417/1417/1414/1415); 10 440 (1417). RATKOŠ, Peter. Vznik a osídlenie Makovického hradného panstva do začiatku 17. storočia (The origin and settlement of the Lordship of Makovica Castle up to the beginning of the 17\textsuperscript{th} century). In Príspevky k dejínám východného Slovenska. Bratislava 1964, p. 44-45. RÁBIK, Vladimír. Osídlenie a národnostný ráz Makovického panstva v stredoveku (Settlement and national character of the Makovica Lordship in the middle ages). In Historický zborník, 2005, Vol. 15, No. 1, pag. 26-54.
\item \textsuperscript{117} MOL DL 32 690, fol. 7-10.
\end{thebibliography}
However, in the case of the other villages, namely: Nižný and Vyšný Svidník,\textsuperscript{118} Nižný and Vyšný Orlik, Ladomírová, Becherov, Vyšný Tvarožec, Gribov and Dubová, their absence from the 1427 portal register can be explained only by new Wallachian and Ruthenian inhabitants, who were not subject to land taxation. They already appear as villages with Ruthenian and Wallachian population in the urbarium from 1507, which is based on the situation in the lordship before 1490.\textsuperscript{119} However, it is typical of the Ruthenian population in this period that the Wallachian element settled mainly in older villages, often originally established according to German law such as the above mentioned villages, and only secondarily in newly founded settlements as the Ruthenian population grew.

Undoubtedly such a development could only happen as a result of the decline of the original Slovak population, as occurred especially in the valley of the river Ondava already at the beginning of the 15\textsuperscript{th} century, partly due to flight of the inhabitants, especially to Bardejov and the villages subject to it. Already from 1415, we have concrete evidence of mass flight of inhabitants from villages in the Lordship of Makovica, with more than 30 serfs of Simon Cudar fleeing to Bardejov and its village of Lukavice at the time of collection of the land taxes. However, the royal exchequer officer John Bubek confirmed the right of Bardejov and other royal boroughs not to give up the serfs of aristocrats, who moved to the town.\textsuperscript{120} This was also a reason for the abandonment of settlements in the Lordship of Makovica. The Cudars and after them also the Rozhanovskýs endeavoured to solve this population deficit by settling Wallachian and ethnically Ruthenian inhabitants. This inflow of people was stimulated especially by the reform and unification of the obligations of the inhabitants to the lordship and “in the domain of Ladomírova” accepted by Reynold of Rozhanovce at the beginning of 1471, and directly emphasizing his effort to increase settlement of the lordship.\textsuperscript{121}

The testimony of two Wallachians Ivan of Stebník and Prokop of (Vyšný) Tvarožec from 1518 also corresponds to this. With other inhabitants of the Wallachian villages, they testified before the judicatory of the county in a dispute about possession of the Čierny les forest in the surroundings of Lukov. They told the story of events more than 40 – 50 years before. Another Wallachian from Snakov also said that he and others moved from Poland to Hungary at that time and settled in the forests of Malcov.\textsuperscript{122} It was precisely at that time that Wallachian and Ruthenian inhabitants penetrated into northern Šariš in larger numbers.

\textsuperscript{118} Wallachian hereditary mayors with the personal names Hayncz and Simon are recorded here from 1434. BEŇKO, ref. 30, p. 232 (with a reference to ŠA Prešov, pobočka Bardejov, MMB, Protokol 1416-1443, fol. 19).

\textsuperscript{119} EKK Budapest, Lit. et ep. Orig., Nr. 7, fol. 9v-10r. Similarly also ŠA Prešov, Druget H, I-66 (from 1514).


\textsuperscript{121} MOL DL 17 161: “volentes possessiones nostras ubique videlicet in pertinencis Makowycz et Ladmer habitas populosas efficere”. RATKOŠ, ref. 116, p. 47.

\textsuperscript{122} MOL DL 69 106.
The above mentioned urbarium of the villages in the lordship written around 9th October 1507 is an important document testifying to the overall settlement penetration of Wallachian and Ruthenian inhabitants into the Lordship of Makovica in the Middle Ages. The whole document is preserved only in draft form, but this is useful, because it includes data that would have been omitted from the finished copy. For example, it recorded that for every ten beehives Wallachians and Ruthenians had to deliver one basket or more precisely the honey and wax from the production of one hive, and for each hive they had to pay one florin. However, this item was later crossed out and no further information more closely specifies the duties of Ruthenian and Wallachian villages, although the villages in the lordship were precisely differentiated in this spirit. The villages of Šarišské Čierne, Rovné, Stebník, Becherov, Varadka, Petrová, Vyšný Tvarožec, Dubová, Vyšný and Nižný Orlik (Vyšný Orlik was the seat of the Wallachian duke), Vyšný and Nižný Svidník, Bukovec (the writer added that the 6 inhabitants were divided into 3 Slovaks and 3 Wallachians – “tres Sclavi et tres volochi”), Veľké Straškovce, Pstrina, Gribov, Vyslava, Kružlová, Ladomirová and Vagrinec, were designated as Ruthenian settlements with Wallachian inhabitants. Orthodox priests, popularly called “Batko” and officially plebanus Rutenus were found in Stebník, Dubová, Vyšný Orlik and Gribov.

It is important to observe that such a division of villages was of older origin, as is shown by comparison of the data on individual villages with the document of the Chapter of Buda from 1492, by which the chapter distinguished the girls’ quarters for the daughters of John and Oswald of Rozhanovce, and recorded in detail the state of settlement in the lordship after the devastating invasion in 1491 – 1492 by the Polish army of John Albert, who aspired to the throne of Hungary with the support of part of the Hungarian nobility after the death of Matthias I. Comparison of the document from 1492 with the urbarium from 1507 documents only minor changes in the settlement of the lordship and shows that even 15 years after the devastation, the district had not been regenerated with new inhabitants. This was also reflected in the total value of the Lordship of Makovica, as illustrated by the exchange between Sarah widow of John Tarczay from Sarišské Sokolovce and the Palatine Imrich of Perin. In exchange for the Lordship of Makovica, he gave Sarah the Lordship of Šečovce, which was composed only of the small town of


124 EKK Budapest, Lit. et ep. Orig., Nr. 7, fol. 1r: “Et hoc in medio dumtaxat Rutenorum et volachorum, non autem Christianorum”.

125 An Orthodox priest is already documented at Svidník (Vyšný or Nižný) in 1458, 1478 and 1492. IVÁNYI, ref. 69, p. 307, no. 2 038. BEŇKo, ref. 30, p. 232, 268.

126 MOL DL 3 022. Specifically, it is possible to add that in 38 villages in the lordship in 1492, the total number of inhabited farms was 154. In 1507 the officials of the lordship counted in 48 villages only 221 inhabited farms and a further 43 cottages. In the context of the total number of farm portals taxed in 1427, when 52 villages in the lordship contained up to 1565 portals (MOL DL 32 690, fol. 7-10), this represented a critical number and a deep decline of settlement in the lordship.

127 Ref. 65.
Sečovce and another seven villages and two abandoned settlements. In this context, they again differentiated between the Ruthenian and Slovak villages in the Lordship of Makovica, giving a division faithfully corresponding to the urbarium from 1507.\(^{128}\)

However, the oldest known record of the presence of Wallachians in Šariš relates to the property of the Sóos family of Solivar, where we learn from the complaints of the noblemen of Kokošovce in 1402, that against their will, the Sóos family had settled Wallachians in the territory of Kokošovce, and the cattle of the Wallachians grazed on the crops.\(^ {129}\) Sometime around 1408, John Kokoš and his men (servants) attacked the Wallachians of Peter Sóos in the disputed woods and left them thoroughly thrashed as a warning to others.\(^ {130}\) However, it is impossible to say reliably whether this concerned the village of Nová Ves, already mentioned among the properties of the Sóos family in 1419. It only received the ethnic adjective “Ruská” in modern time. This village is registered among the taxed settlements of the County of Šariš in 1427, which suggested arable rather than pastoral farming.\(^ {131}\)

However, already sometime in the first half of the 15th century, the sources document the presence of the Wallachian element in the western part of Šariš in the properties of the Torysa and Kamenica lordships, where an intensive settlement process according to German law was in progress from the last third of the 13th century. It spread here from neighbouring Spiš and also extended to the Lordship of Šarišský Háradok. The model we saw in the Lordship of Makovica also applied here. Wallachians of Ruthenian ethnic origin penetrated into older settlements created according to German law, which were later abandoned. In an undated document from around 1400 of John deputy captain of Šarišský Háradok, we learn that Ruthenians were already settled in the village of *Viliamvagasa from which the tithes required by the state laws did not have to be collected.\(^ {132}\) This village already existed in 1345 under the name Wernerwagasa, together with Lúčka and *Harčár, which were located nearby,\(^ {133}\) but it must have been abandoned by the end of the 14th century, as were the neighbouring settlements. Ruthenians with a Wallachian organization settled here around 1400. This is reliably shown by the fact that they do not appear in the portal register from 1427, although the neighbouring settlements did. However, this village also disappeared by the end of the Middle Ages. In 1522 it is already only described as a deserted settlement (*predium*).\(^ {134}\)

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129 ŠA Prešov, Farkaš Z, no. 35: “olahos inter possessionis eorum (sc. Delne)... potentiali condescendi fecisset... fruges ipsorum depasci fecissent”. ULIČNÝ, ref. 71, p. 438, 470.


131 ZsO VII, p. 251, no. 969. ULIČNÝ, ref. 71, p. 273-274 supposes a mixed population of Wallachians and peasant farmers. MOL DL 32 690: “*Wyfalv Nicolai Sos*”.

132 ZsO II/1, p. 90, no. 783: “*decimas... de Viliam Vagasa de omnibus Rutenis*”.


134 MOL DL 69 125.
A document from the captain of Šarišský Hrádok Castle John of Kozojedy addressed to Bardejov in 1455 also testifies to the presence of Wallachians of Ruthenian nationality in the Lordship of Červený Hrádok. He asked the town not to intervene against the Wallachians under his administration, because he himself had no knowledge of their actions.\textsuperscript{135,134} This concerned not only the Wallachians from the village of *Wernerwagasa, but apparently also from Olejníkov, first mentioned among the properties of the castle in 1454.\textsuperscript{136} Olejníkov appears in the tithe register from 1538 as a Ruthenian village.\textsuperscript{137} However, the Ruthenians must have penetrated at the same time into the village of Hanigovce, which had two parts by the end of the 14\textsuperscript{th} century, one of which – Veľké Hanigovce – was granted to Peter of Šemše in 1392 by the king. This Hanigovce remained a Slovak village, while the other Hanigovce settlement was already abandoned in 1398.\textsuperscript{138}

This abandoned settlement then became a property of the Lordship of Kamenica, and when it again appeared as an existing village with the name “Malé Hanigovce” in 1404,\textsuperscript{139} it had undoubtedly become a Ruthenian and Wallachian village. In 1479, an unnamed Wallachian hereditary mayor of Hanigovce was in Bardejov prison and the castellan of Muszyna Castle in Poland John Białogrodzki testified about his offences. These included robbery in the small town of Nowy Sącz.\textsuperscript{140} This Hanigovce is recorded in the tithe register from 1538 as a village inhabited by Ruthenians.\textsuperscript{141}

Walachian and Ruthenian inhabitants settled in a similar way as a secondary element in other villages in the Lordship of Kamenica and Torysa. When Jakub of Brezovica mortgaged his property there to Michael Poch of Žehra in 1440, there was mention of Legnava, where Wallachians lived.\textsuperscript{142} However, the Wallachian population could have penetrated there only after 1427, when Legnava still appeared among the taxed settlements and we learn for the first time about its existence and the German origin of its name.\textsuperscript{143} Legnava also appeared as a village with Ruthenian inhabitants in the tithe register from 1538.\textsuperscript{144}

Blažov also developed as a Ruthenian village with Wallachian inhabitants from the second half of the 15\textsuperscript{th} century, although it was originally established according to Ger-
man law by the founder Blažej of Brezovica in 1317. However, in 1480 Wallachians already lived in Blažov, as we learn from the investigation documents of representatives of the County of Šariš, according to which they attacked the cart of Nicholas of Brezovica, which was returning from Žilina with a load of materials and clothes. In 1513, Peter of Spišský Hrholov protested before the judicatory of the Spiš County, that the villeins of Francis of Brezovica from the village of Blažov, therefore meaning Wallachians, had pastured their sheep without authorization in the woods and meadows of Nižné Repáše. As a result he confiscated them, but armed Wallachians with their landlord came to Repáše at night and took away not only their own, but also the animals of the inhabitants, one of whom was injured. In 1480, when the judicatory of the Šariš County investigated the excesses of Wallachians from Blažov, behind whom stood their landlord Stanislav of Brezovica, he was also accused of attacking on a public road a certain Wallachian from Tichý Potok, a serf of his relation Nicholas of Brezovica.

Tichý Potok with the original German name Stillbach first appeared in written sources only in the portal register from 1427. It was a village founded under German law and here the original population was German. A source from 1519 gives the German name Friedrich for a recently deceased farmer from the village. The Wallachian and ethnically Ruthenian population was also a secondary element here.

The penetration of Wallachian and Ruthenian inhabitants into the north-western part of Šariš and into the Lordship of Makovica is explained in more detail by a document from the deputy sheriffs and county officers in 1518, recording the story of the investigation of possession of the Čierný les forest in the surroundings of Lukov. They questioned various witnesses about these matters, especially Peter Kádar (cooper) from Lenartovo, a serf of Nicholas of Kapušany, who declared that the disputed forest was always used by the castellans of Kamenica, about which he allegedly had 40 years of knowledge. This was confirmed by Trochan from *Miastko (a vanished locality in the territory of Tylicz in Poland), which belonged to Muszyna Castle, and by Hrycko of Andrejovka, as well as by serfs from the Lordship of Makovica Ivan of Stebník and Prokop from Vyšný or Nižný Tvarožec and finally a certain Synka from Lukov.

However, the noteworthy part was the testimony of Jaczko Strizon from Snakov, who declared that fifty years before he had lived in Poland, but at that time he and others, undoubtedly also Wallachians came to the village of Malcov with their sheep and cattle. They settled in certain fields or woods belonging to this village. The inhabitants of Macov discovered them and wanted to drive them out. However, they finally reached agreement and the inhabitants of Malcov permitted them to settle in the territory of the

145 RDSI II, p. 92-93, no. 167. RÁBIK, ref. 6, p. 67.
146 MOL DL 69 070: “quod nobilis Nicolaus de Brzyzowycz quibusdam diebus miserat propter suum currum ad Silnam ... cum igitur domum peragere voluissent... valachi de Balass wagasa... ipsum currum dicti exponentis ad libitum ipsorum cepissent”.
147 MOL DL 63 886: “certas greges et pecora ovium iobagionum... in possessione Balas wagas commoran-cium”.
148 MOL DL 69 070: “dum dictus Stanislaus de Brzywycz... repetit quendam valachium de Stelbachtum”.
150 MOL DL 69 115: “tres sessiones suas iobagionales... alteram condam Frederice dicti in Stelbah (l) ...”.
village, but forbade them to go into the Čierny les forest because it was the property of the late Thomas of Torysa. There is no doubt that this was a matter of the Wallachian population, which settled in the territory of Malcov mainly in the older village of Snakov. It is also noteworthy that with the exception of Lenartov, only inhabitants of Wallachian and Ruthenian villages provided evidence, because it was they who had the most experience of migration in the forbidden areas. However, the document from 1518 allows us to more precisely date the larger scale arrival of Ruthenians not only in Snakov, but in the whole district, to the period around 1470. Ruthenian inhabitants also penetrated into other neighbouring settlements no later than this time. Apart from the villages mentioned in the document, these included Hrabské (partially), Venecia, Orlov, Starina, Údol and Bajerovce, as well as the villages in the Poprad valley of Plaveč and Plavnica. Only the village of Livov, first mentioned in writing in 1470 must be regarded as a newly established Ruthenian settlement. All these villages are designated Ruthenian settlements in the only partly preserved tithe register of the County of Šariš from 1538, and tithes were not collected from them.

However, older information is available about the Wallachian and Ruthenian inhabitants of the villages of Andrejovka, Starina, Lukov and Venecia. We learn that in 1505 the Wallachian Vaško Huerptch bought the positions of the Wallachian hereditary mayors of Starina (Starinska) and Andrejovka (Andrzejovka) from the original hereditary mayors Peter and Andrew sons of Ivan Kruchlica. In 1518, noblemen from Kamenica endeavoured to settle the Wallachian Ichnath, originally from Venecia, in Lukov, but the noblemen from Kapušany, to whom he was subject, protested. The Wallachians were already in Venecia in 1491, when one of them – David, together with associates, participated in an attack on the Polish village of Śnieńtica.

The whole expedition, in which inhabitants of other villages also participated, was led by Andrew son of a man known as Lulow (Livov?), apparently a Ruthenian and an inhabitant of the Wallachian village of Hradisko. However, a complaint from 1506

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151 MOL DL 69 106: “Item Jaczko Strizon de Snako iobagio nobilis Johannis Bornemissa de Polynaka fassus fuisset, quomodo ipse in anno circa quinquaginta preterito… in regno Polonie moram habuisset, et extunc venerat cum aliis sociis suis cum pecoribus suis de Polonia ad campum sew ad silvam possessionis Malczo, ibique eosdem reperissent iobagiones egregii Nicolai de Kapy in eadem Malceza commorantes, ibique ipsos voluissent inde pellere cum pecoribus suis et tandem cum eisdem iobagionibus ipsi concordassent et sic ipsos quieta relinquissent”. At the time of collection of the portal tax in 1548, some inhabitants fled to Poland. MOL Kamara, E 158, A. 2658, fol. 451.


153 MOL Kamara, E 159, B. 1036, Regesta decimarum comitatus Sarosiensis de anno 1538, part 7-9: “Ruteni sunt… non decimantur”.

154 MOL Budapest, Archivum Locumtenentiale, Limitarnea Hungarico-Polonica, Nr. 92, Fasc. Q, Lad. XX, Nr. 3. The content of the document is preserved only in a copy from 1793. BEŇKO, ref. 30, p. 216.


156 SROKA, ref. 84, Vol. III., p. 185, no. 524: “primo fuit Daud de Vanacia cum suis coadiutoribus”.

157 SROKA, ref. 84, Vol. III, p. 185, no. 524: “item de Hradyszko Andreas filius dicti Lulow, qui ducor horum omnium fuit”.

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gives direct information about its Wallachian population. According to the complaint the Wallachians and inhabitants of Hradisko pastured their cattle and sheep in woods outside the territory of the village.\footnote{MOL DL 39 855: “valachi et iobagiones de Hradiseza”. ULIČNÝ, ref. 71, p. 397. Hradisko appears in the urbaria from 1557 and 1606 with Ruthenian inhabitants. MOL Budapest, U et C, fasc. 4, nr. 48: “Radiska” (1557); fasc. 40, nr. 38: “Radiczka Rutheni” (1606). The neighbouring village of Žatkovce also appears as Ruthenian in these urbaria, and it is possible that the Ruthenians also penetrated here at the same time as to Hradisko.} We will also comment that the territory of the County of Šariš in the Middle Ages already contained further villages under the name Voľa, namely Nižná and Vyšná Voľa and Jakubova Voľa, but these villages were the work of Polish founders and were also partly settled by Polish inhabitants. They were not Ruthenian settlements.\footnote{Nižná and Vyšná Voľa were originally called Jakubova Poruba (in 1382 Jacabuagasa; ŠA Levoča, Andrásy KH, Fasc.53, Nr. 15) and Petrova Poruba (in 1438 Petherwagasa; AMK, TA, Kalnaj-S, nr. 21.) but when we have more detailed information in modern times about the ethnicity of the population, both settlements were Slovak. Other settlements were established by Polish founders in the immediate surroundings, including the present village of Poliakovec in the Lordship of Makovica (in 1415 Polyak; MOL DL 10 333) and the village of “Polyvakagasa” somewhere near Maráň, documented in 1370 (CDH IX/4, p. 252-253, no. 149). In the neighbouring village of Porúbka, we find an inhabitant with the ethnic name of “Georgius Polak” in 1572 (MOL Kamara, E 158, A. 2655, fol. 153). It was similar in the case of Jakubová Voľa in the valley of the Torysa (1315 nova villa... Iacobuagasa; 1332 Jacabuagasa; RDSI II., p. 23-24, no. 7 (1315); ŠA Levoča, SspK, Scrin IX, Fasc. 6 (1332); MOL DL 68 903 (1352), which only appears under the name Voľa in 1474 (“Wolyaiacabfalua” ŠA Prešov, Druget H, I-51). This indicates demographic and ethnic changes and shows that the village must have been settled by people of at least partly Polish origin under the new settlement conditions of the 15th century. The fact that the nearby vanished village of *Petrovenec in the territory of Dubovica had an inhabitant called Nicholas the Pole in 1432 is undoubtedly connected with this (IVÁNÝI, ref. 69, p. 45, no. 247: “Nie Polonus de Petermeziv”).}

Finally, it is also necessary to especially mention the Ruthenian and Wallachian inhabitants of the County of Abov, although we do not have proof of more permanent settlements in the Middle Ages. The oldest Košice court book contains a record from 1394 that the burgheers included a certain tinsmith “Walach”,\footnote{HALAGA, Ondrej R. (ed.). Acta iudiciaria civitatis Cassoviensis 1393 – 1405. Das älteste Kaschauer Stadtbuch (The odest town judge book). München 1994, p. 61: “Walach platener”. HALAGA, Ondrej R. Počiatky Košic a zrod metropoly (The Beginnings of Košice and the Birth of a Metropolis). Košice 1992, p. 258.} but he could have been a man of Rumanian nationality actually from Wallachia. However, Wallachian and Ruthenian inhabitants already appeared in the surroundings of Košice in the 14th century. This is shown by a letter from Pope Boniface IX from 1402, by which the Pope endeavoured to support the reconstruction of the burnt out Church of St. Elizabeth by granting indulgences for pilgrims according to the model of St. Mark’s in Venice or the Porziuncola in Assisi. He also emphasized that various Wallachians and Ruthenians had converted to Roman Catholicism in the church at Košice.\footnote{Monumenta Vaticana historiam regni Hungariae illustratia I/4. Budapest 2000, p. 26.}

Some of these Wallachians and Ruthenians undoubtedly became burghers of Košice, as is shown by the case of Michael and Peter from Galicia, who appear as “concives”

158 MOL DL 39 855: “valachi et iobagiones de Hradiseza”. ULIČNÝ, ref. 71, p. 397. Hradisko appears in the urbaria from 1557 and 1606 with Ruthenian inhabitants. MOL Budapest, U et C, fasc. 4, nr. 48: “Radiska” (1557); fasc. 40, nr. 38: “Radiczka Rutheni” (1606). The neighbouring village of Žatkovce also appears as Ruthenian in these urbaria, and it is possible that the Ruthenians also penetrated here at the same time as to Hradisko.

159


in the oldest Košice town book from 1393 – 1405. In 1437 Wallachians were already wandering in the forests of the monastery of Jasov. The grazing of their cattle damaged the forests and the prior Stanislav accused the castellan of Tuňa Castle of introducing them. Two years later the same Wallachians were wandering in the surroundings of Smolník, where they attacked and robbed people. The monarch ordered the castellan of Tuňa Stephen Šafár to take action against them. However, there was no more permanent penetration of Wallachians and Ruthenians or establishment of settlements in the territory of the County of Abov in the Middle Ages.

In conclusion, it is possible to summarize that the Ruthenians penetrated into the territory of eastern Slovakia in two basic waves starting from the beginning of the 14th century. At first they provided population for the settlements established according to the principles of the then fashionable and rapidly spreading German law, but almost at the same time, Ruthenians with Wallachian organization appeared in eastern Slovakia. However, very few settlements with continuous occupation by this Wallachian population can be identified from the 14th century. The Wallachians of this time can be described more as a group leading a way of life without constant links to fixed settlements. They did not build their own settlements but moved into the territories of existing settlements and often migrated.

More permanent settlement of the Wallachian population in eastern Slovakia is documented only from the beginning of the 15th century, but it still applies that new Ruthenian inhabitants with Wallachian socio-legal organization usually settled in older abandoned settlements, which are securely known to have been originally founded according to German law. This was strongly connected with the generally declining state of settlement in eastern Slovakia, especially its northern part, as it can be documented already from the end of the 14th century. It was similar in the case of further waves of Ruthenian inhabitants in the Middle Ages. It was only in the 16th century, especially from its middle, that more substantial Ruthenian-Wallachian activity can be documented. This involved building of new settlements, which significantly changed the ethnic and religious character of this part of Slovakia. However, the situation in the lands of the Drugeth family, namely the Lordship of Humenné within the County of Zemplín is an exception. The Drugeths settled their lands with Wallachian elements already in the Middle Ages, but this was so characteristic for the territory, that villages in the lordship were designated Wallachian already in the Middle Ages and the Wallachian term krajňa was used in the administrative organization of the Zemplín County.

* Symbol indicates a vanished settlement.
The present study deals with Palatine P. Pálffy’s conflict with the Archbishop of Esztergom Georgius Lippay in the years 1646 – 1653. The author used archive materials from the Trautmansdorf family archive and a memorandum written by P. Pálffy to the Emperor Ferdinand III. in the year 1650. As there are no archive documents, J. Lippay’s attitude to P. Pálffy is not known. P. Pálffy and J. Lippay were leaders of political groups which were against each other and their conflicts took place in the Hungarian parliament and at gatherings of the Hungarian nobility. The Vienna court was a significant place where the two representatives had their quarrels. The conflict had a negative influence on 17th century Hungary. Because of Rákoczy’s expeditions and Turkish attacks, Hungary faced an economic crisis, which required a unified approach from the Hungarian representatives, but the situation was different.


Differences of view between leading political figures were not a rare occurrence in the past. When researching the history of the Kingdom of Hungary or of Slovakia in the first half of the 17th century, we find a great number of examples of conflicts between Hungarian aristocrats recorded in the sources. The main causes of the disputes can be divided into two groups: property and power-political, but often there is no difference between them, because power conflicts were connected with efforts to gain wealth and the associated social position. The Battle of Mohács was followed by an era of acquisition of extensive properties. This process was conditioned by the coming of a new dynasty – the Habsburgs – to the throne of Hungary and by the coming of the so-called “new aristocracy” onto the political scene. However, by the first half of the 17th century, the political and economic elite of the country was more or less established and individual powerful aristocratic families already had the area of their activity more or less defined. The route to great properties lay either through advantageous marriages or through obtaining estates, which had returned to the possession of the crown after the male line of a family died out. Merciless struggles were carried on for their possession either in pledge or in the
best case as a hereditary possession. Whoever triumphed in this struggle gained greater prestige in the eyes of his political rivals.¹

The second most important cause of disputes was the struggle to obtain the highest state offices and most recently to gain positions at the Vienna court. In the stabilized political and economic conditions after the upheavals of the Fifteen Years War, the Hungarian elite realized that the route to property and position as well as to the financial, military and material aid essential for the struggle against the Turks was through Vienna. The new generation of politicians coming after the Peace of Vienna – Nicolaus Esterházy (1583 – 1645) and Petrus Pázmány (1570 – 1637) – attempted to promote Hungarian interests at the imperial court to a much greater degree than their predecessors. The Palatine Nicolaus Esterházy strove to raise the importance and range of activities of the office of palatine. He deliberately created contacts with decision-makers and officials in Vienna, maintained contacts with diplomats accredited to the court and with foreign countries.² So that his political work would be continued, he gathered round him talented young aristocrats, among whom Adamus Batthyány (1610 – 1659), Nicolaus Zrínsky (1620 – 1664) and Franciscus Wesselényi (1605 – 1667) were especially notable. They formed the core of a political group of Hungarian aristocrats called the “Esterházy group”.³

Two of the most important Hungarian dignitaries died in 1645 – the Palatine Nicolaus Esterházy and the state judge Johannes Druget.⁴ This meant that personnel changes in the highest state offices were necessary. The situation placed two ambitious and talented politicians against each other, and their conflict was an important feature of political life in Hungary in the period 1646 to 1653. They were the Archbishop of Esztergom Georgius Lippay and Paulus Pálffy.⁵ As a simplified introduction to the analysis of this problem, it is possible to say that they “inherited” the dispute from their predecessors. Nicolaus Esterházy and Petrus Pázmány also came into conflict over unclear responsibilities. The Archbishop of Esztergom watched with great discontent the ever greater power-political ambitions of the palatine, who claimed to be the ”representative of the king”. As head of the Catholic Church in Hungary, he claimed a leading position in political life for himself.

³ The term was first used by the historian Katalin Péter in the Hungarian form „esterházisták“. See: PÉTER, Katalin. Esterházy Miklós. Budapest : Gondolat, 1985, p. 154-184.
⁴ Johannes Druget from Humenné (1609 – 1645) – comes (ispán, župan) of the county of Zemplín, struggled to suppress the rebellion of Peter Császár in 1632. He gained possession of the lordship of Tokaj after Catherine of Brandenburg, but after the Peace of Linz he had to give it up to the Rákóczi family. In 1636, Ferdinand II appointed him as a state judge and chief captain of Upper Hungary. He held these dignities until his death.
In the initial phase of research, we had fragmentary information about the essence and course of the misunderstanding between Pálffy and Lippay. Then we found the memorandum of Paulus Pálffy to the Emperor and King Ferdinand III from 1650, in which he stated the accusations against him from the archbishop and the basis of the dispute between them. Apart from telling us about the rivalry of two of the most important politicians in the Kingdom of Hungary from 1647 to 1653, this important document reveals the mechanisms, which led to the filling of important posts, and provides a unique view of political struggles in both their public and behind the scenes aspects.

However, to enable us to evaluate this problem in a comprehensive and objective way it would be good to have a similar document from the pen of Georgius Lippay summarizing his reservations against Pálffy. The archbishop’s position can only be partially reconstructed from several documents, in which he expressed views on Pálffy. For example, in a letter addressed to Adamus Forgách he criticized the palatine for allegedly going beyond his powers: “I was recently in Vienna... where I heard numerous complaints against the lord palatine, who allegedly arbitrarily decreed the brachium regale against Lord Forgách. I did not speak about this with His Majesty, I saw that enough people are concerned with it. After I came here to Hlohovec, they brought me letters from Upper Hungary about the outrage provoked among the people by the housing of Germans. I also began to consider that if the lord palatine is beginning to grant brachium regale, it may sometime effect me, indeed I know, what attitude the lord palatine has towards me. He is an uncircumspect person, who does not know our laws and is friends with that worthless Vittnyédi.”

In introduction, it is immediately necessary to emphasize that Pálffy and Lippay were a pair of equal political opponents. Although the palatine wanted to create the clear impression with his memorandum that he had increasingly become the “victim” of the archbishop’s attacks, it is more than certain that the palatine made an equal contribution to the tense relations between them.

The first sharp dispute arose between them over the question of Pálffy’s appointment as state judge, as is shown by his declaration to the monarch: “After Lord Homonnai died, he (Lippay) had documents prepared in the name of Your Majesty, in which he named candidates for the position of state judge. (...) However, they included people, who told me directly that they did not want to stand in the way of me gaining the dignity of judge.”

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7 This was the Sopron advocate Stephanus Vittnyédi, who was a Lutheran and this even more antagonized the archbishop. Slovak National Archives, Ústredný Pálffyovský archív, A. VIII, V. F. I., No. 5 Letter from Georgius Lippay to Adamus Forgách, Hlohovec, 18th November 1650. (Hereinafter: SNA, ÚPA).
8 Johonnes Druget.
9 The original German text states „etliche mandata“.
10 HHStA, Turcica 1650, Pálffy memorandum.
According to Hungarian law, the monarch had the right to appoint the state judge. In this case, it is incomprehensible how Lippay could produce a document in the name of the monarch without being punished. It is more than probable that his assistant in these actions was the chancellor of Hungary Georgius Szelepchényi (1595 – 1681), who was the most important political ally of the archbishop.

Pálffy was appointed state judge in February 1646. This meant the end of his twenty years at the head of the Hungarian Chamber. Filling of this now vacant office became a further topical personnel question. Pálffy proposed Gabriel Erdődy and Daniel Esterházy as his replacements. He protested against the activity of his rival, who supported the candidature of his brother Casparus Lippay, in a letter addressed to the Emperor: “Most noble Emperor, I have heard that the Lord Archbishop intends to support the candidature of his brother: I ask Your noble Majesty not to decide on this matter... until I have proved to Your Majesty that Lord Lippay is not suitable for this office and would do great harm there. I will give You a report on this matter.” However, this time the state judge lobbied in vain for his candidate. Two weeks later Casparus Lippay received the congratulations of the court for his appointment as chairman of the Hungarian Chamber.

The quarrel between the two powerful men divided the Hungarian political community into two camps. Pálffy had the support of the most important former supporters of the late Palatine Esterházy, in spite of the fact that during his life the old palatine had been a great critic and opponent of Pálffy. Apart from the above mentioned Batthány and Zrínsky, the core of the Pálffy group included Ladislaus Esterházy and Adamus Forgách (1601 – 1681). The members of the group were related, as well as being close in views. Pálffy became the leading figure in the Esterházy group thanks to the fact that he was one of the guardians of Ladislaus Esterházy and that he had effectively helped the Esterházy’s to win their dispute with the Nádasdy family over the lordship of Eisenstadt.

However, not all faithful adherents of the Esterházy’s could accept Paulus Pálffy as the bearer of the political legacy of the former palatine. Two ambitious members of the Csáky family – Stephanus later the exchequer officer and Ladislaus, from 1650 state judge, and Franciscus Wesselényi captain of Upper Hungary, later also of Košice, left the ranks...
of the Esterházy group. They became supporters of Archbishop Lippay, although they still declared their allegiance to the political legacy of Nicolaus Esterházy, as Franciscus Wesselényi put it: “I was a faithful servant of the late Nicolaus Esterházy, and although I am not as intelligent as him, I learnt the little I know from his teaching.”19 The majority of the Hungarian clergy understandably supported Lippay, but as we already mentioned, his closest and most faithful associate was the Chancellor Georgius Szélephényi.

The route to widening the ranks of adherents did not lead only through identification with the political aims of the leading figure in the group or through family relations. Intrigue and slander also played a role, as can be seen in the case of the vice-palatine Ladislaus Keresztúry, who was described by Pálffy to Maximilian von Trauttmansdorff: “...tomorrow I will travel in the name of God to Nitra and at night with the Vice-Palatine (Ladislaus Keresztúry). I did not discuss this matter only with the Lord Archbishop, who informed me that he had spoken with the Lord Archbishop Püsÿky,20 who said that the Vice-Palatine wants to be his (Lippay’s) enemy and would do everything to take revenge on him, so he complained not only to Your Grace, but also to His Majesty. I replied to the Lord Archbishop that everything is entirely different and I will discuss it with the Lord Vice-Palatine. He told me that the Lord Archbishop never stopped accusing him and said things about him, which did not correspond to reality and humiliated him and destroyed his honour before His Majesty. Therefore, he had to take revenge, defend himself and finally act, although this is not pleasant for the Lord Archbishop. Thus, if the Lord Vice-Palatine said such things, I would not bear it and so I said to him (Lippay) that I did not believe it, to which he replied that on the next day he asked Püsÿky what actually happened and he denied everything... Your Grace will see from this how these people deal with words and say things, which slander others, but Your Grace will see from this that the Lord Vice-Palatine is innocent...”21

There was not a clear dividing line between the two political groups. For example, Franciscus Nádasdy was the chief enemy of Pálffy and young Esterházy from the beginning, because they cast doubt on his right to the lordship of Eisenstadt. After settlement of the dispute, he joined the party of the Palatine, but he still often corresponded with the Archbishop. However, he had very bad relations with Franciscus Wesselényi.22 The allegiance of the chief captain of Komáro and later Vice-President of the Military Council Johann Christoph Puchheim to one of the groups is also difficult to unambiguously determine. In spite of the fact that he was related to the Pálffy family and he maintained friendly

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20 Johannes Püsÿky (? – 1657) – from 1622 canon of Esztergom, from 1637 Bishop of Csanád, from 1643 Bishop of Nitra and from 1648 Bishop of Vac. In 1650 he became Archbishop of Károlysza.
23 His aunt Susanna Puchheim married Stephanus Pálffy, brother of Paulus Pálffy.
relations with Adamus Batthyány, in 1651 he participated in a serious attempt by Lippay to discredit Paulus Pálffy before the Emperor.

There were further disagreements between Lippay and Pálffy at the parliament of 1646. The assembly of the Hungarian Estates, summoned after a break of more than ten years, was accompanied by great expectations. Two important tasks awaited the participants: election of a new palatine and confirmation of the provisions of the Peace of Linz with Hungarian legislation. The sharpest political struggle was expected precisely over the question of acceptance of the peace treaty, because it contained extensive religious privileges for non-Catholics.

The question of Pálffy’s candidacy for the office of Palatine was solved immediately at the introductory meeting of the parliament and there was a surprising reversal.24 Instead of participating in the struggle for the highest position in Hungary, Pálffy was appointed as a member of the Privy Council. We learn about the circumstances of his appointment from a letter sent by Ladislaus Esterházy to Adamus Batthyány, soon after the opening of parliament in 1646: “According to the latest reports, I can write to Your Grace that Lord Paulus Pálffy will not be among the candidates for Palatine because he is to become a privy councillor.”25 So far we have not succeeded in finding out why Pálffy gave up his candidacy. He recalled the circumstances of his appointment to the Privy Council four years later as follows: “When Your Majesty graciously appointed me to the Privy Council at the last parliament, he (Archbishop Lippay) swore to me that he wanted to have sincere relations with me, to be the friend of my friends and the enemy of my enemies...”26 Stephanus Vittnyédy, Sopron advocate and adherent of Pálffy stated that the representatives of the clergy frustrated the candidacy of the state judge. They ensured that he became a member of the Privy Council so that he could not participate in the struggle for the position of Palatine.27

We must take Vittnyédi’s statement in relation to the whole situation. The question arises of how could the Hungarian clergy influence the appointment of members of the Privy Council. We think they had hardly any influence, if we take into account that its composition depended first of all on the monarch and secondly on lobbying by the members. Lippay was also a member of this body from 1637, but in contrast to Pálffy, who frequently appears in its records, Lippay’s name has still not been found in the records of its meetings.28 It is more than probable that Pálffy became a member thanks to his

24 The opening of parliament was originally planned for 1st May, but the death of Queen Maria Anna caused a delay until 24th August.
26 HHStA, Turcica 1650, Pálffy memorandum.
excellent relations with the chairman Maximilian von Trauttmsendorff and the favour of the monarch.29

However, there is a noteworthy statement by Ladislaus Esterházy and Vittnyédi: Pálffy gave up his candidacy to be Palatine so that he could become a privy councillor. Three years later, when he was actually elected Palatine, the fact that he was also a privy councillor was no obstacle. Is it possible to suppose that Pálffy cleared the way for Lippay’s candidate Johannes Draskovich to achieve reconciliation with his rival?30

If our hypothesis is correct, then the reconciliation between the two politicians lasted a record short time: “... Before even three hours had passed, he began to slander me, saying I would betray everything important from the sessions of the Privy Council to the Evangelicals, and conspire with them, I am against the clergy, I support the Evangelicals and place myself on their side, I am the only person, who complicates the proceedings of parliament, I associate with people who take money from Rákoczi, which he and his envoys distribute, I am more Evangelical than Catholic, I want to expel the Jesuits from the country, I allegedly told Your Majesty that he leads an immoral life and so on, as I already informed You from Bratislava.”31

The facts mentioned by Pálffy in his declaration from 1650 can also be verified from one of the letters he sent to Maximilian von Trauttmsendorff in spring 1647 and from the reports to Vienna by Franz Christoph Khevenhüller, who also participated in the parliament. According to the peace treaty of Linz, signed on 16th December 1645, the Emperor and King Ferdinand III committed himself to hand over to Georgius I Rákoczi for his lifetime, seven counties in eastern Hungary and the city of Košice. The treaty guaranteed freedom of religion to the serfs, a ban on the driving out of Protestant clergy, the end of occupation of churches, the mutual return of churches occupied during the war and the negotiation of concessions to non-Catholics at the parliament. The Protestants demanded the return of 144 churches occupied by the Catholics since 1608, but the Catholics wanted to return only 68. In January 1647, the Vienna court adopted a compromise position. According to a diploma from Ferdinand III, 90 churches had to be returned to the non-Catholics.32

Pálffy and Lippay held entirely opposite positions on the question of acceptance of the peace treaty and legislation connected with it. The state judge, who had played a leading role in the negotiations between the Catholic and non-Catholic Estates and Vienna, and between Vienna and Rákoczi’s court at Sárospatak, supported the acceptance of a compromise position so that the situation in the country could be stabilized and further military conflict prevented. Precisely Pálffy’s function as negotiator between the sides stimulated the archbishop’s suspicions, which Pálffy mentioned in his declaration. The parliament dragged on, which aroused serious fears in the participants. Pálffy lacked the support and authority of Trauttmsendorff: “Now we realize where we made a mistake. If Your Grace had been here, the discussions would have been over in ten days, instead of

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29 Maximilian von Trauttmsendorff married Sophia, sister of Paulus Pálffy.
30 Johannes Draskovich was elected Palatine on 25th September 1646.
31 HHStA, Turcica 1650, Pálffy memorandum.
32 For material concerning the parliament, requests and complaints of the Estates at the parliament of 1646 – 1647 see: Magyar Országos Levéltár, Regnicolaris, Diaetae antiquae, N 49, Fase C and D.
dragging on for six months. I am afraid that if things do not change, the parliament will end badly. Your Grace will easily guess who caused all this. If the talks do not succeed, we could have war again and we have even less resources than before, since all parts of Hungary are devastated and the poor peasants have no bread. Your Grace would not recognize Marchegg and the lordship of Stupava. There is nothing left in Marchegg. I cannot give my people bread...

On the other hand, Lippay obstructed or ignored talks leading to reconciliation and made it clear that he was not against the continuation of war. This derives not only from Pálffy’s letter, but also from the statement of Franz Christoph Khevenhüller: “... Nothing has happened in parliament already for 12 days, no talks in spite of the fact that every delay is harmful for His Majesty, so he decided to stay until after Easter week and then go back to Vienna, leaving his commissioners here. After a time, he will see whether the Hungarians are approaching a solution. The Lord Archbishop would not welcome such a solution, he still persists in defending his militant views, that all should be solved with weapons. His position has antagonized Catholics and non-Catholics, because he does not act kindly and amicably to anyone, but speaks with violence, not even sparing our most noble lord. The Palatine is just as much out of his favour as Count Pálffy, who is the only man with the authority among the Estates to solve anything.”

After prolonged negotiations, Ferdinand III and the Hungarian Estates agreed to respect the peace of Linz. Georgius II Rákoczi, successor of Georgius I Rákoczi as Prince of Transylvania, also solemnly promised not to start a war against the German Emperor or other Imperial princes and to return to the Habsburgs the counties in the east of the Kingdom of Hungary. Religious freedom was enacted in Hungarian legislation and 90 churches were returned to the non-Catholics. At the conclusion of the parliament on 16th June, the son of Ferdinand III was elected King of Hungary and crowned on the same day. However, Ferdinand IV could not actually succeed his father because he died in 1654.

The Palatine Johannes Draskovich died in 1648. In August Ferdinand III entrusted the running of state affairs to Paulus Pálffy and Georgius Lippay. He emphasized that they should endeavour to cooperate in the interest of successful government. Both had

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The recipient of the letter, Maximilian von Trauttmansdorff could not be present in Bratislava because he was leading the delegation to the peace negotiations at Münster and Osnabrück.

Pálffy was alluding to Lippay.
Pálffy’s estate.
In the original: „... auch gar unseres allergemedigtes herrn nicht verschonen...“ The text does not make it clear who Khevenhüller has in mind. Lippay would probably have avoided an insult to the monarch.
Johannes Draskovich.
AVA FA Trauttmansdorff, Ee 2 Hungarica, K 133, Nr. 54, Fol. 107-108. Declaration of Franz Christoph Khevenhüller.
to transfer their seat to Bratislava and in the event of problems turn to Ferdinand IV.\textsuperscript{40} The question of who would hold the most important position in the kingdom again led to political conflict between Pálffy and Lippay. Meanwhile, however, Pálffy had strengthened his position sufficiently for his candidacy for the post to be practically unopposable. Parliament was called on 25\textsuperscript{th} January 1649 and the election of the Palatine followed three months later.

Apart from Pálffy, the candidates were Adamus Forgách, Sigismundus Lónyai and Ludovicus Nyáry. Everything suggests that the Archbishop of Esztergom was still trying to complicate Pálffy’s route to the position of Palatine: \textit{“Fourthly, Your Majesty will certainly kindly remember what he (Lippay) undertook with the ecclesiastical and temporal Estates, when he (the King) chose me for the dignity of Palatine.”}\textsuperscript{41} So far our research has not uncovered exactly what it was and the records of the parliament of 1649 do not mention anything extraordinary in connection with the election of Pálffy.\textsuperscript{42}

The fact that Pálffy became a leading political figure in the Kingdom of Hungary and a member of the Privy Council, opened entirely new dimensions to him and the members of his political group. Their main aim was to create the conditions for organizing a great and decisive expedition against the Ottoman Empire. This question became topical again not only because of the end of the Thirty Years War. In spite of the fact that the truce between Ferdinand III and the Sultan Mehmed IV was renewed for a further 22 years, Turkish attacks on Hungarian fortresses again began to increase in frequency. The Ottoman Empire renewed its expansionist policy thanks to the rise to power in Istanbul of the Grand Vizier Kara Mustafa.\textsuperscript{43} This military commander of Albanian origin was extremely ambitious. The Papal court watched the war against Venice for control of the island of Crete and ultimately of the Mediterranean region, with great fear. The Crimean Tatars also began to rebel against Ottoman overlordship, while Moldavia and Wallachia again feared that the Sublime Porte would threaten their independence.

In this situation, the Hungarian Estates had to take a more intensive interest in defence of the country. The 1649 parliament declared an extraordinary tax to finance the improvement of fortifications. This money would also be used to pay 1200 soldiers in fortresses in Upper Hungary, 1700 in Cis-Danubian and 1000 in Trans-Danubian fortresses. Observance of this law would be guaranteed by paragraph no. 7, according to which \textit{“in the case of those magnates, counties or towns, which were not willing to employ soldiers according to the precise regulations, did not want to contribute to their support or would not continue such efforts, the deputy sheriffs of counties, if they were indifferent the chief sheriffs or ultimately the Palatine had the full legal right to take double the pay of each soldier not employed in accordance with this decree, from the property of those...”}\textsuperscript{44}

\textsuperscript{41} HHStA, Turcica 1650, Pálffy memorandum.
\textsuperscript{42} PÉTER, ref. 27, p. 108.
not willing to maintain soldiers or continue to do so, after regular judicial investigation of the case. This sum must be enforced in all circumstances and used for the needs of the frontier fortresses." According to the text of the act, the Palatine had the duty of ensuring that the soldiers were in the fortresses by 1st August at latest.

Pálffy took his role very seriously and endeavoured to mobilize all interested groups in Hungarian society to fulfill this legal resolution. In spite of this, by the end of September there were still not enough soldiers available or enough finance to pay them: “At the last parliament we jointly decided to send a certain number of soldiers to the fortresses to defend our homeland and prevent the continual Turkish invasions. We informed His Majesty that the soldiers had not been enlisted by the deadline set in the legislation, and that some lords, counties and towns had not employed soldiers and they could not be placed in the fortresses.”

In a letter to Ladislaus Esterházy, Pálffy named the specific steps he had taken to fulfill his tasks, and he gave a picture of the situation on different parts of the defensive line: “In the fortresses belonging to the captain of Košice, they did not pay the monthly salary, so we were forced to pay four gulden for every horseman and so we finally succeeded in employing an army. In the capitanate of Nové Zámky, we have similar concerns, especially because of the constant attacks by the Turks. When we saw the suffering of the now dead vice-captain of Fiľakovo Paulus Vadászi, we were also forced to pay a monthly salary of four gulden and so we also employed an army there to defend our homeland. It appears that to pay the soldiers, the Trans-Danubian lords, counties and towns had to meet repeatedly at Csepreg or another place decided by Count Batthyány.” Pálffy asked Esterházy and Batthyány to do everything possible to secure the hiring and payment of soldiers.

The situation was substantially worsened by the fact that the Turks began to systematically attack the frontier line of Hungary. In August 1649 they launched a raid in the direction of Balaton, attacked the ferry near the castle of Kiskomárom and killed the ferrymen. This cut off the fortress from the outside world. Pálffy also informed the monarch about further raids: “The Turks attack us in spite of the validity of the peace treaty, they occupy free villages and – something, which did not happen up to now – they attack with units of two thousand soldiers. The director of the Kremnica mines has declared that the Turks are preparing for a great attack.” In the conclusion of the letter, the Palatine appealed to the unavoidable necessity of defending the country against such incidents:

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44 Corpus Iuris Hungarici, basic article no. 3, § 1-9.
45 S. LAUTER, ref. 19, p. 102. Letter from Paulus Pálffy to Adamus Batthyány, Bojnice, 22nd September 1649.
46 Hungary, village in the present county of Vas.
48 The captain of the castle Ladislaus Pető sought help from Paulus Pálffy and Adamus Batthyány. Adamus Batthyány and the garrison of the fortress of Zalavár. S. LAUTER, ref. 19, p. 90.
“If Your Majesty does not save the Kingdom of Hungary from the Turks, it will disintegrate and that will have unfortunate consequences for Your Majesty’s other countries.”

Apart from the Ottoman attacks, implementation of the acts of parliament on religious freedom from 1647 and 1649 was another great problem. It concerned especially the royal borough of Košice, where article XII of the 1649 act, on the building of churches, schools and residences for ecclesiastical dignitaries of the Catholic and Calvinist confessions provoked dispute. The first text of the act originated in 1647, but in the words of the first paragraph of the act: “... the town has still not designated these places, so religious freedom was violated. Therefore, the act decrees that the town of Košice and its council shall designate the places for construction within a month after the end of the session of parliament.”

In spite of the legislative provision, the dispute between the inhabitants of Košice continued with delegations taking turns to visit Pálffy. In his declaration to the monarch, the Palatine stated that this situation had arisen thanks to the involvement of Archbishop Lippay in the whole affair: “...Your Majesty will certainly remember that he (Lippay) had lengthy discussions with the Estates and towns and promised that only he could serve Your Majesty best. However, the exact opposite has happened: entirely in opposition to Your Majesty’s orders, he encouraged the towns not to obey the law, and in this way he humiliated me before the country and exposed me to ridicule and shame. Kebitsky, the present mayor of Košice confirmed this to me and admitted before 40 or more people that he (Lippay) had done everything, when I took over leadership of the negotiations. He stated that everything is useless, we are only wasting time. But with God’s help, I arranged everything for the satisfaction of Your Majesty, as he (the archbishop) would never have done.”

In October 1649 there was a personnel change, which was not favourable to Pálffy and his political group. Ladislaus Csáky, an adherent of Georgius Lippay’s group, became the new state judge. The two most important state offices after that of Palatine – the chairmanship of the Hungarian Chamber and the post of state judge, were gained by Pálffy’s opponents, which was an extraordinarily unfavourable circumstance for him. Among the most important dignitaries, the Palatine could really rely only on the Bán of Croatia Nicolaus Zrínsky. In a situation, when Hungary really needed solidarity between its highest political representatives, the two hostile political camps strove to use every situation to harm each other and this prevented the implementation of legislation and measures for the proper functioning of defence, the economy and the legal system.

At the end of the year, Pálffy had to fulfill a confidential mission for the monarch. Ferdinand III wanted to obtain a precise overview of the state of the garrisons, both Hungarian and German, in the fortresses, so he entrusted Pálffy as a member of the Privy

49 HHStA, Familienarchiv Pálffy, A. I, L. V, F. VII, Nr. 32 (hereinafter: HHStA, FA Pálffy) or JEDLICSKA, ref. 40, p. 444. Letter from Paulus Pálffy to Ferdinand III, 18th October 1649.
50 Web site: „1000 év törvényei“: http://www.1000ev.hu
51 HHStA, Turcica 1650, Pálffy memorandum.
52 Ladislaus Csáky (? – 1655) in 1645 chief sheriff of the county of Zvolen and from 1646 to 1655 chief sheriff of the county of Komáro and captain of Levice, Tata and Pápa (the last two now in Hungary). He was state judge from 1649 until his death in 1655.
Council, with making unexpected visits to fortresses and verifying the state of their garrisons. In the end, he had to submit a secret report to the monarch on the results of his investigations.53

This task was closely connected with another great project of the Vienna court, which had to be implemented by Paulus Pálffy. After the end of the Thirty Years War, a great number of mercenaries were “without work”. Ferdinand III decided to place them in the Hungarian fortresses. However, in practice, this meant that the Vienna court, which constantly struggled with financial problems, was attempting to transfer the cost of housing, financing and supplying the mercenaries to the inhabitants of the Kingdom of Hungary.

This decision naturally did not evoke positive reactions in Hungary. The country had great problems with maintaining soldiers in the fortresses, so the plan of the Vienna court meant a further immense burden for its inhabitants. Apart from this, the effort to place German mercenaries clearly contradicted the ideas of the Hungarian Estates. After experiences during the Fifteen Years War, when “foreign” mercenaries caused great material and human damage in Hungary, they decided that as few German mercenaries as possible should be kept in the country and only in the frontier fortresses.54

On the other hand, however, German mercenaries could greatly contribute to improving the defensibility of royal Hungary – as long as their coming to the country did not cause serious supply and financial problems. In the end, an internal political problem arose from the whole matter.

Therefore, Pálffy had to take various factors into account when carrying out his task. He had to respect the order from the monarch, while also arranging things so that the measures did not evoke great opposition from the population of Hungary. To put it simply, his task was to find a compromise with the idea of the Vienna court and ensure that the population accepted the German mercenaries. The Archbishop of Esztergom and his adherents did everything to prevent the smooth achievement of this aim. For example, in December 1649, Pálffy organized the placing of mercenaries in the fortress of Nové Zámky, but Lippay ensured that he did not carry out his orders quickly: “... I did not write to His Majesty, who caused all this, but I respectfully inform Your Grace that it was the Lord Archbishop with the help of some of his supporters...”55

At the beginning of January 1650, a meeting was held in Bratislava between the chief captain of Komárno Johann Christoph Puchheim, the advisor to the Court Chamber Clemens Radolt and Paulus Pálffy. The participants in this important meeting agreed on the

53 HHStA, FA Pálffy, A. I, L. V. F. VIII, Nr. 80 or JEDLICKA, ref. 40, p. 448. Letter from Ferdinand III to Paulus Pálffy, Vienna 28th December 1649.

54 According to legislative article no. 12 of the pre-coronation acts from 1608, German and foreign soldiers had to be removed from the castle of Varasd, from the royal borough of Varasd and from Muráň, Divény, Kőszeg, Levice and from places not included in the anti-Turkish defence line. CIH, legislative art. no. 12, § 1-4. According to the accounts from 1626, the following numbers of German mercenaries were placed in fortresses: Ráb 1000, Komárno 300, Nové Zámky 800, Levice 50, Novohrad 100, Fíľakovo 100, Muráň 40. HKA, Hoffinanz Ungarn, Juli 1625, fol. 54-59. Report of Hans Putz (Obrister Musterkommisariat Verweser) Court Military Council on the Situation in the Fortresses, 31st January 1625.

method and procedure for placing mercenaries in the fortresses and in private houses.\textsuperscript{56} The Palatine undoubtedly held the view that billeting mercenaries among the population should only be a temporary measure and offered to secure the construction of housing for the soldiers.\textsuperscript{57} He was extremely satisfied with the results of the talks and especially praised the cooperation with Clemens Radolt: \textit{“Through Lord Radolt, I offered Your Grace various matters, I ask Your Grace to trust him and respectfully grant him your favour as to an old friend and colleague, who visited the Hungarian, Kaniza and Croatian frontiers with men and helped to pay the soldiers. I can sincerely write about him that there are few people in the Court Chamber, who are willing to act in these matters...”}\textsuperscript{58}

Difficulties arose in connection with the fact that the coming of the German mercenaries was not well organized, the soldiers refused to obey Hungarian commanders, the counties did not want to provide resources for their maintenance and even the Vienna court did not supply them regularly.\textsuperscript{59} Hungry and undisciplined mercenaries began to commit offences against the population.\textsuperscript{60}

The Hungarian military commanders also opposed the plan to place German mercenaries in the Nové Zámky fortress. Paulus Serényi, vice-captain of this fortress attempted to gain the support of many others for his opposition, and Pálffy saw this as a threat to his authority as Palatine: \textit{“Your Grace, I send the letter from the Lord Archbishop translated into Latin. Your Grace will see the inclinations of these people from it. Among other things, he writes that because of this he has already called up soldiers, which he as Lord Archbishop should not do without the knowledge of the military commanders, because it is not part of his powers, so I cannot conceal from Your Grace that the Lord Archbishop and the chief commanders want to incline everybody against the general (Adamus Forgách) and cause confusion, which is not only against the orders of His Majesty, but also means great danger. The Lord Vice-Captain Paulus Serényi has stated that he would like to see where they will put the German soldiers. We think that such speech is not appropriate to a captain. When I was in Nové Zámky, talk of payment from His Majesty could be heard publicly at the archbishop’s table, but I quickly objected and closed his mouth with this. On the next day, he came to me with the Lord Count Forgách and again began to talk ridiculously about payments, to which I protested: Lord Šeré-}

\begin{footnotes}
\item[56] According to the agreement, Croatian soldiers would first be placed in Nové Zámky. They had to be financed by Lower Austria, but at the time of the meeting the monarch had still not received a decision from the Estates there. However, 200 horsemen from Walther’s regiment had to be placed in Nové Zámky. Finance for them had already been secured. Pálffy had to ensure that 100 of them got to Filakovo and 200 to Nové Zámky. The monarch learnt from the chief captain of Ráb Philip Mansfeld, that at Ráb 300 soldiers had not been placed in barracks but among the population. The monarch wanted to place 300 soldiers from Starhemberg’s regiment in Ráb. Pálffy would have to provide for them by billeting among the population.

\item[57] HHStA, FA Pálffy, A I, L 5, F 8, Nr. 86 or JEDLICKA, ref. 40, p. 459.

\item[58] AVA, FA Trauttmansdorff, Ee 2 Hungarica, Nr. 58, K 133, Fol. 239-240. Letter from Paulus Pálffy to Maximilian von Trauttmansdorff, Bratislava 6\textsuperscript{th} January 1650.

\item[59] HHStA, FA Pálffy, A I, L 5, F VIII, Nr. 98 or JEDLICKA, ref. 40, p. 457. Letter from Ferdinand III to Paulus Pálffy, Vienna 31\textsuperscript{st} October 1650.

\item[60] HHStA, FA Pálffy, A I, L 5, F VIII, Nr. 92 or JEDLICKA, ref. 40, p. 456. Letter from Ferdinand III to Paulus Pálffy, Ebersdorf 17\textsuperscript{th} September 1650.
\end{footnotes}
nyi, when I was only Paulus Pálffy and the chairman of the Chamber, I would not have tolerated something like this, not to mention that I am now Palatine, so talk to me with respect, otherwise I will show you how you should speak with me. He also wanted to stir up others to oppose me and speak about pay. It will be better if they do not do this, because they know that I will not tolerate it. Your Grace will see from what I write, what the Lord Archbishop is doing against His Majesty and the Lord Chief Captain...”

Pálffy and his adherent Forgách intended to follow the monarch’s orders concerning the placing of German mercenaries. On the other hand, however, Lippay’s position is also understandable. It is known that the Hungarian frontier fortresses suffered from acute supply difficulties. The housing conditions of their garrisons were inappropriate and uncomfortable. Therefore, the Hungarian soldiers and archbishop could rightly ask, how would Vienna finance the German mercenaries, if the pay and supplies of the existing forces were frequently delayed?

In connection with the problems of the placing of German mercenaries in Hungarian fortresses, settlement of the dispute between the Thököly family and the town of Kežmarok and supervision of the observance of the legal articles on religious freedom, Pálffy undertook a circular tour of eastern Slovakia at the beginning of 1650. During it, he examined the fortifications of the mining captaincy. The 58 year old Palatine had difficulty with the physical and mental demands of this task: “... For these ten days, I had the possibility to eat only once a day, I got up at four o’clock in the morning and soon the first people came with complaints. May the Lord God protect me from such commissions...”

The main task of the spring of 1650 was supposed to be the holding of the Octavial Court, traditionally called on the eight days (octave) of the prescribed feast day. From the main dignitaries, the state judge and his deputy the vice judex curiae had to attend, as well as representatives from the clergy and aristocracy. The Octavial Court considered legal matters of the most varied character: from property disputes to murder, but cases of treason were excluded. The main theme of the Octavial Court of 1650 was to be the question of the placing of foreign mercenaries in the eastern counties of the Kingdom of Hungary and the question of the implementation of the religious legislation from 1647 and 1649. During his tour in February, Pálffy had assessed the situation in this part of the country as extremely tense, so he explicitly appealed to the Vienna court to support the calling of the court: “... I would advise His Majesty that His Majesty should delay the question of the mercenaries and concentrate on the calling of the Octavial Court. It will cost His Majesty much money, but will prevent great evil. It would satisfy people and make them into obedient and faithful subjects. It is impossible to describe the benefit

62 It was dispute about the acceptance of Kežmarok as a royal borough. The Thököly family demanded from the people of Kežmarok compensation for the regular payments to the landlord they had lost, when their former serfs became citizens of a royal borough. The conflict over limitation of the property of the Thököly family and the people of Kežmarok was brought to the territory of the town. It continued from 1648 to 1655, when the status of Kežmarok as a royal borough was established by act of parliament.
we would gain from this. We may be able to place the mercenaries even this year. I am writing this to Your Grace to prove that I am striving to serve His Majesty as far as possible... Your Grace should believe me that by this means, we will win this country and keep it, as we were not successful in the Empire. I have nothing from this other than concerns, effort, great expense and conflicts... but I still think that the Octavial Court must be called as soon as possible." 64

Pálffy’s opponents did not agree with the plan to call the Octavial Court, and at the beginning of April they met in Bratislava to coordinate their steps: “Lord Csáky 65 and the Lord Chancellor of Hungary (Georgius Szélepczényi) came here and met today in the house of the Lord Archbishop (Georgius Lippay). His brother, the President of the Chamber (Casparus Lippay) was also there. They discussed the situation and everything suggests that Lord Csáky does not support the calling of the Octavial Court, and will even attempt to frustrate it. I think that Lord Csáky is not pleased that the mercenary question will be discussed at the Octavial Court.” 66 It is entirely probable that the visit of Adamus Batthány and Ladislaus Esterházy to Paulus Pálffy’s palace in Bratislava was also closely connected with the Octavial Court. 67

On 25th April, Pálffy set out on the long journey to the east of the country. He broke his journey at his castle of Bojnice, from where he asked Trauttmanstorf to send after him the deputy state judge Stephanus Aszalay. 68 Pálffy came to Prešov on 4th May and was practically the only one of the high secular dignitaries to honour this important event with his presence. His desperate letters addressed to Trauttmanstorf and the monarch strongly suggest that his opponents had decided to simply ignore the court. Their behaviour did not evoke a negative reaction only from the Palatine, but also from other participants in the judicial proceedings. “People are already speaking openly about it here, and even before the beginning of the Octavial Court, word was spreading that the two Georgii and Ladislaus (I write this exactly as they say it) are striving to prevent this court meeting. Allegedly the two Georgii – by which they mean the Lord Archbishop and the Chancellor, and Ladislaus, namely the Lord Count Ladislaus Csáky – are leading His Majesty, so that as happened before, this court will be thwarted.” 69

As we learn from this letter and from the report by Pálffy to the Emperor about Georgius Lippay, the Archbishop and his adherents, they endeavoured to achieve their aim mainly by provoking disturbances and provocations. “Expressions of discontent” by the population would prove that the “people” disagreed with the coming of foreign mercenaries to the fortresses, and in spite of a strict prohibition by the monarch, the captain of

65 The State Judge Ladislaus Csáky.
Košice Franciscus Wesselényi had to undertake attacks on the Turks, so that the situation would become even more unclear. Pálffy submitted the following report on the actions of the Archbishop: “Firstly, in the name of Your Majesty he began to recruit soldiers and declared that he would grant justice to anybody whose father, mother, brother or sister was harmed or expelled. Secondly, he initiated attacks on the Turks and so gave them reason to counter-attack. Thirdly, he lied to people that thousands of German soldiers were heading for Hungary. Fourthly, he declared in public that if German troops were placed in the frontier fortresses, he would be curious about how 90 churches would be returned. Fifthly, he claimed that the Prince of Transylvania was recruiting an army and preparing to send it here.”

We still have no information available on the further course of the judicial proceedings. The Octavial Court was held and continued until 24th July. As Pálffy’s report shows, the state judge Ladislaus Csáky arrived only on the last day. His arrival happened in a rather curious way: “... he came to about a mile from Prešov, then he had to go back because of illness...”

An event during the holding of the court meant a turning point in Pálffy’s political career. Maximilian von Trauttmansdorff, one of his closest friends and his strongest supporter at the Vienna court, died on 10th May. As a result of Pálffy being hundreds of kilometres from Vienna, the sad news reached him only after 19th May, the date of his last letter to the chairman of the Privy Council. Another serious blow from the point of view of achievement of Pálffy’s political aims was the fact that in 1650, Vienna extended the peace treaty with the Turks for a further twenty years. The dream of organizing a great expedition was practically dissolved by this.

The dispute between Lippay and Pálffy further sharpened in the years 1650 – 1651. The Archbishop did not hesitate to attack the whole Pálffy family, when he cast doubt on the justification of the grant of the Bratislava Lordship to them. In this way, he actually attacked all the representatives of this recognized, rich and powerful aristocratic family and finally also the Trauttmansdorff family: “... Your Majesty may remember that the Emperor Rudolf granted the title comes of Bratislava to my late father. In my absence he claimed that this grant evoked discontent in the country and the Chamber should have opposed it. He spoke and wrote such things only to dishonour me and expose me to ridicule.”

70 HHStA, Turcica 1650, Pálffy memorandum.
73 Nicolaus Pálffy asked for himself and as a permanent hereditary holding of the eldest male heir of the Pálffy family, the positions of comes and chief captain of Bratislava Castle as a reward for his service in the battle of Ráb in 1598. The Emperor Rudolf II granted his request. He was given the hereditary title of count at the same time. In 1646, Stephanus and Johannes Pálffy, the older brothers of Paulus died, so that he became the senior member of the Pálffy family. Therefore, he requested the granting of the title previously held by his father and by his brother Stephanus. Ferdinand III granted it to him on 12th March 1651. On the grant to Nicolaus Pálffy: JEDLICSKA, Pál. Adatok erdődi Pálffy Miklós a győri hősnek életrajza és korához. (Information on the life and times of the hero of Raab Nicolaus Pálffy of Erdődi). Eger 1897, p. 684. Letter from Rudolf II to Nicolaus Pálffy, Prague 23rd July 1599.
We learn interesting details of this grant in Pálffy’s defence of his person: “... I do not understand why I should evoke discontent in the country. Perhaps it troubles him that this property will pass to the Trauttmansdorff family, if the male line of the Pálffy family dies out. I did not get property by fraud, but thanks to the favour of His Majesty, so that I could show my favour to the Trauttmansdorffs as my relations. If this is against Your Majesty’s will, he can take his grant back.” This is a previously unknown detail about the relationship between Trauttmansdorff and Pálffy. Only further research will show whether the same clause existed in the documents of the powerful Austrian aristocratic family, namely that if the male line of the Trauttmansdorff family died out, some of their property would pass to the Pálffys. The fact remains that the will of Paulus Pálffy from 1653 already contains no mention of it.74

In the further continuation of the dispute, the archbishop and his supporters attempted to shake the position of Pálffy directly in Vienna. They used as an excuse for this, the excellent contacts of the Palatine with the Rákoczi court at Sárospatak. This was the background of the still unexplained political affair connected with the relations of Pálffy to the Rákóczi.75 On 30th December 1651, Johann Christoph Puchheim came to the monarch with a report according to which Paulus Pálffy had made an alliance with Sigismundus Rákóczi and they were planning joint military action. The cause of this “conspiracy” was supposed to be the opposition of the Palatine to the placing of German mercenaries in the territory of the Kingdom of Hungary. Pálffy reacted in a “theatrical way”. He immediately sought out the monarch and asked that the king should either immediately have him executed or punish his accusers. Ferdinand III challenged Puchheim to apologize to Pálffy. However, the Palatine did not accept the apology and up to Easter the following year he refused to communicate with his political rivals. Then there was a “great reconciliation” between Pálffy, Puchheim and Lippay: “... the Lord Archbishop and the Palatine are showing good will and favour to each other, may God grant that this state continue between them...”76

We did not have the possibility to trace the genesis of the further development of relations between Pálffy and Lippay because of a lack of archive sources, which would enable us to approach this problem. In any case, the reconciliation of these two politicians brought entirely new dimensions for Hungary. However, we do not learn more because Pálffy died in November 1653.

We learn from the declaration by Franciscus Sigray of an administrator (provisor) for Pálffy’s wife Maria Khuen, how the archbishop received the news of the death of his greatest political rival: “Cardinal Lippay expressed his regret over the death of the

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74 The will states that Paulus Pálffy leaves the title of chief captain of Bratislava Castle and comes of the County of Bratislava to his nephew Nicolaus Pálffy son of Stephanus Pálffy. Will of Paulus Pálffy: HH-StA, FA Pálffy, A. I., L. IX., F. V., Nr. 25. or JEDLICSKA, ref. 40, p. 476-482.

75 For more details on Pálffy’s contacts with Transylvania see: FUNDÁRKOVÁ, ref. 5, p. 136-146 or VÁRKONYI, ref. 22, p. 130-134.

76 Letter from Lucas Vatay to Stephanus Aszalay. VÁRKONYI, ref. 22, p. 127.
Palatine, to whom he had begun to feel greater sympathy than before. These sympathies began to appear when Pálffy placed himself in opposition to Vittnyédi."

However, the death of the Palatine did not evoke only feelings of regret in the archbishop. According to his last will, Pálffy wished to be buried in the simple habit of a Capuchin and the funeral service had to be simple, without any ostentation. This exasperated Lippay, but he did not dare not to fulfill this order. He declared that he would not allow the burial of the Palatine under such unworthy conditions, since according to his exalted position, he deserved a dignified farewell, but he did not want people to accuse him of not respecting the Palatine’s instructions after his death, as had often happened during Pálffy’s life.

The dispute between Paulus Pálffy and Georgius Lippay was an important event in the history of our region for various reasons. Both men represented the new, self-confident generation of Hungarian politicians, who did not endeavour to pursue their interests only in the framework of the Kingdom of Hungary, but did not hesitate to present their conflict before the highest representatives of the Vienna court. Their political aims and ambitions divided the social elite of Hungary into political groups, in which we can see the beginnings of modern political parties. The contemporary correspondence, which captures factors from the struggle between Pálffy and Lippay, is also interesting testimony to the political thought and ideas of the public figures of the mid 17th century.

In this study, we have given only marginal attention to the contacts of the Hungarian aristocracy with Transylvania, because we are still studying this problem. However, it is a very interesting field, which may provide an even more detailed view of the dispute between Pálffy and Lippay. After completing the study of the sources, we would also like to examine the strategic importance of present-day eastern Slovakia from the points of view of Vienna and Transylvania, an area we have only mentioned marginally in this study. We think that such detailed investigations of the political history of Slovakia or the Kingdom of Hungary will enable us to create a more integrated picture of the region as a whole in future.

77 HHStA, FA Pálffy, A. I, L. V, F. VII, or JEDLICSKA, ref. 40, p. 475, letter from Johannes Sigray to Maria Khuen, Bratislava, 10th December 1653.

78 Report on the provisor of Johannes Sigray for Maria Khuen from 10th December 1653. JEDLICSKA, ref. 40, p. 475.
The author of the present study gives a survey of L. Štúr’s youth. L. Štúr was the leading personality in the Slovak national liberation movement, as well as the leader in the formation of the new patriotic generation in the second half of the 1830s. The author investigates the social and political atmosphere which characterized the Habsburg Monarchy at the time. It was under the strong influence of revolutionary Young Europe, Polish enthusiasm and the activities of Polish and other Slavonic associations in Vienna. The author shows how they influenced Slovak students at the Bratislava secondary school which subsequently became the centre of the Slovak national movement. At the end of the 30s these young people discussed basic problems and were looking for solutions, which took place in the following decades. Special attention has been given to the idea of Slavonic mutual cooperation within the Monarchy, which found its reflection in the Slovak national revival.


A new young generation of Slovak national revivalist intelligentsia began to emerge in the mid 1830s. It has gone down in our history under the name of its ideological leader Ľudovít Štúr as Štúr’s generation or group (in Slovak: štúrovské pokolenie, štúrovci). Precisely to this generation fell the great historical task of completing the process already occurring for half a century of the Slovak national revival, the decisive phase of creating a modern Slovak nation as a distinct and equal group in the wider family of Slavonic and other European nations.

It was L. Štúr and his closest associates who adopted and codified Slovak as a new national written language and laid firm foundations for our national literature and culture. They worked out the basic, deeply humane and progressive principles of the Slovak national ideology and formulated the democratic programme of the national emancipation movement oriented towards the material and spiritual raising of the level of the Slovak people. They devoted all their effort, enthusiasm and ability to putting it into practice, and in the revolutionary years of 1848 – 1849 they did not hesitate to sacrifice their lives in armed struggle. But all this came a few years later. In the period we will speak of here, this generation, which grew with admirable speed into the fulfillment of these and other great tasks flowing from the social and national emancipation of Slovak society, was only beginning to become nationally conscious and to formulate its ideas. The formation of Štúr’s generation is inseparably connected with Bratislava, its Evange-
lical Lyceum and student Czecho-Slavonic Society (Spoločnosť česko-slovanská), and after it was banned in April 1837, activity connected with the Slavonic Institute (Ústav slovanský), which became the true cradle of this remarkable generation.¹ Let us mention at least some of its most important representatives. Apart from Ľudovít Štúr, who headed the society from the school year 1835/1836, they included especially his predecessors in this position: Samo Chalupka (in 1831/32, Karol Štúr (in 1832/33), Michal Miloslav Hodža (in 1833/34 and Tomáš Hroš (in 1834/35). Others were the secretary of the society in 1835/36 Ctiboh Zoch and functionaries or active members such as Jozef Miloslav Hurban, later perhaps the closest colleague and friend of Štúr, Ján Bystřský, Gustáv Grossmann, Ján Maróthy, Daniel Bórik, Juraj Záborský and Pavol Ollik. Obviously we should include Štúr’s successors at the head of the institute Benjamin Pravoslav Červenák (in 1838/39) and August Horíšlav Škultéty (in 1839/40), Samo Bohdan Hroboň, Bohuslav Nosák and Peter Kellner Hostinský, later editors of the Slovenské národné noviny (Slovak National News). The poets Janko Kráľ, Andrej Sládkovič and Ján Botta, the prose writer Ján Kaliničiak and many others also need to be mentioned.

Alexander Boleslavín Vrchovský has a special place in this pleiad of young patriots as the initiator of many fruitful proposals and activities, which improved the activity of the society and the institute and changed them into a real, active centre of the national movement. It is only necessary to regret that in spite of his decisive role in forming the “Young Slovak movement” he did not remain its leading figure for long. The society and institute played a great part in the national reawakening of many members of the young Slovak intelligentsia, who later became important figures in Slovak cultural and political life.

Apart from the idea of Slavonic community, that significant feature of the whole of our national revival, the deliberate cultivation and development of historical knowledge or searching for a logical line of development from the nation’s glorious past, through its unhappy present to its bright future, had an important place in the formation of the national consciousness of the whole generation of Štúr. According to Štúr, history is to a living nation what conscience is for a person. “A person without conscience is mere worthless skin; a nation without historical knowledge of itself and its forebears is a mass of enslaved skins” as Ľudovít Štúr said, according to the testimony of J. M. Hurban.² National revivalist historicism appeared very intensively in the activity of Štúr’s group and in many forms. Ľ. Štúr regarded walks “to the graves of ancient glory”, that is to places with

1 M. Pišút already dealt with the history of the society and the institute in detail in the book: Počiatky básnickej školy (The Beginnings of Štúr’s School of Poetry), Bratislava 1938. Ján Béder researched the subject later with a much wider use of the accessible sources preserved especially in the archive of the society and other materials, deposited in the Archive of Literature and Art of the Slovak National Library in Martin (hereinafter: ALU SNK). He could also use various published sources, especially the two volumes of Ambruš: Listy Ľudovíta Štúra (Letters of Ľudovít Štúr). Compare: BÉDER, J.: Spoločnosť česko-slovanská a Slovanský ústav v Bratislave v rokoch 1835 – 1840. In Sborník štúdií a prác Vysoké školy pedagogickej v Bratislave. Spoločenské vedy. Slovenský jazyk a literatúra, zv. I., zošit 1-4, p. 3-80, Bratislava 1957. A special academic conference on 10th – 11th October 1978, marking the 150th anniversary of the society, was also devoted to this problem. The materials of the conference were published in the Literárnomúzejnom letopeise, zv. 14. Matica slovenská, Martin 1980.

memories of national history, as a very effective form of patriotic education for young Slovaks. The “consecration of the national festival” at Devín on 24\textsuperscript{th} April 1836 became the most important. Its participants remembered it for the rest of their lives, because at its conclusion, each chose his motto for life and adopted a symbolic national name, which constantly reminded him of his vow to serve his nation.\footnote{Ľ. Štúr wrote of the national celebration in the ruins of Devín in his letters to M. Godra from 4\textsuperscript{th} April and 26\textsuperscript{th} June 1836 and to A. B. Vrchovský from 30\textsuperscript{th} May 1836. \textit{Listy Ludovíta Štúra} (hereinafter: LĽŠ) I, p. 58, 63, 67-68. Editor J. Ambruš, Bratislava 1954. J. M. Hurban described the preparations for the “trip to Devín” and the course of the festivities in his biography of Ľ. Štúr written almost half a century later (HURBAN, ref. 2, p. 89-100). Only the finding of a valuable authentic source – a manuscript notebook: \textit{Slavnost Děvínska} (The Devín Celebration) written by J. B. Záborský and given to O. M. Boďanský during his visit to Štúr’s group in Bratislava in 1838, has enabled us to make a more accurate reconstruction of this important event. I found it in Boďanský’s archive in Kiev. For more details see: MATULA, Vladimír. Devín 24. apríla 1836. In \textit{Živá voda. Pamätnica k 150. výročiu štúrovskej vychádzky na Devín}. Published by the City Museum in Bratislava, 1988, p. 34-60. This is the first publication of the whole text of the notebook, including the previously unknown speech by Ľ. Štúr and the free thinking ode by the young Ctibor Zoch, mentioned by Hurban, who especially appreciated it, but could not find its text.} Although in their romantic enthusiasm, they often loved the guessed more than the really known, such was the period, such were the sources of their knowledge, where Kollár, Šaľárik and Hollý stood side by side, this did not harm the shaping of the collective feeling that this generation had a place in history or its historical optimism. This derived from the knowledge or at least assumption of the generally progressive tendency of historical development, but especially from the feeling of historical responsibility for the destiny of the nation, which is so characteristic of this generation. The activism and creativity of their patriotism is especially typical. It runs like a golden thread from the first still rather misty ideas about their membership in the society, to which they come “in affairs of the whole nation”, where fulfillment of their obligations contributes “to glorification of the whole nation” in the words of Karol Štúr from the opening address for the beginning of the school year 1832/33, through a more clearly formulated demand to become the “essential support of the nation” against the impact of hostile Magyaro-mania, as Ľ. Štúr put it in a welcoming speech at the beginning of the school year 1835/36. Further development continued through the collective realization of the need to undertake “some enterprise for the nation itself” (\textit{Plody} 1836) and the first doubts about the effectiveness of the hitherto prevailing literary forms and considerations of the need to do “something more useful for our poor people”\footnote{Štúr in connection with the prepared but unrealized publication of the almanac \textit{City vděčnosti mladých synů Slovenska} (Feelings of gratitude of the young sons of Slovakia). In the letter to A. B. Vrchovský from 18\textsuperscript{th} October 1837. LĽŠ I, p. 121-122. The welcoming speeches of Karol Štúr and Ludovít Štúr in the manuscript \textit{Výbor prací Společnosti Česko-Slovanské}. (Work Committee of the Czecho-Slavonic Society). Facsimile published by Matica slovenská, Martin 1975, p. 9-11 and 153-170.}. It progressed to the conscious taking on of the difficult and responsible task of ideologue and leader of the whole national emancipation movement, working out its socio-economic, national political and cultural programme and the struggle for its implementation. This historically remarkably short route, taking only about ten years or even less if we take into account the fact that the basic conception of the national emancipation programme crystallized only at the turn of the 1830s and 1840s, is literally packed with events, stimuli and experiences, which had decisive importance for the formation
of the socio-political views and ideological conceptions of the young generation of the Slovak intelligentsia.

The members of Štúr’s generation, who identified themselves as the “young sons of Slovakia”, entered the arena of socio-political events in the period of resurgence of the democratic revolutionary and national movements in Europe and the significant activation of the national emancipation movements of the suppressed nations of the Habsburg Monarchy. They were also influenced by the same currents of thought as those stimulating the emergence of the Young Germany, Young Italy and Young Poland movements, as well as the origin of the international federation of these secret republican-democratic societies – the society Young Europe, founded in 1834 by the revolutionary Giuseppe Mazzini in Geneva. The influence of the Polish uprising of 1830 – 1831 and the strong wave of revolutionary Polonophilia, which spread across Europe after its bloody suppression, was especially important and fruitful for the young Slovak generation, as it was for the young Czech intelligentsia, with which it had the closest contacts. In nearby Vienna, capital of the Austrian Empire, there were various secret political societies of Polish or other Slavonic pro-Polish students, which produced strong stimuli for the development of the national emancipation movements of the suppressed nations. The young Slovak student at the academy of law in Vienna, Alexander Boleslavín Vrchovský experienced his national awakening and ideological-political formation in this environment. He soon became an important initiator and organizer of the Young Slovak movement and a friend and adviser to Ľudovít Štúr and his associates. The definitely democratic and anti-feudal character of the Polish movement and the conscientious work of Vrchovský, who came to Bratislava in autumn 1836 after completing his study of law and became a member of the society for the whole school year, was soon expressed in the radicalization of the social and political views of the leading functionaries of the society, especially Ľ. Štúr himself. I have in mind especially his realization of the basic historical truth confirmed by the experiences of the Polish revolutionary and national liberation struggle and their generalization in the historical works of Joachim Lelewel, founder of Young Poland, that the greatest evil, and cause of all hardships, unhappiness and decay, was feudalism and the aristocracy derived from it, as he wrote in a letter to his close friend Ctibor Zoch.5

This was also the origin of his conscious support for a revolutionary programme of democratic reconstruction of society and the application of all this to the domestic Slovak situation. Štúr and his colleagues and assistants were very familiar with the difficult social position and poverty of the Slovak people, especially the serfs, and they often lamented over it. Now they began to be more radical under the influence of Polish revolutionary agitation. Later they worked out a whole socio-economic programme, in which a sincere, deeply humane and democratic effort to improve the lot of the ordinary people of Slovakia was a significant feature.

The strong orientation towards general national problems and the needs of the widest groups among the Slovak people, which was constantly stimulated among the members of the Bratislava student community by the Vienna Poles, Vrchovský and their own knowledge of Slovak society, together with the whole associated historical process of the

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5 Letter from 26th December 1837. LĽŠ I, p. 132.
formation of a modern nation, placed before Štúr’s youngest generation of the Slovak national revivalist intelligentsia a whole complex of problems. These were connected, above all, with solution of the language question of the Slovak national movement and with unification on the basis of a standard written language, of the two linguistic and confessional currents, with the formulation of a national ideology and political programme for the national emancipation movement, and the inclusion of as much as possible of Slovak society in it. All these outstanding questions were essentially solved within the Czecho-Slavonic Society and its successor the Slavonic Institute.

The society and the institute played an extraordinarily important role as the organizational base and centre of the Slovak national movement. The question of the organizational base and centre is of fundamental importance for every social and political movement, as is well known. Let us attempt to grasp the situation in this area in the 1830s and early 1840s in Slovakia and compare it with the situation in the Czech or Serbian national movements, where they also had at this time their cultural organizations (Matice), magazines, political newspapers and other institutions, which fulfilled the role of distinctive representative media in relation to other nations. They showed the existence of a particular suppressed nationality in the family of European nations. It is already enough for us to understand the immense importance of the Bratislava society in our national life before the origin of Tatrá and the Union of Slovak Youth (Jednota mládeže slovenskej), Slovenské národné noviny (Slovak National News) and Slovenské pohľady (Slovak Views). This leads to a further aspect of the fruitful activity of A. B. Vrchovský among the young Bratislava Slovaks: his deliberate effort to adapt the organization of the society to the new demands of the national emancipation movement and make it a “centre of gravity”, which would unite all the conscious national forces for achievement of a common aim. In his view, this aim was “the nation, its happiness and freedom”.

This effort, as we know, was crowned with success and brought far-reaching positive results, including the fact that the Bratislava society became an example for other student societies, inspiring and directing their nation-building work.

Alexander B. Vrchovský undoubtedly had great organizational talent, he was educated and well-rounded in the political sciences and in practice. He surpassed his Bratislava friends with his experience gained from work in the Vienna societies of Slavonic students. He knew how to gain their support for his ideas, plans and proposals, and find among them enthusiastic implementors, especially Štúr himself. What was achieved by the common effort in favour of reconstructing the society into a true organizational base and centre of the Slovak national movement was really considerable. The first general proposals by A. Vrchovský from November 1834 and April 1835, according to which it was not enough only to perfect their knowledge of the Slovak language, but in particular, it was important to know their nation and cultivate love for it, are already noteworthy.

Therefore, the members of the society had to direct their attention towards the study of its customs and characteristics or ethnology, language or grammar, geography, the

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6 As he emphasized in letters to Štúr and the society and in personal meetings. Compare: LLŠ IV. Dodatky (Supplements). Editor: V. Matula, Bratislava 1999.
fates it had experienced, its achievements and glorious deeds, that is its history and national poetry. Each member had to choose a subject in which he wanted to perfect himself for the benefit of the nation. The second demand was to break down the confessional isolation and join in the national movement especially with brothers from the Catholic legal academy. He also demanded that membership of the society should not be limited to students of theology and the higher years at the lyceum. Young people from the lower classes should also be drawn into the work and awakened to national consciousness. Finally, they should give priority to the study of the Slovak language rather than to all other, foreign languages.\(^7\)

The implementation of these proposals brought the first substantial revival of the activity of the society. Where the urgent need for study of Slavonic languages was concerned, Vrchovský did not limit himself to advice. He organized a collection among the Vienna Slavs and sent 18 books to the library of the society, mostly textbooks of Slavonic languages in which were inscribed the messages of representatives of the individual Slavonic nations. They are sometimes whole poems emphasizing the idea of Slavonic unity and the importance of cooperation in the common struggle for national emancipation and the special importance of the role of the national language in this struggle.\(^8\) Publication of the almanac *Plody* (Fruits) in 1836 was an important enterprise by which the society aimed to present itself to the outside world and stimulate young Slovaks in other schools to more active national work. In it, the “young sons of Slovakia”, who signed a “*Brief review of the development of Slovak literature and the activity of the society up to now*” are presented not as individuals, but as the rising new generation in the political as well as the literary sense.

The feelings of gratitude of the Young Sons of Slovakia, a collection of odes on the most important representatives of the Slavonic world, on which they worked intensively from autumn 1836 to autumn 1837, was intended to be a manifesto of their Slavonic consciousness and declaration of the idea of Slavonic community. Although the majority of the poems were prepared and approved, the almanac was not published. At this time the society and its individual functionaries and members already carried on an extensive and brisk correspondence with representatives of the older generation of the Slovak and Czech revivalist intelligentsia and with other correspondents at home and abroad. The correspondence of the society was remarkably intensive, purposeful and rich in ideas. It never lacked a strong emotional charge and patriotic enthusiasm, and became an important instrument for the fulfillment of the society’s new task as a centre of the movement.\(^9\) It is an extraordinarily valuable source, which deserves publication as a collection.

As the tasks of the society grew, its statutes were improved and all its activities were strictly organized. After Vrchovský came to Bratislava and became a regular member of the society during the whole school year 1836/37, so that he could directly participate in its activities, far reaching measures were adopted to reconstruct it on the principles of a

\(^7\) Ref. 6, p. 61-62.


\(^9\) Outlines of the letters sent are given in the so-called *Listáre I and II*. The letters received are also preserved in the materials of the society in the ALU SNK, fond M 47 and others.
democratic, republican organization. The society was headed by a committee elected by all the members and it submitted accounts of its work to them. The creation of a special category of so-called country members was a very important measure for the inclusion in the organization of the widest possible range of Slovak patriots, thanks to which the society ceased to be a student society and became the beginnings of an organization for the whole nation and an important instrument in the national emancipation movement.

Testimony to the progressive or revolutionary feelings of its organizers is found in the words of the letters sent to country members, the so-called certificates („osvečné listiny“) of their membership, stating their obligation not only to lead people to knowledge of their duties to the nation, but also to be aware of the injustice of their oppression and to actively struggle against it: „Do not lead our people to permanent patience like the priests active among us up to now – but to the removal of violence and oppression“ as it says in this letter. „Was our people created for slavery? Do they have to put up with the swish of hostile whips like cattle for ever? Let power remove power!“ as the author wrote in the conclusion.10 After the official prohibition of the society in April 1837, this extremely promising beginning of new activity was forcibly interrupted by removal of the institution of country membership. The functionaries of the dissolved Czecho-Slavonic Society succeeded in continuing their activity in spite of all the prohibitions. This new period is most important from the point of view of the effort to build up the necessary organizational base for the Slovak national emancipation movement.

Different views on some basic questions of the content and form of activity, its strategy and tactics, had already begun to appear and gradually led to the formation of two groups: the moderates led by Štúr, who strictly observed school regulations for tactical reasons and the radicals grouped around Vrchovský, leading to the formation of the secret society Vzájomnost’ (Solidarity). Its core consisted of A. B. Vrchovský, B. P. Červenák, P. V. Ollík and M. M. Hodža. This society strove to encourage patriots in the countryside and bring them into active national work by sending out so-called solidarity letters of individually hand-written news. It did not oppose the institute, but only extended outwards its strictly legal activity on which Ľ. Štúr insisted, so that the two organizations complemented each other. When Ľ. Štúr went to study at Halle for two years and B. P. Červenák became head of the institute in the school year 1838/39, the leadership of the institute and Vzájomnost’ were again practically united. Activity continued in this spirit during the following two years under the leadership of A. H. Škultéty.

At the end of the 1830s, various important stimuli for widening the activity of the institute and improving its material position came from members of Vzájomnost’. They included establishment of the Travel Committee, publication of News from the Slavonic Institute (Správy o Slovanskom ústave) and organization of an extensive financial collection for its maintenance. There were also various proposals for the publication of a periodical, working out of rules of life for outgoing members, establishment of an Institute for Education in Slovak Song, a plan to publish a second volume of Plody and a series of other projects. A plan to publish a Slovak political newspaper crystallized. It would bring to life the national consciousness of the Slovak people, especially the small farmers and

10 Listár I, p. 25 (24th February 1837. ALU SNK, M 47, A 42.
towns people. A conference of Vzájomnost' was planned, with the aim of working out an approach to the government, requesting the establishment of a National Learned Society (Národná učená spoločnosť) or Matica slovenská. The Bratislava institute also had to fulfill the role of organizational centre of the Slovak national emancipation movement during the preparation of the first Slovak national petition addressed to the Hungarian Parliament, in which the Slovaks would protest against the strengthening Magyarization, appeal to their national rights and threaten that if parliament rejected their demands, they would appeal to the king and demand the separation of Slovakia from Hungary.

Thus, by the turn of the 1830s and 1840s, the activities of the Bratislava society and its continuation the Slavonic Institute had laid the foundations of a whole series of important national cultural and political projects aiming at the further development of the Slovak national emancipation movement and the enlargement of its social base. Work on these projects continued in the 1840s in the new stage of the national movement under the leadership of Ľudovít Štúr.

It is necessary to mention at least briefly the extraordinary efforts of the generation of young sons of Slovakia led by Ľudovít Štúr to establish contacts and cooperation with the other Slavonic nations, to place the Slovak national emancipation movement in the wider Slavonic context and to share cultural treasures.

The members of the society spontaneously supported Kollár’s solidarity programme outlined in his work On literary solidarity between the different tribes and dialects of the Slavonic nation (1836 – 1837). They made an extraordinary effort to learn all the Slavonic languages, to study the history and contemporary life of the Slavonic nations, read and analyse the outstanding works of their literatures, and systematically follow Slavonic magazines and newspapers to which they also contributed themselves. They corresponded with important cultural and political figures, national institutions and societies, exchanging information on the development of national life, making journeys to Slavonic countries and using every opportunity to meet representatives of the brother nations, who welcomed them as the most valued guests. They also applied Slavonic cooperation directly in their society and Slavonic institute, which had young Czechs, Serbs and Croats as members as well as Slovaks.

The young Slovak generation had the closest contacts and most intensive cooperation with the Czech national movement and they developed them further.¹¹ This derived not only from the old traditions of mutual relations and from the many common tasks of the national emancipation struggle, but also from the ideas and interests of the Czech revivalist society and its leading forces in the development of the Slovaks as part of a Czechoslovak national unit.

The foundation, which determined the relationship of Ľ. Štúr and his generation to the Czech national movement, and on which they developed their cooperation with its representatives from the beginning, was consciousness of the linguistic, literary and general cultural unity of the Czechs and Slovaks. This was deeply rooted in the family

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¹¹ Jan Novotný was one of the first to deal comprehensively with the problem of Czecho-Slovak relations in their national movements using rich archive materials. See: NOVOTNÝ, Jan. O bratrské družbě Cechů a Slováků na národního obrození (On the brotherly relations of Czechs and Slovaks during the national revival). Prague 1959.
upbringing, school education and non-school activities of the young generation of the Slovak Protestant intelligentsia. This consciousness was expressed in the very name of their group – the Czecho-Slavonic Society and in the content of its activity.

From the beginning, Ľudovít Štúr and the society were in constant contact by letter with the leading representatives of Czech culture and the national movement. They corresponded with J. Jungmann, V. Hanka, P. J. Šafárik, F. Palacký, J. Frič, J. V. Staňek and with the representatives of the young Czech generation: K. B. Štorch, K. S. Amerling, F. C. Kampelík and others. They shared their ideas, successes and plans with these people, and drew moral support and encouragement for further work from them.

The exchange and distribution of newspapers, magazines and books played an important role in cultural cooperation between the Czechs and Slovaks. Especially for the Slovaks, who suffered from a lack of their own newspapers and magazines in the 1830s and the first half of the 1840s, Czech periodicals were an important compensation in this area. The most widely read Czech magazine *Květy*, published by J. Pospíšil and edited by J. K. Tyl, was also very popular among Štúr’s associates in Bratislava, especially in this period. Thanks to the sympathy of its publisher and editor for the efforts of the young Slovak intelligentsia and the systematic attention they devoted to Slovak national life, with the special section “From Slovakia” included from 1837, Květy became a real platform for Czecho-Slovak literary solidarity and cultural-political cooperation. Their Slovak writers included Ľ. Štúr and his closest colleagues such as J. M. Hurban, S. B. Hroboň, B. P. Červenák, B. Nosák, A. H. Škultéty.

Apart from Květy, Ľudovít Štúr contributed to other Czech periodicals, especially to the Časopis Českého muzea (Periodical of the Czech Museum) and at the beginning of the 1840s to Vlastimil. It is relevant to recall that he published 60 contributions in seven Czech periodicals, including 45 only in Květy in the period 1836 – 1845. The Czech patriots also gave valuable help to the Slovak students and their societies by presenting numerous books. The most generous donors and supporters of the library of the Czecho-Slovak Society in Bratislava included J. Jungmann and his son, F. Palacký, J. V. Sedláček, J. Nejedlý, V. Hanka and V. Kramerius. All this contributed to the Czechs and Slovaks becoming more familiar with each other’s national life and deepening their feeling of belonging together.

In the mid 1830s, there was a wider and more deliberate effort to establish and strengthen personal contacts, which had immense importance for more consistent mutual acquaintance and exchange of views, leading to the formation of a relationship of the Czech national movement to the Slovak national movement and the crystallization of the Slovak national ideology and the national political programme of the young Slovak intelligentsia. The representatives of the young generation of the Czech patriotic intelligentsia took the initiative in establishing personal contacts. Especially F. C. Kampelík, K. S. Amerling, V. S. Štulc, F. L. Rieger and others were the pioneers in this.

The leading figures in the young Slovak movement at the end of the 1830s were clearly aware of the usefulness and necessity of cooperation with the Czech national

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12 MATULA, Vladimír. Príspevky Ľudovíta Štúra v slovanských a nemeckých periodikách (The contributions of Ľudovít Štúr to Slavonic and German periodicals). In Otázky žurnalistiky, 1995, 38, no. 2, p. 113-127.
movement, and to a much wider extent than the plans of F. C. Kampelík and his circle supposed. They certainly did not want to be only the object of Czech initiatives. This was definitely also the motive for the well-known journey of a leading member of Vzájomnost J. M. Hurban “to the Slavonic brothers in Moravia and Bohemia” in summer 1839, an account of which was published in his book of travels from 1841. Some of his findings and conclusions from visits to the three main centres of the Czech national movement – Vienna, Brno and Prague – were summarized in a special confidential report for the members of Vzájomnost.  

Hurban’s journey, with the findings and experiences he gained during it, confirmed the leading figures in the young Slovak movement in the correctness of the orientation of their nation building activities and significantly contributed to strengthening one of the basic ideas of the emerging Slovak national ideology and whole Slavonic conception of the young Slovak intelligentsia, according to which Slavdom as a whole would fulfill its historic mission through the contributions of the individual Slavonic “tribes”, or the development of their own national social life.

As far as Štúr himself is concerned, he had come into close contact with the Czech national movement and its personalities already a year earlier during his first visit to Prague at the end of September and the first half of October 1838, when he stopped there on his way to Halle. He had detailed discussions with leading representatives of Czech cultural and political life about his role in Slovakia after his return from Halle in the summer of 1840, and a plan was approved for his future activities and financial support for them.

There was also closer cooperation between leading figures in the Slovak national movement and representatives of the Czech liberal intelligentsia in the period of preparation of the new Slovak petition to the monarch (prestolný prosbopis) of 1842. The Czech liberal politicians, starting from their Austro-Slavist conception, urged the quick submission of a Slovak petition against forcible Magyarization to paralyse in advance any attempt at compromise between the Vienna government and the Hungarian opposition. The failure of the petition, disappointment with the unfulfilled hopes of positive results from the support of the Czech liberal politicians and further government concessions to the Hungarian opposition and its Magyarization policy led Ľ. Štúr and his colleagues to the conviction that they could not rely either on Vienna or on the Austro-Slavists to solve the Slovak question, but mainly on the strength of their own nation. The whole further development of the Slovak national movement confirmed this view to them.

I have so far only marginally mentioned the interest of Ľ. Štúr and his generation in Poland, their contacts and cooperation with the Poles and the Polish revolutionary movement, which were important factors in the formation of their socio-political views in the 1830s. This is inadequate even for a rather brief explanation of this question. It is necessary to add at least a few specific facts. Their literary first fruits, read and assessed at meetings of the society already reflected a warm interest in the Polish problem. Especially from autumn 1834 we encounter Polish themes ever more frequently. For example,  

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The first record of it being recited in the society dates from 30th March 1836, when J. M. Hurban recited it “expressively and zealously”. However, they must have known it earlier because L. Štúr cited it in a letter to F. Palacký from 31st December 1835 and in a letter to M. Godra from 4th April 1836, he mentioned Mickiewicz’s ode as an example of “the works of the free spirit”, which he sent to his friends in all corners of Slovakia. According to the testimony of his associates, Štúr was also the most suggestive interpreter of the ode. Mickiewicz’s enthusiastic hymn to the free spirit of youth, pure and free from low bread-wining and egoism, full of high desires for the freedom and happiness for all humanity, capable of unselfish love and the greatest sacrifices, addressed our young people in clear comprehensible language, expressing its highest ideas and feelings. Apart from high ethical postulates, our young generation found in it the truth and logic of revolution. “Let violence oppose violence” (gwalt niech się gwaltem odciska) it cries enthusiastically with the poet, applying this demand for a revolutionary strategy and tactics to our domestic situation. Other works of the prophet of the Polish nation also encountered a great response from our young people. They progressively became acquainted with these works especially thanks to the tireless Czech propagator and translator of Mickiewicz’s work V. S. Štulc and from the Paris edition of his poetry, bought in 1839 with collected money. Favourite poems were then copied from it. The way they adapted Štulc’s Czech translation of the ode, with the verse “The happiness of all be the aim” becoming “The freedom of humanity be the aim”, and the two verses: “And the fortunate man, who in the fatal moment, dies virtuously with sacred fervour” instead ending “dies for freedom in the sacred fire”, can be considered very characteristic of the desire of the young associates of Štúr for freedom.

More detailed analysis of the selection and popularity of some poems and prose works by A. Mickiewicz and their reception by our young generation in individual periods of its conceptual formation and activity, shows how in the second half of the 1830s, the period of the strongest wave of pro-Polish feelings, our young people selected from the complex and contradictory work of the great Polish poet mainly the elements close to their revolutionary and national emancipation ideal and their conception of Slavonic solidarity, while neglecting the elements contradicting this ideal and conception. This concerns not
only his scathing judgements and negative relationship to the idea of Slavonic solidarity, but also the negative aspects of his messianism. Kollár condemned him to the Slavonic hell because of his “lack of solidarity”. This was not unknown to the young Slovaks, but they wanted to see Mickiewicz unambiguously in the camp of the supporters of the revolutionary idea of a federation of free Slavonic nations.¹⁸

As we already mentioned, there was a significant activation of the Polish students from Galicia, who studied in large numbers in Viennese institutions of higher education, in the 1830s. The doctor of medicine Nikodem Bętkowski founded the secret society New Poland and established contacts with the emigrant Democratic Society. Vienna also had an Association of the Polish Nation and at the Polytechnic a Society of Free Galicians. When the united organization Young Sarmatia and its offshoot Sons of the Homeland was formed in Galicia, the Vienna Poles accepted its statutes and joined its organizational network. According to the words of the Lvov police chief Sacher-Masoch they strove “to lay the foundation stone for the break up of Austria within the walls of Vienna”.¹⁹ They also wanted to gain the support of other Slavonic students for this aim, including Czechs, Slovaks and Trans-Carpathian Ukrainians, and they appear to have succeeded. The police even had reliable information that at the end of the school year 1838/39, Vienna had two inter-connected secret revolutionary societies, one Polish, one Slavonic led by F. Zach and F. C. Kampelík. The members were students and young intellectuals of Czech, Slovak and Croatian nationality. They met in the flat of the German poet and democrat Uffo Horn, a native of the Czech town of Trutnov and former student at Prague University and in other places. The members of the Bratislava Slavonic Institute J. M. Hurban and J. V. Pellar participated in one such meeting in summer 1839. The ideological – political atmosphere prevailing in them can be reconstructed, although not entirely accurately, from the materials of the investigation of the leading members of these secret societies in summer 1840, especially from the extensive testimony of F. C. Kampelík. These sources show that, in spite of some differentiation, especially in terms of tactics, a spontaneous free-thinking revolutionary spirit prevailed here and found its concentrated expression in the idea of Slavonic solidarity, understood in the sense of revolutionary cooperation between the Slavonic nations in the national emancipation struggle and in the new ordering of political and perhaps also social relations in Europe.

During the summer vacation of 1837, N. Bętkowski and J. Midowicz made a special journey to Slovakia and to J. Kollár in Budapest. In Bratislava they had discussions with A. B. Vrchovský and some members of the society. In these discussions, as we learn from Vrchovský’s first solidarity letters (vzájomnostný listy), they advised the Slovaks

¹⁸ The concluding verses of the ode by A. H. Škultéty “Na Mickieviče” for the prepared “Feelings of gratitude”: “Nuž tehdy Slávie ozdobo! Dálým potomkem nám jmenován budiž! Kýž necháš hňěv, kýž tě čistá jen, K všem Slovanům vede lásku vérně!” (“O ornament of Slavdom! May you be famous among our distant posterity! May anger be left behind, may you faithfully lead us to pure love for all Slavs”). In City vděčnosti mladých synů Slovenska (Feelings of gratitude of the young sons of Slovakia). Editor: Vladimír Matula. Bratislava 1959, p. 57-59.

not to write “learned” works accessible only to a small number of readers, but books for
the common people or the young and their surroundings to spread general enlightenment
among the people, arouse national consciousness and ennoble the “heart of the nation”.
They were also encouraged to establish political newspapers as the best means for ful-
fillment of these tasks. They promised to send the necessary books and help to establish
contacts with Lvov. They also agreed on a secret method of communication. One of the
Slovak participants in the discussions with the young Poles informed L. Štúr, who was
away from Bratislava at the time, about their content and conclusions. In mid October,
Štúr already informed Vrchovský that he had written to Bętkowski and Midowicz “about
a private matter”.20 N. Bętkowski also later became a correspondent of the Vzájomnosť
secret society of the young Slovaks. This established direct contact between the Brati-
slava centre of the Slovak national emancipation movement and the secret organization
of the Galician Poles in Vienna. This had great positive importance for the growth of
revolutionary pro-Polish feeling among our young generation and for radicalizing its
socio-political views.

Ľudovít Štúr, who was studying at university in Halle from autumn 1838, was not a
direct participant in the cooperation with the representatives of the secret organizations
of the Galician Poles in its final and most productive phase. However, apart from the-
oretical study of the Slavonic problem, he fully used his stay in Halle to further widen
his own and his group’s contacts with the Slavonic nations, especially with the Lusatian
Sorbs. As far as contacts with the Poles are concerned, while he was in Halle, he re-
ceived the first issues of the Tygodnik literacki (Literary Weekly), a magazine publi-
shed at Poznan from 1838 to 1845. At this time it was the most progressive magazine in Po-
land. The ideas of revolutionary democracy and utopian socialism were propagated in
concealed form on its pages. On the Slavonic question, the magazine declared the prin-
ciple of a federation of free Slavonic nations. Štúr highly appreciated this magazine and
during his time in Halle he not only translated several articles from it for the Czech
Květy, he also wrote his own contributions. In January 1839, the Tygodnik literacki published
Štúr’s Letter from a Slovak from Hungary to the editors. Štúr praised the level of the
Tygodnik literacki and expressed pleasure over the fact that “brotherly feelings and love
for all Slavs resound from its pages, and noble feelings are expressed about the brother-
hood of the wider Slavonic world”.21 In an attempt to acquaint readers of the magazine
more closely with the character of Slavonic song below the Carpathians, he sent the ori-
ignal text of two Slovak songs: Nitra milá, Nitra and Bože môj, otcé môj, však je ten svet
zmotaný (My God, my father, but this world is confused), the first as a memory of rich
and glorious times, the second as the thoughts of his oppressed people. The editors of Ty-
godnik literacki replied in an article Reply to the Slav in Hungary giving a lively reaction
to the picture of social and national oppression of the Slovak people. According to the

20 LĽŠ I, p. 122.
21 Tygodnik literacki, no. 43 from 21st January 1839.
author of the article, it was necessary to place the old Slavonic principle of brotherhood and equality against aristocracy and violence, which were foreign influences.  

One of the most important stages of Slovak – Polish relations and cooperation, the period of revolutionary Polonophil enthusiasm, aroused by the Paris revolution and the Polish uprising of 1830 – 1831 and nourished by Polish revolutionary and democratic propaganda, culminated around 1840. It is characteristic that the spirit of this pro-Polish feeling was marked by the relationships of L. Štúr and his associates with such members of the Polish nation as the Lvov landowner and Slavophil A. J. Rościszewski and the historian W. A. Maciejowski, to whom the social and political ideas and efforts of the democratic wing of the Polish national emancipation movement were certainly rather distant. Štúr’s group also placed Rościszewski, friend of Ján Kollár and many Czech nation builders, supporter of the Bratislava society and institute, in the prepared volume “Feelings of Gratitude”, where they had earlier placed W. A. Maciejowski. From the views of this Russophil oriented professor at Warsaw University, author of a noteworthy work about the history of law among the Slavs, which was enthusiastically received by the Bratislava society in 1836, the young Slovaks adopted all that supported their ideas about the former unity of the Slavs and the need to renew it. 

Perhaps it is necessary to add that even when the wave of general pro-Polish enthusiasm declined in connection with the overall receding of the revolutionary situation at the beginning of the 1840s, and the Slavonic orientation of the leading representatives of the Slovak national emancipation movement and especially of L. Štúr himself, turned unambiguously towards Russia, the revolutionary and democratic influences of the Polish liberation struggle did not cease entirely. They were expressed with special strength in the second half of the 1840s, in the new revolutionary situation, especially in the social and political views of the representatives of the radical democratic wing of the movement – J. Kráľ, J. Francisci and others – and in their efforts to formulate a revolutionary programme. 

The extraordinarily wide cooperation of the young Slovaks with the Croats and the Vojvodina Serbs was already conditioned by the fact that they were nations who lived

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22 Ref. 21, no. 45 from 4th February 1839. For more details see: MATUĽA, Vladimír. Ľudovít Štúr – spolupracovník Literárneho týždenníka (Ľudovít Štúr – cooperation with the Literary Weekly). In Literárny týždenník, no. 45, Bratislava 3rd November 1995. 

23 Pamětnice II, minute from 16th June 1836. ALU SNK, fond M 47, C 11. 


92
in the common Hungarian state and their national emancipation movement had many common tasks, problems and interests. Another favourable circumstance was the wide possibilities for personal contacts in Vienna, Budapest and in Bratislava itself, which was then the seat of the Hungarian Parliament and a place where dozens of Serbian and Croatian students came every year to study at the Evangelical Lyceum or at the Legal Academy. Many of them later became active in culture or politics. The first friendly contacts with F. Kurelac were already fruitful and he mediated contacts with further Croats and Serbs. Vrchovský’s friends from his studies in Vienna, S. Mlinarić and Mato Topalović (the Illyrian poet Rodoľub Zdenčanin) founded a patriotic student society in the Zagreb seminary and legal academy and they established contacts with the Czecho-Slavonic Society in Bratislava. The correspondence between them is a valuable source of knowledge of the process of formation of the national consciousness of both nations and convincing evidence that from the beginning the young Slovaks understood Kollár’s literary solidarity only as a preparatory stage on the way to political alliance in a common national emancipation struggle. The Bratislava society and L. Štúr soon established contacts with the official leadership of the Illyrian movement headed by L. Gaj and cooperation with its publications. In the late 1830s and the first half of the forties, when the Slovak movement still did not have its own political newspaper, these publications, along with the Czech newspapers and magazines, took its place, especially by publishing political defences of the Slovak nation and information about successes in developing the national life of the Slovaks. Broad cultural cooperation was developed at the same time. The long lasting and regular contacts with Stanko Vraz started in 1837 by A. B. Vrchovský and continued by L. Štúr, J. M. Hurban and B. Nosák, and the cooperation with other important Croatian cultural and political figures, were especially important. The former member of the Bratislava society Bogoslav Šulek was an important connecting link between the Slovak and Croatian movements from the end of the 1830s. He permanently anchored himself in the Croatian environment and very quickly became one of the leading personalities in its national cultural and political life.

From the similarly extensive field of contacts and cooperation with the Serbs, it is necessary to emphasize especially the deliberate effort of the leading figures in the society to draw into its activity as many as possible of the still nationally indifferent Serbian students and gain their support for the idea of Slavonic solidarity. This effort achieved considerable success, when the Serbian students in Bratislava founded their own society in the school year 1839/40 under the name Čitaonica srbska. The whole history and results of the activity of this first national society of the young generation of the Serbian intelligentsia from Vojvodina and other regions of the Kingdom of Hungary, which became the initial school of national and Slavonic consciousness for a whole pleiad of leading Serbian cultural and political figures thanks to the effort of L. Štúr and his closest associates, bear eloquent witness to its importance in the history of the national emancipation movement and in Slovak – Serbian cooperation, the foundations of which were laid in the Bratislava society.26

The lively interest of the young Slovak generation in Russia\textsuperscript{27} stimulated by Kollár’s apotheosis of the “mighty Slavonic oak”, but increasingly also by the practical aspects of Slavonic solidarity as a national defence doctrine and by actual contacts with Russia, long remained limited mostly to the field of rather accidental and one-sided cultural contacts, because they did not find in Russia the sort of partner for more definite political cooperation they had in the representatives of the national emancipation movements of the Slavonic nations of the Austrian Monarchy. However, this did not mean that the Slovak – Russian contacts and the whole relationship of the young Slovak intelligentsia to Russia did not have great importance for the development of the Slovak national emancipation movement.

We already encounter the first signs of the interest of Ľudovít Štúr and his associates in Russia in the mid 1830s, when the members of the Czecho-Slavonic Society more frequently turned to Russian themes at their meetings. For example in March 1835, Juraj Záborský presented his prose work on Peter the Great and a little later in June of the same year, Ctiboh Zoch presented an otherwise unknown translation from the Russian historian M. V. Lomonos. The personality of Peter the Great also attracted D. Bórik, who presented a “Biography of Peter I, the Great” written according to the Russian historian Sumarokov. Ľ. Štúr assessed it. The members of the society also knew the work of N. M. Karamzin, from which Štúr liked to quote “za tučej vižu zarju” – “behind the clouds I see the dawn”, G. R. Deržavin and A. S. Pushkin, they enthused over the heroism of the Russian people and the victories of the Russian army over Napoleon and so on. This enthusiasm was also expressed in D. Lichard’s The Russians, published without the name of the author in the almanac Plody. However, the knowledge of Štúr’s group about Russia was rather arbitrary and the criteria by which they evaluated the importance of individual representatives of the Russian nation and its culture were quite contradictory. This was also very clearly expressed in the choice of personalities celebrated in the already mentioned work “Feelings of gratitude of the young sons of Slovakia”, where apart from the Russian Slavist Keppenov, the leading examples of generous promoters of Slavonic literary solidarity and pioneers of Russian – Slovak cultural contacts included the conservative minister of national enlightenment and chairman of the Russian Academy A. S. Shishkov, while the third representatives of the Russian nation had to be the great Russian writer Pushkin, a free-thinker and friend of the Dekabrists, persecuted by the Czarist regime. When Pushkin died on 29th January 1837 after being injured in a duel, the planned ode was replaced by Štúr’s elegy Žel nad Puškinem (Lament for Pushkin) published in the Czech magazine Květy. In the poem, which Russians rightly called “the first flower in the Slavonic wreath on the grave of the Russian poet”, the author expressed the grief of his associates over the early death of the “favourite of all children of Slavdom”, whose work inspired the spirits of the young Slovaks. However, they did not lack information on the reactionary character of Russian Czarism. One of the letters

to A. B. Vrchovský from his Czech friend V. S. Štulc indignantly described the system of serfdom in Russia, according to which people could be sold like animals, a man here, his wife somewhere else. According to Štulc, the Czar, that “source of murder” needed to be overthrown so that it would be possible to achieve true Slavonic solidarity, in which he saw salvation for all the Slavs including the Russians. The society turned by letter to the chief secretary of the Russian Academy D. I. Jazykov in an effort to establish a direct connection with Russia and enrich their library. Their request, supported by a priest from the Russian embassy in Vienna G. T. Meglickij and by P. I. Keppen and Janko Šafářík, received a positive response.

The first personal contacts of Ľudovít Štúr and his associates with Russian visitors to Slovakia, especially with Russian Slavists, played an important part in shaping the relationship to Russia and the national ideology. At the end of the 1830s, this meant especially the meetings with O. M. Bodanský, from 1842 head of the Department of Slavonic Studies at Moscow University, who was welcomed with extraordinary interest. The discussions and subsequent correspondence with Bodanský, who fully approved of the pan-Slavonic enthusiasm of the young Slovaks and their nation-building activity, supported their effort to produce their own standard written language and promised assistance, found an enthusiastic response among the circle of young Bratislava Slovaks. The enthusiasm was so great that it evoked serious concern from F. C. Kampelik and other equally pro-Polish and Czechoslovakist young Czechs in Vienna, who came to Bratislava to moderate the excessive Russo-phil sympathies of the Slovaks and neutralize the alleged “Pan-Slavist agitation” of the Russian Slavist. The leading representatives of the young Slovak movement gave the well-known reply that according to their understanding of the true Pan-Slavism, they would strive to be beneficial in the Slavonic spirit first of all to the Slovaks and through them to the Czechoslovak tribe and to the whole of Slavdom, that “they wanted to be first Slovaks, then Czechoslavs, but also Slavs”. This already clearly outlined the new version of the Slavonic conception and political programme of the Slovak national emancipation movement, as it was publicly formulated later in the mid 1840s.

The contacts and cooperation with all the Slavonic nations, including those not mentioned here, developed to a previously unprecedented extent by the young generation of the Slovak intelligentsia, the mutual exchange of experiences from the activities of national institutions, stimuli and support in the emancipation struggle, played an important part in the Slovak national movement and in the social and political life of the other Slavonic nations. It brought very positive results in the sphere of academic Slavonic studies, literature and the whole cultural field, where it significantly contributed to ensuring that our national culture did not lose contact with the culture of the other Slavonic nations, strengthened its democratic character and helped to develop its national specificness.
Ivan Kamenec

ON THE TRAIL OF TRAGEDY

The Holocaust in Slovakia

H & H
THE ROLE OF MILAN HODŽA IN SLOVAK COMMERCIAL BANKING (1918 – 1938)

ĽUĐOVÍT HALLON


This is a study of so far unknown facts about the activities of Milan Hodža in the financial sector of Czechoslovakia from 1918 until 1938. Before World War I, Hodža had been trying to establish a strong Slovak bank in Budapest, but failed. This period of his professional endeavours has already been extensively documented. However, only very limited attention has been paid to his similar activities in the newly founded Czechoslovakia. The information available is only about his screening of the market situation. Deeper examination is undertaken by the author, and shows that Hodža put a significant effort into pressuring the banks to merge. His tactic included extortion, corruption and bribery, even undemocratic governmental decisions. Between 1918 and 1938, Hodža managed to create a central monetary institution of public finances, and subordinated it to function in line with the economic interests of his own political party.

History. Czechoslovakia. Milan Hodža and role in the commercial banking 1918 until 1938.

The person of Dr. Milan Hodža has been the subject of intensive research by historians, political scientists and sociologists for many years. The socio-political situation after 1989 has finally enabled the systematic uncovering of individual aspects of the life work of this extraordinarily significant personality in Slovak, Czechoslovak and European history. At first attention was directed mainly towards the political activity of M. Hodža. However, from about the middle of the 1990s, studies depicting M. Hodža as a leading national economist have increased. His effort to build up the capital background of the agrarian movement is one of the questions to be relatively well mapped in these works. It mainly involved building up a sophisticated system of people’s financial institutions from small cooperatives through middle-sized institutions to financial centres. These activities of M. Hodža culminated in the inter-war period. Historians have also partially mapped M. Hodža’s achievements in the area of establishing branches of the Czech Zemská banka (Land Bank) and Hypotečná banka (Mortgage Bank) in Slovakia during the 1920s, which replaced the role of a central organization for people’s finance for some
time. However, it is less well-known that the Agrarian Party and especially M. Hodža endeavoured throughout the inter-war period to widen their influence in the field of commercial banking and bring the main banking centres into their financial system. Works usually only speak of the idea of M. Hodža to establish an agrarian or small farmers’ bank in Slovakia, to serve as a centre for Slovak national agrarian capital. He already had this idea before 1918, but concrete activity in this direction is mentioned only sporadically. M. Hodža also had a share in the internal development of the system of commercial banks. The aims of M. Hodža in the field of commercial banking can be divided into three main areas: to concentrate the fragmented banking system of Slovakia into a central banking organization with a strong capital base, to subordinate this unified bank to the influence of the Agrarian Party and change it into a centre for the banking operations of people’s banking. M. Hodža pursued these aims in a really systematic way throughout the inter-war period. To achieve them, he used every opportunity in the contemporary economic development of Slovakia and all accessible resources provided by the political and legal system of the Czechoslovak Republic. The results of the activities of the Czech agrarian movement in the sphere of finance and the development of the Czech Agrárna banka were M. Hodža’s model in this effort. The following study is concerned with precisely these economic and political activities of M. Hodža and the Slovak wing of the Agrarian Party in the inter-war period. However, these activities are examined from the point of view of the development of banking on the basis of the source material especially from the Archives of the National Bank of Slovakia and the rich collection from the Tatra banka in the Slovak National Archives.

Milan Hodža already entered the life of commercial banking in the first period of the existence of the Czechoslovak Republic. However, after 1918 his activities in the field of banking acquired a new dimension against the background of his rapid rise to the highest political circles of the new state. The situation in banking also changed fundamentally.

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1 Among the various recent works on the national economic activities of M. Hodža, it is necessary to mention especially the monographs: CAMBEL, Samuel. Štátivík a národohospodár Milan Hodža 1878 – 1944 (Statesman and national economist Milan Hodža 1878 – 1944). Bratislava : Veda, 2001; HOLEC, Roman et al. Stopáďdesiat rokov slovenského družstevníctva: Vítazstvá a prehry (A Hundred and fifty years of Slovak cooperatives: Victories and defeats). Bratislava : Družstevná únia SR, 1995; MARTULIÁK, Pavol. Stopáďdesiat rokov slovenského družstevníctva (A Hundred and fifty years of Slovak cooperatives). Nitra : b. v., 1995. The national economic activity of M. Hodža has been traced in various works by R. Holec, most recently, e.g. in the collective monograph: KOVÁČ, Dušan (ed.). Na začiatku storočia 1901 – 1914 [At the beginning of the century 1901 – 1914]. Bratislava : Veda, 2004, as well as by S. Cambel. For example the following studies are concerned with the inter-war period: CAMBEL, Samuel. Miesto Milana Hodžu v slovenskom družstevníctve po vzniku ČSR, 1918 – 1924 (The place of Milan Hodža in the Slovak cooperative movement after the formation of Czechoslovakia, 1918 – 1924). In Historický časopis, (Hereinafter HČ), 1998, year’s vol. 46, no. 1, p. 24; CAMBEL, Samuel. Milan Hodža a slovenský regionalizmus 30. rokov (Milan Hodža and Slovak regionalism in the 1930s). In České a slovenské zemědělské zemědělství v období mezi světovými válkami: Sborník přispěvků z celostátní konference. Uherské Hradiště 1992. We also find this theme in volumes from the regular conferences on agriculture in Uherské Hradiště, e. g. the volume: Politická a stavovská zemědělská hnutí ve 20. století: Sborník přispěvků z mezinárodní konference. Uherské Hradiště 2000. Information about the national economic activities of M. Hodža can also be found in some works on his role in politics, e.g. the collection of studies in the volume: PEKNÍK, Miroslav (ed). Milan Hodža štátník a politik. Bratislava : Veda, 2002; the study: ZUBEREC, Vladimír. Milan Hodža (1. 2. 1878 – 27. 6. 1944). In HČ, 1990, year’s vol. 38, no. 6, p. 769.
Before the origin of Czechoslovakia, M. Hodža was mainly concerned with questions of the emancipation of nationally Slovak financial capital, but in the new conditions, he and other representatives of the new regime were faced with the problem of the further development of the whole credit system in the territory of Slovakia. The situation of banking was critical after the disintegration of the unified financial system of the Kingdom of Hungary. A total of 228 independent banks operated in Slovakia, but the whole of their assets, together with those of other types of financial institution amounted to only 6% of the assets of the financial institutions of the Czech lands. The economy depended for capital on the great banking centres of Budapest. However, the new state frontiers and tense political relations between Czechoslovakia and Hungary interrupted the connection with them. The older conception of M. Hodža demanding the creation of a capital strong central bank acquired a new and wider meaning and urgent topicality in these conditions. The capital needs of Slovakia inevitably required the centralization of the small and middle-sized banks into larger entities. Therefore, the so-called process of concentration, that is the merging of banks was one of the key aims of the development of banking in the inter-war period. Concentration was initiated by the government economic circles about the middle of 1919 and its first phase culminated at the end of 1921. One of the main “engines and directors” of this process was most probably M. Hodža in the posts of secretary of state at the Ministry of the Interior and minister for unification. The period of preparation and advance of concentration coincided with his work in these functions during the years 1919 – 1920. However, M. Hodža remained in the background, and came out from the shadow into the light only at the culmination of the first phase of the concentration process. As a result of the economic and national – political changes, the more important national Slovak banks, especially the Tatra banka and Slovenská banka played the leading role in concentration, at the expense of the Hungarian or German banks and the smaller institutions with Slovak management. The share capital of the two leading banks increased from 7.6 million to 145 million Czechoslovak crowns (Kč) in the years 1918 – 1921, while the number of banks decreased to about 60 during this period. Apart from the centralization of banking and strengthening of the position of Slovak national institutions, M. Hodža was constantly concerned with his long-term aims, especially the establishment of an agricultural bank to serve as an epicentre for agrarian capital and a financial base for the agrarian movement.

The first successful, although only very modest, attempt to establish an agricultural bank was launched by M. Hodža in the autumn of 1919. In cooperation with the distinguished legionary and pioneer of Slovak national banking Rudolf Gabriš, he participated in the foundation of the Slovenská roľnická banka (Slovak Small Farmers’ Bank) in Košice. R. Gabriš took up the position of commercial director of the bank. The new institution had a relatively successful development. It established six branches in eastern Slovakia,
gained share capital of 4.5 million Kč and took over some small local banks. However, with its regional character and orientation to commercial activities, it was actually a long way from the ideas of M. Hodža about the main base for agrarian capital. Therefore, he sought a better route to the achievement of his long-term aims in the “muddy waters” of the hectic process of bank mergers. In this, he used his political position and his extensive network of personal and family connections with representatives of financial institutions and members of the top management of banks. He found a starting point in the capital connection of the Slovenská roľnická banka with the leaders of the concentration of banking.

In the name of the Slovenská roľnická banka and as a member of the management of the Americko-slovenská banka, a leading financial institution, Milan Hodža proposed in autumn 1921 that these two institutions should merge with the Tatra banka. The Americko-slovenská banka with 25 million Kč of share capital was founded by the Slovak American Michal Bosák with the participation of domestic, mainly agrarian capital. The merger aimed to create the largest bank in Slovakia with share capital of 100 million Kč, which was almost double the share capital of the Czech Agrobanka. This would form a really strong capital centre corresponding to Hodža’s ambitions. The merger project was apparently also associated with political aims. All the leading members of the top management of the Americko-slovenská banka would join the management of the merged institution. They were mainly representatives of the agrarian movement and the government of the time, such as Dr. Vavro Šrobár, Dr. Pavol Blaho, Ľudovít Okánik, Jozef Bránecký, Ivan Štefánik, the director of the branch of Agrobanka in Bratislava Karol Hellmuth and not least M. Hodža himself. The centralized bank would play an important role in the background of the development of the Slovak wing of the Agrarian Party, as well as in the further development of the agrarian movement. Hodža’s proposal was an outstanding example of the pragmatic combination of pursuit of an aim with the real economic and political conditions. This is also shown by the content of a letter from October 1921, in which M. Hodža explained to the director of the Americko-slovenská banka the aims of the planned merger: “The plan is to merge our bank and the Tatra banka so that with the addition of our Roľnická banka, an institution with abundant reserves and deposits will be formed... As you see my approach is pragmatic and it is clear how I see the merger of the Roľnická banka... It is a matter of great development for Slovak finance...” The merger project collapsed immediately before implementation mainly because of opposition from the representatives of American Slovak capital especially M. Bosák, who feared the
weakening of their capital positions and considered the plan for the largest Slovak bank “sewn with a hot needle” to be too risky.\(^8\)

In spite of the failure of the merger plan, the Tatra banka became the largest commercial bank in Slovakia. It took over about 20 institutions, including the Slovenská roľnická banka in Košice. M. Hodža was a member of the board of the Tatra banka for some time and made various journeys to retain his personal influence there.\(^9\) However, in the period we are considering, M. Hodža also supported the development of banking in a direction, which brought unwelcome competition to the Slovak financial sector and evoked strong opposition among the representatives of the Slovak banks. It was a further manifestation of his pragmatism. In autumn 1921, he supported the establishment of an entirely new large financial institution: the Slovenská všeobecná úverná banka (Slovak General Credit Bank). It was formed by taking over the Slovak branches of an important Hungarian bank with the participation of “Czecho-Jewish” capital and the Americko-slovenská banka. The representatives of all the more important banks with Slovak managements unanimously opposed the granting of a concession to this “Hungaro-Czecho-Jewish” institution, which was Slovak only in name according to them. In October 1921, they jointly submitted a complaint against the granting of a concession to this bank to the minister with full power Martin Mičura, where they stated: “We, the undersigned protest against the granting of a concession to the Slovenská všeobecná úverná banka in Bratislava, which would not only threaten the economic, but especially the political interests of the Czechoslovak Republic. It would destroy all the gains of Czechoslovak finance in Slovakia up to now.”\(^10\) In October 1921, the captains of national Slovak banking also complained directly to the Banking Office of the Ministry of Finance in Prague. M. Hodža personally accompanied the deputation, but in the discussions he supported the establishment of the new bank. The representatives of the Banking Office at the Ministry of Finance in Prague stated that when the Slovak bank directors used the argument of inadequacy of the capital of the Americko-slovenská banka for participation in the new institution, which would prevent the creation of a bank with Slovak participation, M. Hodža refuted their argument: “The gentlemen expressed doubts that the Americko-slovenská banka would provide and maintain the capital (for participation in the Slovenská všeobecná úverná banka – note L. H.), so there was a justified fear that after a time, the capital would fall into the hands of people hostile to us. Dr. Hodža declared that the Americko-slovenská banka has the necessary capital prepared and has expressed the willingness to allow other Slovak banks to participate in this transaction.”\(^11\) M. Hodža helped to overcome fears over the “national” character of the new bank. The Slovenská

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\(^8\) Letter from the management of the Americko-slovenská banka to the directors of the Tatra banka from 12\(^{th}\) December 1921. SNA, f. TB – fúzie, k. 191, i. č. 410.

\(^9\) Minutes from the general meeting of the Tatra banka on 31\(^{st}\) December 1921. SNA, f. TB – knihy úradné, k. 2, i. č. 4.

\(^10\) Telegram of the representatives of the financial institutions to the minister with full power M. Mičura from 31\(^{st}\) October 1921. SNA, f. Ministerstvo s plnou mocou pre správou Slovenska (hereinafter MPS), k. 46, kmeňové číslo (hereinafter k. č.) 7 226.

\(^11\) Banking Office at the Ministry of Finance to the Ministry with Full Power, 13\(^{th}\) October 1921. SNA, f. MPS, k. 46, k. č. 7 226.
Historický časopis, 55, Supplement, 2007

všeobecná úverná banka gained the concession. It became the third largest commercial institution in Slovakia and a dangerous competitor to the leading Tatra banka and Slovenská banka.

The activities of M. Hodža in commercial banking weakened for a time after he entered the government of A. Švehla as minister of agriculture in October 1922. In the period up to the middle of the 1920s, he directed his attention mainly to building up the system of people’s finance. In this area, he initiated the spread of a new type of institution: the small farmers’ mutual savings bank (roľnícke vzájomné pokladnice). M. Hodža was mainly responsible for these savings banks gaining generous state assistance and from the end of the 1920s, they were the main competitors to the commercial banking sector. Hodža solved the absence of a banking centre for people’s finance with initiatives to open branches of the Czech publicly owned financial institutions the Zemská banka (Land Bank) and Hypotečná banka (Mortgage Bank) in Bratislava. The initiatives were successful. These branches became the main source of cheap credit in Slovakia and they replaced the missing financial centre for people’s finance. M. Hodža put aside his long-term aims in the field of commercial banking and waited for an appropriate opportunity.

From the position of minister of agriculture, M. Hodža maintained contacts with the commercial banks and as in other spheres of economic and political life, he used his powers as a minister and his rich connections to assist numerous applicants from Slovakia. However, “selfless assistance” for Slovakia often had a controversial background, which was a further characteristic of Hodža’s activity in the highest political positions. Among the various cases, it is necessary to mention Hodža’s role in the commercial activities of the commercial banks, especially in the timber trade. There was immense demand for building timber in the years of post-war reconstruction in Europe. The leading Slovak banks participated in this boom with “great style”. They jointly founded the Drevársky účastinársky spolok (Timber Joint Stock Company) and the Drevárska banka (Timber Bank), which specialized in this sector of business. However, it was clear from the beginning that the management of the Slovak banks was not professionally mature enough for transactions of international importance. As a “prudent statesman”, Hodža should have quickly identified the difficulties of banking. Instead of this, he contributed to deepening the economic problems. For example, he arranged for the Drevársky spolok to use state sawmill facilities and forced the state administration of the Orava komposesorát to sell the Spolok raw material for a low price, which caused millions in losses to the Orava forests. Soon after taking up his position as minister, he even planned to draw the timber business of the Slovak banks into a huge and extremely dangerous international deal involving the timber of the state forests and reaching a planned value of about 200 million Kč, with the participation of American capital, which he assisted in various ways.


13 HALLON, Ľudovít. Expanzia a ústup slovenského finančného kapitálu v účastinných podnikoch 1918 – 1929 na príklade Tatra banky (The expansion and retreat of Slovak finance in joint stock companies, using the example of the Tatra banka). In HČ, 1998, year’s vol. 46, No. 2, pp. 239-240.
government fortunately rejected this megalomaniac deal.\textsuperscript{14} In 1924 – 1925, the directorate of the state forests already refused to accept the guarantee certificates from the Slovak banks for the purchase of timber by their timber company, because the business was heading for certain collapse. M. Hodža as minister of agriculture applied strong pressure to the state forests to accept guarantee certificates worth 2.3 million Kč. The timber business caused losses of about 50 million Kč to the five largest Slovak banks.\textsuperscript{15}

Paradoxically, the high losses of the commercial banks in the first half of the 1920s gave Hodža new opportunities to implement the idea of a large central bank and extend the influence of the agrarian party in banking. The losses from the timber business were only the tip of the iceberg of fatal losses for the Slovak banks. As a result of the post-war economic and deflationary crisis and of mistakes of a subjective character, the whole Czechoslovak financial sector got into serious difficulties. The losses of the Slovak banks reached 643 million Kč, a “fantastic” sum by the standards of the time, and after deduction from reserves, 451 million Kč, from which 300 million Kč fell to the Slovenská banka and Tatra banka.\textsuperscript{16} The situation had to be solved with recovery resources from the state, on the basis of the so-called banking acts from 1924. Mainly thanks to M. Hodža, the leading Slovak banks received a significant proportion of the recovery resources. Hodža also placed the only representative of Slovakia in the commission approving the recovery awards. He was the director of the Tatra banka Vladimír Jesenský, brother of the writer Janko Jesenský. The Tatra banka received one of the largest amounts.\textsuperscript{17} However, recovery “was not freely given”. The Tatra banka, like other recovering institutions, had to fulfill various official and unofficial recovery conditions in the mid 1920s. It was symptomatic that the talks of the government representatives with representatives of the Tatra banka on the future of the institution in summer 1925, were held at “Hodža’s place” – the Ministry of Agriculture. The unofficial conditions for the recovery of the Tatra banka included appointment of the head of the branch of the Agrobanka in Bratislava, K. Hellmuth as the new director of the institution. The senator for the agrarian party Kornel

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{14} Report from director V. Jesenský on talks with the representatives of governments bodies in Prague at a session of the executive committee of the Tatra banka on 29\textsuperscript{th} December 1922. SNA, f. TB – knihy úřadné, k. 7, i. č. 50; NOVOTNÝ, Gustav. Josef Opletal a Karel Šiman aneb „Ale Ježíšmárjá, vždyť je to náš človek!” a „Ale já to přece chci!” In Politická a stavovská zemědělská hnutí ve 20. Století: Sborník přispěvků z mezinárodní konference. Uherské Hradiště 2000, pp. 227-229.
  \item \textsuperscript{15} Report on business to a session of the executive committee of the Tatra banka on 15\textsuperscript{th} November 1924. SNA, f. TB – knihy úřadné, k. 7, i. č. 53; Report on business to a session of the board of directors of the Tatra banka, 3\textsuperscript{rd} – 4\textsuperscript{th} March 1925. SNA, f. TB – knihy úřadné, k. 7, i. č. 54.
  \item \textsuperscript{17} Report of V. Jesenský on the recovery plan to a session of the board of directors of the Tatra banka on 26th April 1926. SNA, f. TB – knihy úřadné, k. 4, i. č. 26; FALTUS, Jozef. Povojnová hospodárska kríza v Československu (The post-war economic crisis in Czechoslovakia). Bratislava : Vydavateľstvo politickej literatúry, 1966, pp. 223-227.
\end{itemize}
Stodola gained the post of chairman of the board of directors. In a letter from July 1925, the director of the Banking Office at the Ministry of Finance instructed K. Hellmuth on his tasks at the Tatra banka as follows: “Your position will be outwardly described as membership of the board of directors and of the narrower executive committee. You will be granted the right of veto over all questions, whether in the personnel or commercial fields”. Until the end of the 1930s K. Hellmuth was the eminence grise of the commercial leadership of the institution and whenever new members were elected to the board of directors, more members or supporters of the agrarian party joined it. For example, Dr. Pavol Blaho was a member until his early death, as well as Dr. Michal Slávik, Jozef Országh, Dr. Ján Halla, Dr. Ján Kohút. The newspaper of the People’s Party irredentist group Slovenský národ wrote about the changes in the leadership of the Tatra banka in August 1925: “the chief director will be a Czech K. Hellmuth, head of the Bratislava branch of Agrobanka... This will bring the leadership of this institution into Czech hands... Many shareholders are not satisfied with the appointment of Mr. Hellmuth... If there is no change they want to call an extraordinary general meeting...”

According to the official balance statistics, Tatra banka still remained the largest commercial bank after 1925 and it gradually succumbed to the influence of the agrarian party. However, as a result of its economic state, it was difficult for it to fulfill the role of a strong banking centre. From the middle of the 1920s, therefore, M. Hodža, now already minister of education in Švehla’s government from 1926 to 1928, promoted the merging of the Tatra banka with the second largest commercial institution in Slovakia, the Slovenská banka. These plans had the full support of the government and especially of the minister of finance Karel Engliš, a promoter of agrarian and export capital. The recovery process again indirectly helped Hodža. Already in the first months after the approval of recovery grants in 1925, it became clear that these resources were not sufficient for the recovery of the two institutions, and more was needed. M. Hodža used all the available political “leavers” to gain more state aid for the banks. The chairman of the board of the Tatra banka K. Stodola commented to the session of the leadership of the institution in May 1927, about Hodža’s contribution to the recovery process as follows: “We must maintain (while gaining recovery assistance – note L. H.) the closest contacts with the government, and the gentlemen, who have spent most time in Prague, have had the opportunity to learn that as a result of the interventions and provision of information by minister Hodža and his associates, all the influential figures are very much inclined to favour us. Only time and continual contact with the government are needed, because

18 Report on the course of the talks between representatives of the Tatra banka and the government authorities in Prague to a session of the board of directors of the Tatra banka on 14th July 1925. SNA, f. TB – knihy úradné, k. 4, i. č. 25; Speech by K. Stodola to the general meeting of the Tatra banka on 12th July 1926. SNA, f. TB – knihy úradné, k. 2, i. č. 9.
19 Letter from the chief director of the Banking Office at the Ministry of Finance (BÚMF) A. Novák to the director of the Bratislava branch of the Agrobanka K. Hellmuth from 10th July 1925. SNA, f. TB – korešpondencia riaditeľa, k. 34, i. č. 395.
20 Zmeny vo vedení Tatra banky v Turčianskom Sv. Martine (Changes in the management of the Tatra banka at Turčiansky Sv. Martin). In Slovenský národ, 11th August 1925.
21 Report from K. Stodola on discussions at the Ministry of Finance to a session of the board of directors of the Tatra banka on 15th September 1926. SNA, f. TB – knihy úradné, k. 4, i. č. 26.
effective aid can come only from the government...” However, M. Hodža made merger a condition for aid to the Tatra banka and Slovenská banka. The top management of both institutions formally promised to merge in 1927, but after recovery resources were awarded, they immediately broke their promise. Therefore, Hodža lost his more effective instruments for economic-policy influence in the late 1920s. As a result of affairs with international connections, in which he had been a leading figure, he had to leave the world of the highest government positions and withdraw for a period to restore his “political health”.

In spite of the failure of pressure on the two leading banks, M. Hodža and the whole agrarian movement received their “just reward” for their initiatives in the recovery process from the second half of the 1920s. In return for its support, the agrarian party gained so-called political credits. Specifically the Tatra banka, which most depended on the recovery programme, paid these credits after the approval of every new state assistance. It paid a total of 1,990,000 Kč to the account of the agrarian party or to M. Hodža in person during the period 1926 – 1930. The top management of the Tatra banka openly admitted the following facts in the matter of the problem of the so-called political credits, in the framework of analysis of the financial losses and recovery process: “On the occasion of the granting of the first recovery support to our institution, in the amount of 90 million crowns, the management of the bank granted a representative of the agrarian party a loan of 200 thousand crowns... A further case preceded the 1929 elections, when Seďa the chief secretary of the agrarian party came to the Tatra banka with Dr. Milan Hodža’s authorization and requested a loan of 500 thousand crowns for the central secretariat of the party. He explained the need for this to our functionaries with the statement that if we did not grant this loan to the party, the Tatra banka would not get the promised state deposit of 60 million crowns... A short time later, chief secretary Seďa drew another loan of 500 thousand crowns, which also was not returned... Then on orders from the chairman of the board of directors Jozef Országh, the director Rudolf Kubiš was sent to Prague, to Beran, where he was to present the declaration that the Tatra banka could not pay this credit demanded by the party, and so this amount would have to be included in the losses covered by the recovery programme...” These facts were reported from a later period, but they show that the Tatra banka was already under the economic and political influence of the agrarian party at the end of the 1920s. On the initiative of M. Hodža, it contributed to the activity of the party and clearly contributed to financing the 1929 election campaign. However, research has shown that M. Hodža and the agrarian party gained further “generous donors” in the banking sector in return for intervention or as a result of pressure.

22 K. Stodola to a session of the board of directors of the Tatra banka 24 – 25th May 1927. SNA, f. TB – knihy úradné, k. 4, i. č. 28.
23 Conclusions of a session of the board of directors of the Tatra banka on 3rd November 1927. SNA, f. TB – Kniži úradné, k. 4, i. č. 28; Conclusions of a plenary session of the board of directors of the Slovenská banka on 8th October 1927. ANBS, f. Slovenskej banky, záznamy zápisnic správnej rady, unsorted.
24 List of “political” credits of the Tatra banka in the period 1926 – 1929. SNA, f. TB – spisy, k. 316.
25 Session of the administrative and supervisory committee of the Tatra banka on 12 – 13th July 1939 on the causes of the losses in the period 1918 – 1938. SNA, fond f TB – fúzie, k. 198, i. č. 410.
In the second half of the 1920s, M. Hodža also significantly intervened in the development of commercial banking in connection with his extensive activities in the sphere of people’s finance. After serious losses on investments in industry and whole-sale trade, the commercial banks partially returned to small and middle-sized credit investments, which had become the domain of the people’s financial institutions, namely savings banks, credit cooperatives and especially the small farmers’ mutual savings banks promoted by Hodža. By about 1930 the savings banks were operating in almost all the district centres in Slovakia. The partial return to business of a people’s finance character brought the banks into a continual competitive struggle with the institutions of the people’s finance sector, and to the painful recognition that in this struggle they were the less successful competitor. They could not compete in the area of interest rates and their promotional efforts among smaller clients were rather clumsy. For example, the branch of the Tatra banka in Martin, where the bank originated, reported to Bratislava in 1927 that its economic position was hopeless as a result of competition with the local small farmers’ savings bank and the town savings bank. The commercial banks were also at a disadvantage on the economic – political level. This especially applied in relation to minister M. Hodža. In this period, Hodža made a great contribution to the recovery of the banks, but the people’s finance institutions, especially the small farmers’ mutual savings banks, were an “affair of the heart” for him. As a result, he stood on the side of people’s finance on controversial questions. The representatives of the commercial banks sent dozens of memoranda to government representatives, complaining about the expansion of the small farmers’ mutual savings banks. Their credit activities were described as unfair competition. In these circumstances, the board of directors of the Tatra banka undertook the paradoxical initiative of turning, in cooperation with the other banks, to M. Hodža, to get him to restrict the expansion of the small farmers’ mutual savings banks. The protests culminated in a joint memorandum from the commercial banks to the minister of finance against the activities of the people’s financial institutions. The effort of the bank directors was doomed in advance to fail. At the end of the 1920s, they had to act in agreement with the savings banks and other types of people’s financial institutions to limit activities on the financial market and set interest rates. M. Hodža directed the talks from behind the scenes. The commercial banks were placed in the position of supplicants at the talks. The strong position of the small farmers’ mutual savings banks at these talks is shown by the content of a letter, in which the director of the Hypotečná banka in Košice Elo Šándor informed M. Hodža that only the commercial banks really needed agreement about the level of interest rates: “With regard to your talks with the joint stock company banks... I wish to inform you that the position of all the banks in the republic and especially in Slovakia is such that they cannot compete with the savings banks. Credit must


27 Conclusions of the session of the board of directors of the Tatra banka on 19th June 1926. SNA, f. TB – knihy úradné, k. 4, i. č. 26. CAMBEL, ref. 12, p. 109.
be below 8% today, and the banks are not capable of this." 28 The small farmers’ mutual savings banks, apparently on the initiative of M. Hodža, expressed willingness to reach a compromise agreement on interest rates with the commercial banks and it was concluded in January 1931. 29

The new economic policy environment formed at the beginning of the 1930s gave government financial circles in general and M. Hodža in particular new possibilities to put pressure on the banks to continue the process of merging. The causes lay in the coming of the great economic crisis. The recovery programmes from the 1920s, which counted on the long-term health of the financial institutions, collapsed under its impact like a house of cards. The key banking institutions, burdened with new losses, were in an economic position as bad or worse than that of the mid twenties before the recovery programmes. They had to ask the government to participate in another great recovery action to save them from their hopeless position. Parliament approved it in 1932 by amending the so-called banking acts from 1924. However, the government argued that Slovak banking had received a disproportionately large share of the recovery resources in the 1920s, which was not far from the truth and it included in the recovery programme only the Tatra banka, which had the largest amount of losses. 30 The other large banks in Slovakia understandably protested. The Slovenská banka successfully protested by asking for help from M. Hodža in a letter from its chairman Vladimír Makovický. Hodža returned to high politics at precisely this time and was prepared to help, understandably in return for appropriate services and concessions. In the letter from June 1932, V. Makovický turned to M. Hodža as to an old friend: "You promised me that in distributing support... you would take an interest in the Slovenská banka... The Slovenská banka certainly needs support..." 31 The commission awarding recovery resources approved aid for both banks thanks to M. Hodža. However, the amounts were small this time and conditional on very strict measures. Apart from economic restrictions such as reduction of share capital and closure of branches, the recovery conditions also included restriction of the excessive incomes of leading figures in the financial institutions. Therefore, the leadership of the Slovenská banka retreated from its request for state assistance, especially as a result of a partial improvement in its financial situation, while the Tatra bank remained dependent on recovery aid. 32 Milan Hodža’s manoeuvring space in relation to the Slovenská banka was significantly limited by this, and in the following period, he could only use recovery aid to put pressure on the Tatra banka.

29 Interest rate agreement between the financial institutions from 1st January 1931. SNA, f. TB, k. 241.
30 HALLON, ref. 16, pp. 285-286.
31 Letter from V. Makovický to M. Hodža from 6th June 1932. SNA, f. V. Makovický, k. 9, i. č. 11.
32 Decision of the council of ministers, číslo jednacie (Hereinafter č.j.) 93946/32 IIA/3 on recovery conditions for the Tatra banka, sent to the Ministry of Finance on 1st August 1932. State Central Archive of the Czech Republic, f ministerstvo financí, k. 1 326. The content of the grant of the Ministry of Finance to the Slovenská banka of recovery conditions, č. j. 93947/32 IIA/3 from 5th August 1932. ANBS, f. Slovenská banka – zápisnice správej rady – unsorted.

107
The small amount of recovery resources from 1932 only temporarily moderated the hopeless economic position of the Tatra banka. Various ideas about how to save the largest bank in Slovakia from certain collapse arose in government circles in connection with efforts from M. Hodža. They considered merging of the Tatra banka with the Banka československých légií, which was successfully expanding in the eastern parts of Czechoslovakia at this time, but Hodža’s old idea of merger with the Slovenská banka appeared to be more advantageous. A new plan for the merging of the two main centres of Slovak banking arose in 1934 with the support of M. Hodža, the leadership of the Slovenská banka and secretly also of the government representatives in the Tatra banka. V. Makovický agreed to the merger if the Tatra banka was incorporated into his institution as a bankrupt company and the state provided a generous financial “injection” for its recovery. V. Makovický informed M. Hodža about his conditions in a letter from October 1934 and requested intervention in the discussions of the council of ministers on financial aid for the two institutions: “These are the conditions under which the Slovenská banka could take over the Tatra banka... I ask you, dear friend, if you could intervene in the council of ministers, so that the merged institution will get what it needs...” However, when V. Makovický later learnt that the government financial circles and M. Hodža himself still expected the two institutions to merge as equals, he took up a position of firm opposition to the merger. The government finally decided to postpone the merger project, because it had to solve similar problems in Czech banking.

The position of M. Hodža in relation to the commercial banks changed in 1935, when he took up the post of prime minister and gained substantially more effective political instruments than he had held in his previous ministerial positions. At last, he could undertake a really vigorous and systematic fulfillment of his economic policy aims. He supported preparations for a substantial reorganization of the whole financial system. The planned reorganization aimed to strictly define the position of the individual types of financial institution in the credit market and complete the process of concentration of banking. M. Hodža was determined that on top of the pyramid of finance would be a capital strong commercial bank with the function of centre for the banking operations of people’s finance. This would mean combining the planned banking centre with the structure of the small farmers’ mutual savings banks, which grew vigorously during the 1930s, in contrast to the commercial banks. The savings banks became the “showcase” of agrarian capital and the whole agrarian movement in Slovakia. By 1937 they had achieved liabilities of 651 million Kč, while the total liabilities of the commercial Tatra banka amounted to 539 million Kč. The Union of Small Farmers’ Mutual Savings Banks (Zväz roľníckych vzájomných pokladníc) provided an organizational and super-

33 Letter from V. Makovický to M. Hodža on the talks between the Slovenská banka and Tatra banka in Prague from 25th September 1934. SNA, f. V. Makovický, k. 9, i. č. 11; Report of the Supervisory Unit for financial institutions on the economic state of the Tatra banka up to 31st October 1935. SNA, f. TB – knihy úradné, k. 5, i. č. 36.
34 Information from V. Makovický to M. Hodža on the conditions for merging of the Slovenská banka and Tatra banka, 9th October 1934. SNA, f. V. Makovický, k. 9, i. č. 11.
visory centre for the savings banks. From 1932 the union also fulfilled the function of a financial centre for the savings banks, and its activities gradually acquired the attributes of commercial banking. In the course of the 1930s, it developed investment activities in the food industry. The instrument of its expansion was the holding company Zemedel-
ský priemysel (Agricultural Industry) founded and financially backed by initiatives from prime minister M. Hodža. The savings banks also began to penetrate into the joint stock company banks. At the end of the economic crisis, they took over some of the business of the failed Americko-slovenská banka and merged with one of the smaller commercial banks. In the second half of the 1930s, they penetrated into the middle sized commercial Dunajská banka. This institution on the edge of bankruptcy was expected to take over the role of financial centre from the Union of Savings Banks and mediate its banking operations, but it was only an alternative solution. The savings banks needed a substantially greater bank with a stronger capital base. Prime minister M. Hodža, the Ministry of Finance and the representatives of agrarian capital worked intensively behind the scenes to create it by means of another great merger project.

In 1936 and 1937, M. Hodža as prime minister, in cooperation with the government, economic institutions and representatives of the agrarian movement, carried on a decisi-
ve “campaign” to achieve the merging of the Tatra banka with the Slovenská banka and perhaps with other major institutions according to his economic and political concep-
tions. He also initiated the creation of programmes for the consistent economic recovery of the central bank, which would arise from the merger. Under the weight of losses of about 160 million Kč, the managers of the Tatra banka had to wait humbly for the verdict of the government on the further destiny of their institution. However, the main obstac-
le to merger was the opposition of the leadership of the Slovenská banka, headed by the chairman V. Makovický. M. Hodža used the whole arsenal of forms of pressure to get the top management of the Slovenská banka “to see reason”. He proceeded according to the familiar “carrot and stick” method. He sent representatives of the agrarian movement Samo Hrianka and Ján Ursíny to the bank with attractive offers but also threats. For example, V. Makovický and his son Igor Makovický, also an important representative of the bank, received interesting financial offers. However, M. Hodža and minister of finance Jozef Kalfus also used the controversial empowering act no. 109/1934 and on this basis, the council of ministers approved a government decree ordering the merger be carried out even without the agreement of the management of the Slovenská banka. The government decree planned the creation of a united Slovenská ústredná banka (Slovak Central Bank) or Slovenská národná Tatra banka (Slovak National Tatra Bank). The second of these institutions would arise with the participation of the Národná banka of

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37 Report of the Supervisory union (Revízna jednota) for financial institutions on the economic state of the Tatra banka up to 31st October 1935. SnA, f. TB – knihy úradné, k. 5, i. č. 36.

Banská Bystrica, headed by the representative of the agrarian party Viliam Pauliny. In December 1936, the minister of finance informed premier M. Hodža about the government decree as follows: “The Ministry of Finance considers it essential that the Slovenská banka be included in the prepared merger... For this reason, a draft of the government decree is already prepared...” The last person to grasp that M. Hodža stood behind the pressure on the Slovenská banka, was the chairman of the bank V. Makovický. He could not believe that his long-term friend M. Hodža would use such dirty methods against him. In a letter from March 1937, a psychologically broken V. Makovický accused M. Hodža of treating his bank worse than the Hungarian authorities did before 1918: “I turn to you on the matter of the unhappy merger... I already experienced many things... I survived hardships and violence from the side of the Hungarian government... Take it dear Milan, if my own government and you as prime minister and my old friend really want it... You have also used the Hungarian methods, this finally hurts me and I don’t know whether I’ll pay for it with my health.” V. Makovický then appealed to other old friends in the highest state positions to stop the attack on his bank by M. Hodža and his agrarian party. For example, in a letter to the minister of justice Ivan Dérer, he asked Dérer to reject the government proposal on the banking merger if it was discussed by the council of ministers. He also pointed to the incompatibility of the practices of the agrarian party and M. Hodža with democracy: “I am writing this confidentially to you dear friend... If this matter (the government merger decree – note Ľ. H.) comes to the council of ministers for discussion. I don’t believe that our Czechoslovak Republic should intervene in private property like this... so that one political party can gain control of the Slovenská banka and its good businesses... They are doing all this because associates of the prime minister want to get banking into their hands...” In the end, M. Hodža seems to have understood that he had “gone too far”. Immediately before the decisive step, that is before approval of the government decree, he gave up the pressure on the Slovenská banka and so preserved a definite line beyond which democracy ended.

The inflexible position of the top management of the Slovenská banka meant that the project to create a large central bank in Slovakia had to be postponed indefinitely. However, Hodža’s plan to build up a banking centre for the people’s financial institutions remained realistic. In the interests of preserving its own existence, the Tatra banka accepted the conditions of agrarian capital around the turn of the years 1937 – 1938. In return for a promise of final recovery aid, again initiated by M. Hodža, it accepted the role of centre for the banking operations of people’s finance. The Ministry of Finance worked out a programme for the recovery of the Tatra banka including firm conditions with the character of an ultimatum. After talks between the management of the bank and government representatives in spring 1938, Hodža agreed to a more moderate version

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40 Confidential report from the Ministry of Finance to prime minister M. Hodža from 15th December 1936. SNA, f. TB – fúzie, k. 220, i. č. 410.
41 V. Makovický to M. Hodža, 3rd March 1937. SNA, f. V. Makovický, k. 9, i. č. 11.
of the conditions.\textsuperscript{43} However, from the political point of view, the programme for the economic recovery of the institution opened the way to the complete subordination of the largest bank in Slovakia to the interests of the agrarian party. In the framework of this programme, the Tatra banka had to substantially increase its share capital by means of the capital entry of the Union of Small Farmers’ Mutual Savings Banks. The minister of finance already informed the management of the bank about this basic condition for recovery aid in a letter from January 1938, where he also stated its future role in relation to people’s finance: “I consider it necessary that the people’s finance sector, especially the small farmers’ mutual savings banks, should have shareholdings because the bank will perform the function of financial centre for these institutions...”\textsuperscript{44} In the course of 1938, the Tatra banka already closely cooperated with the Union of Small Farmers’ Mutual Savings Banks in the area of the capital transactions of the Zemedelský priemysel company and they jointly penetrated into the food industry. At a general meeting in August 1938, where the Tatra banka officially accepted the recovery programme, the composition of its managing bodies was changed so that they came almost entirely under the control of representatives of agrarian capital and the Republican Party. For example, the directors of the Union of Small Farmers’ Mutual Savings Banks Jozef Rybár and Ján Obuch, the chief director of the Central Cooperative (Ústredné družstvo) Jozef Kukuča, the secretary of the agrarian party in Košice Karol Rybárik and the deputy chairman of the Agrarian Council (Zemedelská rada) for Slovakia Ján Chorvát became members of the top management of the bank.\textsuperscript{45} The programme for recovery aid and the entry of agrarian capital into the Tatra banka still required approval from parliament. However, the complex process of parliamentary debates was interrupted by the rapid course of political events in autumn 1938. The long conceived plans collapsed and the recovery of the Tatra banka continued up to the end of 1938 in entirely new economic and political conditions.

In spite of the failure of the recovery project considered above as a result of the international political development, it is possible to state that on the eve of the dissolution of the Czechoslovak Republic, Dr. Milan Hodža succeeded in achieving two of his strategic aims in the area of commercial banking: the creation of a banking centre for people’s finance and its subordination to the economic and political interests of the agrarian party. The third main aim: the merging of the banks into one centre with a strong capital base was achieved only by the coming totalitarian regimes, which did not stop their economic and political pressure halfway like Hodža, but continued their non-economic interventions to the “victorious” end. The role of M. Hodža in commercial banking had a similar character to his activity in other spheres of the economic and political life of Slovakia and the whole of Czechoslovakia. The typical feature was the contradictory and contro-

\textsuperscript{43} Record of the minister of finance from 10\textsuperscript{th} January 1938 no. j. 160 951/38 II A/3 on the conditions for recovery of the Tatra banka. SNA, f. TB – knihy úřadné, k. 3, i. č. 21. Report of the director of K. Hellmuth on talks about the recovery conditions in Prague to a session of the board of directors of the Tatra banka on 17\textsuperscript{th} May 1938. SNA, f. TB – knihy úřadné, k. 5, i. č. 41.

\textsuperscript{44} Record of the minister of finance from 10\textsuperscript{th} January 1938 no. j. 160 951/38 II A/3 on the conditions for recovery aid to the Tatra banka. SNA, f. TB – knihy úřadné, k. 5, i. č. 21.

\textsuperscript{45} Decree of the Ministry of Finance from 27\textsuperscript{th} August 1938 č. j. 61 313/38 II A/3 on the recovery conditions for the Tatra banka. SNA, f. TB – knihy úřadné, k. 5, i. č. 41. Minutes of the general meeting of the Tatra banka on 18\textsuperscript{th} August 1938. SNA, f. TB – knihy úřadné, k. 3, i. č. 21.
versial background of the majority of important activities. However, he also entered the field of banking as the most important Slovak politician of the inter-war period. With great effort, he contributed to overcoming the difficult situation in banking after the break up of the financial system of the old Kingdom of Hungary. He assisted the successful rise of Slovak national capital and the recovery of banking in the 1920s, which saved the leading Slovak banks from certain collapse. The building up of the system of people’s banking institutions under the “protective hand” of M. Hodža also had great importance for the commercial banks in the end. After the great economic crisis of the 1930s, people’s finance became the supporting pillar for the whole credit system in Slovakia including the commercial banks.

MILAN KATUNINEC


The Society of Saint Adalbert (Vojtech) played a significant role in the religious and national life of the Slovak people for a long period of time. During World War II, it was at odds with the authorities, but managed to become a little more independent than in previous periods. The Democratic Party won the 1946 parliamentary election in Slovakia. This development was supposed to solidify the newly found independence of the Society of Saint Adalbert. Increases in publication rate and membership numbers were also encouraging this trend. After the Communist Party had taken power in 1948, the society fell on hard times. Its activities continued, but their scope was severely restricted and the Communist Party exercised strong control over them. People of the regime took over running the society, and prepared a new Charter in 1953. The society started to be defined as a religious institution without active membership, and the new Charter came into effect in 1954.


The socio-political development in Slovakia after the Second World War was marked by the unfavourable evaluation of the Catholic Church by the new power-political authorities. In the renewed Czechoslovak Republic, forces, which regarded the Catholic Church as a strong ideological opponent, gained a leading position in political life and so they strove to weaken its influence in Slovakia and deliberately linked its representatives with the regime of the Slovak state. Catholic organizations were also placed in a complicated situation. The position of the national – religious literary and educational society of the Slovak Catholics – the Society of St. Adalbert – active since 1870 also in the field of strengthening the national consciousness of the Slovaks, worsened especially because the new regime interfered with its organizational structure and publishing activity.

In mid May 1945, the Slovak National Council approved a decree on the punishment of fascist criminals, occupiers and collaborators, establishment of the people’s courts and state control of education. This decree was also misused against many honourable Slovak patriots, who had participated in the social and political life of the Slovak state with honourable intentions and their reputation was sullied. The Society of St. Adalbert did not escape its misuse, with opponents of the Catholic Church representing it as the basis of the political power of Andrej Hlinka. Especially the administrator of the society Ján Põstényi, who was accused of being a collaborator, was subjected to sharp criticism.

The Roman Catholic priest Jozef Straka with the function of cultural officer of the Commission of the Slovak National Council for Education, came to the office of the administrator of the Society of St. Adalbert in Trnava on 6th June 1945 with the secretary of the commission and a member of National Security. They presented Pöstényi, who had served as a member of the State Council from 1st August 1940 to 1st July 1943, with a decree from the commission depriving him of the leadership of the Society of St. Adalbert with effect from 1st June 1945. The chief accountant of the society Adolf Vagner was appointed by the commission as temporary manager until the matter was definitively solved. J. Pöstényi was arrested and placed in remand imprisonment. He had to be placed before the National Court.

At a session of the society committee on 11th June 1945, Jozef Straka read the decree from the Commission for Education on dismissal of the members of all society committees and the formation of a temporary managing commission. Ambróz Lazík, Augustín Raška, Emil Funczík, Augustín Pozdeck, Juraj Hodál, Ján Ševčík, Anton Palkovič, Dominik Drgoň, Jozef Straka, Kornel Filo, Pavol Macháček, Jozef Fiala Udavský and Vincent Šinkovits became members of it. Augustín Raška was appointed chairman of the commission. In the inter-war period, he had worked in Slovakia as head of the regional council of the Catholic gymnastic organization Orol, which developed various educational as well as sports activities. A member of the dissolved management committee Ján Válek informed those present that Trnava town council did not agree with the “removal of Pöstényi from the society”. Since Jozef Straka actually had the last word in the management commission and the commission was not capable of passing a resolution, the members present did not concern themselves more closely with J. Válek’s position.

At the session on 25th July, Pavol Žiška, Ján Arleth, František Minarovich, Michal Pavlík and Jozef Vavrovič were coopted as new members of the management commission. J. Straka rejected the attempt of some members of the commission to call a general meeting of the Society of St. Adalbert. He regarded preparation for the election of a society manager and officer as the priority for the activity of the management commission. Juraj Hodál informed those present that only a temporary administrator could be elected. The names of the candidates had to be submitted by the Commission for Education in Bratislava.

At the session of the management commission on 1st August 1945, Michal Pavlík again commented that the Pöstényi case was not solved. He proposed that they delay the election of a manager. However, J. Straka uncompromisingly persisted with the demand for the election of a temporary manager, on which he also conditioned the dissolution of the management commission and the election of a management committee and supervisory body. Augustín Raška was elected to the post of temporary manager on the proposal of the commissioner Ján Ševčík. After his election, Straka announced the completion of the activity of the management commission and the formation of the management com-

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2 Jozef Straka, a member of the screening senate for the Catholic clergy, was entrusted by the leadership of the Slovak National Council with the arrest of the Bishop of Spiš Ján Vojtaššák on 5th May.
mittee of the Society of St. Adalbert. Bishop Jozef Čársky again became chairman of the society, while Ambróz Lazík, apostolic pro-notary of Trnava became deputy chairman of the society and chairman of the management committee. With these changes the Society of St. Adalbert was partially freed from the directive interventions of the political power. Its representatives expressed the conviction that they did not have to change anything in its orientation, because its programme was oriented mainly towards the people: “It serves the national unit and especially the ordinary people, and it wants to continue to serve”. However, he also directed his interest to the closer attachment of the Slovak Catholic intellectuals to the society: “Neither can we disappoint the expectation of our more educated people and we officials of the society will put our best efforts into ensuring that the society also fulfils its mission among them.” The ambition of the society was to gain “full understanding” not only among the educated readers, but also among Catholic writers, with whom it wanted to establish “the closest cooperation”. At a meeting of the society committee on 25th September 1945, they also discussed the building and further development of the Slovak Catholic Academy, which had been formed in the framework of the society during the period of the Slovak state after many years of preparation. However, the activity of the officials of the society already did not save the Slovak Catholic Academy.

The effort to stabilize the situation

On 8th October 1945, the chairman of the Bishops’ Conference Archbishop Karol Kmeťko, who opposed the intervention of the government in the development of the Society of St. Adalbert, submitted a memorandum to the Board of Commissioners and the Slovak National Council. Among other things, it pointed to “the damage to Catholic life in the field of the press”, noting that from 1st April to the end of August 1945, no publication of Catholic periodicals and newspapers was allowed, and later the situation had only partially improved. He regarded the intervention in the Society of St. Adalbert as a “clear offence against Catholics”, since no other organization of this type had experienced a similar intervention. He regarded the removal of the “distinguished patriot Ján Pôstényi” from the leadership of the society as especially offensive. Archbishop K. Kmeťko recalled his “pre-revolution construction activity”, contributions to the development of the society, his disputes with Hlinka about personnel questions, effort to resist

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5 Pútnik cyrilometodejský, 1, no. 3, 16th September 1945, p. 39.
6 Ref. 5, p. 45.
7 Pútnik cyrilometodejský, 1, no. 8, 25th November 1945, p. 118.
Nazi pressure in the period of the Slovak Republic to publish literature supporting the Nazi ideology, and rejection of consideration of evacuating the society to Austria.⁹

Ján Pöstényi was released from prison on 1st October 1945. The temporary manager of the Society of St. Adalbert Augustín Raška reacted to this by resigning from his position at the session of the managing committee on 17th November 1945. He proposed that Pöstényi should again take over the leading position, but Pöstényi rejected this with the explanation that “his case was still not solved”. Therefore, the managing committee asked Raška to head the management of the society until the general meeting.

The results of the parliamentary elections in May 1946 encouraged the stabilization of the situation in the society. In Slovakia the Democratic Party gained 62 % of the votes, and Catholic politicians favourable to the activity of the society joined its leadership after the April agreement. A resolution on the calling of a general meeting was adopted at a session of the managing committee of the Society of St. Adalbert on 10th June 1946, probably under the influence of the election results. A preparatory committee was entrusted with securing its problem-free course, but within it, there was an open dispute between Ferdiš Juriga and Pavol Macháček. It culminated in discussions by the management and preparatory committees on the eve of the holding of the general meeting, and it was only thanks to the chairman of the Society of St. Adalbert Bishop Jozef Čársky, that it did not continue at the actual general meeting. At the talks preceding the general meeting, A. Raška again demanded that Ján Pöstényi should return to the position of manager, since the obstacles to his return “are already overcome”. In an effort to remove the obstacles, which prevented Pöstényi taking over the leading position, some of the bishops turned to the political representatives of the Democratic Party with a request for help. They got support from the commissioner for transport Ivan Pietor. On 31st August 1946, he wrote to Pöstényi that he himself considered that Pöstényi’s return to the post of manager of the Society of St. Adalbert was extremely urgent, because it was in the interests of all Slovak Catholics that his rich experience and energy should be devoted to the society, which he had personally raised “to the height the Society of St. Adalbert had reached”. Pietor also mentioned in the letter that he had discussed the whole matter with the chairman of the Slovak National Council Jozef Letrich. He informed Pöstényi about information he had just received about discussion of this question with the commissioner for education Ladislav Novomeský, “who promised that he would not oppose you in the performance of your function”.¹⁰

The chairman of the Society of St. Adalbert Jozef Čársky appealed to Pöstényi to officially take up the post of manager already on the day of the general meeting. Probably as a result of the fact that the Pöstényi “affair” was still not unambiguously solved, Ferdiš

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Juriga proposed a more cautious approach and asked Raška to continue performing the function of temporary manager, which would also contribute to the smooth course of the general meeting.

The Bishop of Trnava Pavol Jantausch opened the general meeting. In spite of serious health problems, he considered it **“his duty as defender of the society”** to encourage the participants in the assembly to continue their activity.\(^\text{11}\) He was followed by Bishop Jozef Čársky, who announced his intention to resign from the position of chairman of the Society of St. Adalbert, but at the personal request of P. Jantausch, he decided to continue for a further period. Mikuláš Schneider-Trnavský was elected to the post of deputy chairman of the Society of St. Adalbert by the general meetings. However, the question of the manager was not successfully solved and in addition to Pöstényi, A. Raška continued his work as temporary manager.

**Society periodicals**

The post-war interventions in the publishing activity of the society were directed mainly towards the publication of the society periodicals. After the forced interruption of the publications of the society, which had a long record of producing relatively high quality magazines oriented towards various groups, publication of a new fortnightly magazine – the *Pútnik cyrilometodejský (Cyrillo-Methodian Pilgrim)* – began on 19\(^{\text{th}}\) August 1945. It was intended as a continuation of the monthly *Pútnik svätovojtešský (St. Adalbert Pilgrim)*. After a short time, the society gained permission to publish the monthly *Nová práca (New Work)*, intended as a continuation of the magazine *Kultúra (Culture)*. The magazine *Plameň (Flame)* began to appear again from 1\(^{\text{st}}\) January 1947, as did the monthly *Duchovný pastier (Spiritual Shepherd)*.

The *Pútnik cyrilometodejský*, presented by the editors as the basic regular publication of the Society of St. Adalbert, appeared from 2\(^{\text{nd}}\) September 1945 with the sub-title “Magazine of the Slovak Christian Community”. Its temporary editor was the society cultural officer Stanislav Jurovský. In summer 1946 the society management decided to publish the *Pútnik cyrilometodejský* as a monthly.\(^\text{12}\) The magazine *Nová práca* was directed towards the Slovak Catholic intelligentsia from the point of view of content. Its editor was Augustín Raška. After Raška became the dean of Trnava and parish priest of the church of St. Nicholas in September 1947, he stopped editing the magazine\(^\text{13}\) and gradually withdrew from active participation in the society. Raška’s effort to ensure that *Nová práca* maintained a Christian view of “social, religious and cultural questions”, which was strongly criticized by the communists,\(^\text{14}\) as well as his opposition to later changes in the society, “contributed” to this widely learned priest, teacher and organizer, who did much work for the stabilization of the society, being sentenced in the period of

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11 *Pútnik cyrilometodejský*, 2, no. 15, October 1946, p. 228. See also: *Pútnik cyrilometodejský*, 3, no. 8-9, August – September 1947, p. 117.

12 *Pútnik cyrilometodejský*, 2, no. 13-14, August-September 1946, p. 16.


communist totalitarianism, to four years in prison, where he died in 1953.\textsuperscript{15} After Raška, Nová práca was edited by Pavol Macháček, who was also responsible for editing the \textit{Pútnik cyrilometodejský} from May 1947.\textsuperscript{16}

During the revival of its publishing activity, which had been paralysed practically up to autumn 1945, the society also had to react to the increased cost of publishing. A session of the managing commission on 1\textsuperscript{st} August 1945 decided to collect \textquoteleft\textquoteleft a voluntary contribution to the high production cost of membership books\textquoteright\textquoteright,\textsuperscript{17} but this was only a temporary and rather ineffective solution. Therefore, at Easter 1946 the society had to adjust the level of its annual membership fee, which had been set at 5 crowns for more than thirty years. The leadership of the society informed the members that the annual membership subscription would increase to 15 Kčs \textquoteleft\textquoteleft because of the greatly increased cost of production and paper\textquoteright\textquoteright.\textsuperscript{18} However, this level was not adequate either, so the general meeting on 8\textsuperscript{th} September 1946 raised the membership subscription to 20 Kčs.\textsuperscript{19} The increased annual membership fee did not weaken interest in membership in the society and the number of its members continued to increase. It had 144,319 members in 1945, but already 182,853 members in 1947. In this period, the leadership of the society decided that in 1946 – 1947, the members would receive, apart from the \textit{Pútnik svätovojtešský} calendar, the popular edition of the New Testament in two volumes as a membership book.\textsuperscript{20} The society published a pocket edition of the New Testament in 1946. The introductory notes were written by the chairman of the Bible Commission Štefan Zlatoš, who also translated the Gospels of Sts. Matthew, Mark and Luke and the Acts of the Apostles. The rest was translated by Anton Šurianský.\textsuperscript{21} In the preface to this edition, they emphasized that the role of the society was to care for the cultural and religious improvement of the Catholic people and that the society wanted to be a \textquoteleft\textquoteleft spiritual guide and reliable support for Slovak Catholics in the struggle between different world views, which is not leaving even our nation untouched.\textquoteright\textquoteright\textsuperscript{22} For communication with its members, the leadership of the society could rely on a relatively well functioning network of society branches divided according to dioceses and parishes. Every branch was headed by a society representative, who reported to the centre in Trnava all changes in the circle of members for whom he was responsible. In 1946, the society had a total of 2,019 representatives, with 1,686 of them in Slovakia. The membership books were sent to the representatives, who distributed them to the members from whom they collected the contributions decided by

\footnotesize{\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{15} Augustín Raška died on 27\textsuperscript{th} August 1953 during an operation in the prison hospital in Brno.
\item \textsuperscript{16} \textit{Pútnik cyrilometodejský}, 3, no. 5, May 1947.
\item \textsuperscript{17} \textit{Pútnik cyrilometodejský}, 1, no. 1, 19\textsuperscript{th} August 1945.
\item \textsuperscript{18} Membership subscriptions remained equal: for individual members 20 Kčs, for families and institutions 40 Kčs, for founding members 1 000 Kčs.
\item \textsuperscript{19} The change to the annual subscription by decision of the general meeting was enabled by § 11 of the statutes of the SSV.
\item \textsuperscript{20} ASSV, fasc. 488/83. Minutes from the session of the managing committee of the SSV on 31\textsuperscript{st} January 1946.
\item \textsuperscript{21} The Bible Commission headed by Štefan Zlatoš had representatives from throughout Slovakia. It included the professors of Biblical studies Jozef Buda, Ján Švec, Štefan Janega, Anton Šurianský and Mikuláš Stanislav. ASSV fasc. 488/83. Minutes from a session of the Bible Commission on 13\textsuperscript{th} September 1945.
\item \textsuperscript{22} \textit{Písmo sväté Nový zákon}. (Holy Scripture, The New Testament). Trnava : SSV, 1946, p. 3.
\end{itemize}}

118
the general meeting and sent the money to the centre at Trnava. The branch structure had been tested over a long period and contributed to the fact that communication between the centre and the ordinary members was not broken in the post-war period. Apart from its productive sections – the printing and book binding facilities, the society had its own bookshops at its centre in Trnava with branches in Bratislava, Košice, Prešov, Nitra, Banská Bystrica, Nové Zámky and Brezno nad Hronom. By 1950, society shops were also established in Šaštín, Levice, Ružomberok, Martin, Trenčín and Spišská Nová Ves. In April 1947, the representatives of the society could already report in connection with the publishing activity that 42 books had been published in the last commercial year. The gradual recovery of the publishing activity is also shown by the fact that the society published 98 books in 1948 with a total output of 106,300 copies.

Successes in publishing activity led the representatives of the Society of St. Adalbert to cautious optimism and the assumption that the regime would change its negative attitude to the Catholic Church, and the society had also passed through its most difficult period, in spite of continuing problems and obstacles. However, political instability and experience from the preceding period also forced them to constantly emphasize that the society, which “always did religious and national cultural work and always wants to remain outside politics”, preserved its orientation, did not need to change it and “would never change it”. A general meeting of the Society of St. Adalbert was held on 14th September 1947, in an atmosphere of hopeful new plans for publishing activity, but also of uncertainty over unstable political development. It was opened by Ambróz Lazík, who had been appointed apostolic administrator of Trnava by the Holy See on 8th July 1947, after the death of Bishop Jantausch. Lazík was soon made an ordinary with the powers of a regular bishop. The general meeting was held in the presence of the deputy chairman of the Slovak National Council Andrej Cvinček and other representatives of political and social life in Slovakia. However, the hopes that the Democratic Party represented a guarantee of more peaceful conditions for the society had already disappeared by this time. Precisely in the middle of September, the Commission for the Interior published a report on the “uncovering of an anti-state conspiracy in Slovakia” worked out by the communist dominated state security service. This was the beginning of the autumn political crisis according to the scenario of the Communist Party. It culminated in February 1948 with the take over of absolute power in Czechoslovakia. After the liquidation of political pluralism, the only organized force, which could stand in the way of the aims of the atheist communist regime, was the churches, and especially the numerically largest of them – the Catholic Church.

The society in the period of establishment of the communist regime
Until the communists seized power, the conditions for the activity of the Catholic Church were relatively free and both sides endeavoured to solve disputes between

23 Pútnik cyrilometodejský, 3, no. 5, May 1947, p. 78.
Church and state “by mutual agreement”. After February 1948, the position of the Church began to significantly worsen as the regime dictated the barriers within which it had to operate. After seizing power, the communists made an effort to obtain expressions of loyalty from the Church. They demanded that it should issue a public declaration on the February events, expressing a positive attitude to them. In an effort to avoid open confrontation, which would lead to persecution, the bishops chose the route of emphasizing the non-political and non-partisan activity of the Church.

The Society of St. Adalbert also had to work within this line. The number of its members reached 200,000 on 25th February 1948, and the change in the political situation did not stop the growth of the number of members. The Archbishop of Prague Josef Beran also appreciated the interest of the Slovak Catholic faithful in membership of the society and in its publishing activity. When he visited the society on 7th June 1948, he stated that “the Society of St. Adalbert is an institution for which he had always envied the Slovak Catholics, although in a good sense of the word, because the Czech Catholics have nothing like it”.

However, action committees to intervene in the life of the churches were already formed during the coup. The Society of St. Adalbert became one of the first objects of interest for the anti-church political strategy of the totalitarian communist regime. Initially, the communists were not concerned with dissolving the membership base of the society, but with controlling it. A Commission for Religious and Church Questions was established in the framework of the Central Action Committee of the National Front in Prague. Official representatives of the Church were not invited to join it, but “patriotic” priests, who supported the communist regime. The Central Action Committee of the Slovak National Front in Bratislava issued instructions for the lower bodies to organize meetings of priests, establish contacts with them and endeavour to gain their public support for the united list of candidates, or their membership of commissions of the Slovak National Front, in spite of the strict prohibitions from their superiors.

In spite of the fact that the bishops rejected the participation of Catholic priests in the parliamentary election at the end of May 1948, for which the communists compiled a united list of candidates, some priests did not respect the ban. In Slovakia the dispute about the candidature of priests was personified especially by Alexander Horák and Jozef Lukačovič, who decided to build their personal careers by cooperation with the communist regime.

Alexander Horák became manager of the Society of St. Adalbert in Hungary in May 1941. After the war he took over the function of deputy chairman of the Anti-Fascist

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26 PEŠEK - BARNOVSKÝ, ref. 25, p. 33.
27 Pútnik cyrilometodejský, 4, no. 4, 4th April 1948.
28 Pútnik cyrilometodejský, 4, no. 7-8, July-August 1948, p. 125.
29 PEŠEK - BARNOVSKÝ, ref. 25, p. 39.
30 In an effort to improve the difficult position of the Slovaks in the territories taken by Hungary, the committee of the SSV decided to allow the members in Hungary to be organized into an independent society.
Front of Slavs in Budapest.\(^{31}\) In 1948 he returned to Slovakia and began to work as a non-party member in the function of commissioner for post. As a member of the Board of Commissioners, he later took over the area of local economic affairs and also served as chairman of the Slovak reconstruction committee.\(^{32}\) A. Horák put himself in the service of the communist regime and did not even ask the Church authorities for permission before the parliamentary elections. After the elections, he did not react to the oral prohibition on holding the function of commissioner brought to him by the vicar of the chapter of Rožňava Róbert Pobožný. Since Horák and Lukačovič\(^{33}\) did not respect the general prohibition of the ordained priests in the whole state “*that priests should not accept political functions*”, they were suspended.\(^{34}\)

The communists also used “patriotic” priests to control the Society of St. Adalbert. They subjected all committee resolutions to approval by Alexander Horák. The Commission for the Interior with the support of the Commission for Education and National Enlightenment appointed him as the “supervisory authority over the activity of the society”. On 12th April 1948, the Central Action Committee of the National Front in Bratislava passed a resolution appointing Horák as the representative of the society at the plenary session. Michal Štetina was already appointed as national administrator of the printing works of the society on 27th February 1948.\(^{35}\)

After a short, relatively peaceful period, publishing activity was radically reduced. The publication of textbooks for individual school subjects was already stopped after 1945 and the production of religious publications was also reduced after the communists came to power. Political interventions prevented the distribution of published materials and some printing work was stopped while it was in progress. The possibilities to publish various Church calendars and occasional publications were also limited. The Bishops’ Conference reacted to these limitations with a memorandum read in churches on 29th August 1948.\(^{36}\)

At the suggestion of the Office of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Slovakia, the Central Action Committee of the Slovak National Front told the representatives of the Roman Catholic Church to submit a proposal for the concentration of the Church press. If they did not do it, the Central Action Committee reserved the right

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31 Alexander Horák held the function of chairman of the Union of Slavs in Hungary in 1947 – 1948.
33 Jozef Lukačovič originally engaged in the Democratic Party and after the February events in the Party of Slovak Renewal. He also refused to give up the post of commissioner. In contrast to Horák, he asked for permission to be a candidate, but the apostolic administrator of Trnava refused to give it.
34 SNA, fond: ÚV KSS, GT, carton 2 157. Letter from the apostolic administrator Ambróz Lazík to the chairman of the Board of Commissioners Gustáv Husák from 12th June 1948. Letter from Gustáv Husák to Ambróz Lazík from 15th June 1948. Record of their conversation from 24th June 1948. Also: SNA, fond: Ústredný akčný výbor Slovenského národného frontu (ÚAV SNF), carton 88. Circular to Roman Catholic parish offices from the apostolic administrator. See also: PEŠEK - BARNOVSKÝ, ref. 25, p. 51.
36 In this memorandum, the Bishops’ Conference opposed the liquidation of Catholic schools and limitation of the press.
to do the concentration itself. However, the appropriate authorities acted according to their wishes without waiting for a reply. In mid December 1948, the representatives of the Catholic Church and the Evangelical Church of the Augsburg Confession in Slovakia protested to a session of the press commission of the Central Action Committee of the Slovak National Front against the forcible intervention, which aimed to drastically reduce the number of regular Church publications, but their joint action did not find understanding and they had to submit.

With the help of power and administrative interventions, the government limited the possible activities of all the churches and ended the activity of various societies and associations. The Society of St. Adalbert was not dissolved, but it found itself under the control of the state power authorities. A very limited allocation of paper also reduced its activities. These interventions and other limitations reduced the output of society publications and indirectly liquidated some society periodicals or magazines.

A decree from the Central Action Committee in Bratislava in December 1948 informed the society that the Press Commission had unanimously decided to stop the publication of all Catholic periodicals from 1st January 1949, with the exception of the Katolícke noviny, Nová práca, Pútnik cyrilometodejský and Duchovný pastier. However, permission for their publication was limited by the suggestions of the Press Committee, established at the society on the basis of a decision of the Central Action Committee of the Slovak National Front from 20th December 1948. The Press Committee had 9 members, 6 of them appointed by the management of the Society of St. Adalbert and one each by the Central Action Committee, the Commission for Information and the Commission for Education. Bishop Jozef Čársky and the apostolic administrator of Trnava Ambróz Lazík strove to ensure that Alexander Horák and Jozef Lukačovič were not delegated to the Press Committee, and that the activity of the lay members would be limited. Where the question of interference in matters of religious teaching was concerned, they were informed that “the lay delegates will have decisive influence in the application of religious teaching to the problems of our public life”. Bishop Čárský reacted to this with the words that if the press ceased to have the character of a Catholic press, the bishops would issue a declaration “that it was not a religious press”.

The duty of the Press Committee was to observe the line of the newspapers and magazines, determine their content and appoint the members of the individual editorial boards. Religious newspapers and magazines were also under strict press supervision from the Press Commission at the Central Action Committee of the Slovak National Front.

37 SNA, fond: ÚV KSS, Predsedníctvo ÚV KSS, carton 788. Minutes of the session of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Slovakia from 9th December 1948.
38 PEŠEK - BARNOVSKÝ, ref. 25, p. 51.
39 The amount of paper for the society’s periodicals and magazines was reduced by a decree of the Commission for Information from 23rd August 1948.
In spite of the “permission”, they did not succeed in reviving publication of the Pútnik cyrilometodejský. Its last issue appeared in December 1948. The society also stopped publishing Nová práca, which was explained by the internal “collisions” of the Catholic intelligentsia. The Society of St. Adalbert asked the Central Catholic Office in Bratislava to help it seek a solution so that “this unique vehicle would be common”. However, this office was forcibly closed on 24th November 1948.

Direct interventions by the state authorities

In an effort to stop the growing confrontation with the state authorities and the worsening position of the Church, the Catholic bishops strove to revive cooperation with the representatives of the state, but after listening devices were found at the Bishops’ Conference in Dolný Smokovec on 22nd March 1949, talks between Church and state ended. This was the end of the first stage of these relations and without agreement between them. The leadership of the Communist Party of Czechoslovak changed its tactics and activated a general long-term plan of Church policy measures involving open confrontation. The regime used the weekly Katolícke noviny (Catholic News) in this unequal struggle against the Catholic Church.

According to the already mentioned decision of the office of the Central Action Committee of the Slovak National Front from 20th December 1948, only the Society of St.

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43 In January 1949, Jozef Čársky and Ambróz Lazík unsuccessfully endeavoured to save the magazines Hlas s misii (Voice of the Missions) and Posol Božieho Srdca (Message of the Sacred Heart) “at the expense” of the Pútnik cyrilometodejský. Ref. 42.

44 ASSV fasc. 317, no. 32. Letter from the manager of the SSV to the Central Catholic Office from 20th September 1948.


47 Publication of the Katolícke noviny was revived in October 1940. After the war, the Katolícke noviny again began to appear from September 1945 thanks to the Bishop of Trnava Pavol Jantausch, who owned and published it. In February 1948, this weekly reached an output of 177,000 copies. After the communists came to power, publication of it was limited in various ways. In September 1948, the amount of paper assigned to the Katolícke noviny was reduced so that only 100,000 copies could be produced. The interventions of the communist regime were also directed towards the staff of the editorial office and its leadership. Augustín Pozdech became the chief editor of the Katolícke noviny, but he did not fulfill the expectations of the regime and closely cooperated with the apostolic administrator of Trnava Ambróz Lazík. On 22nd October 1948, the two of them together visited the secretariat of the Slovak National Front, where they submitted information about changes in the editorial team and content of the Katolícke noviny. However, these changes did not satisfy the representatives of the regime and A. Lazík was indirectly informed that the Katolícke noviny would suffer a further reduction in its number of copies, which was gradually reduced to 50,000. See: SNA, fond: ÚV KSS, Předsednictvo ÚV KSS, carton 816. Analysis of the press – Katolícke noviny from 26th April 1952. Report on the Church press. See also: SNA, fond: ÚV KSS. Sekretariát ÚV KSS, carton 1. Minutes of a meeting of the political secretariat on 6th September 1948. See also: SNA, fond: ÚV KSS, GT, carton 2 157. Brief record of the visit of A. Lazík and A. Pozdech to the secretariat of the Central Action Committee of the Slovak National Front on 22nd October 1948.
Adalbert had the right to publish Catholic newspapers or magazines. The Bishop of Košice Jozef Čársky and the apostolic administrator of Trnava Ambróz Lazík, who had to hand over publication of the Katolícke noviny to the society in January 1949, requested an increased allowance of paper for this weekly. However, they did not even get permission for a reduced number of pages, which would have enabled a larger number of copies. The only agreement was on the question of leaving the editorial office of the Katolícke noviny in Bratislava, if the Society of St. Adalbert insisted on it.\textsuperscript{48}

Augustín Pozdech remained chief editor of the Katolícke noviny after the society became its owner and publisher. The Katolícke noviny could only be sent to subscribers and could be sold in small numbers by some newsagents. The taking of a larger number of copies by one person was forbidden. The decision also affected the content. Apart from articles on religious teachings, the Katolícke noviny had to be concerned with “constructive tasks”.\textsuperscript{49}

Publication of the Katolícke noviny remained in the hands of the society only for a short time. At a meeting held on 14\textsuperscript{th} June 1949 in the editorial office of the Katolícke noviny on Kapitulská ulica in Bratislava, the representative of the Commission for Information announced that the commission was placing their publishing business under state management. Jozef Janík was appointed as the manager for the state. The Society of St. Adalbert was mentioned on each copy as the owner and publisher of the Katolícke noviny until 19\textsuperscript{th} July 1949. From 26\textsuperscript{th} July, the Committee of Catholic Action in Slovakia was presented as the owner and publisher. This made the Katolícke noviny the representative of the views of the state promoted Catholic Action (Katolícka akcia), which had originated on the initiative of the regime with the support of the “patriotic” priests. This forcible intervention led to measures, which substantially changed the content of the Katolícke noviny.\textsuperscript{50} Attacks on the bishops and the Vatican appeared, to which the bishops reacted by forbidding the faithful to read the Katolícke noviny. The appeals of the bishops and the Vatican did not remain without effect. The parish offices returned the Katolícke noviny to the administrators and the faithful boycotted it.

In this disturbed period, the regime fully uncovered its totalitarian face and also brought the bishoprics themselves under its supervision. Representatives of the Ministry (or Commission) of Education, Science and Art were placed in the bishops’ offices.\textsuperscript{51}


\textsuperscript{49} SnA, fond: ÚV KSS, GT, carton 2 157. Directives for the activity of the Press Committee at the Society of St. Adalbert. Political Secretariat of the Communist Party of Slovakia from 18\textsuperscript{th} January 1949.

\textsuperscript{50} The chief editor of the Katolícke noviny A. Pozdech, who refused to publish the Oblas katolíckej akcie (Declaration of Catholic Action), was removed from this position. From 19\textsuperscript{th} June 1949, Jožo M. Janík was given as the responsible representative on every copy of the paper, and from 24\textsuperscript{th} July 1949 Ladislav Škoda, parish priest of Prievoz, was given as the national manager. The security services arrested A. Pozdech on 17\textsuperscript{th} September. He was convicted of treason and sentenced to 12 years in prison, from which he was released on 17\textsuperscript{th} September 1957.

\textsuperscript{51} The representatives were authorized to sign all post and documents produced at the bishops’ offices. No written material could be sent from these offices without their approval. They supervised the whole office agenda and the activities of the bishops themselves. PEŠEK - BARNOVSKÝ, ref. 25, p. 61.
The regime also used the “services” of those clergy, who decided to cooperate with it for various reasons, to supervise the Church.

Alexander Horák very actively engaged in the schismatic Catholic Action.\(^{52}\) He also had the task of supervising the development of the Society of St. Adalbert. At a session on 19\(^{\text{th}}\) May 1949, the Central Action Committee of the Slovak National Front approved a decision of the Church Commission of the Central Action Committee of the National Front in Prague from 13\(^{\text{th}}\) May 1949, on the basis of which all the existing arrangements for supervising the Society of St. Adalbert had to be abolished and national administration of the society would be applied by means of the commissions for the interior, trade and industry, education and information. The society would be preserved as a single organizational and economic unit under the supervision of the National Front in the person of Commissioner Alexander Horák. He was given full power over the society by the Church Commission of the Central Action Committee of the National Front on 5\(^{\text{th}}\) October 1949.\(^{53}\) His representative was Viktor Gajdošík, but he was soon replaced by Koloman Štefko, who also became a canon of Rožňava in this period.

In August 1949, the office of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia, in an effort to solve the relationship between the state and the Church with the help of legislation, decided to create the State Office for Ecclesiastical Affairs (Štátny úrad pre veci cirkevné – SÚC), by means of which the regime wanted to achieve the subordination of the Church to the state.\(^{54}\) The Slovak Office for Ecclesiastical Affairs was established in Slovakia. The adoption of the so-called Church acts and the associated government decrees significantly changed the position of the Church and the Office for Ecclesiastical Affairs also penetrated into the running of the churches. The state took over the supervision of Church property and government decrees determined the level of pay of the clergy. Any spiritual activity required state permission and an oath of allegiance to the people’s democratic regime was made a condition for it. This made the Church politically and economically entirely dependent on the regime.

However, in October 1949 the Katolícke noviny published on its front page under the title Material cares of the clergy removed, a demagogic account of the importance of the so-called Church acts. Gustáv Husák, chairman of the Board of Commissioners “emphasized the unfortunate role of the Church dignitaries” in the past and did not forget to point to the political activity of the Society of St. Adalbert, which had also made “anti-socialist and anti-human mistakes”. At the same time, he expressed the view that “freedom of religion is fully secured in our country. The churches, priests and lay-people

\[^{52}\] The commissioners A. Horák and J. Lukačovič were present at the establishment of the Central Committee of Catholic Action in Slovakia on 22\(^{\text{nd}}\) June. For more detail on Catholic Action see: PEŠEK - BARNOVSKÝ, ref. 25, p. 61-85.

\[^{53}\] ASSV, sign. C11. Minutes from discussions of the SV SSV on 12\(^{\text{th}}\) December 1949.

\[^{54}\] In October 1949, the National Assembly passed act no. 217 on establishment of the State Office for Ecclesiastical Affairs and act no. 218 on the economic support of the churches and religious societies by the state.
are not only unobstructed in their religious activities, they are actually strongly supported by the state from the moral and economic points of view".\textsuperscript{55}

The society also came within the area of the responsibilities of the Slovak Office for Ecclesiastical Affairs. On 29\textsuperscript{th} November 1949, the society’s leadership submitted a memorandum to this office giving information about the situation in the society and requesting that the “directing” of society activity should be coordinated with this state institution. The Commission for Information empowered A. Horák as national manager of the Society of St. Adalbert to carry out the delimitation of the property of the printing facility with the society “in agreement with the regional authority of the printing industry” and submit the proposal to the Commission for Information.\textsuperscript{56}

The Society of St. Adalbert was not liquidated by the interventions of the state authorities, but its many sided activities were significantly reduced and had to be carried on under the supervision of the regime and in harmony with its policies. This included the appointment of the leading figures in the society, who more or less had to fulfill the function of “extended hands” of the regime.

After the failure of the schismatic Catholic Action and record decline in the number of readers and output of copies of the Katolícke noviny to 20,000 copies\textsuperscript{57} and after an agreement between the regime and the bishops leading to their release from internment, the paper again came under the ecclesiastical censorship of the bishop’s office in Trnava. After the weakened Church hierarchy accepted a strategy of “cooperation” with the regime, the number of customers began to increase rapidly. Ján Pöstényi was appointed as censor for the Church. Then the bishops recommended that all Roman Catholic parish offices should order the Katolícke noviny.\textsuperscript{58}

The Society of St. Adalbert again became the publisher of the Katolícke noviny at the beginning of April 1951 and received Church approval for this.\textsuperscript{59} However the Katolícke noviny did not escape from the influence of the authorities and remained under firm censorship from the point of view of content.

The regional conferences and general meeting of 1950

The regime decided to push its campaign against the Church to further extremes. It intensified its intimidation campaign against the opponents of communist totalitarianism and it interned, imprisoned and put on trial many priests, monks, nuns and lay people.\textsuperscript{60}

In April 1950, the male monasteries were occupied by the police and security forces and the monks were concentrated in internment camps. The action against the monaste-

\textsuperscript{55} Hmotné starosti duchovných zažehnané. (Material cares of the clergy removed). In Katolícke noviny, 64, no. 43, 23\textsuperscript{rd} October 1949.

\textsuperscript{56} Proposal on the property delimitation of the printing operation as a productive division of the society submitted by its representatives to the Slovak Office for Ecclesiastical Affairs on 25\textsuperscript{th} January 1950. In Svätovojtešské zvesti, 1-2, no. 4-5, 15\textsuperscript{th} December 1950 – 1\textsuperscript{st} January 1951, p. 66-67.

\textsuperscript{57} Vatican Radio developed an intensive campaign against reading the Katolícke noviny up to the end of 1950. LETZ, ref. 46, p. 92.

\textsuperscript{58} Katolícke noviny, 65, no. 41, 15\textsuperscript{th} October 1950.

\textsuperscript{59} ASSV, fasc. 298/7b. Circular of the Bishop’s Office in Nitra from 2\textsuperscript{nd} April 1951.

ries for women came in August of the same year. These interventions also influenced the society, which had closely cooperated with some of the interned members of religious orders for a long time. In this period, the regime also prepared a fabricated show-trial against the Greek Catholic Bishop Pavol Gojdič and the Roman Catholic bishops Michal Buzalka and Ján Vojtaššák.\(^{61}\)

In such an atmosphere of a campaign against the Church, pressure and intimidation of the clergy and faithful, the society began to prepare for a jubilee general meeting, to be held on 14\(^{th}\) December 1950.

The general meeting held on the 80 anniversary of the origin of the Society of St. Adalbert was preceded by regional conferences held in Bratislava, Košice and Sliač. The aim of these conferences was to ascertain the mood among the local representatives of the society, who would not have to listen to “malicious speeches”\(^ {62}\) and to gain their support for the “People’s democratic” orientation of the society.

The regional conference held in Bratislava on 5\(^{th}\) December 1950, was led by Pavol Macháček, who had administered the parish of St. Martin’s in Bratislava since 1946.\(^ {63}\) He had already changed his views in the preceding period, and after the communists came to power, he adapted to the “new conditions” by adopting a conformist position, which he also represented in the society. Alexander Horák gave the main speech, which presented an appearance of religious freedom within the intentions of the regime. He informed the local representatives of the society that the Catholics had “complete cultural freedom” in the new political conditions.\(^ {64}\) The conference at Sliač for the local representatives from the Banská Bystrica and Žilina regions was held in the same spirit and with the presence of Horák and Macháček. The Košice conference on 9\(^{th}\) December 1950 in the presence of the national administrator Koloman Štefko was attended by only a small number of local representatives, which was explained by the statement that many would have preferred it, if the “conference had been held in Prešov”.\(^ {65}\)

Pavol Macháček also presided over the jubilee general meeting on 14\(^{th}\) December 1950, and Alexander Horák gave the main speech. He stated that it was the duty of the society to publish Catholic books, which had to proclaim Slavism, Czechoslovak solidarity and “our allegiance to the USSR and the peaceful community of progressive humanity”. He appealed to the employees and members of the society to obey “this well-intentioned advice” and he assured them that as national administrator of the society he guaranteed “a very fine future without fear of any danger… Whoever follows the outlined programme and faithfully implements it will not suffer harm to a hair on his head”. He defended the coercive practices of the authorities and justified them with the claim that a “new man” was coming into the world and that in any birth “blood and pain are unavoidable”.\(^ {66}\)

\(^{61}\) Michal Buzalka and Pavol Gojdič were sentenced to life imprisonment and Ján Vojtaššák to 24 years in prison after the fabricated trial held from 10\(^{th}\) to 15\(^{th}\) January 1951.

\(^{62}\) \textit{Svätovojtešské zvesti}, 1, no. 3, 1\(^{st}\) December 1950, p. 36.

\(^{63}\) P. Macháček was appointed a canon of Bratislava in 1951.

\(^{64}\) \textit{Svätovojtešské zvesti}, 1, no. 3, 1\(^{st}\) December 1950, p. 36.

\(^{65}\) \textit{Svätovojtešské zvesti}, 1-2, no. 4-5, 15\(^{th}\) December 1950 – 1\(^{st}\) January 1951, p. 77-78.

\(^{66}\) Ref. 65, p. 64.
Ján Pöstényi gave a relatively extensive talk at the general meeting informing the participants about the development of the Society of St. Adalbert since 1948. He cautiously indicated that the political situation had reduced the publishing activity of the society to production of religious literature and textbooks. He regarded the activity of the Biblical and catechetical commissions as especially successful. He acquainted the participants in the general meeting with the publishing plans of the Society of St. Adalbert for the immediate future. He emphasized that a translation of the whole of Holy Scripture was ready and a complete Missal was also ready to be printed.67

After the approval of reports and granting of decision – making for the officials and supervisors of the Society of St. Adalbert, Pavol Macháček presented a proposal to vote “a sum of 250,000 Kč to support the purposes of the peace movement”. The general meeting approved this proposal as well as an increase in the annual membership subscription to 25 crowns. A. Horák was elected as chairman of the Society of St. Adalbert, while Ján Ševčík deputy prime minister of Czechoslovakia and chairman of the Party of National Renewal became first deputy chairman. Ševčík asked the society functionaries “to support the noble efforts of the society for the good of the state and for those among our people who profess the Christian religion”.68 Canon Leopold Adamčík became the second deputy chairman and an 84 member committee, 7 member supervisory committee and 8 member managing committee were elected.

On 23rd January 1951, Horák, Ševčík, Pöstényi and other members of the committee, as well as chairmen of commissions and officials of the Society of St. Adalbert visited the commissioner for ecclesiastical affairs Ladislav Holdoš, who appealed to the representatives of the society to adopt a positive attitude towards the people’s democratic regime and not forget that the person of Alexander Horák was a guarantee of the “peaceful orientation” of the society’s activity.69

At this meeting, Ján Pöstényi requested “a favourable view of important publications of the Society of St. Adalbert”. His position in the society was now only secondary. Church representatives also appealed to him to remain in his function.

After an agreement was concluded between the state and the Catholic Church in Hungary in 1950,70 some of the Slovak bishops also sought a way out of the difficult situation. Ambróz Lazík, consecrated Bishop of Trnava on 18th August 1949 and the Bishop of Košice Jozef Čársky took the oath of allegiance in March 1951 and were followed a little later also by the Bishop of Nitra Eduard Nécsy. This was an attempt to prevent further worsening of the position of the Church after three years of brutal interventions in its life.

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67 Ref. 65, p. 67.
68 Ján Ševčík was arrested in 1952 and after two years in remand imprisonment, he was sentenced to 18 years in prison in June 1954.
69 Svätovojtešské zvesti, 2, no. 5, 1st March 1951, p. 130-131.
by the authorities. The authorities used the “allegiance” of the bishops especially for the removal of the excommunication of “peaceful” clergy and for the writing of pastoral letters encouraging the faithful to be obedient and responsible towards the state and its leadership. However, the bishops for whom the authority of the Holy See remained unshaken directed their attention mainly towards the internal activation of the Church and strengthening of its unity.

In an effort to maintain Pöstényi’s interest in the society, Ambróz Lazík Bishop of Trnava wrote to him as follows: “today you may look wearily at the varied and beautiful past of your life’s mission. But today – more than ever before – it is necessary to keep a hand on the rudder of the ship of the society and lead it on the way to the harbour of eternity.”

Behind Pöstényi’s continuing position in the society, it is to some degree possible to see fears that the regime would use his activity in the State Council during the period of the Slovak Republic to put him on trial. In December 1947, the chairman of the Board of Commissioners Gustáv Husák promised “benevolence in the case of Pöstényi” during talks with Ambróz Lazík. Pöstényi was freed from indictment in 1948, but especially from the beginning of the 1950s, when the regime began to spread fear and violence, even its implementers could not be sure of their existence. In this atmosphere of spreading fear and violence, Pöstényi adapted to the new leadership of the society and expressed this with participation in its activities. However, he used every appropriate opportunity to ensure that the society did not remain only a passive symbol of the past and to avoid the complete stopping of its publishing activity.

At a meeting with L. Holdoš, he mainly mentioned the Missal and the Holy Bible, on which the Biblical Commission had been working for sixteen years. He also emphasized the importance and need for “the publication of an adequate number of textbooks”. He devoted attention to the problem of society activities in a radio talk on 15th February 1951, in which he strove to get the political representatives not to obstruct them. He announced that the Biblical Commission had translated the whole of the Holy Bible and

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71 In spite of requests, Bishop Róbert Pobožný of Rožňava, who had been in isolation since October 1950, was not allowed to take the oath. Bishop Pobožný could take up his legal powers, although to a limited extent, only in 1956, when he was allowed to take the oath of allegiance. See: PEŠEK - BARNOVSKÝ, ref. 25, p. 228. See also: PEŠEK - BARNOVSKÝ, ref. 46, p. 45.
76 The victims of the communist regime included its own representatives, among them G. Husák and L. Holdoš, who were accused of “bourgeois nationalism” and sentenced in April 1954 to life and 13 years in prison respectively.
77 Svätovojtešské zvesti, 2, no. 3, 1st February 1951, p. 101-103.
prepared it for printing: “20,000 copies of this precious work will be printed and we are endeavouring to complete it this year”.78

The edition of the New Testament from 1946 was reprinted in 1949 and 1952. However, some members of the Biblical Commission had already attracted the hostility of the authorities. Its chairman Štefan Zlatoš was arrested in November 1951 and not released until 7th May 1953 in spite of serious health problems.79 Jozef Búda, translator of a substantial part of the Old Testament, also spent the years 1950 – 1954 in prison. The society published it in large format only in 1955.80

Ján Pöstényi also announced on the radio programme that the society was publishing the United Catholic Hymnbook, Prayerbook with supplements and 40,000 copies of a complete Latin-Slovak Missal. The Missal had been prepared since 1949, but it was published only in 1952. Pöstényi devoted special attention to the work of the Catechetical Commission, “which worked out educational curricula and on this basis produced 14 textbooks on the Catholic religion for our three levels of school”.81 However, the work of this commission was also limited by various “ideological” censorship interventions.

The publication of religious textbooks was reduced and regulated from 1950. The Society of St. Adalbert retained its own printing works only until 1st January 1950, when its material, financial and personal affairs were separated from the society and it became an independently accounting enterprise. Some new editions of textbooks were produced, but without the names of authors. Finally only catechisms for elementary schools were published. However, these were subjected to ideological censorship and were approved only after the removal of “defective passages and sentences”.82 The society was continually encountering new obstacles to its work. The members did not receive the calendar of the Pútnik svätovojtešský for 1951 or any membership books. Ján Pöstényi probably saw his activity in the society as an effort to prevent even greater harm. Activities to help interned members of religious orders, to whom religious books were sent, were also recorded in this difficult period.83 However, the leadership used his name both towards the membership base in Slovakia and towards the international community. According to his former close colleague Mikuláš Mišík, he found himself “in a vicious circle of phrases about democracy and actions diametrically opposed to it, which is not an enviable route and position”.84

78 Svätovojtešské zvesti, 2, no. 5, 1st March 1951, p. 130-131.
80 The censors for the Old Testament were Mikuláš Višňovský, Ján Malec and Michal Krovina.
81 Svätovojtešské zvesti, 2, no. 5, 1st March 1951, p. 130-131.
82 The following can be given as an example of the ideological interventions of the Commission for Education, Science and Art in the content of the catechism for the fifth year of elementary school. The Society of St. Adalbert as the publishers had to accept a change in the sentence: “The upbringing of children is the responsibility of: the family, Church and state” to: “The upbringing of children is the responsibility of: the state, parents and the church”. ASSV, fasc. 488/136. Commission for Education, Science and Art to the Society of St. Adalbert publishing house on 2nd August 1949.
83 See e.g.: ASSV, fasc. 227, fol. A, no. 16. Letter to nuns interned in Ivánka pri Nitre from 8th August 1951.
Meetings of local representatives

By the time of the general meeting of 1950 the number of members of the society had increased to almost 230,000\(^{85}\) and its organizational network included 2,182 local representatives.\(^{86}\) The new leadership of the Society of St. Adalbert strove to bring the local representatives under its influence by organizing working meetings at which it was emphasized that the society “is a mass cultural organization of Slovak Catholics oriented mainly towards the general population. It is, above all, an organization of Slovak small farmers and working people”.\(^{87}\) The Pútnik svätovojtešský calendar and the new organizational fortnightly of the Society of St. Adalbert Svätovojtešské zvesti, which began to appear in November 1950, devoted a relatively large amount of space to propagating these meetings. Ján Pöstényi was identified as the chief editor of the Svätovojtešské zvesti, with Štefan Schulz as the responsible chief representative of the society. In the introduction to the first issue, the editors of the Svätovojtešské zvesti addressed the readers in these words: “The Svätovojtešské zvesti aims to prove that life ordered according to socialist principles is not opposed to religion, but can harmonize with it beautifully. It aims to denounce those who claim that people’s democracy destroys religious life”\(^{88}\).

The Svätovojtešské zvesti pointed to the popular character of the society, appealing to § 4 of the society statutes, which stated that its aim “is to raise the level of Slovak Catholic literature and the religious-moral education of the general public”\(^{89}\). Three and a half thousand copies of each issue of the Svätovojtešské zvesti were printed and distributed free to the local representatives.\(^{90}\)

The meetings organized for local representatives from March 1951 were used mainly for “state-political” training and “state-political educational aims” became their main part. The local representatives were informed in lectures “that they should always have a positive attitude to the people’s democratic state system”\(^{91}\). The representatives of the Slovak Office for Ecclesiastical Affairs lecturing at these meetings, directed their agitation mainly towards the themes of the ecclesiastical policy of the state, the agrarian policy of the state, its efforts to achieve peace and the international situation. Some meetings were organized only for local representatives from among the priests. The meetings were held in spa towns, which were intended to draw attention to the “new leisure possibilities of the working class” in the people’s democratic regime. As many as 700 local representatives and their deputies in 20 groups participated in these meetings in three distinct time periods.

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85 The first issue of the Svätovojtešské zvesti from November 1950 gave a number of 229,133 members of the society.
86 The diocese of Trnava with 564 had the largest number and Košice was next with 393 registered representatives of the society. In Svätovojtešské zvesti, 1, no. 1, 1st November 1950, p. 9.
87 From the life of the organization of the membership of the Society of St. Adalbert. Ref. 86, p. 9.
91 Pútnik svätovojtešský for 1952, p. 77.
In spite of the attempts of the leadership to present the society as an organization supporting the ideas of socialism and oriented mainly towards the workers and peasants, the regime was entirely unwilling to accept the mass character of this Catholic organization, and so it decided to significantly limit the activity of the society by removing its internal organizational structure.

The society as a special purpose organization

As a result of the act on voluntary organizations from 12th July 1951, the Society of St. Adalbert had to become an “organization of a new type” or an “organizational component of religious society”. The regime decided that the society, the destiny of which “was placed in the hands and management” of the Peace Movement of Catholic Clergy (Mierové hnutie katolícke duchovných – MHKD), would not be liquidated, but would be made a “showcase” of religious freedom, although its activity would be “limited and consistently supervised”. A report on the activity of the society submitted to the Secretariat of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Slovakia on 13th December 1952 stated: “The failure to publish membership books has reduced the interest of the members in the society and saved 7 wagons of paper. The failure to publish was explained to the appropriate figures by shortage of paper.”

With reference to the act on assembly and societies, the Society of St. Adalbert was informed that it could not continue as an organization. Its employees developed an attempt to be allowed to continue as a cooperative, but this was not acceptable to the regime, because it had no interest in the society continuing to operate as a mass organization with the aim of promoting Slovak Catholic literature and spreading the Christian world view in Slovakia.

The society prepared a proposal that after agreement with the Slovak Office for Ecclesiastical Affairs and the Church authorities, a 24 member management committee would be formed according to the number of members in individual dioceses. Since the headquarters of the society was situated in the territory of the Apostolic Administration of Trnava, it would be attached to this administration as a special purpose organization of the Roman Catholic Church in Slovakia, but its activity would be developed for all the dioceses in Slovakia. This transition, from the form of a society to that of a special purpose organization was, implemented on 1st April 1953.

The society had to dissolve its membership base at a time when it had 247,282 members. The leadership of the Peace Movement of Catholic Clergy took over responsibility for its reorganization. An “organizational committee” was established in the Society of St. Adalbert on 8th April 1953 in accordance with the act on societies and all the rights


93 The managing committee would be responsible for electing a 6 member managing board, which would carry on the regular agenda of the office. The Ecclesiastical Office would send to the managing committee its press officer, appointed for the Slovak Catholic press. The society’s publishing operation would continue to distribute its religious books to members and parish offices. ASSV, fasc. 488/176.


95 ASSV, sign. C14. Minutes of talks of the Organizational Committee of the Society of St. Adalbert from 8th April 1953.
and duties of the membership organization were transferred to it. The organizational committee composed of functionaries of the Peace Movement of Catholic Clergy under the leadership of A. Horák worked out a statute for the Society of St. Adalbert as a special purpose organization of the Church. Its content was discussed at a session on 10th August 1953 and on 28th September it was approved by the Slovak national committee of the Peace Movement of Catholic Clergy. The statute acquired validity from January 1954.

The statute emphasized that “the people’s democratic regime freed the working believers from the burden of material support for the Church” and that the concentration of publishing activity in the hands of the state administration “gives religious life further freedom from material concerns”.

The statute spoke of the society as a publisher of periodical and non-periodical Catholic publications, an activity concentrated in the editorial commission. However, after the nationalization of the society’s printing facilities, the production of periodical and non-periodical publications was placed in the hands of the Ecclesiastical Publisher (Cirkvené nakladateľstvo) of the Slovak Office for Ecclesiastical Affairs in Bratislava, which originated in December 1952. From January 1953, all the state recognized churches lost their authorization to publish and all publication activity passed to the Ecclesiastical Publisher.

In this way, the “supervision” by reliable people of the cost, content and level of writing of church periodical and non-periodical publications was secured from the conceptual point of view.

The society prepared manuscripts and publications, while the Ecclesiastical Publisher had responsibility for authorization and printing, which “secured supervision from the points of view of conceptual content and cost”. The society was also responsible for distribution. This was secured through the society headquarters and society shops, which were reduced to a minimum. The Society of St. Adalbert was also responsible for the production of hosts at Báč near Šamorín and liturgical equipment at Zlaté Moravce. The society shops also distributed things necessary for devotional and church activities.

The statute stated that the society had to care for archive, library and museum collections. The society had been building up a library since its foundation. It gradually began to accumulate the literature necessary for producing a Slovak translation of the Bible and many texts connected with the theological disciplines of varied linguistic and typological origin. Parts of the libraries of various nation builders and former employees and members of the society were bequeathed to the society. Reference books, dictionaries

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97 A new statute of the Society of St. Adalbert was issued in 1965 and became valid from 16th May 1966.
98 Andrej Belánsky was appointed as director of the Ecclesiastical Publisher. Up to 1950 he had worked as a member of the state security service. PEŠEK - BARNOVSKÝ, ref. 25, p. 262.
99 LETZ, ref. 46, p. 190-191.
100 PEŠEK - BARNOVSKÝ, ref. 46, p. 41.
and educational literature in Slovak and other languages necessary for preparing and publishing textbooks formed an important part of the library.\textsuperscript{102}

Ján Pöstényi made a great contribution to the development of the library. He built up a rich collection “of works with a historical orientation including dictionaries, encyclopedias, historical and artistic literature,”\textsuperscript{103} and other works such as major basic works (monumentá), compendia, bibliography, reference books and historical aids, especially works connected with Trnava as a special collection. Acquisition of old publications from parish and private libraries formed an important part of Ján Pöstényi’s activity up to 1948.\textsuperscript{104}

However, the society could not implement the idea from the above mentioned point in the statute because it did not have adequate premises or staff.\textsuperscript{105} The various measures and limitations reduced creative work on building up the library to a minimum after the communists came to power. Both publishing activity and additions to the library collections stagnated. Liquidation of the library was even considered for a time. However, in spite of the unfavourable conditions, a substantial part of the 65,000 books and more than 30,000 archive items remained in the possession and administration of the Society of St. Adalbert.\textsuperscript{106} The managing committee of the Society of St. Adalbert was informed about this decision on 13th December 1954.\textsuperscript{107} J. Pöstényi also strove to secure the possibility to exchange books between the Society of St. Adalbert and similar societies in Western Europe and America, but the regime was not willing to accept this.\textsuperscript{108} Ján Pöstényi was mainly responsible for developing and organizing the archives. Apart from his organizational work, he collected a great number of original, transcribed or photographed archive documents over many years.

The Museum Society (Muzeálna spoločnosť) of František Richard Osvald also operated in the framework of the Society of St. Adalbert. The society had problems for many years with seeking appropriate accommodation for this Museum Society. At the end of 1942, it bought a neighbouring building on Divadelná ulica and placed the museum in its upper floor rooms. In the post-war period, the members of the society and the general public were encouraged to contribute to the “meritorious collecting work” of the society by presenting “objects to the museum”.\textsuperscript{109}

However, in May 1949, the town administrative commission in Trnava decided that the building would be needed for the town theatre. The society was invited to announce

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102 Ref. 101.
103 These works are part of the Main Library.
104 For example, he succeeded in acquiring and preserving a Kralice Bible from 1556, in exchange for books published by the society and a supplementary financial reward. STRELKA, ref. 101, p. 183.
107 ASSV, Zápisnice SV SSV z roku 1954. Minutes of the 5\textsuperscript{th} working meeting of the managing committee of the SSV on 13\textsuperscript{th} December 1954 in Trnava.
108 ASSV, Zápisnice SV SSV from 1954. Minutes of the peace speech of A. Horák given on 13\textsuperscript{th} December 1954 in the meeting room of the Society of St. Adalbert in Trnava.
109 Pútnik cyrilometodejský, 1, no. 8, 25\textsuperscript{th} November 1945, p. 118.
that it would sell this property voluntarily or the commission would be forced to expropriate it. Although the society strove to save its museum, it had to give up the building. After the enforced agreement in October 1954, the collections were transferred to the former Clarist monastery, in which the Regional Museum was to be established.\textsuperscript{110}

After the change of the Society of St. Adalbert into a special purpose organization, the Secretariat of the Peace Movement of Catholic Clergy in Slovakia became the “only existing base of the society”. V. Vnuk the long-term secretary of the Society of St. Adalbert had to give up his position in 1951 at the request of the Slovak Office for Ecclesiastical Affairs.\textsuperscript{111} His successor was Matúš Longauer, who died in May 1952. Then the position of secretary was abolished. In a letter from 16\textsuperscript{th} September 1953, J. Pôstényi asked the society leadership to free him from the management agenda for “reasons of health”, so that he could organize the department of care for church monuments, archives and libraries. However, the organizational committee granted him only a month of holiday, after which he returned to the society. The leadership of the society also summoned him to sessions of the managing committee, “\textit{so that it could use his advice and rich experience}”\textsuperscript{112}.

The managing committee of the society secured the running and economic activity of the society in accordance with the statute.\textsuperscript{113} The managing committee was composed of one representative of every diocese in Slovakia proposed by the Diocesan Peace Committee, a representative of the Charity Headquarter in Slovakia and the faculty of theology, a chairman, secretary and the press officer of the Slovak national peace committee. The period of membership of the managing committee was two years.\textsuperscript{114} At the founding meeting of the managing committee on 22\textsuperscript{nd} February 1954 in the meeting room of the Society of St. Adalbert in Trnava, A. Horák was elected as chairman of the committee. J.

\textsuperscript{110} The town of Trnava deposit and additional objects concerning the history of the town were handed over to the town according to a document from 18\textsuperscript{th} November 1954. Other objects were placed in the meeting room and archive of the Society of St. Adalbert, from where they were gradually transferred to the building of the Regional Museum according to requests for them. The managing committee of the SSV agreed to deposit the Osvald Museum with the Regional Museum at its session on 20\textsuperscript{th} October 1954. However, the transfer of these objects was interrupted because of the unsuitability of the Regional Museum. It was only in 1962 that the adaptation work at the Regional Museum, by then renamed the Western Slovakia Museum in Trnava, progressed far enough to enable the society collections to be fully transferred from the society premises to the museum. See: ASSV, fasc. 400, no. 1/d. Report of a manager of the SSV to a session of the managing committee of the SSV on 3\textsuperscript{rd} December 1954. See also: ASSV, Zápisnice Správneho výboru SSV z 1954. Minutes from a working meeting of the managing committee of the SSV on 20\textsuperscript{th} October 1954 in the premises of the Katolícke noviny in Bratislava. See: ČORDÁŠOVÁ, Silvia: Múzeum Františka Richarda Osvalda pri SSV v Trnave. In Odborný seminár 125 rokov Spolku sv. Vojtecha, ref. 101, p. 216-219.

\textsuperscript{111} ASSV, sign. C13. Minutes from the discussions of the managing committee of the SSV on 24\textsuperscript{th} November 1951.

\textsuperscript{112} ASSV, Zápisnice SV SSV z roku 1954. Minutes from the founding meeting of the managing committee of the Society of St. Adalbert, special purpose organization of the Roman Catholic Church in Slovakia at the Apostolic Administration in Trnava on 22\textsuperscript{nd} February 1954 in Trnava.

\textsuperscript{113} ASSV, fasc. 225, fol. D, no. 3 and 4.

\textsuperscript{114} ASSV, Zápisnice SV SSV z roku 1954. Statute of the Society of St. Adalbert, 7\textsuperscript{th} January 1954.
Lukačovič became deputy chairman and the serving deputy chairman K. Štefko became director.\textsuperscript{115}

The Society of St. Adalbert found itself under political control for a short time after the Second World War, but from the autumn of 1945 it could gradually develop its original activity, which appeared mainly in its publishing work and its growing number of members. However, after the Communist Party seized power in 1948, the situation of the society began to get significantly worse and after 1953 it became a “special purpose organization of the Roman Catholic Church in Slovakia at the Apostolic Administration in Trnava”. Although it did not disappear, it ceased to serve its original aim, became an instrument for power-political manipulation by the Communist Party and found itself in the most difficult part of its long period of existence.

\footnotesize\textsuperscript{115} ASSV, Zápisnice SV SSV z roku 1954, Minutes of the founding session of the managing committee of the Society of St. Adalbert, special purpose organization of the Roman Catholic Church in Slovakia at the Apostolic Administration in Trnava on 22\textsuperscript{nd} February 1954 in Trnava.
CZECHOSLOVAKIA AGAINST WILLIAM NATHAN OATIS

SLAVOMÍR MICHALEK


The story of the American journalist W. N. Oatis’ time in 1950s Prague is an integral part of Cold War history. It is a document on the non-democratic or totalitarian atmosphere in Communist Czechoslovakia where the state police was very powerful. Oatis’s case followed the traditional scenario. Oatis was first followed by the state police, then arrested and accused of espionage. In the year 1950 he was sentenced to 10 years in prison. This process had two political dimensions – the internal and external. From the viewpoint of the internal context the state police proved links between some domestic political representatives and the imperialistic West; from the viewpoint of the external context this process proved that Czechoslovakia was not afraid of the USA. Oatis’ case was accompanied by intensive Czechoslovak-American diplomatic negotiations which resulted in economic and trade limitations and losses for Czechoslovakia.

History. Czechoslovakia. Oatis’ case and the Cold War of the 50s of the 20th Century.

The brief four year period of the life of the American journalist and correspondent for the Associated Press (AP) William Nathan Oatis in Prague at the beginning of the 1950s, recorded in documents as the “Oatis case”, is an integral part of the history of the Cold War. It gives true testimony about the undemocratic or totalitarian system in communist Czechoslovakia, where the State Security Police (Štátna Bezpečnost’ – ŠtB) had uncontrollable power in this period.

William N. Oatis came to Czechoslovakia in June 1950 with authorization to take over the leadership of the Prague branch of Associated Press. His predecessor, Nathan Polowetzky was expelled by the Czechoslovak authorities, a common practice towards Western journalists in that period.

The Oatis case in Czechoslovakia followed a familiar scenario. The State Security Police first followed Oatis, then arrested him, invented his anti-state activity and accused him of espionage. On 4th July 1951, he was sentenced to 10 years in prison after a political trial before the State Court. This trial had two important political dimensions for the Czechoslovak communist regime – internal and external. From the internal point of view, the Czechoslovak State Security Police wanted to prove that selected domestic political representatives had contacts with the imperialist West. The international aspect was to show the world that small communist Czechoslovakia was not afraid of the main imperialist world power – the USA, and would not submit to it. What was the result? The already cold, strained and complicated bilateral Czechoslovak – American relations received a serious new crack. The Oatis case accompanied many Czechoslovak – Ame-
rican diplomatic negotiations, and immediately led to serious economic and commercial limitations and losses, which mainly harmed communist Czechoslovakia.

William Nathan Oatis was arrested in Prague on 23rd April 1951 in the office of Associated Press by members of the State Security Police, who took him to their headquarters in Bartolomejská street. Investigation of the case started there.

The proposal for his arrest was worked out and submitted on the day of the arrest by first lieutenant Michal Králka from the headquarters of the State Security Police, and approved by the Czechoslovak minister of national security Václav Kopřiva. Králka’s text justified the arrest with the argument that Oatis had committed criminal offences against the people’s democratic regime in Czechoslovakia.¹

Not only was the proposal for the arrest of Bill Oatis submitted on 23rd April 1951. On the same day, the state prosecutor Dr. Josef Urválek also signed the request to keep him imprisoned in the headquarters of the ŠtB for three months, because of “suspicion that he had committed espionage against the Czechoslovak Republic”.²

From the point of view of the need to gain evidence, this step was necessary to the Czechoslovak authorities, and it confirmed that Oatis would be given extraordinary attention, that he would be hermetically isolated from any outside contact and that the “Oatis case” would be thoroughly directed by the Czechoslovak State Security Police.

The first interrogation of William N. Oatis in the regional headquarters of the State Security Police in Prague took place on the day of his arrest, 23rd April. It was more a matter of a first sounding or enquiry for information – five short questions and an equal number of short answers. According to the record of this interrogation, they informed Oatis that he had been arrested for anti-Czechoslovak espionage. He rejected this. As evidence they showed him four personal notebooks and a photograph of Koloděje Castle with the text “Clementis was held in this window”.³ According to W. N. Oatis, this “evidence” contained no indication of spying and he again rejected the accusation of espionage.

The interrogation continued two days later, again only briefly. Three questions, three answers. Oatis again categorically rejected the claim that he had done any espionage. To the comment of the investigator: “Don’t be naive, you’re an old spy, caught in the act” Oatis only repeated that he had not done any espionage against Czechoslovakia.⁴

The further investigations by the State Security Police followed the routine or tried and tested approach. The chief of the first section of the regional headquarters of the ŠtB Kamil Pixa and his deputy Arnošt Pokorný asked Oatis to name people with whom he had recently been in contact. He named 26 people including staff of the American Embassy in Prague – Ambassador Ellis O. Briggs, consul Tyler Thompson, first secretary

2 AMV ČR, ref. 1, no. B/4-V-1510/51.
3 AMV ČR, ref. 1, Protokol z vypočúvania Williama N. Oatisa spísaný na Krajskom velitelstve ŠTB v Prahe (Record of the interrogation of William N. Oatis, written at the Regional Command of State Security in Prague) 23rd April 1951.
4 AMV ČR, ref. 1, Protokol ...... from 25th April 1951.
of the embassy Alexander Schnee, military attaché Col. George Attwood, air attaché Col. Whitman, British diplomats in Prague – Ambassador Geoffrey Kirk, press attaché Anthony Snellgrove, secretary of the embassy Peter Swan and consul Arthur Bray. Oatis also said that he had had contact with an employee of the Ministry of Information Rudolf Popper, former employee of Associated Press Lydia Votavová, translator Miroslav Hutschák, correspondents Robert Bigio of Reuters and Russel Jones of United Press, an employee of the prime minister’s office Antonín Kratochvíl, employees of the Associated Press and other people from diplomatic circles. To the question which of these people gave him information of an espionage character, Oatis replied that he had only friendly or working contacts with the people he had mentioned. To the challenge of the investigator that he had not mentioned all the names of people with whom he had carried out espionage, the accused stated that he had no espionage contacts with anybody.  

Reconstruction of the further interrogations of William N. Oatis is possible today mainly on the basis of the accessible records of his statements preserved in the Archives of the Ministry of the Interior of the Czech Republic in Prague. We cannot precisely document what actually happened between the individual interrogations, although we also have information from the fragmentary reports of investigators for the headquarters of the ŠtB, as well as reports of planted agents – fellow-prisoners and the records of the testimony of former colleagues. However, some of these sources may not be truthful, since their value as evidence was influenced by many factors – the methods of psychological pressure, promises, alleviation, threats and so on. It is also necessary to approach the documents recording the statements of Oatis with caution and reserve, especially when we realize the aim the documents were intended to serve. Above all, they were supposed to be written evidence of his guilt, bases for the trial and passing of a sentence. In the case of Oatis they formed the skeleton of the actual trial. For this reason, they were adjusted and supplemented in advance, with the same questions and answers occurring repeatedly. The State Security Police obviously did not use such a scenario only in the case of Oatis and his associates. Other accused such as Eugen Löbl and Arthur London, also documented this approach in their memoirs.

But let us return to the first interrogation of the accused Oatis. On 27th April 1951, five days after his arrest, he wrote a declaration in the document: “I confess that as an accredited correspondent of Associated Press in Czechoslovakia, I obtained military, economic and political information of a confidential and secret nature from unofficial sources. I am aware that this information obtained by me has the character of espionage.” This meaningless confession was a success for the investigators. The next step was clear – to fill out the confession with content.

The ŠtB already began to achieve this aim at the following interrogations. It is interesting that the actual technique of interrogation partially changed. According to the documents, the psychologically broken Oatis gave long monologues about how he obtained facts personally or through employees about events around the disappearance of Clementis, the stay of Vyšinský in Karlovy Vary and similar subjects. He also described

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5 AMV ČR, ref. 1, Protokol ...... from 26th April 1951.
6 AMV ČR, ref. 1, Protokol...... from 27th April 1951.
the system of his work, especially the methods of verifying various information. He
devoted a relatively large part of his statements to the above mentioned photograph of
Koloděje Castle, initially the main material evidence of his anti-Czechoslovak espionage.
Oatis explained the background of obtaining this photograph from Miroslav “Mike”
Husták, an interpreter, who showed great interest in the work of the Prague branch of the
Associated Press. Although members of the staff of the American and British embassies
repeatedly warned Oatis that Husták was a planted agent of the State Security Police,
he did not break off contacts with him, but accepted him as an external employee of the
Associated Press. Husták provided Oatis with the incriminating photograph of Koloděje
Castle only a few hours before his arrest. Today, we know that Miroslav Husták was an
agent of the State Security Police with the cover name “Huba” as is confirmed by the
Report of the Regional Prosecutor in Prague from 3rd December 1956. The report also
says that the existence of the group around W. N. Oatis was worked out on the direct
order of the minister of national security Kopřiva at a time when the security service had
no convincing anti-state material apart from some agency reports. Therefore, the ŠtB had
to obtain a reason for the arrest by provocation. Agent Huba was assigned to Oatis. Ac-
cording to the above mentioned report from December 1956, he was under the direction
of Major J. Chalupa. It was Chalupa who gave Huba the photograph of Koloděj Castle,
which was of interest to Oatis because according to his information, Clementis was in-
terned there. Agent Huba alias Miroslav “Mike” Husták testified in the trial of William
Nathan Oatis only once – on 5th June 1951. He later backed out of the whole case by
pretending illness and hospital treatment. His only testimony revolved around the above
mentioned photograph. Allegedly he only did what Oatis asked from him, namely to
obtain information and photographic documentation concerning important personalities
imprisoned in Czechoslovakia. To the question of what espionage information he had
given to Oatis, he replied that he had also provided detailed information about military
questions, movements of the Czechoslovak army, its weapons and so on. However, the
peak of Husták’s abilities as an ŠtB agent was his reply to the question of whether he
realized what resulted from his contacts with William N. Oatis: “Yes, I realize that I
spied for the American intelligence service, but only at the request and according to the
instructions of Oatis. Therefore, I also went and voluntarily told everything to the secu-

insisted on speeding up the trial of Oatis. This was followed by further interrogations, psychological pressure and multiple written revisions to the documents recording the interrogations. The head of the investigation section 6-B of the headquarters of the ŠtB Staff Captain Milan Moučka played the leading role here. He personally revised, supplemented and improved the documents. This sleight of hand with the documents continued so that they were returned to the interrogations, which proceeded according to them and the witness or accused endlessly memorized them. It was inevitable that the trial occurred without any deviations from the carefully prepared documents.10

The official investigation of William N. Oatis occurred from 3rd May to 22nd June 1951. It was headed by Lieutenant Josef Lédl, who was assigned to this case as Oatis’ personal officer. His direct superior was Staff Captain Milan Moučka. The documents from the interrogations in this period concern especially the circle of Oatis’ associates in carrying out the espionage. The questions were almost always identical. If Czechoslovak citizens were involved, they concerned what roles they fulfilled and what was their attitude to the people’s democratic regime. For example, Oatis testified on 3rd May about cooperation with a clerk for PanAmerican Airways Miroslav Havelka and a former employee of the Czechoslovak Chamber of Commerce in London Vlasta Pánková, an employee of Chemapol. According to the document recording this interrogation, Pánková informed him about the arrest of Otto Šling in Brno and the alleged lover of Rudolf Slánský Maria Švermová. It also named as a further informer Jiří Mucha, a translator and writer in contact especially with the British Embassy.

A relatively extensive document records the interrogations from 7th and 8th May 1951. The investigator challenged W. N. Oatis to describe and explain all the personal notes in one of his notebooks, marked with a letter “A”. It was an ordinary notebook containing names of people with whom he was frequently in contact. It included information about Czechoslovak diplomats such as Adolf Hoffmeister, Rudolf Bystrický and Vladimír Otrata, who were recalled from representative offices to the headquarters of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs for consultations. Oatis analysed these generally known facts for himself as a step by the ruling authorities, when these people did not return to their posts because they were not acceptable to the Czechoslovak communist regime.11

The questions from the interrogation on 9th May 1951 were directed towards the British Embassy in Prague, and especially towards what espionage Oatis obtained from them. He replied that he had received information mainly from the press attaché Snellgrove, but also from the chief of the visa department and the military attaché. They did not lack the information that Klement Gottwald was a notorious drunk and the minister of national defence Alexej Čepička was homosexual. Another type of information from the British was data about economic matters, specifically reports about the discovery of rich deposits of uranium ore in south-east Bohemia.12

The investigation on 19th May 1951 was again a routine matter for the investigators Lieutenant Lédl and Staff Captain Moučka. Oatis described the whole of his military in-

10 10. AMV ČR, ref. 1, Rozsudok. V mene republiky! č. j. 19Tr10/69.
11 AMV ČR, ref. 1., Protokoly o výpovediach Williama N. Oatisa z dní 3., 4., 7. a 8. mája 1951.
12 AMV ČR, ref. 1, Protokol o výpovedi Williama N. Oatisa zo dňa 9. mája 1951.
intelligence preparation, which also involved the military attaché at the American Embassy in Prague George Attwood. Oatis completed his exposé of Attwood with the statement that many facts convinced him of his espionage activity, and he openly said: “He is our; that is American, spy tested by experience”. This brief sentence proves that Oatis was willing to say anything to get himself out of this situation in some way. He knew that he had been driven into a corner, so he tried to do something. A note for the investigators in this document about interrogation of the accused is more valuable evidence than Oatis’ declaration about Attwood. According to the note, they had to observe protocol and emphasize confession as an extenuating circumstance. This again confirmed the fact that this document did not include everything that had happened during the interrogation, and that they had used methods of psychological pressure and persuasion on Oatis. This view is confirmed by the Report on the case of William Oatis from 21st and 22nd May 1951 worked out by Josef Lédl for the Ministry of National Security. The report says that Oatis was transferred to the prison at Ruzyně on 30th April 1951. He was investigated by people from the Headquarters and Regional Section (Krajský výbor) of the ŠtB in Prague, but the investigation was done in an incorrect way. Many people had alternated at the interrogations, each using a different method of interrogation. Some investigators unrealistically offered Oatis many alleviations or even complete release. In the course of the investigations, the prisoner had not slept for several days, and they had written documents with him, which he later declared had been compiled by the investigators working on the case and he had signed them to gain alleviation of his position. According to these reports, Oatis admitted that in his work he had often used unofficial sources, but he denied that he had deliberately carried out espionage. He also stated that he had never received any task involving espionage, but only orders to verify various pieces of information already published by foreign agencies or in Czechoslovakia. Lédl stated that the most important espionage information obtained by Oatis in the territory of the Czechoslovak Republic was the information about the arrest of leading security personnel, the preparation of the political trial of Bishop Ján Vojtaššák and associates and about Church – state relations in Slovakia. Oatis then verified these reports by contacts with Western diplomats. According to Lédl’s reports, Oatis also had great interest in Vladimír Clementis. He strove to find out for himself whether Clementis had been arrested or had fled abroad. He said of his activity that he realized that he had committed espionage against Czechoslovakia, but he denied that for sending reports abroad he had used methods other than telex, telegraph or telephone. He had never sent any report with a courier or by diplomatic post. He arranged by date all the reports he had sent. As it says in the report, these were confiscated, but “they contained no convincing evidence of espionage”. New interrogations of Bill Oatis and his group continued with a practically unchanged scenario. The report of the responsible investigating officer Josef Lédl had no influence on the methods, or on the way of preparing documents recording the interrogations. Thus, the preparatory phase of the Oatis case reached its final stage.

13 AMV ČR, ref. 1, Protokol o výpovedi Williama N. Oatisa zo dňa 19. mája 1951.
14 AMV ČR, ref. 1, Správa o prípade William N. Oatis z 21. mája 1951, s. 3.
Thus, the fabricated trial of William N. Oatis and his group reached its final phase. Further interrogations of Oatis were repetitions of replies from earlier documents. The questions and answers from his fellow-accused and from witnesses were equally consistent, as is confirmed by the document recording their confrontation with Oatis on 21st and 22nd June 1951. According to these confrontations, Helena Kučerová provided Oatis with espionage information of an economic, military and political character. As the motive for this activity, she stated: “hatred for this system, which finally led me so far that I lent myself to coordination of espionage”. Pavel Wojdinek also confessed that he had carried out espionage for Associated Press and had received most tasks from William Oatis, who “was the most cunning of all, and so I liked to work for him even more actively than for his predecessors”. Petr Münz and Tomáš Svoboda answered the question similarly to Wojdinek. Neither did Lydia Votavová deviate from the required pattern, she also stated that all the espionage reports had a political, economic and military character. ŠtB agent Jiří Mucha stated that the espionage reports for Oatis were especially concerned with details about the arrest of Vladimír Clementis. Miroslav Havelka from PanAmerican Airways replied to the question of what were his contacts with the accused according to the pattern: “My contacts with Oatis had the character of espionage. I provided him with important espionage information, since it was clear to me from his behaviour that he is a trained American spy, who undertakes espionage under the cover of work as a journalist”.

The new interrogations of Bill Oatis on 12th and 15th June 1951 had only a repetitive character. The aim was clear – to perfectly prepare the accused for the actual trial, so that it would happen according to the prepared scenario.

The preparatory phase of the Oatis case finally ended on 23rd June 1951 at the State Prosecutor’s Office in Prague. The state prosecutor Dr. Urválek issued a decree that William Nathan Oatis, at this time in the custody of the Ministry of National Security – Headquarters of the State Security Policy, because he was suspected of anti-state criminal activity, would continue to be held by the Headquarters of the ŠtB. The accused would also be charged and the trial would also include his group – Woydinek, Svoboda and Münz, who had also committed the criminal offence of espionage.

The preparation of the whole trial of “William N. Oatis’ espionage centre” by the Czechoslovak communist State Security Policy took 71 days. During this period, Bill Oatis was not allowed a visit from a representative of the American diplomatic corps in Prague or from another representative of Associated Press or consultation with a lawyer. This also emphasized the fact that Oatis was not an ordinary case for Czechoslovakia. It was intended to symbolize the victory of Czechoslovakia over the West.

“The Western imperialists, already waging a bloody and barbarous war against the peace-loving nations, are preparing an aggressive third world war. The military preparations include increased espionage against the people’s democratic countries and so also against the Czechoslovak Republic. The intelligence services of the imperialist states are

15 AMV ČR, ref. 1, Protokoly o konfrontácii s Williamom N. Oatisom z 21. a 22. júna 1951.
16 AMV ČR, ref. 15.
17 AMV ČR, ref. 15.
using all possible means and possibilities to obtain espionage reports. The espionage centres are sending to us especially well-trained terrorists and spies...”

This sharp statement introduced the indictment of the State Prosecutor in Prague against William N. Oatis and his group. It continued with the accusation that representatives of the diplomatic offices were also carrying out espionage activities, that they came to Czechoslovakia only for this purpose and they misused diplomatic immunity and violated international law. The indictment described Associated Press as one of the centres of Western espionage activities in Czechoslovakia. It concealed its true face with journalism. William Nathan Oatis took over this intelligence network in June 1950. He was in contact with the military attachés and other diplomats from the Western states.

The whole indictment had four pages. It stated that Oatis was a trained spy from the time of the Second World War. In Prague he gained the cooperation of associates of the Associated Press for espionage purposes, and received specific tasks from the headquarters of the agency in New York and London. He especially collected information on the unmasking of American spies by the security services of the Czechoslovak Republic. “His espionage activity was directed towards facts about the group of Šling, Švermová, Clementis and co. Oatis himself describes the value of these espionage reports for the American intelligence service as follows: Such espionage findings were very important for our intelligence service mainly because this information enables it to assess to what extent its network in Czechoslovakia has been unmasked and what measures are necessary to protect the positions, which still remain undiscovered in Czechoslovakia. – Thus, among other things, he endeavoured, with the help of his espionage network, to obtain detailed information about the place of imprisonment and guarding of Clementis, about the course of the investigation of him, about the arrest and investigation of other unmasked traitors and spies. In this way, he succeeded in penetrating into responsible places.”

The indictment continued that a group of collaborators verified the information, which concerned high offices in the army and the activities and arrests of some important personalities in the Czechoslovak security and military structures. All this information was secret at the given time.

According to the indictment, Oatis’ efforts was also directed towards obtaining espionage information about facts important for the defence of the republic.

At the beginning of June 1951, the minister of justice Štefan Rais set the dates of 28th – 30th June 1951 for the holding of the trial. He later changed his decision and set new dates of 2nd – 4th July 1951. He entrusted leadership of the trial to Josef Urválek as prosecutor and Jaroslav Novák as chief judge. On 29th June 1951, immediately before the trial, all the materials were again thoroughly studied with the cooperation of the ŠtB in the so-called rehearsal of the trial. It was a sort of dress rehearsal for the actual trial.


19 AMZV ČR a NA ČR, ref. 18.

Czechoslovak government confirmed the dates of the trial as 2nd–4th July 1951, by issuing an official decree on 1st July, that the trial of Oatis and his co-accused – the translators for the Associated Press, Woydinek, Svoboda and Münz, would begin the next day. On the same day, the New York headquarters of the Associated Press issued a declaration expressing its full conviction that the approach of William Nathan Oatis and his American predecessors, responsible for the office of the Associated Press in Prague, was in harmony with the principles of the work of the Associated Press, namely honourable and objective journalism.21

The trial of the accused before the State Court in Prague began on 2nd July 1951 at 8.00 AM. The chief judge (predseda senátu) was JUDr. Jaroslav Novák with JUDr. Zdeněk Kaláb, Karel Bautz, Karel Hybš and Anna Součková as the other judges. The state prosecutor JUDr. Josef Urválek was obviously also present. The four accused were assigned defence counsels ex officio: Vladimír Bartoš for Oatis, Vlastimil Fáček for Svoboda, Jiří Vízek for Woydinek and František Vorel for Münz. This public hearing was held in the main court room of Pankrác Prison. They put Oatis in the place assigned to the accused. He was “garnished” with six microphones on the semicircular rail. The prosecutor was to his left and the defence counsel to the right. The judges sat in front of them. Behind his back were about a hundred spectators, mostly chosen from among the activist workers, who received tickets to the trial as rewards. These spectators also filled the gallery and were expected to create an atmosphere with appropriate sounds. The participants were similarly arranged at other trials, especially at those of representatives of the churches or other enemies of the communist regime.

The chief judge opened the trial, then the indictment of the state prosecutor was read. The chief judge challenged the accused to respond to the indictment. They were questioned separately. He also challenged them to state the circumstances, which weakened or refuted the suspicions against them and include the extenuating circumstance of voluntary confession.

The first words of the completely broken William Nathan Oatis at the trial were: “I feel myself to be guilty of committing espionage in Czechoslovakia.”22 Thus, everything began to happen according to the precisely prepared scenario or according to the memorized question document. The repeatedly prepared series of questions and answers was repeated. It was not surprising when William Nathan Oatis spoke of his espionage training during the Second World War at Ann Arbor, from where the military attaché George Attwood also came. This was followed by questions and answers concerning Vladimír Clementis, contacts with Mucha, Havelka, Husták, Pánková, Kratochvil, Kucerová, Burdová, Kubík, Votavová, Stránsky and others. Oatis further described the tasks he entrusted to Woydinek, Svoboda and Münz, who also recited their testimony without hesitation.23

22 AMV ČR, ref. 1, Protokol o hlavnom pojednávaní Štátneho súdu v Prahe proti Williamovi N. Oatisovi v dňoch 2. – 4. júla 1951 (Record of the main hearing of the State Court in Prague against William N. Oatis on 2nd–4th July 1951), č. j. 7 Ts I 32/51.
23 NA ČR, f. Československá tlačová agentúra – spravodajské správy 1945 – 1956 (Czechoslovak Press Agency - carton no. 1 056.)

145
On the morning of the first day of the trial, most space was devoted to Clementis. Since the investigator did not succeed in producing documents about the connection of the Associated Press espionage network with Clementis and his associates as was originally intended, the preceding interrogations and understandably also the question document of the trial, concentrated on the circumstances connected with Oatis’ effort to learn details of what had happened to the former minister of foreign affairs. However, according to the Czechoslovak communist investigators and prosecutor, this was also proof of anti-state espionage.

The testimony of 11 witnesses was planned for the second day of the trial. They were expected to confirm Oatis’ espionage efforts and his connections with the espionage activities of other Western journalists and members of the diplomatic corps. After all the witnesses had given their testimony, Oatis’ defence counsel announced that his client wanted to add evidence he had not given the day before. Oatis perfectly followed the scenario, thoroughly and monotonously reciting the contacts and demands of Col. Attwood, and the exchange of information with Bigio, Jones and Fournier. He also described his espionage channel through the British Snellgrove and Kirk, and the Americans Thompson, Schnee and Martin Bowe. He had allegedly received constant demands for espionage reports from these people and from the headquarters of the Associated Press. If Oatis thought that this “harakiri” would improve his position, he was very much mistaken. He had enough experience to understand that he had no chance to escape. It was only a false vision of salvation foisted on him by the investigators and associated with total disintegration of the personality, which led to him saying: “My agency works for the West and produces articles slandering the Soviet Union and other people’s democracies. I was under pressure to provide reports of this sort and send them to our agencies. I gained some reports from one source and sent them to another source. Thus, I was the person in the middle. I am sorry that I accepted such tasks.”

Or was it only a “theatrical” insertion in the perfect scenario? The second possibility is more probable. Whichever is the case, his public apology provoked wild laughter from the audience.

The trial of Oatis and his associates shows us a further interesting fact about the work of the ŠtB during a political trial. Its final document was “interlarded” with non-specific expressions of an accusatory type: a certain important political functionary, a certain minister, a certain material, in a certain town, that information, that man and so on. The trial was public, so according to the ŠtB scenario, the people present could not hear any “secret” facts.

The finále of the whole tragi-comedy or perfectly staged theatre lasted only two and a half hours. The chief judge Dr. Novák allowed the prosecutor Dr. Urválek to speak. In his final speech, he proposed that the accused should be convicted in accordance with the written indictment.

The concluding speech of the state prosecutor Josef Urválek was a masterpiece of propagandist theatre. First, he “analysed” the politics of the bipolar world, the camp of peace and the camp of war. The Western imperialists wanted to destroy the socialist camp by war, continuing the work of Adolf Hitler. They were sending espionage specialists to

24 NA ČR, ref. 20, carton no. 252, Správa MS – Zhodnotenie... z 5. júla 1951.
our territory, with the United States playing first fiddle in this destructive policy. Representatives of the diplomatic corps and various agencies were helping the trained Western terrorists. However, the Czechoslovak authorities had succeeded in unmasking this network of agents and neutralizing an especially dangerous nest of spies, hidden under the roof of the so-called Associated Press agency. According to Urválek, the espionage activity of Oatis was directed mainly towards facts about the gang of Šling, Švermová, Clementis and their associates. He strove to obtain detailed information about the place of imprisonment of Clementis, about the investigation of him, and about the arrest and investigation of other unmasked traitors and spies. He attempted to obtain photographs of these facts. With the help of his informers, he diligently investigated which connections of this gang of traitors were broken, which of the conspirators from all sectors of public life and the state apparatus had been arrested and where they were imprisoned. His Czech informers helped him in this.

The conclusion of Urválek’s speech was a really perfect work of propaganda and educational activity not only for the people present, but for the whole of society, although in his challenge he turned to the Western imperialists:

“You are preparing in vain for a new war; you are giving millions of dollars to spies and subversives in vain. You are seeing from day to day, the growth of the strength of socialism, as liberated human labour miraculously changes people and countries. And woe to you, if you dare to commit the greatest crime of all time. The people of our country and yours, with whom you never reckoned, will sweep you into the abyss for all time.

And we all join in the cry of our poet:

'May the loudspeaker from Wall Street make his death-bringing screeches, it will not dry up our rivers!

I sing stand on guard, I sing a song of peace!"

The verdict on William N. Oatis and his associates was announced on the morning of 4th July 1951. There is no written record, so it is useless to discuss whether the Czechoslovak authorities chose this date by accident or deliberately. The fourth of July is the greatest American holiday, but it had a bitter taste for Oatis in 1951. Since the date of the trial was changed, I incline to the view that that Czechoslovak communists did not choose the date of reading the verdict by accident, but that it was a deliberate act.

The State Court in Prague decided that William Nathan Oatis, Tomáš Svoboda, Pavel Woydinek and Petr Münz, all in prison at the time, were guilty of obtaining state secrets with the intention of betraying them to a foreign power. Directly and indirectly, they deliberately betrayed state secrets to a foreign power. By doing so, they committed the criminal offence of espionage according to § 86 section 1 and section 2 sub-section a-b of the Criminal Code and they were given prison sentences: 10 years for William Nathan Oatis, 20 years for Tomáš Svoboda, 18 years for Pavel Woydinek and 16 years for Petr Münz. They would suffer the confiscation of all their property and loss of civil rights. William N. Oatis would also be deported from the territory of the Czechoslovak Republic.

25 NA ČR, ref. 20. Záverečná reč štátneho prokurátora Josefa Urválka z 3. júla 1951 (Final speech of the state prosecutor Josef Urválek from 3rd July 1951).
On the day the verdict was declared, the American State Department issued a declaration condemning the trial of William N. Oatis as a distressing parody of justice and a fraud under the auspices of the Czechoslovak State Police. The headquarters of Associated Press also reacted immediately. Its declaration described the trial as an arrogant example of disregard and contempt for basic human rights, since the Czechoslovak government had only shown evidence that William Nathan Oatis had merely done the legal work of a journalist as it was understood in the whole of the free world.26

What was the further fate of prisoner no. 2 091 William N. Oatis after receiving the verdict of the State Court at the beginning of July 1951? He remained in Ruzyně prison. Soon after his conviction, the ŠtB planted an agent in his cell as a fellow-prisoner. He had to constantly communicate with Oatis, to provide information to form a basis for official reports.

On the basis of this report from the fellow-prisoner, Oatis’ personal officer Josef Lédl wrote a special report with the title “Report on the state of William Nathan Oatis, former head of Associated Press in Prague”. It stated that after the trial, Oatis was very exasperated by the length of the sentence and expressed great hatred towards the investigating personnel. He said that he had given in to their urging that he should confess to espionage, let himself be influenced and believed that after confessing he would not be strictly punished and would soon be sent home. He called all this fraud from the side of the investigating authorities. He demanded a meeting with the consul, transfer and release. He did not want to admit in any way that he might remain permanently in Czechoslovakia. He was willing to do anything to get out of prison except apply for asylum. He would allegedly only write a declaration against the USA if he would be immediately released and deported from the Czechoslovak Republic. Then he would like to publish a book about the brutality inflicted on him by the security services in Czechoslovakia. At any price, he had to get out of Czechoslovakia, and to achieve this he asked the president for clemency and, at the same time, for deportation.27 On 7th September 1951, Oatis actually wrote to President Klement Gottwald an application to be granted clemency. He included the “history” of his coming to Prague, his arrest by the security services in April, the verdict of the State Court from 4th July 1951 and the associated sentence to ten years for anti-state espionage.28

On 19th September 1951, he also addressed an application for asylum to the Czechoslovak government. He stated in it that he had asked the president to grant clemency and that he had spoken openly about his espionage activity. It is difficult to decide today whether Oatis wrote the asylum application, or whether it was the creation of his officer. If he wrote it himself, he was certainly pursuing only one aim – to get away from communist Czechoslovakia, although the text says exactly the opposite: “I would like to stay in Czechoslovakia. With this decision, I would like to show that I regret my espionage, that I have given up this activity and that I am a friend of the Czechoslovak Republic. I

26 SCHMIDT, ref. 21, p. 47.
28 NA ČR, f. Klement Gottwald, 100/24, zv. 102, a. j. 1 157.
realize that espionage against peace-loving nations only helps a few rich people, who want war because it is good for business, and that it is directed against the working people. This is my application for asylum and employment and a place where I can live in Czechoslovakia, where I hope I will be able to work for peace in the whole world.”

Other written sources also documented the psychological disposition and disintegration of his personality, his internal hopelessness or depression. They were especially his own memories, written only after his return to the USA and published in the American press in September 1953, but also further reports of officer Lédl from autumn 1951 and early in 1952.

In a report from 26th October 1951, Josef Lédl stated that Oatis’ current state was bad from the point of view of his possible use in the trial of those, who had testified against him. They did not question him regularly, there was no directive on how to deal with him, and so he also escaped the influence of the officer. Lédl also appealed to Oatis’ mood, as well as to the fact that he could not work with Oatis because he did not know what the authorities intended to do with him next.30 Lédl’s next report from 26th December 1951 was rather more specific. He proposed planting another ŠtB agent as a fellow-prisoner in Oatis’ cell, and with his help beginning to work on Oatis again.31

The final version of the document about the testimony of the witness William N. Oatis was “produced” on 4th March 1952. The questions and answers in it more or less copied the documents from the beginning of July 1951, when Oatis and his three closest associates had their trial. Precisely these associates were alleged to have a network of further collaborators, some of whom, including Helena Kučerová, Miroslav Havelka and Lýdie Votavová, informed Oatis directly.32 Oatis had to memorize the final version of his testimony. Moreover, and this was also extraordinarily important, he again had to be “ripe” for this step from the psychological point of view. His personal officer Lieutenant Josef Lédl from investigation department 6-B at the Headquarters of the ŠtB, worked out a report on 11th March 1952, in which he revealed the psychological preparedness of his client. He stated in it that on this day he had thoroughly gone over the whole testimony document with Oatis, and he “answered exactly according to the document, but it is still necessary to give him short questions to draw out all the details in the document. Then he replies willingly and with all the details. He is clearly well-prepared for the trial, he is calm and his overall state of health is good…”33

The prosecution and indictment of members of the espionage group of William Nathan Oatis from 18th March 1952 states that apart from his closest associates – Svoboda, Woydinek and Münz – other people also helped him. They all carried out espionage activity entirely consciously and admitted their anti-state activity as witnesses at the trial. Oatis

29 NA, ČR, ref. 28, or AMV ČR, ref. 1, Žiadost’ o azyl podaná W. N. Oatisom dňa 19. septembra 1951 (Application for asylum submitted by W. N. Oatis on 19th September 1951).
30 AMV ČR, ref. 1, Operačný podzväzok č. 1 (Operational Subfile no. 1).
31 AMV ČR, ref. 1.
32 AMV ČR, ref. 1, Protokol o výpovedi svedka Williama N. Oatisa zo dňa 4. marca 1952 (Record of the testimony of William N. Oatis from 4th March 1952).
33 AMV ČR, ref. 1, Správa sektoru 6-B o stave vyšetrovania v prípade Oatis (Report on sector 6-B on the state of the investigation of the case of Oatis).
himself and his three closest associates also admitted their anti-state activity. According to the indictment of the members of Oatis’ espionage group, Jiří Mucha and Jindřich Kratochvíl committed the criminal offence of espionage (§ 86, section 1 of the Criminal Code), Karel Loula and Vlasta Pánková committed the offence of espionage (§ 86, section 2, sub-section a of the Criminal Code), Jan Stránsky committed the offence of association against the republic according to § 79 of the Criminal Code and the offence of threatening service secrecy according to § 112 of the Criminal Code, Amália Burdová and Matěj Kubík committed the offence of association against the republic (§ 79 of the Criminal Code), while Jan Knetl had committed the offence of hostile action against the republic according to § 129 of the Criminal Code.34

The trial of the accused was held on 6th and 7th May 1952. The State Court in Prague declared its verdict on 7th May and imposed the following sentences: 6 years in prison for Jiří Mucha, 18 months for Jindřich Kratochvíl, 8 years for Karel Loula, 2 and a half years for Vlasta Pánková, 4 years for Jan Stránsky, 2 years for Amália Burdová and 1 year for Matěj Kubík. Jan Knetl was acquitted.35

Those found guilty appealed to the Supreme Court, but it understandably confirmed the sentences of the State Court on 28th July 1952, including financial penalties and loss of civil rights and property in favour of the state.

The accusation of espionage, arrest, investigation, trial and imprisonment of William Nathan Oatis in summer 1951 also had its international dimension or impact. It contributed to a serious new crack in the already cool, tense and complicated relations between Czechoslovakia and America. The Oatis case accompanied many Czechoslovak – American diplomatic negotiations with the immediate result of limitations and losses mainly in the economic and commercial fields, and mostly damaging to communist Czechoslovakia.

Czechoslovak – American relations developed in a relatively positive direction until the Prague communist coup in February 1948. Czechoslovakia used American credit policy and both countries granted each other most favoured nation status on the basis of the Declaration on commercial policy from 1946, which took the place of an inter-state commercial treaty, and as member states of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT).

Removal of most favoured nation status represented the tip of the iceberg of strained economic and political relations between Czechoslovakia and the USA in this period. The American side took the step of declaring invalid the Declaration on commercial policy. It also put pressure on the member states of GATT, which supported the unilateral American approach. For Czechoslovakia, this meant almost complete collapse of the already limited exports to the United States, which accounted for 70 % of Czechoslovakia’s dollar income.36

The loss of most favoured nation status was reflected in the tariff barrier to goods. The American tariff on Czechoslovak goods increased by 100 % on average and in some

34 AMV ČR, ref. 1, Vyšetrovací zväzok William N. Oatis (Investigation file on William N. Oatis).
35 AMV ČR, ref. 1.
36 AMZV ČR, f. Odbor medzinárodných organizácií (Department for international organizations) 1945 – 1954, carton no. 5, without no.
cases even more. This prevented the export of Czechoslovak costume jewellery, wooden musical instruments, beer and spirits, textiles and toys.³⁷

These discriminatory trade measures culminated in the summer and autumn of 1951.³⁸

Unfortunately the Oatis case did not improve the frozen relations. On the contrary, it provoked further negative steps, mainly at the expense of Czechoslovakia. The Czechoslovak side probably expected a different result from the staged Oatis case than that which happened in reality. Moreover, it was not original, but only copied a similar case from a short time before in Hungary.

The main actor in the Hungarian case was the American Robert A. Vogeler. The Hungarian Security Police arrested him in Budapest on 18th November 1949. The American side sharply protested, but nobody was allowed to visit him, neither family members nor diplomatic representatives. Therefore, the American government closed the Hungarian consulates in New York and Cleveland, and banned American citizens from travelling to Hungary. American diplomatic activity followed, leading to talks between the American ambassador to Budapest Robert Davis and the deputy prime minister Máté Rákosi. The Hungarian side initially indicated that Vogeler might be released under certain conditions. The talks continued in the following months. The Hungarian communists agreed to his release on 28th April 1951.³⁹

The diplomatic “game” around William Nathan Oatis officially began on 25th April 1951, two days after his arrest. The Czechoslovak Ministry of Foreign Affairs sent a note to the American Embassy in Prague to inform it that the head of Associated Press in Prague “has been arrested by the Czechoslovak security authorities for anti-state activity. According to the testimony of witnesses, William Nathan Oatis instructed former employees of the Prague office of Associated Press to obtain and verify secret information. He also illegally obtained and spread reports slandering the Czechoslovak Republic and its regime. He used Czechoslovak citizens, employed in the Prague office of Associated Press, for similar purposes.”⁴⁰ In the official reply of the American Embassy from the next day, the American side demanded that the vice-consul Richard C. Johnson should be able to visit Oatis. The Czechoslovak Ministry of Foreign Affairs rejected this demand. It also rejected the further demand that William Oatis should have an American defence counsel. According to Czechoslovak legal norms, Oatis had the right to select a legal representative with Czechoslovak citizenship, recognized by the Czechoslovak courts as qualified to act as a defence counsel in a Czechoslovak court.⁴¹

This initial diplomatic correspondence already indicated that the Czechoslovak side was not willing to make any, even non-substantial concessions with regard to Oatis. Therefore, it could not be surprised that a strong mainly political step followed from the

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³⁷ NA ČR, Prague, ref. 28, carton no. 102, a. j. 1 157/1.
³⁸ NA ČR, Prague, f. MZV-VA, cart no. 489, no. j. 1-97c(19).
³⁹ SCHMIDT, ref. 21, p. 54-55.
⁴⁰ AMZV ČR, f. TOT, 1945-1954, USA, carton no. 19, č.m. 117.943/A-V-1.
⁴¹ AMZV ČR, ref. 40, no. j. 118.649/51 A/V/1.
American side. On 2\textsuperscript{nd} June 1951, the State Department issued a decision removing the validity of American passports for travel to Czechoslovakia.

The USA used mainly political argumentation to justify this. With the two sides using different interpretations of facts and internationally valid agreements and principles, it was simply impossible to find a way out of this vicious circle acceptable for both sides, although especially the American diplomatic circles certainly made an effort to solve this incident. This is confirmed especially by the talks at the Czechoslovak Ministry of Foreign Affairs with minister Viliam Široký, on the initiative of ambassador Ellis O. Briggs on 15\textsuperscript{th} June 1951. According to the record of the talks, Briggs explained to Široký that the American side had a strong interest in the release of Oatis, and he demanded an explanation of his arrest. The reply of Viliam Široký was faultless – it was a matter directed against the Czechoslovak state. He had studied the documents himself and Oatis had signed a detailed confession. To further urging from Briggs for a clarification of the details of the offence, Široký explained that it was concerned with questions of national security, the army and its organization. Briggs described such a classification of the offence as very distressing. In the discussions, he continued with the statement that his government would consider it a reasonable solution, if Oatis was deprived of his accreditation and deported from Czechoslovakia, if he had really offended against the republic. He also objected that Oatis was in contact with foreign countries only through public means of communication, so that all his activity was legal and known to the government of Czechoslovakia. Oatis’ accreditation had been regularly renewed, for the last time only a week before his arrest. If the Czechoslovak government was not satisfied with his work, it could have expressed its disagreement by not granting accreditation. The reply of Viliam Široký was again very general: accreditation was granted for journalism, but Oatis’ case was allegedly not a matter of the work of a correspondent, but of espionage activity. A further part of the conversation revolved around permission for contact between Oatis and the embassy. The Czechoslovak minister of foreign affairs also rejected this. Briggs still called for the release of Oatis, and he had a duty to care for an American citizen. Široký concluded the discussion with the statement that his duty was to care for the state and so Oatis’ release could not be considered.\textsuperscript{42}

After requesting and obtaining a written record of the trial, the embassy in Prague also officially reacted. A note from 16\textsuperscript{th} July 1951 stated that the record of the trial gave no evidence of any activity of William N. Oatis, which was not the activity of a conscientious journalist according to generally valid customs. Therefore, the unjust treatment of him was a violation of the principle of freedom of information. It also demanded his release with the condition of departure from Czechoslovakia. The reply of the Czechoslovak side, in the spirit of communist propaganda, was that the American note was a coarse attempt to intervene in affairs, which lie exclusively within the legal authority of Czechoslovakia, and so the Czechoslovak government refused to even consider the American demand.\textsuperscript{43}

\textsuperscript{42} AMZV ČR, ref. 40, without no.
\textsuperscript{43} AMZV ČR, ref. 40.
The American professional journalists’ organizations also supported the release of Bill Oatis, and leading American politicians began to take an interest in the Oatis case. Many senators and congressmen condemned the Czechoslovak communist regime in the press. Senator William E. Jenner presented a fiery declaration that if Oatis was not released, the American airforce should be sent to Czechoslovakia to free him by force. It was obviously technical nonsense and Jenner himself did not know how such an “operation” would be carried out. Perhaps the American planes would take off from a military base in West Germany, and bomb Prague, or a special commando unit would snatch Oatis from the tightly guarded prison? Perhaps only one short logical answer to this question is correct – propaganda.

Senators Herbert O’Connor and Mike Mournery and congressmen John V. Beamer and O. K. Armstrong made a much more rational and practical proposal. They suggested economic sanctions against Czechoslovakia. Finally, Congress itself took an interest in the Oatis case. On 14th August 1951, the House of Representatives proposed the immediate interruption of all commercial relations with Czechoslovakia for as long as Oatis was not free. This resolution was not binding on the administration, namely the president and ministries, but was only a recommendation expressing the view of the American public and Senate. On 23rd August 1951, the Senate also considered this resolution and unanimously accepted it. In the American system it was entirely clear and natural that a resolution approved by both chambers of Congress could not be ignored by the President and the ministers. The text of the resolution approved by Congress was as follows: “Since the arrest and conviction of William N. Oatis, correspondent for the Associated Press in Czechoslovakia, is an unprecedented violation of original basic human rights, guaranteed by the Charter of the United Nations, and since the treatment of William N. Oatis has proved that the Czechoslovak government arbitrarily rejected the principle of free information, which is essential for peaceful cooperation and friendly contacts between the nations of the world, and since the American people and the people of the whole free world condemn the persecution of other American citizens, let the House of Representatives (with the participation of the Senate) decide that the Congress of the United States expresses its deepest indignation over the arrest, fraudulent trial and unjust conviction of William N. Oatis, and urges the executive branch of government to take all possible steps to secure his release, let the sense of this resolution be sent by the appropriate representatives of our government to the United Nations and representatives of the Czechoslovak government. Let it be further decided that Congress is resolved to immediately end all commercial contacts with Czechoslovakia and renew them only when the Czechoslovak government restores the freedom of William N. Oatis.”

The appropriate moment to present the position of the highest American circles came a few days later on 28th and 29th August 1951, when the new Czechoslovak ambassador to Washington Vladimir Procházka had to present his credentials to the President of the United States. The new Czechoslovak ambassador was received first by the secretary of state Dean Acheson and on the next day by President Harry Truman.
The discussion between secretary of state Acheson and ambassador Procházka began with Acheson’s account of Czechoslovak – American relations, which he described as bad and still worsening. He described the Oatis case as the main obstacle. He pointed to the recent resolution of Congress, as well as the case of another American Jan Hvasta, convicted in Czechoslovakia for invented espionage. According to Acheson, Oatis was convicted of espionage, although he had done nothing to prove his guilt. He described such an approach as a Czechoslovak effort to worsen relations with the USA, which therefore decided that in agreement with Great Britain and France, they would ban all exports to Czechoslovakia and flights by Czechoslovak planes over West Germany. Acheson also sharply condemned the fact that Oatis was not allowed to select his own defence counsel, and the Czechoslovak authorities had not allowed him to contact American diplomats in Prague. Ambassador Procházka replied that Bill Oatis had confessed, that he had been legally convicted of espionage and that the case was closed.46

The reception of the new Czechoslovak ambassador with his credentials on 29th August 1951 by President Truman was brief and cool. Truman declared that the Oatis case would not end as long as he was not free. According to Procházka, the case was closed and Czechoslovakia would not give in to any pressure.47

Diplomatic efforts from the American side to achieve the release of Oatis by means of exchange continued around the turn of the years 1951 – 1952, but without success. On 7th December 1951, the American Embassy in Prague submitted a proposal to exchange people with American citizenship under Czechoslovak jurisdiction for an equal number of people with Czechoslovak citizenship under American jurisdiction. The reply of the Czechoslovak minister of foreign affairs Viliam Široký from 12th January 1952 in the form of an aide memoire was that the Czechoslovak side would agree with the exchange only if the American government removed discriminatory measures, that is, the USA would immediately or on the day of the exchange, verify consular invoices for Czechoslovak exports to the USA and American offices would give licences for the export of American goods to Czechoslovakia to the same extent and with the same structure of goods as in 1950 – 1951. On the day of the exchange, the American side would also lift the ban on flights through the American zone of Germany to Western Europe and would request that the governments of Great Britain and France also agree to end this ban.48

The reply of ambassador Briggs from 14th February 1952 was almost identical to the Czechoslovak demands, especially concerning licences, invoices and flights, but it said nothing about the return of accounting for equipment ordered in the USA, specifically the already mentioned rolling mill. It was blocked by a decree of the Ministry of Finance of the USA on 17th January 1952, five days after the American proposal for the exchange of people. However, the Czechoslovak side made precisely the rolling mill a condition for

46 AMZV ČR, ref. 40, carton 18, no. j. 8041/51. Telegram veľvyslanca Vladimíra Procházku zachytávajúci rozhovor s Deanom Achesonom zo dňa 28. augusta 1951 (Telegram from ambassador Vladimír Procházka reporting a discussion with Dean Acheson on 28th August 1951).
47 AMZV ČR, ref. 40, Zvláštny tlačový prehľad č. 2 zo dňa 30. augusta 1951 (Special press review no. 2 from 30th August 1951).
48 AMZV ČR, ref. 40, carton 2A, Diplomatická korešpondencia medzi Československom a USA za rok 1952 (Diplomatic correspondence between Czechoslovakia and the USA in 1952), no. j. 421.672/54.
the release of Bill Oatis and did not want to retreat from this demand.\(^49\) At the beginning of March 1952, the State Department described this possibility as “pure speculation”. The rolling mill was not and would not be the subject of an exchange for Oatis.\(^50\)

Not all the above mentioned discriminatory measures of the American administration against Czechoslovakia in connection with Oatis had immediate or entirely desirable effects. In reality, if the American government did not want to perpetuate the situation by breaking off diplomatic relations with the communist regime in Czechoslovakia, it had to patiently seek secondary or indirect methods of pressure or wait until the economic levers and measures began to have effects. It was also not simple for Czechoslovakia to get out of the dispute over Oatis with minimal losses, because political argumentation or blindness prevailed over the economic needs of the state. Almost nine months passed from the trial until the Czechoslovak government allowed Oatis to meet American diplomatic representatives in Prague. This first meeting between Oatis and Briggs was held on 30\(^{th}\) March 1952. However, before this meeting the case officer Lédl and the chief of the department of investigation at the Headquarters of State Security Staff Captain Milan Moučka spoke to Oatis. Moučka informed Oatis that he had to consider how he would answer the possible questions from Briggs. Bill Oatis, perceiving an improvement of his personal situation, promised that he would answer only with the agreement of Moučka. The actual meeting between Oatis and Briggs with the participation of Moučka and interpreters occurred on the level of general phrases about state of health, good food and so on.\(^51\)

The second meeting of an American diplomatic representative in Prague, this time of chargé d’affaires Nathan King with William Oatis on 7\(^{th}\) October 1952, occurred in a similar spirit. On 3\(^{rd}\) October 1952, King had received “instructions” at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs from the head of the American and British section Dr. Ján Pudláš, who emphasized that the content of King’s conversation with Oatis could only concern purely personal matters: health, small needs, books, family greetings. He could not talk to the prisoner about anything concerned with his criminal offences or about political matters.\(^52\)

Oatis’ conversation with King was similar to his previous conversation with Briggs. It occurred in the investigation section of State Security in Bartolomejská street. It was routine. King stated that the American authorities had not forgotten him. Oatis did not ask what they were doing. To the question of whether he needed hygienic necessities, cigarettes and books, he replied that he had enough of everything. Interpreters and State Security representatives were again present so that Oatis could not learn what stage efforts to secure his release had reached. Understandably, he could not know that the government of the USA was proposing to Czechoslovakia, talks about opening economic questions, about global compensation for American nationalized and confiscated property, about IBM or about releasing the blocked rolling mill. Equally he could not know that

\(^{49}\) AMZV ČR, ref. 40.

\(^{50}\) AMZV ČR, ref. 45, carton 30, no. j. 108.300/52

\(^{51}\) AMV ČR, ref. 1, Operačný podzväzok no. 1.

\(^{52}\) AMV ČR, ref. 1, no. 133.107/ABO/52.
Czechoslovak—American trade was completely interrupted, that consular invoices were not being verified or export licences issued, that the American Embassy in Prague was requiring finger prints before issuing visas for travel to the USA and so on. He also could not know that the American side had made his release the condition for the lifting of these discriminatory measures. The deputy secretary of state David Bruce also emphasized this position to the new Czechoslovak ambassador to Washington Karel Petřželka during his introductory audience on 14th October 1952.53

Only in the course of March and April 1953 did the release of William Nathan Oatis acquire a real basis. It was preceded by a request for clemency from Oatis’ wife Laura-bella, who addressed it to the President of Czechoslovakia Klement Gottwald on 15th November 1952.54 This request for clemency was passed from the President’s Office to the Ministry of Justice. The minister Štefan Rais asked the foreign minister and deputy prime minister Viliam Široký for the view of his area of government in a letter from 26th January 1953. Rais observed in this letter that further proceedings in the matter were still delayed and he proposed three solutions:

1. Rejection of the request for clemency by the Ministry of Justice and announcement of this decision to W.N. Oatis’ wife.
2. Inform Mrs. Oatis that the minister of justice had given instructions for further consideration of this request and would inform her of the result.
3. Indefinite postponement of the request for clemency without informing his wife about the fate of her request.

When the adviser to the American ambassador Nathan B. King visited the head of the American and British section of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs Ján Pudlák on 27th March 1953, and asked about progress towards the release of Bill Oatis, Pudláč’s reply was indefinite but also hopeful: The request for clemency from Mrs. Oatis was a basis for the proceedings then being considered. Two days later, the American diplomatic offensive continued with a letter from the new American ambassador in Prague George Wadsworth to the chief of protocol at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs Josef Šedivý, informing him that he would like to visit on the occasion of the election of Antonín Zápotocký as President of Czechoslovakia and personally deliver a message from President Dwight D. Eisenhower.55

The announced audience of the American ambassador with the new President of Czechoslovakia was held on 30th March 1953. The personal message from President Eisenhower congratulated Zápotocký on his election and expressed the hope that he would consider releasing William N. Oatis and so remove one of the causes of tension between the USA and Czechoslovakia. “If your government releases Mr. Oatis” continued the message from Eisenhower, “and so removes the obstacle his continuing imprisonment has placed in the way of their solution, the government of the USA from its side is willing to talk on the basis of full mutual understanding about questions, which derive from the arrest...”

53 AMV ČR, ref. 1, všetrovací zväzok William N. Oatis, podzväzok no. 3.
54 AMV ČR, ref. 45, carton 30.
55 AMZV ČR, ref. 40, carton 19, no. 104.518/53-ABO
of Mr. Oatis and are still open between us.” This personal message from Eisenhower offered an elegant solution. The Czechoslovak side could use the presidential amnesty, the traditional ritual of the new head of state, without this step looking like a surrender to American pressure. This was also advantageous for the American side. It would not look as if it had paid “ransom”, and the removal of some discriminatory measures would outwardly look like a generous gesture. It was a way to close the Oatis case satisfactory to both sides. Eisenhower’s message was supplemented on 13th April 1953 by a memorandum from the American Embassy in Prague, which formally confirmed the American assurance that the American government would begin to verify consular invoices, that the limitation on the export of American products to Czechoslovakia would be removed, the validity of American passports to Czechoslovakia would be restored, and Czechoslovak planes would again be allowed to fly over West Germany.

It is an undeniable fact that the American government made these concessions. The reply of the Czechoslovak government was positive. On 15th May 1953, Viliam Široký delivered to George Wadsworth a note or message from Antonín Zápotocký from the same day, in which President Zápotocký thanked the Americans for their congratulations on his election as President of the Czechoslovak Republic and announced that “on the proposal of the government, by its decision from 15th May 1953 on the basis of § 74 section 1, no. 11 of the Constitution, he pardoned William Oatis and freed him from the remainder of his prison sentence...”

The Oatis case ended successfully from the diplomatic point of view. William Nathan Oatis returned to the USA. The United States of America removed some discriminatory measures, but the main measure concerning most favoured nation status remained valid. The release of William Nathan Oatis from imprisonment in Czechoslovakia was obviously not the result of some momentary idea of an individual or group. Neither was it the result of Czechoslovak understanding of the principles of democracy, freedom and fundamental human rights. This result was “dictated” to the Czechoslovak communists and State Security by economic problems and needs, in symbiosis with the application of patient but firm American diplomacy.

The Ministry of National Security dealt with the technical aspect of the departure of William Nathan Oatis from Czechoslovakia on 16th May 1953, in coordination with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. They took him from Ruzyně Prison to the American Embassy and after a brief audience with ambassador George Wadsworth, Oatis was taken to

56 NA ČR, Prague, f. 100/3, zv. 179, a. j. 605.
57 NA ČR, ref. 56.
58 NA ČR, ref. 56.
59 After the release of William N. Oatis, the USA again began to confirm consular invoices and issue licenses for the export of American non-strategic goods to Czechoslovakia. As a result, trade could start and the agenda of the office of the commercial attaché at the Czechoslovak Embassy in Washington revived. Although it was clear that trade with the USA would not reach its former level both because the pre-conditions for this did not exist in a period with unfavourable customs tariffs for Czechoslovakia compared to competitors and re-exporting at disadvantageous prices, and because the Czechoslovak Republic was not interested because of its integration into the Soviet Bloc, some increase was expected. In NA ČR, Prague, f. Ministerstvo zahraničního obchodu (Ministry of Foreign Trade) 1945 – 1989, carton 17, reg. 30.
the frontier crossing into Germany at Rozvadov, from where the American occupation authorities took him.

The first articles about his release appeared on 17th May 1953 in the New York Times and New York Herald Tribune. Both important American dailies first informed readers of Oatis’ story in Czechoslovakia and his first statement to journalists at the American military base in Nuremberg, West Germany. They also said that Oatis still refused to discuss his trial in Prague, which had been based on accusations of espionage or his sentence of ten years, which the State Department pilloried as a judicial farce.

William Nathan Oatis returned to the USA on 18th May 1953 on a flight from Frankfurt to New York. On American soil he was welcomed by his wife Laurabella and a crowd of American journalists.

On the same day, 18th May, the Chicago Daily Tribune published a statement from the former American ambassador to Czechoslovakia Ellis O. Briggs, who called on all Western democratic nations not to forget that William Nathan Oatis was falsely accused in Czechoslovakia, and so the Czechoslovak communists did not deserve thanks for releasing him. Moreover, they had convicted him on 4th July, the American Independence Day. This again raises the question of whether William N. Oatis was sentenced in Czechoslovakia on this date only by accident or as a planned act. Is there information that the date of the main hearing was changed? It is necessary to repeat that no document verifies one or the other possibility, but the logical argumentation that little Czechoslovakia humiliated the great United States on the day of their greatest state celebration is not unrealistic.

All Western press agencies published a series of Oatis’ articles in the period 13th – 18th September 1953. They were effective reports on the discrimination, terror and coarse violence, which existed at the time in Czechoslovakia. The content of these articles covered various aspects and are the personal testimony of a person with a painful personal experience.

The story of William Nathan Oatis in Czechoslovak communist imprisonment was published by all important American daily and periodical press, including the New York Times, New York Herald Tribune, Washington Post, Washington Evening Star, Chicago Tribune, Life, Time and Newsweek. Western European dailies, especially the French Figaro and Le Monde, British Times and Italian Corriere della Sera published the full text of Oatis’ account of his experience. However, his story from communist Czechoslovakia may have been rather exotic for readers of the Peruvian El Comercio.

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61 The Czech authors Karel Kaplan and Pavel Paleček devote less than a page to the Oatis case in the book Komunistický režim a politické procesy v Československu v rokoch 1948 – 1989 (The communist regime and political trials in Czechoslovakia, 1948 – 1989) (Prague 2001). They incorrectly state that William N. Oatis was sentenced to 7 years in prison. It is also untrue that William N. Oatis wrote about his experiences from Prague in a book I was in a red prison after his return to the USA (p. 114 of the cited book of the two authors). The only published material by W.N. Oatis from Prague was the series of six articles from 13th – 18th September 1953, published in the American and world press.
The media wave around William Nathan Oatis in the USA faded by the end of 1953. It was certainly a positive development for him. He stayed in New York and continued to work for the Associated Press, becoming its United Nations correspondent. For almost 30 years he continued to report on world events, especially questions concerning disarmament talks, the Cuban crisis, the Middle East, China, the Vietnam War and so on. He died on 16th September 1997.

Czechoslovak justice concerned itself with the Oatis case several times in later decades. Although this finally brought public rehabilitation and personal satisfaction for the main actor – William Nathan Oatis – the false accusation, conviction, imprisonment and the associated human suffering could not be wiped away.

The complete and perhaps already final civil rehabilitation of the chief accused in the Oatis case came after the fall of the communist regime in autumn 1989. At a non-public session on 9th July 1990, concerned with the rehabilitation of William Nathan Oatis, Tomáš Svoboda, Pavel Woydinek and Petr Münz, the judges of the City Court in Prague under the chairmanship of Dr. Jiří Lněnička decided to nullify the verdict of the State Court in Prague from 1951, all further decisions in this criminal case and to stop any criminal penalties against the convicted persons according to § 2 section 2 of act no. 119/1990 Zb. on judicial rehabilitation.

In the basic description or evaluation of the Oatis case, it is still necessary to formulate an answer to the question of what the Czechoslovak communist regime was pursuing by accusing and convicting William N. Oatis. What aim or intention had to be fulfilled? There were certainly several aims and intentions, but the dominant aim appears to have been an effort to discredit the West, the United States of America and world imperialism in the eyes of the domestic population and the populations of the countries of the Soviet Bloc. Partial, but no less important aims, were the attempts to use Bill Oatis in future as a Czechoslovak agent, or through him to convict domestic enemies of the state, such as the foreign minister of Czechoslovakia Vladimír Clementis, for whom William N. Oatis was a “link” with the West, although officially accessible Czechoslovak documents do not speak about this directly. Another important factor was that Prague did not want foreigners to be informed about what was happening inside the country. Lastly, there could have been a significant interest in using the “Oatis case” as a financial factor, as the successful Hungarian scenario showed. Finally, in the language of symbolism, Oatis was a warning and proof, a sort of living reminder that little Czechoslovakia was not afraid of the main imperialist super-power.
FESTIVALS IN SLOVAKIA AS PART OF POLITICAL RITUALS

SILVIA MIHÁLIKOVÁ


The structure of holidays and festivals in Slovakia has confirmed the fact that they are mainly religious, or better to say Catholic holidays and festivals. The data from recent census, symbolic motifs on banknotes and coins, as well as the official state awards confirm that the image of Slovakia has not exceeded the magic circle of preserved national traditions and confession of faith. The symbolism of state holidays and festivals and memorial days remains within the foundation myth and adoration of national heroes and traditions. The ritual content of holidays and festivals together with the symbols and myths used should confirm the legitimacy and strengthen the authority of their actors or those historical personalities or ideas which have been adoptet by a group. It is to provoke people’s emotions and enthusiasm towards the policy as well as manifest their understanding of the policy. Political attitudes have been formed more under the influence of symbolic forms than under utilitarian calculations.

History. Slovakia. Festivals in Slovakia as part of political rituals.

Symbols, myths and rituals shape the world in which we live our everyday lives. They are part of the codes we know how to deal with mechanically without thinking. Vladimir Macura stated that we can rebel against them, we can ironize and criticize them, but they do not cease to surround us and outwardly adapt more like part of the natural environment than like a human creation.\footnote{See the work: MACURA, V.: Šťastný věk. Symboly, emblémy, mýty 1948-89 (The happy age. Symbols, emblems, myths 1948-89). Pražská imaginace. Prague 1992; Masarykovo boty a jiné semi(o)fejetony. (Masaryk’s boots and other semi-articles). Pražská imaginace, 1993; samtene Revolution – samtene Scheidung. In Deutsche und Tschechen. Geschichte, Kultur, Politik. Berlin : Verlag C.H. Beck, 2001.}

If we do not regard politics as the simple achievement of group or local interests, regardless of individual cultures, politics will be an expression of a certain cultural system and every political action will be part of a wider cultural context. The cultural norms and values we do not directly understand as political also have a significant influence on political behaviour.

Political anthropologists mainly emphasize the symbolic dimension of political behaviour. Symbolic behaviour represents a basic form of interaction between political elites and the public, it confirms the legitimacy of power relations and strengthens the authority of rulers. Symbols are used to effect the emotions and arouse enthusiasm for a particular political programme. They express identification with the political line or political forces, and are the principle means helping people to give meaning to political processes, which are presented to them mainly in the form of symbols.

Thus, the person ceases to perceive the symbols “only” as symbols and they become realities to him. In contrast to adherents of the theory of rational choice, the “symbolists”
are convinced that “political positions are shaped more by means of symbolic forms than by utilitarian calculations”. The strength of symbols in political processes flows from the fact that they are bearers of concepts, which are used in various types of discourse. I do not have in mind the linguistic type of discourse, but its Foucaultian understanding in the form of a corpus of texts in spoken, written, iconographic, kinetic, musical or other forms, created in varied contexts. Social communication leads to the production of texts and can have multiple forms – for example action or performance expressions in various artistic genres. A whole spectrum of varied expressions can also be classified as spoken and written texts, because culture is the basis of many discourses and cannot be enclosed in the framework of one discourse. I agree with the authors, who understand culture as a system of collectively accepted views, ideas, connections and meanings. This system is not something, which is enclosed in peoples’ heads, it is reflected in the accepted symbols by means of which we exchange information about our views on the world, value orientations and ethical norms.

The basic categorization of symbols speaks of reference and condensed symbols. Reference symbols relate to certain facts or realities, they are neutral, they point to a certain situation and everybody perceives them the same way. They include such examples as figures of statistics on injuries at work or exchange rates. In contrast to reference symbols, condensed symbols are loaded with emotions or enthusiasm and so appeal to feelings. Precisely as a result they are subject to different interpretations.

In the field of symbols we can speak of their forms and functions. A whole series of symbolic forms can fulfill the same symbolic function: for example every political group uses a particular symbolism to distinguish itself from others and express its own identity, exclusivity and boundaries. This function is usually fulfilled by various symbolic forms: emblems, names, origin myths, elements of endogamy or exogamy, faith and customs associated with forebears, specific ceremonial and festive rituals. These matters were often underrated in political science, minimal attention was devoted to them or they were completely ignored.

When analysing the symbolic aspect of politics, literature speaks of symbolic politics or the politics of symbols, which shape the varied range of symbolic constructions. They may be the above mentioned “texts” without words: a ballet performance, palace garden, anniversary celebration, lighting of bonfires, floating down rivers on rafts or statues of dictators. Thus, we are all, presumably each according to our own choice, part and also co-creators of the symbolic world of mythology. Its “analysis touches us like a scalpel turned on our own bodies”. A new reality emerges, in which real people of flesh and blood move, rather than tables of statistics.

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2 KERTZER, D.: Ritual, politics and power. Yale University 1988, p. 3.
5 This classification of symbols was worked out by: SAPIR, E.: In: Symbolism, Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences. New York 1934.
Interpretation of the situation in society and where it is going is a combination of rational and irrational narrative elements or a combination of various myths and symbols. The protagonists of recently used myths sometimes include legendary rediscovered historical personalities. Historians doubt the real existence and heroic deeds of some of them, or they are discussed in serious or emotional terms. It often happens that modern mythology adapts or improves according to current needs personalities and events from the distant past.\(^7\) For every group, myths represent a narrative form of justification of its existence and designation of its systems of morals and values. In this sense, myth is more a perception and interpretation of where the group is situated, where it comes from and where it is going, than a matter of historically verified truth. Myth is not truth or lie, it is a way of explaining the ordering of the world, which people perceive as something natural.

A few words on the relationship between myths, rituals and symbols: The myth is a narration, a collection of ideas, while ritual is the active articulation of myth. Symbols are the building stones of myths and they are also an important part of ritual, because rituals are soaked in symbols and are widely accepted in their expressions: Myths are, therefore, encoded in rituals, liturgies and symbols. For example, Pribina’s sword or Svätopluk’s sticks evoke the whole context of Great Moravian mythology in the minds of Czechs and Slovaks without them having to personally participate in celebrations connected with the heritage of this historical period.

How do symbols penetrate into politics?
Honours and awards, school textbooks, festivals, celebrations, street names, monuments and rituals express in concentrated symbolic form the basic political values, historical traditions and identity proclaimed at least by the elite, if not by the whole society. Members of the elites have the power to choose between personalities, events, places and artefacts, which symbolize a particular value orientation. In this way, selected personalities or events become themes of public discourse and are assigned to the virtual symbolic world and so also to the reality in which we live. In relation to the now popular ideas on the invented or imaginary essence of national communities,\(^8\) I think that there are relatively clear and uncrossable limits in this area. The construction of myth does not start from simple inventions or from ideas not at least partially supported by the content of the existing collective memory. There must always be some factor, event or personality to which the myth relates and which is then interpreted in a particular way. In this context, G. Schöpflin wittily comments that it is difficult to imagine Slovak or Czech mythology starting from naval or sea-faring traditions.\(^9\)

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\(^7\) Robert Pynsent calls this approach active atavism, by which he means “deriving the distant past from the present... it is first of all a matter of projecting the present into the past, of projecting properties desired in the present into the past to confirm the desirable present”. PYNSANT, R.: Patrání po identitě. Prague : H&H, 1996, p. 84-85.


The elite of a newly established regime urgently searches and considers what parts of history to select, as if it is choosing goods in a supermarket, what should be the context of the selected personalities and events, what to emphasize and what to reject, which narratives and rituals to dust off, which should be partially adapted or given a content more appropriate to current needs.

However, new elites are preoccupied with a multitude of urgent tasks, so they often do not achieve the “great clean out” and leave it until later. Views crystallize over time, things which initially appeared to need removal lose their strongly hostile character and meaning. A heterogeneous configuration of symbols and myths arises, which we may see as an expression of growing tolerance, but also as a sign of the resignation of the elite from the task of fighting the windmills of the collective memory.

The political and intellectual elite, that is, those who are able to address society and ultimately control the language and content of public discourse, play a substantial role in the selection of appropriate symbols, myths and rituals. They are most frequently shaped by the representatives of political power, artists, academics, writers, journalists, in some cases Church dignitaries or state bureaucrats. The electronic media play an important part in communication between the elite and society. Television is especially influential. Its exceptional position resides both in its ability to reach the broad masses and in the fact that visualization evokes the feeling or conviction of the real existence of the mythical events and personalities. Verification of such ideas with the help of facts, information or experience is then almost excluded.

To devote attention to the problems connected with the role of symbols and rituals in processes of transition to democracy demands concentration on certain phenomena, although it is impossible to claim completeness in their analysis. The obsession of social scientists with “comprehensively” capturing certain phenomena is already long out of date and today it is more a matter of systematic reinterpretation, reconstruction and reformulation of previous approaches. Crisis moments of rupture and the origin of new political regimes form fertile ground for re-confirmation as well as for reworking, modification or complete transformation of fundamental values. This specific intermediate period has been described in literature as the “moment in and out of time” or as the expression of a “new temporality”.

The symbolism of newly-established states

The establishment of a new nation state always demanded increased attention to the symbolic construction of the nation, formation of its consciousness of unity, identification with the new abstract entity of their own state. If possible, a personified image of the state is created in such cases. Its rituals are connected with a “golden age”, with national

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10 Ref. 9, p. 28.
heroes, who led their people into an imaginary promised land. A worse situation occurred when history was “depopulated” as in the case of Slovakia, or the evaluations of individual historical personalities and events were not only not generally agreed, but were actually controversial. Creation of the symbolic image of the new state did not remain exclusively in the hands of the cultural management of the new executive, but was done with the participation of all political actors. As a result of the persistent conflict between the political and ethnic concepts of the nation, the urgent need to confirm or reject one of these alternatives became an acute political agenda. The essence of the controversy undoubtedly lay in the field of symbols and both sides in the public dispute organized a ritual defence of their positions in the form of manifestations, assemblies of citizens, petitions in the media, strikes and so on.

The rituals of modern political life also include sessions of parliament and conferences of political parties, as well as presidential inaugurations and enthusiastic singing of the national anthem in football stadia. Politicians attempt to legitimize their activities by means of rituals. The holders of power strive to strengthen their authority with rituals and revolutionaries use rituals to gain new committed supporters. Regardless of whether they are interested in making changes or in preserving the status quo, all these actors use rituals to shape the political reality around them. The symbols with political content do not include only the official state symbols such as the flag, state shield, national anthem, honours, festivals and memorial days, that is the symbols introduced and used on the basis of legislation and so subject to institutional political analysis. Things of which political actors are not always aware can also become political symbols: for example, a hair style or type of clothing such as pullovers and “Budaj style” wool hats in Slovakia immediately after November 1989 or the traditional Russian shirt (rubaška), Mao style shirt or Armani suit. Further examples are political gestures such as rattling of keys, various types of greeting – fascist, the communist clenched fist, Churchill’s V for Victory – and sports activities, some as symbols of health and success – Marathon, cycling, others as expressions of social status and prestige – golf, tennis, flying, yachting. Various forms of political intervention are associated with sport. Re-introduction of the position of First Lady, the appearance of notebook computers on the desks in parliament and orders for the production and public presentation of family shields were attempts to become like the “civilized West”.

12 Anthony Smith offers various types of “usable past” for the constituting of nation states. By the way, he places the Slovaks among the nations, who had problems with their own “golden age” and their intellectuals had to work hard to find heroes and distinguish the Slovaks from more powerful and better known neighbours. See: SMITH, A.: The “Golden Age” and national renewal. In HOSKING, G. – SCHÖPFLIN, G. (eds.). Myths and Nationhood. London : Hurst Company, 1997, p. 36-59.

13 In the case of Slovakia, the conflict between the supporters of these two conceptions of the nation was described as a conflict between the cosmopolitans and the nationalists. It was expressed in a whole series of public actions connected with the name of the federal republic or the text of the so-called Language Act.

In the study, I concentrate on the situation in the field of political symbolism in Slovakia, especially in the area of setting state holidays, in connection with the division of Czechoslovakia. The basic sources for the analysis are the legislative norms, prevailing trends in public discourse and records of the parliamentary discussions of the relevant legislation.

Ordinary days and holidays

The changes of views on which memorial days recognized during the existence of the common state of the Czechs and Slovaks should be preserved by independent Slovakia and which dates and events deserved to become holidays in the new state, were also a reflection of the search for the interrupted continuity of national myths or attempts to create new myths and traditions of the Slovak nation and state.

In their everyday activities, people usually do not have time to think about elevated principles connected with the origin and “star” moments of their national, ethnic or state community. Various types of political festival, whether official or only sacred to the closed circle of opponents of the existing establishment, serve this purpose. Festivals differ from ordinary days mainly by the fact that space is created for ritual activities, by means of which we recall the principles of collective identity. Various types of festival express the basic values, traditions and identities of a given community in concentrated form. The dates of major turning points are more or less “orientation points, historical lighthouses, according to which a nation orients itself on its journey through historical time”.

Every regime selects from history the lines of development and historic turning points, which most correspond to its historical self-image, its projections of the future and to everyday political utilitarianism. So it happens that some historic dates, which do not fall into the regime’s ideological concept, which complicate its interpretation of the past and present, become the subject of organized collective forgetting. Obviously, it is not possible to cut certain events out of the collective memory from one day to the next, but by means of cunning manipulation, one-sided emphasis on the desirable aspects of historical reality, the facts are not completely suppressed, only adjusted or reinterpreted according to current wishes.

I will not devote attention to analysis of the traditional Church feast days of Christmas, Easter, Three Kings and so on, but I will concentrate on the state holidays in the narrower sense, namely on the political festivals, by which I understand the state holidays and memorial or significant days with a symbolic content which is not primarily religious and which relates to the political history of Slovakia. Such festivals include both holidays from work and working days marked in the calendar as memorial or significant days, to which the regimes of different historical periods attached sufficient importance for their celebration to be required by law.

The repetition of historical myths in the ritualized form of festivals only appears to relate to the past. Its real aim is to strengthen confidence in the present system and in those who represent this system. It is not a matter of nostalgic recollection and it does not aim

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to find the historical truth. The common justification for state festivals in every society is some variation on the reaffirmation of the continuing values proclaimed by the regime. If the past is explained from the point of view of the values proclaimed today, people learn with satisfaction and relief that things have been the same from the beginning as they are today. Celebrations of the origin of a new state always involve repetition of the claim that the more or less expensive recovery of independence and freedom was the result of the long-term efforts of the best sons and daughters of the given community to secure a “new quality of life” for their successors. In every historical period and depending on the degree of modernization of society there are different preferences for understanding the new quality of life – from tribal, ethnic, regional or constitutional arrangements to the level of protection of human rights and respect for ecological demands.

The actual rituals represent more a stylized public expression of a position than its internal acceptance. However, this does not mean that participation in the rituals is exclusively formal. Whether members of the community directly participate in the rituals or not, whether they interpret the content of the rituals differently or not, they are still emotionally “drawn” into their force field, although subconsciously. By means of rituals, internal solidarity of the community is formed without the demand for uniformity of view, with every participant keeping his individuality, personal orientation and values. Thus rituals enable people to act jointly without demanding the existence of a consensus. And the myths encoded in rituals are the basic pillars preserving the community. David Kertzer adds that rituals even have the ability to survive after their basic justification and so also the content of the myth has disappeared or changed. The ritual stereotype secures the persistence of myths although in an entirely different, systematically changing form.

Festivals in the past

It is characteristic of almost all European countries that rituals connected with Christianity have a decisive place in their list of festivals. This situation remained unchanged for centuries. It applied both in conditions of the existence of dictatorships and under democratic regimes. Religious festivals show the dominance of one confession and in spite of verbal proclamations of religious tolerance and the application of ecumenical principles, it does not appear that we can expect substantial change in this area in the near future. Development in Slovakia is marked by ever more intensive application of Christian principles, and public life gives the impression of increasing concessions to the demands of rigid Catholicism. The results of the 2001 census, when more than two-thirds of the population expressed their allegiance to the Catholic faith, suggest that the public space for alternative confessions is narrowing. The Catholic Church and its political representatives are striving to bring into public discourse themes, which are tests of how far it can go in regulating or limiting rights to abortion, regulating the ways of spending free time, intervening in school curricula or dictating Catholic principles in a united Europe.

However, we will examine how the situation in the structure of festivals developed after the origin of Czechoslovakia. The Act on festivals and memorial days from 1925 mentioned nine Christian festivals and five memorial days. The latter included 5th July as the anniversary of the coming of Cyril and Methodius to the territory of Great Moravia, 28th September the anniversary of the coronation of St. Václav, 6th July the anniversary of the burning of Jan Hus, 1st May - workers’ day and 28th October – independence day, which was also a state holiday commemorating the origin of the republic. It is impossible to deny that the majority of state recognized memorial days concerned Czech history, especially if do not take into account that Cyril and Methodius and 28th October combined Czech and Slovak mythology equally. May day was appropriated more by political groups than by the national community. The two July festivals – Cyril and Methodius and Jan Hus – had a considerable religious dimension.

The origin of the Slovak state in 1939 meant the abolition of memorial days containing Czech symbolism and the strengthening of Church festivals. The clerical regime did not neglect the opportunity to publicly demonstrate its commitment to the ideas of Christianity and especially to the national cause. To leave no-one in any doubt about the character of the state, the preamble to the Constitution of the Slovak Republic from July 1939 stated: “The Slovak nation under the protection of God Almighty has lived in the territory assigned to it for centuries. It has founded its free Slovak state with the help of God, who is the source of all power and law”.17 A government decree of the Parliament of the Slovak Region stated that it was “liquidating the worst fruit of democracy”, namely party divisions, but, allegedly this did not mean totalitarianism. “If there can be talk among us of totalitarianism (in Slovak: totalita), then it is only of the totality (in Slovak: totalita) of the nation.”18 In this way the “interest of the nation” was actually placed above any legal norms, which opened the way to totalitarianism in spite of the declarations.

After the end of one totalitarian regime, another followed relatively quickly. The regime between 1945 and 1948 was only a brief interval between two totalitarian regimes. The communist regime included an effort to regulate and control the whole of social life, so festivals and rituals represented appropriate objects for communist social engineering. In this context, it is impossible to avoid the fact that the communists saw the traditional Church festivals in political terms as expressions of reactionary and religious prejudices, which needed to be gradually removed. As a first step, the festivals connected with the Conception and Assumption of the Virgin Mary, All Saints day, Good Friday and Three Kings disappeared from the calendar. However, at first they did not have the courage to take the radical step of abolishing the other Church festivals, so they attempted to change their character. The Easter festival celebrating the resurrection of Christ was designated the spring festival, while the symbolism of the coming of St. Nicholas, Christmas and the birth of Jesus Christ was to be covered by publicly organized processions for the coming of Grandfather Frost (Dedo Mráz), who most frequently arrived from distant Siberia, leaving no doubt that it was essentially a winter festival.

17 185/1939 Sl.z., čiastka 41.
The religious festivals acquired a political content under communism because the conflict between the Church and state had a power-political character after the establishment of the communist regime. The communists saw the Church as a political force connected with the Vatican, which they regarded as an instrument of American imperialism. Their aim was to subordinate all the churches and especially the Catholic Church, to neutralize its influence, detach it from the Vatican and create a national Catholic Church. Although the Christian festivals and the associated traditional rituals acquired modified forms as a result of modernization, they retained their symbolic message under communism. At the time of Church festivals and not only then, large numbers of people attended Church services in spite of the threat of unpleasant results such as persecution of family members or dismissal from work. The decision of the government to move festivals was much disliked by religious people. These movable festivals were justified by pragmatic reasons. The communists started from the view that it was not important whether a festival happened a day earlier or a day later, what mattered was that people had a day off work. The Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs even issued special decrees about the adjustment of working time and the moving of days free from work. At first sight it appeared that they were making concessions to the wishes of citizens, but in the background was the aim of reducing the importance of festivals and proving that the communist regime was also capable of deciding not only what, but also when was sacred. Thus, it was not unusual if several working Saturdays and Sundays occurred during the year or other festival days were moved. The communist regime alternately permitted, removed and restored the places of the festivals commemorating the Apostles of the Slavs Cyril and Methodius and the burning of Jan Hus among the memorial or significant days with direct or indirect religious connections.

Now we will turn to the political festivals in the narrower sense of the word. The communist regime naturally introduced as one of the first festivals, the celebration of its establishment in power – namely the anniversary of the February Victory, celebration of which was associated with repeated emphasis on the past, present and undoubtedly also future achievements and heroic deeds of the communists. The People’s Militia (Ľudová milícia) – the armed fist of the working class was never forgotten in the February celebrations. The formality of the regular commemorative ritual systematically multiplied the empty phrases in the speeches of orators, the uninventive symbolism with a predominance of red stars and flags, boring militia men and hammers and sickles. The whole of this symbolic arsenal of the communist ideology overlapped with portraits of the communist leaders on posters. The celebrations of the Russian Bolshevik Revolution were very similar. Neither of these days, by which the communist regime attempted to promote its interpretation of history, became a reason for spontaneous celebrations, they were only passively accepted symbols of the regime and were not worthy of celebration by rituals in the eyes of the citizens. These realities show that it is not easy to change or transform political culture. Any sophisticated political movement, which persistently manipulates, applies and organizes collective forgetting, while sharing in the indoctrination of its own

19 Václav Havel, Milan Šimečka and others have mentioned the absurd “charm” of such situations.
aims gradually becomes more the object of change than its initiator. Thus the communist regime and its ideological outfit changed over time rather than the political culture of the population.

And festivals today

Fifteen years after the fall of the communist regime and after twelve years of the existence of the independent Slovak Republic, the legislation recognizes three types of festival: state holidays, days free from work and memorial days. In present day Slovakia we have five state holidays, ten days free from work and seventeen memorial days. At the top of the hierarchy are the state holidays, which are mainly supposed to express political values. Their symbolic function is to recall the origin of the existing social order. In the case of Slovakia, it is difficult to accept without reservations the traditional division of festivals into religious, ethnic and political, since their symbolic contents overlap. This applies not only in the case of days free from work and memorial days. As I will show below, even the state holidays are not free from this ambivalence.

We will look at which political festivals are not based on a consensus in society and why. They include the state holiday commemorating the declaration of the Slovak National Uprising – 29th August. Although the uprising is universally regarded as one of the most important events in modern Slovak history, it is also the subject of different interpretations and evaluations. “At the end of summer 1944, it was not two nations that came into conflict, but two parts of Slovakia – fascist and non-fascist. The Slovak President Tiso symbolically confirmed this internal nature of the conflict by giving medals to German soldiers after the suppression of the uprising”. The Czecho-Slovak dimension of the uprising is justified by the support of the leadership of the uprising for the Czecho-Slovak state, which symbolized democracy. Therefore, the symbolic message of the uprising is interpreted today as anti-fascist and democratic, so that the symbolic content of the state holiday should be generally accepted.

However, the supporters of the wartime Slovak state cannot accept a positive evaluation of the uprising, because it was an open struggle against their own state and it finally contributed to the creation of an alliance with the communists. The communists “appropriated” the uprising and while they were in power they did not allow the view that non-communist, civil democratic forces had played a significant role in its preparation and course.

In the interest of maintaining their own interpretation of the uprising, the communist dictatorship not only directly liquidated non-communist participants, but also found victims in their own ranks, for example, Gustáv Husák one of the communist participants in the uprising was accused of bourgeois nationalism by his own party and imprisoned.

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21 ČERNUŠÁKOVÁ, B.: Štátne sviatky v prvých rokoch samostatného Slovenska (hlavou proti múru). (State festivals in the first years of independent Slovakia (with head against the wall). In OS-Fórum občianskej spoločnosti, no. 12/1999, p. 15-16.
22 In spite of his own negative experiences with the practices of the state police, Gustáv Husák finally became its symbol. Štátna bezpečnosť (State Security – ŠtB) was known as the “Gustapo” in the 1980s.
for more than nine years. However, this did not stop him participating with new elán in implementing the communist experiment after his release from prison and his political and judicial rehabilitation. He reached the highest state and party positions and before the fall of communism he was President of Czechoslovakia.

However, let us return to the contradictory evaluation of the symbolic meaning of the Slovak National Uprising. It enables us to understand why interpretation of these events evokes ambiguous acceptance of the date of the declaration of the uprising as a state holiday.

From 1951 to 1968, 29th August was one of the significant days of the Czechoslovak (Socialist) Republic. In summer 1969, already after the signing of the act on the federal organization of Czechoslovakia, the Slovak National Council decided to make 29th August a state holiday of the Slovak Socialist Republic. Twenty ninth August remained a state holiday and day free from work only until 1975, when the Slovak National Council removed its status and the Federal Assembly of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic placed it among the significant days again. This date remained a significant day of the common state until September 1992, when the Slovak National Council again declared it a state holiday of the Slovak Republic. Apart from pragmatic calculations about economic losses as a result of a day free from work, we cannot fail to see the differences between the Czech and Slovak evaluations of the significance of the uprising in the changes to the position of this festival.

It is impossible to deny that the Slovak and Czech communists actively participated in the deformation of the interpretation of the uprising, but the Czech approach contained more disdain and under-valuing of this anti-fascist armed uprising than the Slovak falsification of the facts. According to the words of the historian and dissident Jozef Jablonický, a recognized expert on the problem of the Slovak national uprising, there are few books, “in which the Slovak National Uprising is not wickedly deformed and its representatives from communists to democrats incriminated, as shown by Kopecký and Laštovička”. Their works could be used in historical seminars as examples of falsification. Czech authors liked to indicate that the uprising was only a sort of joint attempt by communist and Ľudák cafe intellectuals, who followed the principle: “what politics divides, slivovica (plum brandy) unites”. According to this interpretation, the Slovaks only prepared a sort of “palace coup” of which President Tiso was also informed and their aim was “to quickly repaint the Slovak state in democratic colours and then invite British and American military missions and rely on the Western powers in the further

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23 Act no. 93/1951 Sbierka zákonov on state holidays, days free from work and memorial and significant days.
27 Jablonický, ref. 26, p. 43.
development of events”. But this does not mean that a whole series of Slovak authors did not subscribe to the deformed and arbitrary explanation of the uprising.

However, it is possible to state that when the Slovaks gained the feeling that they had more freedom to decide for themselves, they declared that the commemoration of the uprising was a state holiday, in spite of the internal Slovak dispute about its decisive figures, causes and effects. This is shown by the acts accepted by the Slovak legislative body in 1969 and 1992. In the first case, the Slovak members of parliament took this decision only after the official and formal confirmation of the federal organization of Czechoslovakia, and in the second case even before the formal declaration of Slovak independence.

Another date, with meanings which were and remain the subject of heated discussion in the framework of Czechoslovakia and Slovakia, is 28th October. Its interpretation reflects the turbulence in Czech-Slovak relations, deliberate communist manipulation of organized collective forgetting and internal tensions between groups in Slovakia. This date was regarded as the origin of Czechoslovakia and it became a state holiday known as Liberation Day already in 1919. The government of the Slovak state abolished it and other memorial days connected with Czech history by a government decree from 4th July 1939. In 1951, 28th October appeared among the days free from work, but it was already designated Nationalization Day. The constitutional act on the Czechoslovak Federation was passed by the National Assembly of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic on 27th October 1968 in Prague and was ceremonially signed on 30th October in the Federation Hall of Bratislava Castle. The ritual character of the signing of the act was part of the celebrations of the 50th anniversary of the origin of Czechoslovakia, and 28th October became the Day of the Czecho-Slovak Federation. In 1975, the communists placed this date among the significant days without clear symbolic reference to its content. In 1988, a legal measure from the office of the speaker of the Federal Assembly re-established the state holiday as the anniversary of the origin of the independent Czechoslovak state. The demand to revive the anniversary of the origin of the independent Czechoslovak state had already resounded in public for some time and was supported by the Charta 77 movement. The communist leadership could not ignore it in the generally tense atmosphere. However, the regime strove to keep all events connected with celebration of the 70th anniversary of the origin of the republic under control and to direct them in the spirit of its ideological aims.

After the fall of communism, 28th October became a state holiday of the common federal republic as a commemoration of the day of origin of the common Czecho-Slovak

28 KOPECKÝ, ref. 24, p. 348.
29 In the work cited above, Jozef Jablonický analysed this tendency to misuse and falsify the history of the Slovak National Uprising in the works of Slovak and Czech historians.
30 Act no. 555 Sb.Z. a n. from 14th October 1919.
31 On 24th October 1945 and not 28th October! E. Beneš President of Czechoslovakia signed a decree nationalizing key industries, banks and insurance companies. Joint stock company banks, private insurance companies, mines, the energy industry, smelting works, arms factories, cement works and important chemical works were completely nationalized. The second stage of nationalization came after the communist coup of 1948.
state, and kept this position until 1992. After the division of the federation, this state holiday was abolished in Slovakia and up to 1999 it was not even placed among the memorial days. This situation was a faithful reflection of which political forces had a majority in parliament and what atmosphere prevailed in Slovak political circles in the given period. For the Czechs, 28th October remained the state holiday commemorating the origin of the independent Czechoslovak state and became the Day of Czech Statehood. The various changes to the name of the common republic of the Czechs and Slovaks could be the theme for an independent publication, in which the hyphen war and the various combinations of large and small letters at the beginning and in the middle of the name of the republic would have a significant place.

After the division of the republic, there was a passionate discussion between historians in Slovakia about whether the Slovaks should celebrate the date of the declaration of the common Czecho-Slovak Republic on 28th or 30th October. The proposal that 30th October, the anniversary of the adoption of the Martin Declaration, should be declared a state holiday of the Slovak Republic started from the view that the Czecho-Slovak state originated as the state of two separate nations — the Czechs and Slovaks, who declared their state on the basis of the right to self-determination. Therefore, the Czechs created the state by the declaration of 28th October and the Slovaks by the declaration of 30th October. The Martin Declaration was the constitutional act of the Slovaks and there is no reason why the unilateral act of the Czech political representatives should be regarded as the symbol of the origin of the common state.

Another group of historians headed by Dušan Kováč supported 28th October and interpreted the Martin Declaration as a declaration of the support of the Slovak political representatives for the conception of a united Czecho-Slovak nation. They claimed that the Czecho-Slovak state would have been formed even without the Martin Declaration and it would have been equally legitimate, because it originated as the nation state of the united Czecho-Slovak nation, a conception the Slovaks supported, although mainly for tactical reasons. On the other hand, without the Prague Declaration of 28th October, the state would not have been formed, and so this date should be at least a significant date or memorial day in Slovakia.

When deciding which dates should be memorial days, they did not consider the view that the whole legal continuity and existence of the Czecho-Slovak Republic was con-
nected with 28th October and both dates – 28th and 30th October could be placed among the memorial days. This did not happen, and only the date of the adoption of the Martin Declaration was placed among the memorial days. It was only in 1999 that the Slovak parliament again decided to place 28th October among the memorial days as the day of the origin of the independent Czecho-Slovak state. However, some political parties and civil associations declared that “only placing of 28th October among the Slovak state holidays would show true appreciation of its historic importance”.

The content and character of the discourse on the selection of political festivals confirms that the changing government groupings are aware of the symbolic importance of festivals and each of them has intervened in their structure. It is a sort of social engineering, which is, however, characteristic of newly formed states, which are seeking their own identification.

Discussion of the declaration of new or the abolition of some of the existing festivals filled the Slovak media in the summer and autumn of 2001, when some of the members of parliament proposed placing 17th November among the memorial days or state holidays as the symbolic day of the fall of communism. This problem became one of the main themes of public discussion for some time. Views on it were expressed by politicians, artists, intellectuals and “the man in the street”. Questions about it were included in public opinion polls and surveys. After long and turbulent discussions, parliament finally approved this date as a new state holiday: the Day of Struggle for Freedom and Democracy. Supporters of the proposal argued that commemoration of the time when the country started on its road to democracy should not be missing from the calendar and “after the 12 year struggle for the establishment of 17th November as a state holiday, this day was placed among the pillars of the identity of the nation”.

In an explanatory report on the proposed act, Peter Zajac stated: “November 1989 means the return to history... It opened the road to a history with no sharp lines of forgetting or falsification, but the ability to look at ourselves critically, to distinguish in our own history between good and bad, the ability not only to take the right steps, but also to admit to errors and mistakes, and be able to correct these errors and mistakes”. Apart from this, the symbolic context of 17th November was also connected with events from 1939 as a day of struggle by students for freedom and democracy.

The initiative of declaring 17th November as a state holiday was accompanied by consideration of the abolition of another festival. Especially 1st September – the Day of the Constitution of the Slovak Republic and 1st May – the festival of labour were considered. Two Church festivals – 15th September, the feast of the Seven Sorrows of the Blessed Virgin Mary and Christmas Eve were also candidates for abolition. However, their abolition would have violated the basic treaty between Slovakia and the Vatican, according to which selected Church feast days would be kept free from work. The Conference of

38 „28. oktober sa dnes na Slovensku prvýkrát oslavuje ako pamätný deň“ (“Today, 28th October is a memorial day in Slovakia for the first time”). In SME, 30th October 2000.
39 Budaj: Vyhrali sme dvanásťročný zápas o 17. november (We won the 12 year struggle for 17th November). In SME, 25th October 2001.
Bishops of Slovakia stated, even before the question was discussed in parliament, that the treaty with the Holy See mentioned ten free days, and it did not recommend making any changes to their structure.\footnote{The Church feast days, which are days free from work are: 1\textsuperscript{st} January – New Year’s Day, 6\textsuperscript{th} January – Three Kings and Orthodox Christmas, Good Friday, Easter Monday, 5\textsuperscript{th} July – feast of Sts. Cyril and Methodius, 15\textsuperscript{th} September – the Seven Sorrows of the Blessed Virgin Mary patron of Slovakia, 1\textsuperscript{st} November – All Saints Day, Christmas Eve, 25\textsuperscript{th} and 26\textsuperscript{th} December.}

May Day has more than a century of tradition behind it. In Slovakia, it has been a festival since 1919 and it is celebrated in almost all European states.\footnote{The exceptions are Denmark, Great Britain, Holland and some of the Swiss cantons.} From 1994, 1\textsuperscript{st} May became connected with expansion of the European Union, which creates the pre-conditions for modification of its symbolic message. Therefore, it appeared that it would be most acceptable to abolish 1\textsuperscript{st} September – the Day of the Constitution of the Slovak Republic. This festival was placed among the state holidays associated with the foundation of the state by Mečiar’s second government in 1993.\footnote{Act no. 241/1993 Z. z. on state holidays, days free from work and memorial days.} It can be regarded as an expression of the “state-forming self-congratulation” of the political representatives of the time, who decided on the “memorability” of these days without any historical perspective. It cannot be said that they contained political symbolism, which contributed to cementing the national, civil or state community. The recent state holidays celebrating founding of the state include 1\textsuperscript{st} January as the Day of Origin of the Slovak Republic and 1\textsuperscript{st} September as the Day of the Constitution of the Slovak Republic, but 17\textsuperscript{th} July, the anniversary of the adoption of the Declaration on the Sovereignty of the Slovak Republic is also a memorial day. The introduction of these festivals also included an attempt to initiate or actually “create” rituals by means of which people would identify with the new state. However, this was not successful and the “celebration” of all the foundation festivals is rather problematic.

The first of January remains in the shadow of the traditional celebrations of the New Year by family and friends. In spite of the efforts of some official circles, adequate and generally acceptable rituals to celebrate the origin of the state have still not been successfully created. Assignment of symbolic sums of money from the budgets of towns and villages to annual celebrations has little effect because in most cases they are spent on fireworks and pyrotechnic displays or free refreshments in the streets during the New Year celebration. Similarly, 1\textsuperscript{st} September remains in the shadow of the end of the holidays and beginning of the school year. Apart from this, the 1992 constitution was much criticized and in 1998 parliament amended it. In connection with the proposal to introduce new festivals, the view is often publicly repeated that it would be best to abolish this most inappropriate festival as a result of the already introduced or expected amendments of the constitution. People repeat the question of whether we should continually celebrate a document, which actually no longer exists in its original form. Opponents of this view argue on the basis of the symbolic value of the act of adoption of the first democratic constitution of the independent state. The celebrations of the declaration of sovereignty of the Slovak Republic on 17\textsuperscript{th} July 1992 by lighting so-called sovereignty bonfires are an unsuccessful attempt to start a new tradition of a ritual character. The representatives of
the political parties and various civil associations, which regard themselves as the initiators and supporters of the declaration of Slovak sovereignty, organize annual assemblies of citizens around bonfires at dozens of places in Slovakia. In spite of attempts to make these events attractive with the participation of political leaders or refreshments, they have not gained wide popularity among the public. Although lighting and jumping over bonfires evokes the legend of Jánošík, they are also associated with the perception of the pastoral way of life and folk traditions of the coexistence of man with nature without the negative influences of modernization. However, only a small part of the population gives priority to the values associated with returning to life in the natural environment, and so it is not surprising that the ritual lighting of fires has not found a spontaneous response among the Slovaks. The attempts of some politicians to show courage and connection with ordinary people by floating down rivers on rafts also had a problematic end. Like the shepherd, the woodcutter belongs to the foundations of village culture, and symbolizes the antiquity and purity of the national culture of the Slovaks, but is also perceived as an image of poverty and backwardness. They are part of the myth of the plebeian character of the Slovak nation in contrast to the so-called historic nations. Apart from this, the political polarization of society from the period of preparation for division of the federation still persists in the consciousness of the people and participation or non-participation in such rituals represents public political self-identification. The content of these rituals is a confirmation of the myth about the founders of the new state, an effort to strengthen in the collective memory recollection of the political groups and individuals who stood at the birth of the new state. Myth here plays the role of simplifying the explanation of the complexity of the factors, which caused the break up of the federation.

The ritual content of the festivals together with the symbols used and the myths have the aim of confirming legitimacy and strengthening authority either of the actors in the myths themselves or of the historical personalities and ideas to which the group proclaims allegiance. Their role is to evoke emotion and enthusiasm, by means of which people can become enthusiastic about politics, and to give them the impression that they understand its aims. Political attitudes are shaped more under the influence of symbolic forms than of utilitarian calculations. The power of symbols in politics derives from the fact that they are the building stones for conceptualization of the origin, perceived destiny, periods of suffering or heroism of the national community. The celebration of festivals also offers space for the transfer of activities from the private to the public sphere, which enables the penetration of politics into private life. The structure of the festivals in Slovakia confirms that in the majority of cases they are Church or to be more specific Catholic festivals. Beginning with data on the religious composition of the population according to the last census, though the symbolism of banknotes and coins, and ending with the state honours, we can see that the symbolic image of Slovakia does not deviate from the magic circle of conserved national traditions and confessional orientation. The symbolism of the state holidays and memorial days has remained mostly on the level of foundation myths and adoration of national heroes and traditions.

REVIEWS


In the last decade of his academic life, Professor Avenarius devoted intensive attention to the problem of Byzantine Iconoclasm and the icon in the broad context of its understanding. The Iconoclast struggle in Byzantium, its many layers in the religious, ecclesiastical and general social context, became the subject of his monograph, published in 1998.* In this work, the author identified and described iconoclasm and iconoduly in the framework of the cultural-historical development of Byzantine society in the 8th and 9th centuries, and so created a basis for continued research into this problem in the context of the continuing tradition of Byzantium itself and the whole of Eastern or Orthodox Europe. The position and purpose of the icon in Byzantine and post-Byzantine society, in the development of the dogmatic teaching and liturgy of the Eastern Church from the beginning to the middle of the 17th century became the central problems to which he devoted the last stage of his life and remained in manuscript, although almost finished.

Alexander Avenarius gave the prepared monograph the title Byzantský ikonoklazmus a jeho tradícia. K problému výchoeurópskeho symbolizmu (Byzantine Iconoclasm and its Tradition. On the Problem of Eastern European Symbolism), and since he wrote it during the period of our very close cooperation, when we were building up Byzantine studies in the Department of General History at the Faculty of Philosophy of Comenius University in Bratislava, I had the possibility to become familiar with it. Not long before his death, the author stated that the work was still not definitively completed, but he believed his illness would not take away his strength to the extent that he could not continue. However, his wish was not fulfilled.

With the editorial direction of E. Mannová and the generous assistance of two of Avenarius’ students V. Zervan and M. Hurbanič, the Institute of History of the Slovak Academy of Sciences prepared the monograph for publication in an English translation by Martin C. Styan. I firmly believe that the professor’s students, who already became his assistants and colleagues in the last period of his life, will continue the academic research, which A. Avenarius involuntarily left unfinished in this monograph. It should be published in Slovak in future and enriched with supplementary studies by his students, dealing with this problem in the context of the professor’s research results.

A. Avenarius’ monograph devoted to the problem of the icon can be perceived and assessed from various points of view. Above all, it is undoubtedly an unconventional look at the relatively frequent theme of the icon, which has been considered in many studies, but so far without a satisfactory synthetic overview. The art-historical aspect is not placed in the foreground as usually occurs. Primary attention is devoted to the position and purpose of the icon in Byzantine and post-Byzantine society and in the development of the dogmatic teaching and liturgy of the Eastern Church from the beginning to the middle of the 17th century. On the first level, he provides an instructive review of iconographic and iconological theories, views, conceptions and especially polemics. He analyses individual views and polemics in close connection with the theological thought and dogmatic teaching of the Church in which they developed. The theological and dogmatic context of the polemics and struggles over the icon form the second level of the work.

The third and most important level of the monograph about the icon is its conceptual and philosophical context. The immense importance, which Eastern European society and the Eastern Church attributed to the icon, also flowed from the firm anchoring of the iconological problem in the philosophical thinking of the period. It was on this level that A. Avenarius most strongly
showed the originality of his thinking, and his account of this aspect of the icon must be regarded as the most important contribution of the work to a deeper understanding of the problem. On the basis of partial analyses, he points to the deep connection of iconographic theories and the polemics carried on over more than a millennium on the problem of symbolism, the method of the symbolic approach and its specific expressions in the Eastern European environment.

Starting from this basic theoretical postulate, A. Avenarius pursues the problem in its wide historical range. He points to the formation of the basic opposing positions in relation to the icon – iconoclast and iconodule – already in the Patristic period, and he traces the formulation of a positive Patristic concept of the icon. However, he devotes the greatest attention to the period of the Byzantine Iconoclast struggle. Apart from the position rejecting the icon, two variants of the positive concept of the icon crystallized: the icon became either a symbol or sign of Divine transcendence or a medium assisting people on the road to God. Especially the second variant or understanding became decisive in the later Byzantine and post-Byzantine development, and it influenced the deep relationship and importance the icon acquired in the spiritual life of Orthodoxy.

The method of symbolism or symbolic thinking with the help of which the problem of the icon was solved in Eastern European spirituality, also reached into other spiritual, theological and secular problems. Symbolism influenced especially the character of the reform and correction of the writing systems of the Slavonic languages, and so contributed to their establishment as cultural and literary languages. The author devotes attention to these problems in the last chapter of the work.

The monograph by A. Avenarius represents an integrated and instructive presentation of views and conceptions of the icon in the spiritual life of the Eastern Church and Eastern European society. It also uncovers specific forms of thinking, which appeared in this environment. Apart from its instructiveness, it shows originality in the solution of often very traditional questions and brings new views and new possible solutions to often very traditional questions.


Miroslav Daniš


The synthesis of the history of Slovakia at the beginning of last century is the work of a group of researchers from the Institute of History at the Slovak Academy of Sciences under the editorial direction of Dušan Kováč. It is the first of a prepared series of monographs on *Slovakia in the 20th Century*, which will continue with volumes devoted to the First World War, the period between
the two world wars, the Second World War and the period after 1945. The whole planned series has the ambition to include the latest findings about the past of Slovakia and the Slovaks in the “disturbed” 20th century, and is undoubtedly an important and necessary professional and editorial project. Apart from chapters in the synthesis of the history of Slovakia edited by Elena Mannová (A Concise History of Slovakia 2000, Slovak version: Krátké dejiny Slovenska 2003), Slovakia at the Beginning of the Century is the first synthetic monograph on this part of Slovak history published after 1989. It was published 18 years after the publication of the relevant fourth volume of the academic synthesis: Dejiny Slovenska (History of Slovakia) (1986). The aim and result of the latest research is naturally to overcome the deformations in the interpretation of our past caused by the totalitarian regimes. The published monograph opens a series, which will not only be a synthesis of new research and views on our history in the last century, but also a reflection of the development of Slovak historiography since 1989. The method of its production and interpretation, as well as the stimulating illustrations, create the conditions for it and the further volumes being prepared to reach the wider public beyond the strictly expert circles.

The structure of the content and texts shows the progressive trends in our historiography. An important positive feature of the work is the shift from political history to a greater emphasis on the socio-economic and cultural aspects of life in the past, in spite of the fact that the monograph retains the classic division of syntheses with chapters on political development, society, the economy and culture. Four of the seven chapters are devoted to purely political development, but they make up less than half the total content of the book. Placing of development in the wider Hungarian and Central European context is an important part of the interpretation. This applies to the chapters about international and internal political development by Dušan Kováč and Milan Podrimavský, to the chapter on demographic trends by Elena Jakešová and especially to the chapters on economic development by Roman Holec, culture by Elena Mannová, political thinking by D. Kováč and the development of science by R. Holec. The image of the past of the Slovaks and the territory of Slovakia is placed in the framework of the Kingdom of Hungary and the Habsburg Monarchy against the background of events in the Central European region. Modern theoretical approaches such as the theory of modernization, nationalism, multi-culturalism and collective identities, opened the way for the authors to reach new interpretations and conclusions. Such a view undoubtedly enables a higher quality and more objective view of the impact and significance of individual events and processes in the history of Slovakia.

The collection of chapters gives an image of society in Slovakia as rapidly developing, socially, ethnically, culturally and politically differentiated, and in transition from traditional agrarian forms to a modern industrialized society. It is possible to state with pleasure that the main ambition of the editor and authors to describe basic events and trends of development on the basis of the latest research has been successfully achieved in the relatively consistent text.

The authors present a summary of new data and stimulating conclusions. An important factor captured by D. Kováč in his outline of the ever more strained international and internal political situation, is the reactions of the Slovak political representatives to the individual events in international politics: the conclusion of the Dual Alliance (p. 18), the rapprochement of Britain with France and Russia (p. 20-22), the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina (p. 25) and the Balkan wars (p. 30-31). The following chapters about the internal political development explain the positions of the Slovak political representatives and their ability to orient themselves in specific political situations. The question of the degree and limits of political realism of the Slovak political groups also remains important. Especially the conceptions of Milan Hodža in the framework of the differentiated political spectrum before the First World War are interesting from this point of view. The authors give them a lot of attention.

New conclusions supported by convincing argumentation and analysis of a large quantity of new facts are positive features of the chapters about economic development and culture. R. Holec
describes the conditions for economic development in Slovakia in the Central European context, bringing new argumentation especially to the problem of the “connection of politics with economics” and the problem of economic nationalism. His conclusions about the effort of the Hungarian ruling circles to regulate the internal and external migration of workers with the aim of accelerating Magyarization and about the possibilities for the application of foreign, especially Czech capital in Slovakia, are equally important. R. Holec offers a graphic depiction of trends in modernization in the wider context of economic life, as well as the direct effects of this process in a particular environment and in the life-style of the whole population (subchapter: The person against the background of socio-economic changes).

The no less stimulating chapter by E. Mannová about culture starts from the wider understanding of this term. She does not restrict culture only to artistic expression and activities in the field of art such as literature, music, theatre, fine art and cultural institutions, and she does not concentrate only on the field of elite or high culture. The author is closer to the anthropological understanding of culture in which culture is seen as an expression of the way of life of a particular cultural group, including its customs, ideas and symbols, just as much as the institutions in which they are developed. The unconventional method of interpretation of E. Mannová, by which she includes religious life, education, the press, societies, life style and collective identities as well as the traditional field of culture, has enabled her to describe the variety of expressions of the culture of the ethnically and confessionally diverse population of the Kingdom of Hungary. In the period of an emerging consumer society, the author also devotes attention to the expressions of mass, so-called lower culture, that is popular artistic genres and trends. On the question of the rise of mass culture and consumption, she concentrates more on quantity in terms of number of copies or subscribers to books, periodicals and magazines, than on the formerly preferred aspects of their artistic or political value. The sub-chapter Religious and Church life in a multi-confessional environment, accurately illustrates the process of the secularization of society, and also on the everyday level. She gives concrete data about the Magyarizing practices of the Catholic Church, through the influence of the priests on the faithful and within the hierarchy of the Church. She interlinks the secularization process with the struggle of the Catholic Church to maintain its traditionally dominant position in the state, during the so-called “culture war” (Kulturkampf). The author has masterfully captured the multi-cultural character of Slovakia, giving a varied picture of the coexistence of the various ethnic and religious groups, which created a rich variety of cultural forms. The mixed artistic and cultural styles so typical of the Central European environment are a natural part of such coexistence. E. Mannová’s method of interpretation stimulated new considerations and questions, opening possible new interpretations, which disturb some fixed ideas about Slovak society at the beginning of the 20th century. I will mention two of the many examples. Firstly, analysis of the number of subscribers to individual titles, from which the political orientation of readers can be deduced, convincingly corrects the idea that politically conservative and nationally oriented newspapers and periodicals were dominant in Slovak society at the beginning of the 20th century. While the number of subscribers to the Národné noviny varied from 600 to 1 000, Hodža’s Slovenský týždeník reached up to 16 thousand copies, while the Ľudové noviny (later the Slovenské ľudové noviny) showed the fastest growth – from 12 to 20 thousand copies. However, religious newspapers and calendars had absolute predominance with 40 to 50 thousand copies of the Pútnik svätovojtešský (p. 245-247). Secondly, the cliché about the “cultural” and educational backwardness of the Slovak regions is disproved by the publication statistics, and as the author directly states, also the statistics for the existing libraries (p. 248). The review of the number and vocational orientation of the various types of school enables us to correct the conclusions about cultural backwardness emphasized up to now. The growth in the number of vocational schools
illustrates the trend towards assimilation of non-Magyars, but it also shows a general growth of literacy and education (p. 240).

As editor D. Kováč states in the introductory synthesis, the authors are aware that some questions remain open and require further research. This is a natural part of all research. For example, a more specific and differentiated picture of women in society is lacking. Public discussion of the right of women to vote represented an important stage in political development at the beginning of the 20th century, as D. Kováč briefly mentions on p. 196-197. Since it the first volume of a synthesis of the 20th century, to which the later volumes will naturally connect in content, I think that a summary of the basic trends of the preceding period would be useful to the reader as an “introduction to the 20th century”. A concluding summary of long-term trends of development with an impact on later periods would also be useful. I recognize that in relation to the size of the work, such an introduction and conclusion would be a complication, but it would undoubtedly be a gain from the content and methodological points of view.

Today, compilation of a synthesis as a collection of chapters by different authors is often the only solution to the problem of producing such a professionally demanding publication, but it also brings its own problems. The heterogeneity of the chapters in method of interpretation, structure of text and use of language, may be an advantage, since it can bring different views on interpretation of the past, but inconsistence of the texts may be a negative aspect. The use of different terminology and different definition of terms in individual chapters may lead not only to lack of terminological clarity, as with the terms “service sector”, “social organism”, “element” or “noble proletariat”, but in some cases also to completely different conclusions and contradictions. For example, the claim in the chapter Society that: “The developmental phase of modernization, dating on the political level from the 1848 revolution, continued up to the outbreak of the First World War for almost half a century without radical changes and shocks...” (p. 33), or in other words: “the period after the Austro-Hungarian Ausgleich was a half century of peaceful development of the Dual Monarchy, without more radical political reversals and with a more or less unchanged power-political system in the Kingdom of Hungary” (p. 37) is in conflict with the picture of political crisis and turbulent economic changes in the following chapters.

Some shortcomings have a technical character and editorial correction could be more consistent here. For example, inconsistent use of numbers for acts of parliament (XL, 40) is confusing. Similar inconsistence is found in the Select Bibliography, where some titles are given sometimes with the name of the editor and sometimes without (e.g. the title Diferenciácia mestského spoločenstva, p. 278 and p. 285). In some cases the bibliography does not indicate whether the authors or editors of publications are named (e.g.: Švorc, P. – Harbuľová, L.: p. 284, Evans, R. – Kováč, D. – Ivaničková, E.: p. 282). However, the shortening of the list of literature used to a minimum is already a more serious problem, than these formal inadequacies. Some significant titles are missing, for example R. Holec refers to the works of the historians Jones, Matis, Oros and Jeleček in the text, but they are missing from the bibliography. Unfortunately, the compression of footnotes to the minimum, which is a clear trend in the demands of publishers, is beginning to be an unpleasant feature in the publication of expert literature. The high quality pictorial material selected by Elena Kurincová undoubtedly improves the publication and deserved more space. Since the pictures are little known or previously unpublished, a larger format would have been advantageous.

Among the inaccuracies in the content, which publications hardly ever avoid, I consider it important to point to an incorrect statement on the age of gaining full adult rights. At the beginning of the 20th century, this age was 24 and not 20 as is stated on p. 66, although girls could reach adulthood earlier by marriage. Inaccuracies in quoting titles from the period (“tekintetős” should be “tekintetes” and “uri rend” should be “úri rend”, both on p. 37) are not as serious as the lack of
clarity of whole passages about aristocratic titles, which is coming ever more into the foreground in comparison with the claims of the Hungarian historian György Kövér. Minor mistakes in some of the illustration captions include “Museum of the Andrássy Family” instead of “Mausoleum of the Andrássy Family” in Krásnohorské Podhradie (ill. 152)

In conclusion it is necessary to say that the publication of the synthesis Slovakia at the beginning of the 20th century, as a summary of new research and findings, is a further step towards more objective knowledge of our past. We believe that the chosen style of the interpretation and form of the publication will guarantee the expert quality of the whole planned series, which will find its way to the widest range of readers.

Gabriela Dudeková


After many recent works devoted to partial themes from the inter-war period, readers now have available a book by leading experts with a title promising a synthesis. The picture on the cover – Kriváň rising above Bratislava Castle and the banks of the Danube – evokes the joining of the national history symbolized by the sacred mountain of the Slovaks and the new capital city, with urban history, historical memory and the continuity or discontinuity of history, since all the buildings in the picture originate from the time of the Monarchy and little of their appearance from the inter-war period survives today – they have either been demolished or reconstructed.

In a very brief introduction the editors summarize the importance of this period. They appreciate the extraordinary importance of the origin of the Czechoslovak state for the Slovak nation: the general progress of civilization, democratization of public life, achievement of separate legal status for the territory of Slovakia. They draw attention to the problematic coexistence with the Czechs and with the ethnic or “nationality” minorities. From the historiographic point of view, they emphasize that in contrast to the period before 1989, the authors are not ideologically directed and they have attempted a “partly” wider thematic range in comparison with earlier works.

The first part of the publication is concerned with power-political history. L. Deák analyses the position of Slovakia in the new state from the point of view of international politics, while B. Ferenčuhová deals with the foreign policy of Czechoslovakia. The contribution of N. Krajčovičová is devoted to the integration of Slovakia into the new administrative, judicial, legislative, economic, transport, cultural and political system. The author states that Slovak specifics were generally not taken into account during the integration of Slovakia, and the result was deepening of the “otherness” of Slovakia. The relationship between the state administration and local government, administrative reforms and their political context, especially the conception of administrative versus political autonomy, and the question of financing local government are well researched by X. Šuchová. The next three studies solve partial historical-political problems: the entry of Hlinka’s Slovak People’s Party into the government and the constitutional ideas of the Slovak politicians up to the middle of the 1930s (A. Bartlová), views on constitutional organization in the second half of the 1930s (V. Bystrický), and the changes in the electoral base of the minority parties and the communists in elections to the lower house of parliament (M. Zemko). In the account of the final stage of the inter-war political history the views of V. Bystrický are balanced with those of L. Deák.
In the dramatic period from Munich to the break up of Czecho-Slovakia, the foundations of Slovak statehood were laid, with a relevant group in the framework of a political party setting the aim of an independent state for the first time. However, at the same time, the democratic structures were liquidated, and as after 1918, the intellectual potential of the country was weakened, this time by the departure of the Czech intelligentsia. M. Čaplovič has provided an overview of the organization of the Czechoslovak army in Slovakia, with its historically conditioned low number of Slovak officers, the defensive conception of the state, the conditions of the army in 1938 and during the so-called second republic. It is supplemented with a rich appendix.

The second, “non-political” part of the publication begins with an extensive synthetically conceived study of the structural changes in the economy. L. Hallon considers the heritage of Austria-Hungary, including another Slovak specific: the overlapping of features of the first and second industrial revolutions, the incorporation of Slovakia into the single economic space of the Czechoslovak Republic and the individual booms and crises. The sub-chapter about the social impact of economic restructuring, especially the comparison of the levels of income and living expenses in Czechoslovakia, the USA and Germany and the tax burden in the Czech Lands and Slovakia, contains some interesting facts. Another comparison shows that the average national income per person in Slovakia reached about the same level as in Rumania. The author also considers the political dimensions of the restructuring processes.

The health and social services of the inter-war period are realistically described by A. Falisová. She summarizes the state of health of the population, including infant mortality, infectious diseases, the so-called social diseases – tuberculosis, alcoholism and sexually transmitted diseases – and the diseases of civilization. The health care facilities and personnel are also covered. In the area of social policy, she describes the introduction of the eight hour working day and paid holidays, social insurance and care for people disabled in the war, the unemployed and young people. A study by L. Kázmerová presents the basic facts about the organization of education in inter-war Slovakia. She devotes attention to the Bratislava branch of the Ministry of Education and National Enlightenment, especially to the work of Anton Štefánik and the reform of all types of school. She does not omit the social position of teachers and their organization in societies.

I. Kamenec has expressed his views on the serious problem of culture. He emphasizes that in democratic conditions, Slovak culture ceased to take the place of professional politics. However, in spite of this, he still regards the political phenomenon of the oscillation between the Czechoslovakist ideology and the expression of a separate Slovak national identity, as the key question. From the chronological point of view, he distinguishes the period of Slovakization of culture, the following quantitative development of all areas of culture, the ideological differentiation, and in the 1930s the coming of the new generation of the Slovak cultural elites, qualitative growth and overcoming of regional limits. He agrees with Štefan Krčméry, who regarded the overcoming of regional differences, confessionalism and Hungarianism as the aims of cultural policy. I. Kamenec places in the sphere of culture: education, cultural and public information institutions, especially societies with Matica slovenská in the leading position, art including literature, theatre, fine art and radio, as well as gymnastics and sport but without distinguishing between them. He avoids cinema and the press. He mentions the cultural life of the ethnic minorities only very marginally.

The conclusion of the “non-political” sections consists of a contribution by L. Lipták about the way of life. Apart from evaluation of the importance of the traditional fields of research into everyday subjects – clothing, housing, food, work and leisure, relations between generation, gender and social groups – the author concentrates on phenomena, which are in the centre of the attention of the history of mentalities: the structuring and perception of time and space. Everyday life was substantially influenced by the on-going modernization and the experiences of people from the First World War. Although the views of people socialized after the revolution were already expressed
by the end of the inter-war years, this period was too short for innovations to occur in all spheres of life. L. Lipták defines changes in the geo-political position of Slovakia in the state, shifts in the relations between regions and changes in the traditional relations between town and village, as the spatial factors in everyday life. He states that the revolution and constitutional changes were not the immediate cause of all the changes. The revolution significantly influenced the Slovakization of public life, but most of the changes had a long-term character and were connected with modernization. Mobility of the population and the growth of informedness opened society to the world.

The publication is supplemented by a select bibliography compiled by A. Sedliaková and extensive appendices, to which X. Šuchová added a selection of demographic statistics and reviews of legislative, representative, executive and judicial institutions. Maps and numerous photographs of very small size contribute to the informative value of the book. Since they are not printed on better quality paper, I see no reason why they could not have been placed with the appropriate text and given a large size, which would have made them much clearer. The book ends with a summary in English and an index of names. It would be better for the user if the index also included names from the appendices.

The new history of inter-war Slovakia offers rich factual information freed from the ideological ballast found in the last academic synthesis. In the introduction to Dejiny Slovenska V (History of Slovakia Vol. V) published in 1985 with 612 pages, the editor M. Kropilák declared allegiance to the Marxist method and more or less admitted the selectiveness of his approach: The authors described the “lives and struggles of the working people” and devoted most attention to the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia and the “progressive traditions”. In contrast to those of the 1950s, the historians of the 1980s already did not write about the “bourgeois” but about the “bourgeois-democratic” state. In the book reviewed here, it is described only as the “democratic” state. The central motif is no longer class war but the national history of the Slovaks: In various places it mentions the growth of national consciousness and self-confidence or the maturing of the Slovaks into a modern nation. N. Krajčovičová describes the divided terminology of the Martin Declaration. In this context, the editors should at least have stated in the introduction which historiographic concept of the nation they support, or they should have included a study of national consciousness in the inter-war period in the book because of the importance of this theme.

The notes already show that the authors gave hardly any consideration to the more recent academic theories and conceptions, especially from the fields of history and cultural anthropology. They do not have to automatically accept them, but should at least react, even if negatively. It is certainly a matter for discussion whether theoretical problems have a place in a publication with a synthesizing aim. However, I think that the reader has the right to know the instruments used in a historical work, because deeper theoretical knowledge often leads to changes of interpretation. The authors only occasionally emphasize that they incline to a new interpretation of processes or phenomena. For example, L. Hallon mentions that the conception of a colonial relationship of the Czechs towards Slovakia was already refuted in the 1960s, that the expression “destruction of industry” has ideological connotation and the term “restructuring” is more appropriate, or that the perception of the role of Czech capital is contradictory: The problem is not its expansion, but rather the premature reduction of its activity. The majority of authors evaluate the events, processes and phenomena they describe only from one point of view, but precisely their consideration from different points of view gives a text depth and flexibility. For example, L. Lipták mentions that although the film about Jánošík by the Siakel brothers was a chapter in the history of our film production, in the history of attendance and the social function of the cinema it was only an episode.

The minimal consideration of the conclusions of foreign researchers is also surprising. I have in mind especially the work of Ismo Nurmi, who refuted the traditional view of the Slovaks “on the edge of national disappearance” and presented the hypothesis of a developed national con-
sciousness already in autumn 1918, or the work of Elizabeth Bakke about Czechoslovakism and the Slovak autonomist reaction. Both works, as well as the relevant works by Owen Johnson, Yeshayahu Jelinek and other foreign authors are also missing from the select bibliography.

The foreword to the reviewed publication promises a partial widening of the range of themes. Political history traditionally dominates: 60% of the text and 47% of the illustrations belong to the sphere of power-political history, while all the other areas account for 40% of the text and 53% of the illustrations. In comparison with the academic synthesis from 1985, health and social services, the army, way of life and many aspects of the economy have been added to the themes. However, comparison with the summarizing volume Československo 1918 – 1938. Osudy demokracie ve střední Evropě (Czechoslovakia 1918 – 1938. The Fates of Democracy in Central Europe) published in Prague in 1999, shows that various already at least partially studied themes were omitted, for example, legal culture, Church history and stereotypes in the perception of Czecho-Slovak relations. In view of the importance of Church and religious life and the secularization process, a comprehensive synthetic work on this theme must be produced in the near future. I see the second serious deficiency of the work in the fact that, except in the chapter on way of life, half the population is missing from the new history of the inter-war period – women. We only learn that they lived here from marginal comments that they gained the right to vote and from the tables of statistics in the chapters on health and education. The theme of historical memory is also missing, although it is usual in many recent monographs, including R. Holeč’s book about Černová among Slovak publications. The perception of the history of Slovakia during the period 1918 – 1939 in the following decades and regimes by the public and historians does not belong to a work about the inter-war period according to the conventions followed up to now, but it would certainly be an interesting warning on the relative nature of historical knowledge. The present state of research also prevented the editors including a section on the participation of Slovakia and its inhabitants in the history of the whole state of Czechoslovakia. In spite of studies on the Hungarians, Romany, who were mostly settled, in spite of the text on page 374 giving the impression that they were all nomadic, Germans, Jews, Ruthenians and Czechs in Slovakia, there is no general consideration of the role of the ethnic minorities in the life of the inter-war period, and the basic character of the book shows Slovak ethnocentrism. In spite of the flood of monographs on towns, we do not have enough materials for modern urban history. In spite of works on some aspects, there has been a lack of basic research on modern social history. Therefore, the reviewed work only corresponds to the present situation in Slovak historiography.

The majority of these comments react to the synthetic aspirations of the book already expressed in its title. Perhaps the title “Chapters (or Studies) from the History of Slovakia...” would be more appropriate in relation to the absence of important themes and the varying conceptions of the individual authors, ranging from synthesizing chapters to partial analytical studies. Many authors give a traditional priority to description and as experts on one theme avoid more general and comprehensive questions. They provide valuable information, but often stop on the level of Ranke’s “as it was”, without comparison with the situation in neighbouring countries and without posing untraditional questions. Even the preferred political history does not have to be narrowed to diplomacy, the state, elections and organization of the administration. Political life is constituted as a specific area of communication, and so apart from the actors, political history includes the mechanisms and processes of their inclusion or exclusion, possibilities for participation, communication strategies, semantics, representation, symbols, the internal structure of the political communication space and so on. Apart from the concept of ideology, it is possible and more attractive for the readers to use discourse, to examine public debates and their political consequences. Only the contribution of L. Lipták follows a conceptually new route and accurately formulates the basic problems of the way of life. Apparently as a result of the substantially different method of expla-
nation and the absence of footnotes, since the author had nothing to cite in the absence of basic research, the editors described it as an essay, which means an artistically written account according to the explanatory dictionary. The question is whether essay style works would suit the aims of our works of synthesis. The readers would certainly welcome them.

If this book had appeared five years after the revolution, it would have been excellent. Fifteen years after, something more is required. However, it provides substantial source materials for a future synthesis. Thanks to the rich presentation of facts and the extensive appendices, it represents a basic handbook for the study of the history of Slovakia in the inter-war period.

_Elena Mannová_


The extensive three volume collection of documents prepared by L. Deák maps the events connected with the preparation and implementation of the Vienna Arbitration on 2nd November 1938 and its impact on the lives of the inhabitants of the occupied territories and in the framework of Czech-Slovak – Hungarian relations up to 4th April 1939, that is up to the signing of the joint Hungarian-Slovak delimitation protocol on the new frontier in eastern Slovakia. The publication of 551 documents about this short but very eventful period provides an exhaustive overview of various aspects of this question for the first time in our historiography. The choice of materials, their processing and the method of publication testify to the high professional level of the compiler and give an example in many ways for the publication of documents from recent history. It is also necessary to positively appreciate the introductory studies in each volume, which give a general synthesis of the whole problem and of the specific questions covered in the individual volumes. On the other hand, it is possible to ask why the volumes do not give the whole texts of some telegrams from Belgrade, Bucharest and Rome, but only parts included in the notes.

L. Deák based his work on the principle of collecting and publishing documents exclusively of Czecho-Slovak origin, preserved in the archives of both republics. Naturally there are extensive collections of published diplomatic documents from Germany, Britain, France, Hungary, the Soviet Union, USA and Italy, which concern the given problem on various levels, but their inclusion in the Slovak publication would make the publication impossibly large and badly integrated, since many of them only repeat the basic information in one way or another.

The research of L. Deák is comprehensive, because he knows the individual archive collections very well. Although it is possible to point to some unpublished documents, they do not have substantial value or their content corresponds to other published documents.

The first volume of documents covers the period of diplomatic preparations and the implementation of changes to the Czecho-Slovak – Hungarian frontiers of Slovakia and Sub-Carpathian Ruthenia. Use of the collections of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Czecho-Slovakia in confrontation with the published Hungarian and German materials gives an almost complete overview of
the position of Czecho-Slovakia on this problem, as well as the demands of Budapest and partial evaluation of the views prevailing in Berlin and Rome or London and Paris. All questions connected with the correction of frontiers are understood and confronted with the development of the international situation, inter-state relations, Nazi policy in Central Europe and the appeasement policy of Great Britain and France. In this context, he unambiguously follows the principle that the Vienna Arbitration was not only an inseparable part of the Munich dictat, but was essentially connected with the aggressive aims of Nazi Germany and the changing policy of Berlin towards Hungary in connection with the preparation for a military solution of the Czechoslovak crisis. It also reflects the fact that after Munich and the associated policy of Budapest, Berlin was not content to leave Slovakia to be the prey of Hungary, as was already reflected in the preparation and implementation of the corrections to the Czech-Slovak – Hungarian frontiers in Slovakia and Sub-Carpathian Ruthenia, and in the end this also influenced the extent of the territorial changes in autumn 1938.

The decision of the author to begin the publication of documents from 20th September 1938, when the government in Budapest officially opened the question of the position of the Hungarian ethnic minority in the Czechoslovak Republic in the form of the rectification of frontiers, is entirely justifiable. It meant a demand to consider the problem of the position of the Hungarian minority in the same way as the German, which meant in the given context according to the scenario of the British and French ultimatum from 19th September 1938. On the other hand, it would have been appropriate to point in the notes to the reasons why Budapest had not dared do it earlier, why H. Göring criticized the passivity of the government in Budapest and the activities of the Hungarian minority in Slovakia, which had not used any sharper forms of pressure. It is necessary to seek in the evaluation of these questions the answer to the question of why the “lesser” and not the “greater” solution from the Hungarian point of view was implemented in Vienna on 2nd November 1938, and why Hungary did not gain possession of the whole of Slovakia. The actions of the Czecho-Slovak or autonomous government were insignificant in this context, because it could not influence the essence of the matter, but only some of the extent of the frontier corrections.

Various approaches to dealing with the Hungarian territorial demands can be traced, but two were the most important: the policy of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Czecho-Slovak Republic and that of the Slovak politicians or representatives of political groups. Up to 1st October 1938, that is up to the acceptance of the Munich dictat, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs did not talk to Budapest about ceding territory to Hungary, but only about solving the whole problem in the framework of application of the principles contained in the nationalities statute. L. Deák proves that the aim of Prague was to prolong the talks apparently in an effort to gain time. On the other hand, in a discussion with the Polish ambassador in Prague K. Papée on 26th September 1938, M. Hodža acting as a “private person”, but also “in the name of the majority centre-right coalition” and in “agreement with E. Beneš” declared that Czechoslovakia agreed with the territorial changes contained in the accepted ultimatum from 21st September 1938 and with the further demands of A. Hitler presented in the second discussion with N. Chamberlain on 22nd September 1938. He also spoke of ceding Tešín to Poland and Žitný ostrov to Hungary.1

J. Tiso and K. Sidor also expressed their views on the question of territorial changes in Central Europe in discussions with K. Papée on 29th September 1938. In a declaration of fundamental importance intended for the Polish government, they presented: “a programme for an independent Slovak state guaranteed by Poland. The declaration rejects coexistence in one state with Hungary and gives up regions inhabited by ethnic Hungarians”,2 M. Hodža as well as the representatives

of the People’s Party created a precedent and expressed themselves on questions, which did not belong to their responsibilities, and which agreed to territorial changes. L. Deák should also have mentioned this aspect of the talks about Slovakia in September 1938.

In his summary, the first volume offers a comprehensive picture of the diplomatic discussions connected with application of the Supplement to the Munich Agreement as well as to the course of the Czecho-Slovak – Hungarian discussions led by the head of the autonomous government J. Tiso. The positions of Czecho-Slovakia’s Little Entente allies and of the great powers are also included here.

The second relatively extensive volume has an equally high expert level from the point of view of quality of production. Its main aim is to outline the situation, which arose in the occupied territories after the Vienna decision. It is concerned with the Slovak or Czecho-Slovak view of the development of events, the view of participants, who experienced all the results of the Hungarian occupation, which resulted from the decision. The often emotive description of events gives a relatively realistic picture of the problems, the methods of solving them and the aims pursued. The documents published by L. Deák also have a much wider relevance than as purely historical materials. It is certain that it is often a matter of personal experiences, testimony and evaluations coloured by the emotional feelings of a complicated period, but precisely the summary of these testimonies give the possibility to form an objective picture of the lives, hardships and sufferings of the non-Hungarian inhabitants of this territory. However, it is interesting why L. Deák did not include in this volume the order from the head of the autonomous government J. Tiso and the resulting action to move part of the Jewish population of Slovakia into the territory ceded to Hungary, although the documents are well-known. The counter-measures of the Hungarian government are also well-known. All this falls within the conception of the second volume, but the problem is not considered.

An important part of the volume is the publication of complete documentation on the drawing of frontiers, expert reports on the frontiers and numerous documents testifying to the tragic stories of individuals or whole families.

The third and largest volume includes all aspects of Czecho-Slovak – Hungarian diplomatic, economic and political contacts with an orientation towards the course of the discussions of joint commissions and sub-commissions for the solution of specific problems. It covers the period from the Vienna Arbitration to the signing of the delimitation protocol about the new frontier in eastern Slovakia after the so-called little war. It contains evidence of the complicated course of the negotiations and of the economic, political, social and cultural impact of the resulting decisions. L. Deák grasped the whole problem comprehensively, from official inter-state contacts, through assessment of the position and explanation of the fate of Slovak and Czech colonists in the ceded territories, problems connected with supply, health services, communications and exchange of villages, to conflicts associated with the invasion of Slovak territory by illegal armed forces. He presents extensive, original materials of a primary character documenting all aspects of the given political atmosphere and situation, most of it published for the first time. A new factor came to the fore in this period and specifically in March 1939 – the attitude of Budapest to the origin of the Slovak state and its ambition to use the given situation to achieve a new correction of the frontier

by occupying part of eastern Slovakia. This proves that the Vienna Arbitration had not satisfied the ambitions of Budapest to achieve territorial changes in Central Europe even after the decision of the great powers.

All three volumes have a very high quality index of names, while the second and third volumes also have indexes of contemporary, present-day and foreign language place names. The content of the documents is well summarized and the translation into English must be positively evaluated. The notes are better than the usual standard and document the level of the author’s knowledge of the questions he has researched.

Slovak historiography is generally known for not giving a high priority to the systematic publication of documents. The production of L. Deák’s three volumes is a positive step in this context. However, it also provokes consideration of the overall solution of this question in the framework of the general cooperation between the historical institutions in Slovakia, especially the research institutes, university departments and archives. L. Deák’s approach in connection with earlier publications of documents, solved all the expert, academic and to a considerable degree also methodological problems connected with the publication of documents. His work is also a contribution from this point of view.

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Detlef Brandes, Dušan Kováč und Jiří Pešek (Hg.)

Wendepunkte in den Beziehungen zwischen Deutschen, Tschechen und Slowaken 1848–1989