

# **HISTORICKÝ ČASOPIS**

## **Historical Journal**

**of the Institute of History of the SAS**

ISSN 0018-2575

Volume 56 \* 2008 \* Supplement

SLOVAK ACADEMIC PRESS, spol. s r. o., Bratislava

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## ARTICLES

### THE MOROSINIS IN HUNGARY UNDER KING ANDREW III AND THE TWO VERSIONS OF THE DEATH OF THE QUEEN OF HUNGARY TOMMASINA

MARTIN ŠTEFÁNIK

ŠTEFÁNIK, Martin. The Morosinis in Hungary under King Andrew III and the two versions of the death of the Queen of Hungary Tommasina. *Historický časopis*, 2008, 56, Supplement, pp. 3-15, Bratislava.

The youngest son of King Andrew II, Stephen lived in exile in Venice, where he married a local noble woman Tommasina Morosini and had a son Andrew with her. After Stephen's death, Andrew was brought up by his uncle Albertino. Meanwhile in the Kingdom of Hungary the direct line of the House of Arpád died out. Andrew's candidacy succeeded with the support of the domestic clergy. His succession was opposed by Ladislav's sister, Maria wife of King Charles II of Naples from the House of Anjou. Aristocrats in the southern part of the kingdom formed the domestic opposition. Andrew was supported by his mother Tommasina and uncle Albertino from Venice. After ten years Andrew III had the situation firmly in his hands thanks to the support of the lesser nobility, but on 14th January 1301 he suddenly died. The official historiography based on the Austrian chronicle of Ottokar von Horneck holds the view that Tommasina already died before him. However, according to a less well-known version of the chronicle of Donato Contarini, she died in her native Venice a few years after her son Andrew.

History. Hungary. Morosinis in Hungary under the King Andrew III and the two versions of the death of the Queen of Hungary Tommasina.

The death of the last king of the Arpád dynasty Andrew III in 1301 closed an important chapter in the history of the Kingdom of Hungary. The extinction of the native dynasty meant the beginning of many years of struggle for the throne, during which the country fell into confusion. After years of conflict and uncertainty, the Angevin dynasty from southern Italy established itself and brought an exceptionally able monarch to Hungary in the person of King Charles Robert. The king coming from the "more developed" world brought his backward kingdom necessary economic reforms, which raised its economic level and made it a powerful player in European politics during the 14th century.

In reality, Charles Robert's predecessor, the last Arpád, Andrew III, called the Venetian, was already a foreigner on the throne of Hungary. He also came from Italy, and like his Angevin cousin, he was only distantly related to the monarchs of the direct Arpád dynasty, although in contrast to Charles Robert, Andrew was a descendent in the male line, which was very important according to medieval thinking.

Andrew III's father Stephen was born from the third marriage of King Andrew II – with the Italian noble woman Beatrice d'Este. Since Andrew II was already dead when Stephen was born, Stephen was usually called the Posthumous. His birth was accompanied by the dramatic events of his mother's flight from Hungary. In an advanced stage of pregnancy, she had to escape from persecution by the heir to the throne – the first-born Bela, later Bela IV. Dressed as a man, she secretly joined a foreign delegation, which was leaving the country. The little Stephen came into the world already beyond the frontier.<sup>1</sup> He spent most of his life in northern Italy (Este, Ferrara, Ravenna, Venice). With the help of Italian relations and allies, he unsuccessfully attempted to win the throne of Hungary. An invasion of Dalmatia failed and he had to escape back to Italy.<sup>2</sup> King Bela IV was very much afraid of this potential rival: When he concluded peace with the Venetian Republic in 1244, he made it a condition that the Venetians would not make an alliance with Stephen.<sup>3</sup> Stephen never freed himself from the suspicion of non-marital origin, strongly supported by King Bela, that his real father was not the old King Andrew II, but the Palatine Dionysius.<sup>4</sup> After the death of his first wife, who came from Ravenna, Stephen moved to Venice, where he got to know a daughter of one of the most important families: Tommasina Morosini.<sup>5</sup> Their marriage, concluded after several years of living together, was not only a result of mutual love, but also of political calculation from the side of the powerful Venetian Republic, since such a relationship with the ruling dynasty of the Kingdom of Hungary, with which Venice had long been struggling over possession of the Dalmatian coast, might eventually bring great success.<sup>6</sup> Peace and the cession of Dalmatia in favour of Venice agreed by King Bela IV could change on the accession of a different person to the throne of Hungary. According to Venetian ideas, a reserve in the form of an heir to the throne brought up in Venice was better and cheaper than a whole army. The future showed that they were thinking very accurately in Venetian government circles.

Stephen and Tommasina had a son named Andrew, who later went down in history as Andrew III. His father Stephen made another attempt to gain the throne of Hungary by force, but was again unsuccessful. In documents and his testament, he called himself Duke of Slavonia – *dux Sclavoniae*<sup>7</sup> – although he never actually ruled this territory. After returning to Venice from the unsuccessful war, he died as a result of exhaustion from the demanding campaign. His wife Tommasina became a widow and his son Andrew

- 1 Annales S. Iustinæ Patavini. In GOMBOS, A. F.: *Catalogus fontium historiae hungaricæ* (hereinafter: GOMBOS), Tomus I. Budapest 1937, p. 143 (no. 348).
- 2 Chronicon pictum Vindobonense 88. In GOMBOS. I, p. 659 (no. 1 456).
- 3 FEJÉR, G.: *Codex diplomaticus Hungariæ ecclesiasticus ac civilis* (hereinafter: CDH). VII/4. Budapest 1837, p. 94-95 (no. CXVII). WENZEL, G.: *Árpádkori új Okmánytár* (*Codex diplomaticus arpadianus continuatus*, (hereinafter: CDAC). Budapest 1861, p. 155-156 (no. 93).
- 4 The Parma Chronicle of the Franciscan Salimbene: Salimbene de Salimbenis: *Chronica ab a. 1168-1287*. In GOMBOS. III. Budapest 1938, p. 2 107 (no. 4 535).
- 5 The Morosinis were one of the leading aristocratic families in Venice. They produced four doges, two cardinals and many high officials of the aristocratic Republic of Venice. In the sources, we mostly find the Latin form of their name *Maurocenus* and sometimes the Venetian *Morexin*.
- 6 TENCAJOLI, O. F.: *Due italiane regine d' Ungheria*. In *Corvina*, anno X (1930). Vol. XIX – XX, p. 63-74. TENCAJOLI, O. F.: *Principesse italiane nella storia d' altri paesi*. Rome 1933, p. 15-26.
- 7 CDH VII/1. Budapest 1831, p. 297-298 (nos. CCXLV – CCXLVII).

an orphan. Andrew's uncle Albertino Morosini provided a male hand in his upbringing. Albertino, his sister Tommasina and another relation – Marino Gradenigo – were the guardians of the young Andrew.<sup>8</sup>

In Hungary, several monarchs followed each other in the direct line. From 1272, Ladislav IV, known as the Cuman, ruled, but he had no descendants in the male line. The closest heir with ancestry in the male line was actually Andrew, brought up in Venice by the Morosini family. The government of Venice strove to get Andrew recognized in the Kingdom of Hungary as heir to the throne.<sup>9</sup> Tommasina and uncle Albertino had a strong interest in his career and clearly did everything they could for his success.<sup>10</sup> In Hungary, Andrew's candidature gained support mainly thanks to the inappropriate way of life of King Ladislav, who became increasingly close to the pagan Cumans. He adapted his appearance according to their example, lived with them in their camps, rejected the Christian way of life and ignored papal admonitions. Andrew's succession was opposed especially by Ladislav's older sister Maria, married to the King of Naples Charles II from the House of Anjou. How and when Ladislav accepted or was forced to accept Andrew's succession cannot be clearly determined from the surviving sources. Andrew was at least briefly in Hungary<sup>11</sup> and became Duke of Slavonia while King Ladislav was still alive.<sup>12</sup> With this position, he already had his own chief steward in 1287.<sup>13</sup>

When Ladislav was unexpectedly murdered in summer 1290, Andrew was outside the territory of Hungary. According to Austrian sources, he was held captive in Vienna

- 8 According to Stephen's testament from 1271, Andrew's property and property claims would fall to Albertino and his heirs, if Andrew died without male heirs. Manuscript collection of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences (Magyar tudományos akadémia – Kézirattár, hereinafter: MTA-Kézirattár), 4 976/8 (10 April 1271).
- 9 In 1286, the young Andrew asked the Venetian Republic for help. The Great Council (*Maggior Consiglio* – the supreme body of the republic) expressed a positive view in its resolution and asked Andrew for more precise information on the required help. LJUBIĆ, S.: Listine o odnošajih izmedju južnoga slavenstva i mletačke republike III (hereinafter: MSM – Monumenta spectantia historiam Slavorum meridionalium). Zagreb 1872, p. 424 (no. LXXIV, 5 May 1286).
- 10 According to some sources, Andrew sought the crown on the advice of "immensely rich" uncles. *Chronicon pictum Vindobonense* 88. In GOMBOS, I. p. 659 (no. 1 456).
- 11 *Andreas... vivente adhuc rege Ladislao in Hungariam subintravit...* *Chronicon pictum Vindobonense* 88. In: GOMBOS I, p.659 (no.1 456). Another Austrian chronicle refers to an earlier unsuccessful attempt to gain control of the country, when describing the coronation: "*Eodem anno Andreas... prius ab Ungaris repulsus et fugatus... in regem est coronatus.*" *Continuatio Vindobonensis* a. 1267-1327. In GOMBOS I, p. 789 (no. 1 792). As king, Andrew later rewarded a certain Gyarman, who had brought him messages and secured communication with supporters in Hungary during that period. He accompanied uncle Albertino Morosini, when he came to his nephew and guided him back to his homeland. CDAC. V. Budapest 1864, p. 24, (no. 15, 1291).
- 12 From 1286 Andrew already took the title Duke of Slavonia. CDAC. IV. Budapest 1873, no. 181. Later as king, he referred in his documents to the period when he was still a duke: "*Tempore ducatus nostri...*" and when he was still not in Hungary: "*cum nos extra Regnum fuissetus...*" CDH. VI/1. Budapest 1830, p. 249 (1293), p. 292 (1294). CDH. VI/2. Budapest 1830, p. 249. CDAC, V, p. 24 (no. 15, 1291).
- 13 CDH. V/3. Budapest 1830, p. 387 (1287).

by Duke Albrecht,<sup>14</sup> according to the chronicle of Donato Contarini, which will be considered below, he was in Venice, from where he travelled to Hungary, accompanied by a numerous delegation of Venetian noblemen.<sup>15</sup> With the support of the clergy of Hungary, led by the two archbishops – Lodomer of Esztergom and John of Kalocsa, Andrew was definitively established as candidate for the throne at home in Hungary. Thanks to the cooperation of the provost Gregory, the young king could be crowned at Székesfehérvár (Lat. Alba regalis) with the genuine Crown of Saint Stephen.<sup>16</sup> The Hungarian Parliament also confirmed his position as king.<sup>17</sup> Tommasina stayed in Venice, but intended to join her son in Hungary soon. In September 1291, the Venetian Republic sent an official delegation, headed by her uncle Giovanni Cornero, to accompany her. According to the instructions of the Great Council, the emissaries had to congratulate Andrew on his accession to the throne, and ask him in the name of the republic to confirm the previous agreements on Dalmatia, naturally to the advantage of Venice. Apart from the usual courteous phrases, they also had to secure the adjustment of privileges (*reformatio pactarum cum illis melioramentis*) in the interest of the Venetians, so that the immense pleasure expressed in the congratulations were apparently not only a formality.<sup>18</sup>

- 14 The story of Andrew's imprisonment, how he was treacherously captured by Count Arnold and handed over to Albrecht in Vienna, as well as the circumstances of his escape disguised as a monk, comes from the Styrian Rhyming Chronicle. Ottokar von Horneck: Steierische Reimchronik. In GOMBOS. III, p. 1859-1860, 1866 (no. 4 146). Other Austrian chronicles took over the story. Oesterreichische Chronik von der Anfang der Welt IV, p. 330-332. In GOMBOS. II. Budapest 1938, p. 1739-1740 (no. 4 071). Thomas Ebendorferus de Haselbach: Chronicon Austriacum libris V comprehensum ab eiusdem gentis origine ad annum usque 1463 perductum. In GOMBOS. III, p. 2 219 (no. 4 778). According to Alfons Huber, Andrew was with Albrecht voluntarily. He had found refuge in Vienna after his unsuccessful attempt to gain power in Hungary. HUBER, A.: Studien über die Geschichte Ungarns im Zeitalter der Árpáden. In Archiv für österreichische Geschichte 65, I. Hälfte (1884), p. 210, 216.
- 15 "*Piaque a dio ch'el morì quello che uolentemente ocupava el regno d'ongaria et morì senza alcuna relicta. Esendo congregati i baroni d'ongaria per far elezione del nuovo re parse ala mazor parte de elezer el sopradicto Stefano* (Contarini exchanged Stephen and Andrew in this place) *naturalmente Re suo et signor esendo de reale sangue d'ongaria... et mandarono una solene et degna ambasaria a Venexia in la qual era i mazor baronii de Ungaria... ad regem suum per far a saper ch'el uegnise a gouernar el stado suo. Et compareseuo davanti al Serenissimo principio el qual li fese grandenisimo onor et fexeli de beli presentare al novo electo Re. Andarono el Principo et la Signoria fino ala sua abitazion... et fo mandado molti zentilomeni con qualo per acompagnarlo in fino a Buda in Ongaria.*"  
The original chronicle is kept in the manuscript collection of the Austrian National Library. Österreichische Nationbibliothek, Handschriften-, Autographen- and Nachlaßsammlung (Hereinafter: ÖNB Handschriftensammlung), Cod. 6 260, p. 105.
- 16 Andrew rewarded the Székesfehérvár provost for his coronation with the genuine crown, which his enemies wanted to prevent, with the grant of a fief in 1292. CDH VI/1, p. 237, 256. The date of the coronation was most probably 23 July 1290. BREZOVÁKOVÁ, B.: Politický zápas anjouovcov o uhorskú korunu. (The political struggle of the Angevins for the crown of Hungary.). In *Historický časopis*, 1991, Vol. 39, No. 6, p. 570.
- 17 "*... Consensu venerabilium Patrum, Archiepiscoporum, Episcoporum, Baronum, Procerum et omnium Nobilium Regni nostri, apud Albam, in loco nostro cathedrali, annuente Domino, fuisset coronati, et in Regni gubernaculum successissemus iure et ordine geniturae, habita congregatione generali...*" CDH. VII/2. Budapest 1832, p. 140 (1291). Hóman, B.: Gli Angioini di Napoli in Ungheria 1290 – 1403. Rome 1938, p. 82-85. TENCAJOLI, O.F.: Principesse, ref. 6, p. 28-29.
- 18 CESSI, R.: Deliberazioni del Maggior Consiglio. Vol. III. Bologna 1934, p. 306 (Liber Pilosus, no. 91-94).

The queen mother travelled through Venetian controlled Zadar, where the representatives of the city paid homage to her.<sup>19</sup> There were difficulties on the further journey into the interior, since a decree from 1292 contains a passage saying that the Venetian Great Council ordered the group to return to Venice if they did not succeed in reaching Hungary with the queen by the end of the month.<sup>20</sup> The opposition in Croatia organized an armed attack on the retinue led by a certain Ugrino, who had been sent by Andrew to meet his mother. It was only when the Bán of Slavonia Radoslav freed Ugrino that Tommasina, accompanied by the bán could reach her son safely.<sup>21</sup>

Tommasina and her brother Albertino were the connecting link and mediators of assistance between the young king and his most important foreign ally – the Venetian Republic. In royal documents from 1293, she appears not only as the dearest mother, but also as the Duchess of Slavonia<sup>22</sup> and governor of the lands from the Danube to the sea.<sup>23</sup> The energetic woman with her brother Albertino undertook the administration of the critical territories in the south of the country and on the coast. It was a region inhabited by a mixture of Slavs and Latins, and an area of permanent interest to the Venetian Republic. The language spoken there was close to the Venetian dialect, and the traditions and general mentality were close to those of the Venice of Tommasina and Albertino.<sup>24</sup> Therefore, it was natural that the king chose precisely her from the circle of absolutely trustworthy people close to him. She was immediately followed by Andrew's uncle and guardian Albertino, who also gained the title dux Slavoniae. Albertino was accepted into the ranks of Hungarian magnates in 1292, as a reward for his efforts.<sup>25</sup>

The young king together with his mother and uncle did not have an easy task. At the beginning of his reign, he had to solve a dispute with Albrecht of Austria about the

19 CDH. VI/1, p. 185. CDH. VII/4, p. 221-222 (no. CCXXIV).

20 CESSI, R.: Deliberazioni, ref. 18, p. 317 (Liber Pilosus, no. 20, 6 May 1292).

21 Some of the soldiers of the bán and an unspecified member of his family were killed fighting the rebels. As a reward, Andrew granted him Želin Castle near Zagreb. SMIČIKLAS, T.: Codex diplomaticus regni Croatiae, Dalmatiae et Slavoniae (hereinafter: CDCDS), vol. VII. (1290 – 1300), Zagreb 1909, p. 146-148 (No. 128).

22 "... Ducissam totius Sclavoniae... maritimarum partium Principissam, charissimam matrem..." In this document from 1293, Andrew granted Paul Šubič hereditary possession of the "*banatum maritimum*" (Croatian coast) on condition of faithful service to the king and his mother. The coast was part of her duchy. CDH. VII/4, p. 225-228 (no. CCXXXI). Tommasina had her own court similar to that of the king. For example, she had her own treasurer: CDAC. X. Budapest 1873, p. 141 (no. 93, 1294); and her own chief steward. CDAC. X, p. 183 (no. 121, 1295).

23 "... Ducissa totius Sclavoniae et Gubernatrix Citra-Danubialium parcium usque mare..." CDAC. X, p. 186 (no. 123, 1295). "*Ducissa totius Sclavoniae, et Gubernatrix parcium Citra-danubialium usque maritima...*" CDAC. X, p. 213 (no. 144, 1296), p. 375 (no. 248, 1300).

24 ŠTEFÁNIK, M.: Úvodná fáza benátsko-uhorského sporu o územie Dalmácie do polovice 12. storočia. (The initial phase of the dispute between Venice and Hungary over the territory of Dalmatia, up to the mid 12th century.). In *Vojenská história* 4/2004, p. 13-29. Albertino also had experience of Croatia from the period when he served as an official of the Venetian Republic at Zadar in 1275 – 1276. CDCDS. VI. Zagreb 1908, p. 102 (no. 89), p. 163 (no. 149).

25 CDH. VII/5. Budapest 1841, p. 502-504 (no. CCCXXIII).

western frontier region including Bratislava (Lat. Posonium).<sup>26</sup> The Angevin threat reappeared and accompanied Andrew until his death.<sup>27</sup> King Ladislav's sister, Queen Maria of Naples transferred her inherited claims to her son Charles Martel on 6 January 1292.<sup>28</sup> By means of privileges, titles and promises for Hungarian noblemen, shipments of grain to Croatia<sup>29</sup> and use of the old rivalry of the coastal towns with Andrew's Venetian homeland,<sup>30</sup> the Angevins strove to gain as many supporters as possible, provoke rebellion and gradually defeat King Andrew with the help of rebel magnates. Therefore, opposition in the ranks of the nobility was the most serious problem of Andrew's government. The situation changed from year to year, opponents changed into supporters and the reverse, so that the king sometimes rewarded people he had recently fought against. Opposition magnates sometimes cooperated with both sides at the same time. The most important representatives of such manoeuvring noblemen were the bans of Slavonia and Croatia. It was in the south of the territory of Hungary that the interests of the two sides came into conflict and it was possible to gain the most from this. This was also why many

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- 26 HUBER, A.: Studien, ref. 14, p. 220. De REGIBUS, A.: Le contese degli Angioini de Napoli per il trono di Ungheria (1290 – 1310). In Rivista storica italiana, 1934, 51, p. 54-58. On the conclusion of peace between Andrew and Albrecht: CDH. VI/1, p. 180-185.
- 27 The King of Naples Charles II, in the name of his wife Maria sister of Ladislav, appealed to all the inhabitants of Hungary to resist Andrew. More than once, he sent a delegation to obtain in his name an oath of allegiance from Hungarian subjects. WENZEL, G.: Magyar diplomáciai emlékek az Anjou-korból. I. Budapest 1874 (hereinafter: ADE. I), p. 76-77 (no. 94, 21 April 1291), 78-79 (no. 96, 21 April 1291), 88-89 (no. 105, 18 April 1292).
- 28 ADE. I, p. 82-84 (no. 100, 6 January 1292). CDH. VI/1, p. 190-193. From June 1293, Charles Martel was authorized by his parents to grant dignities and fiefs in Hungary. CDCDS. VII, p. 143 (no. 123).
- 29 ADE. I, p. 100-101 (no. 125, 6 January 1293). CDCDS. VII, p. 372 (no. 327), p. 377 (no. 332), p. 391 (no. 344), p. 395 (no. 350). The purpose of the delivery of grain to Leonard from the island of Krk is precisely stated: "... *Contra Andraecium regni Ungarie illicitum invasorem exercere ac extendere satagit quicquid potest resistencie ac vigoris...*" CDCDS. VII, p. 395 (no. 351).
- 30 Uncertainty prevailed in the coastal towns after Andrew's accession to the throne. It disturbed the traditional pattern of relations with Venice on one side and Hungary on the other. The towns were accustomed to inclining to one side or the other in disputes and conflicts, and skilfully manoeuvring between the two great powers, but suddenly there a King of Hungary, who was also a Venetian. The Venetians were traditionally dominant in the northern and central part of Dalmatia including Zadar, while the towns in the southern part of Dalmatia (Split, Trogir) belonged to the Hungarian sphere of influence. In the uncertain situation they chose a cautious policy also in the south to avoid antagonizing Venice. CDH. VII/2, p. 137-138 (no. CCCXCIX). In the end they decided to continue the policy of recognizing Hungarian overlordship, namely of King Andrew, as can be seen from the practice of dating according to his name. CDAC. X, p. 72-73 (no. 52). CDCDS. VII, p. 46-48 (no. 35-36). The Angevins attempted to change their position by support and protection of trade with them. CDCDS. VII, p. 95-96 (no. 76-77). Charles Martel directly turned to Trogir and through it also to Split and Šibenik, with an appeal to accept his rule. CDCDS. VII, p. 123-124 (no. 104). After a vigorous debate at Trogir they decided to give an evasive answer. In spite of views in the literature coming from indirect indications (De REGIBUS, A.: Le contese, ref. 26, p. 75), that Split and Trogir inclined to the Angevins, we hold the opposite view. From January 1293 to the end of Andrew's reign, they wrote dates in Split, Šibenik and Trogir according to King Andrew ("*...regnante domino nostro Andrea serenissimo rege Vngarie...*"), and recognized him in this way. CDCDS. VII, p. 126 (no. 106), p. 135 (no. 114), p. 142 (no. 121), p. 184 (no. 165), p. 214 (no. 194), p. 220 (no. 200), p. 281 (no. 242), p. 321 (no. 278), p. 374 (no. 330). CDAC. X, p. 172-173 (no. 113). At least Trogir antagonized the Angevins in another way. It was associated with piracy affecting the life of Italian towns subject to the Angevins. CDAC. X, p. 292-294 (no. 187).



noblemen held these positions in a short time during Andrew's reign. They came from the circle of several families, and were appointed and confirmed either by the Arpád monarch or his Angevin opponent. They were especially the Kőszeg,<sup>31</sup> Babonič<sup>32</sup> and Šubič families.<sup>33</sup>

- 31 In January 1292, King Charles II of Naples called for John son of the Bán of Slavonia Henrich of Kőszeg, and in his service since 1285, to put full effort into waging war against the "aggressor" (Andrew) and his supporters, and do everything possible to harm them. ADE. I, p. 68 (no. 85), p. 81-82 (no. 99, 5 January 1292), p. 90-91 (no. 108, 21 April 1292). Charles Martel repeatedly confirmed his possessions. ADE. I, p. 87-88 (no. 104, 12 April 1292), p. 121-122 (no. 146, 1 April 1295). John of Kőszeg even captured King Andrew during disturbances and only released him in return for concessions and leaving of hostages. Other members of his family also participated in the rebellion ("... *cum contra filios Herrici bani movissemus...*"). The king and the Queen Mother Tommasina rewarded various noblemen for their services and sacrifices to free King Andrew. The son of one of them died of exhaustion as a hostage in captivity. CDAC. X, p. 185 (no. 122, 1295). CDAC. XII. Budapest 1874, p. 525-526 (no. 430, 1292), p. 530-531 (no. 433, 1292). There was a reconciliation at the end of Andrew's reign, when the Morosini and Kőszeg families were joined by a marriage alliance (see note 43).
- 32 The Bán of Slavonia Radoslav Babonič cooperated with both side. In summer 1291 he travelled to Manfredonia for talks with the court of Naples and received enthusiastic recommendations. ADE. I, p. 77 (no. 95). In December 1292, Charles Martel confirmed the grant of King Ladislav to the faithful and deserving Bán of Slavonia. ADE. I, p. 98-99 (no. 122, 1 December 1292). However, at the same time, Radoslav performed the valuable service of escorting Andrew's mother, for which Andrew granted him the castle of Želin near Zagreb. CDCDS. VII, p. 146-148 (no. 128). In September 1293, Radoslav gained possession of various lands from Andrew in return for "faithful service", but he was also having secret talks with the Angevins. CDCDS. VII, p. 19 (no. 130, p. 151-152 (no. 133). ADE. I, p. 120 (no. 143, 1 September 1294). The talks led to open rebellion in 1295, when Tommasina rewarded her faithful supporters for their services while capturing Radoslav's castles. CDCDS. VII, p. 215 (no. 195, 1295). After some time with his brothers, he again returned to Andrew, who forgave him and in a document from 1 August 1299, confirmed all his property. CDCDS. VII, p. 351-353 (no. 305, 1299). Less than 6 weeks later and again in May 1300 Charles II of Naples issued similar confirmations. ADE. I, p. 136-137 (no. 416, 7 September 1299). ADE. I, p. 145 (no. 180, 14 May 1300).
- 33 The Bán of Slavonia Paul Šubič and his brothers George and Mladen were supplied with grain from southern Italy from 1291. CDCDS. VII, p. 57 (no. 47, 1291). ADE. I, p. 100-101 (no. 125, 6 January 1293), p. 421 (no. 399, 28 May 1295), p. 125 (no. 150, 19 June 1295), p. 127-128 (no. 154, 4 March 1296), p. 157 (no. 197, 4 September 1299), p. 161 (no. 202, 19 January 1301). The King of Naples addressed to Paul with the title *bano Sclavonie* an appeal for opposition to Andrew. CDCDS. VII, p. 65 (no. 57, (1291 – 1292). George Šubič as ruler of Omiš was also concerned with the Venetians, when the notorious Omiš corsairs – his subjects – threatened Venetian commercial shipping. CDAC. X, p. 97-100 (no. 68, 1292). CDH. VI/2, p. 273 (1300); CDH. VII/4 (no. CCLVI, 1300). ADE. I, p. 103-108 (no. 131, 28 March 1294), p. 162 (no. 205, 1301). They also attacked people who recognized King Andrew, for example, the merchants from Trogir. CDAC. X, p. 171-173 (no. 112-113). In summer 1299, Charles II of Naples even gave Paul Šubič a siege engine – balista – presumably for the struggle against Andrew. ADE. I, p. 134 (no. 162, 19 June 1299). In return for cooperation and support, the Angevin monarchs rewarded the Šubič family with frequent confirmations of their landholdings and titles: Paul Šubič as *Chrovacie, Dalmacieque banus* and both brothers on 19 August 1292 for their services. ADE. I, p. 95-96 (no. 117, 19 August 1292). In 1295 he was confirmed as *banus maritimus in Croatinis et Dalmatinis partibus* for life. ADE. I, p. 124 (no. 149, 17 June 1295). In 1298 and 1299, all the properties of the Šubič family in Hungary, Slavonia, Croatia and Dalmatia were again confirmed. ADE. I, p. 421 (no. 400, 4 August 1298), p. 134-135 (no. 163, 4 August 1299). The frequent Angevin – Šubič contacts are documented by abundant evidence of journeys by messengers or by the Šubičs themselves to Naples, protection letters for them ADE. I, p. 85-86 (no. 102); invitations addressed to George and Paul – *bano Croatorum* in the period 1293 – 1299, CDCDS. VII, p. 145 (no. 126). ADE. I, p. 114 (no. 136, 20 June 1294), p. 119 (no. 142, 8 July 1294), p. 139 (no. 168, 19 November 1299); and diplomatic messages for Venice and Genoa that the Šubičs should not be threatened on their voyage to Naples. CDCDS. VII, p. 181 (no. 162). ADE. I, p. 141-142 (no. 172, 11 January 1300). The Šubičs did not change their orientation as often as the Baboničs, but we have evidence that they cooperated with Andrew at least once (see note 22).

The rulers of Naples even attempted to reach agreement with the Venetians themselves and their dependency of Zadar, to at least partly secure their favour against Andrew, but without any visible effect.<sup>34</sup>

In summer 1295, Charles Martel and his wife Clementia, a Habsburg by birth, unexpectedly died of plague. Charles Martel's son Charles Robert, still a child, became the Angevin candidate for the throne. His claims were based only on the female line and limited support from the domestic nobility, represented mainly by adherents in Croatia and the wavering support of some magnates, but the foreign support of the Holy See was an important factor adding to his legitimacy.<sup>35</sup> Therefore, from the beginning, Andrew emphasized in his documents his hereditary rights of succession, the support of the clergy and nobility of Hungary and the fact that he was crowned with the genuine Crown of St. Stephen.<sup>36</sup>

It is possible to say that Andrew secured the support of the domestic nobility against the Angevins, who relied mainly on support from abroad. He could also count on the constant external support of the rich Venetian Republic. He also built up a network of commercial-economic contacts with Venice, which contributed to the general economic improvement of the country.<sup>37</sup>

However, the most important thing was that he came from a state with a democratic and politically developed system by the standards of the time, and he partly showed a liberal orientation in his style of ruling backward Hungary. A different monarch, educated in the classic autocratic spirit, might have reacted in a different way to the strengthening demands of the nobility to participate in government. It was precisely during Andrew's reign that the king began to summon parliament every year. In 1298, he took the even more important step of allowing the middle and lower nobility to directly intervene in government through elected representatives in the royal council. This was the culmination of the process that began with the Golden Bull of his grandfather Andrew II in 1222.<sup>38</sup>

To the young Andrew, such ambitions of the lesser nobility must have appeared normal and natural. In the Venetian Republic, the full participation of the aristocracy in government and the election of all functionaries including the doge was obvious. Who knows whether at a session of the Hungarian parliament the king had not remembered sessions of the Great Council (the assembly of all the Venetian nobility), where the

34 De REGIBUS, A.: Le contese, ref. 26, p. 71-72, 78.

35 HÓMAN, B.: Gli Angioini, ref. 17, p. 92, 95. TENCAJOLI, O.F.: Principesse, ref. 6, p. 29. The new Pope Boniface VIII appointed the court chaplain of Queen Maria, the Franciscan Peter to the vacant Archbishopric of Split. This significantly strengthened the supporters of the Angevin claim to the throne in the region. CDCDS. VII, p. 277-278 (no. 239). Queen Maria also persuaded the Pope to establish a bishopric at Šibenik in May 1298. CDH. VI/2, p. 154-155. CDAC. V, p. 189-191 (no. 126).

36 "Omnibus archiepiscopis, episcopis, principibus, proceribus, et baronibus, ac universis nobilibus per totius regni Hungarie climata nos assumptibus et a[g]noscantibus ut dominum naturalem et sanctissimum regis Stephani dyademate... fuisset coronati." CDCDS. VII, p. 97 (no. 78, 1292).

37 ŠTEFÁNIK, M.: Počiatky obchodných stykov Uhorska s Benátskou republikou za dynastie Arpádovcov. (The beginnings of commercial contacts between Hungary and the Venetian Republic under the Arpád dynasty.). In *Historický časopis*, 2002, Vol. 50, No. 4, p. 547-568.

38 HÓMAN, B.: Gli Angioini, ref. 17, p. 77-79, 95-96. Legislation from 1298: CDH. VI/2, p. 130-147.

Morosini family was represented... In any case, 1298 was important because with this measure Andrew gained the support of a wide range of the nobility and could rely on them for support in the struggle against the Angevins and the unreliable magnates, who occasionally cooperated with them.

The situation in the kingdom was generally stabilized at the end of Andrew's reign. Thanks to skilful policy and gradual military successes, he had the majority of the nobility on his side except in parts of Croatia, his twelve year old rival for the throne Charles Robert of Anjou remained isolated in Croatia,<sup>39</sup> and the greatest supporter of the Angevin claims, Pope Boniface VIII was fully occupied with preparing for the 1300 – 1301 Holy Year in Rome.<sup>40</sup> In spite of the death of his supporter Archbishop Lodomer of Esztergom and the hostile position of the new Archbishop Gregory, the rest of the Hungarian clergy were on Andrew's side. After the death of his first wife Fenena, he married a daughter of the Austrian Duke Albrecht, which strengthened his connection with the Habsburgs, a year after the death of Charles Martel and his Austrian wife had weakened the Angevin – Habsburg connection. Albrecht, who had now become Emperor, promised to assist in an expedition to Croatia, which Andrew planned to undertake in spring 1301 to put a definitive end to the claims of the young Angevin.<sup>41</sup>

However, Andrew lacked one element of stability – a male heir to the throne. The king solved this in 1299 by appointing his uncle Albertino and his male descendants as his successors. He also granted Albertino hereditary possession of Slavonia, which

39 Charles Robert was sent to the Kingdom of Hungary at the instigation of the Pope and his grandfather the King of Naples. The *Chronicon pictum Vindobonense* 89. In GOMBOS. I, p. 659 (no. 1 456). George Šubič brother of the Ban secured communication between the court of Naples and Croatia. For this purpose, he received various letters of recommendation, including for Venice. CDCDS. VII, p. 361 (no. 315). ADE. I, p. 139 (no. 168, 19 November 1299, p. 141-142 (no. 172-173, 11 January 1300). Charles Robert's grandfather, the King of Naples Charles II prepared his grandson's journey from the end of 1299 by sending soldiers to Hungary in two ships. ADE. I, p. 140-141 (no. 170-171, 7 December 1299). In messages from January and February, he announced his coming to Serbia and to supporters in Hungary and Croatia. CDCDS. VII, p. 367 (no. 320). ADE. I, p. 422 (no. 401-402, 12 January – 10 February 1300). The Šubičs had the task of bringing the young prince to Hungary. CDCDS. VII, p. 367-368 (no. 321-322). On 26 April 1300, King Charles II issued a proclamation directed to Hungarian subjects. ADE. I, p. 144 (no. 176, 26 April 1300). At the beginning of May he appointed the castellan of the castle, where Charles Robert was to land. ADE. I, p. 145 (no. 177, 6 May 1300). The final preparations for the journey were made in May 1300. The retinue consisted of 60 people. 160 horses and a large quantity of supplies were put on the ships. ADE. I, p. 143 (no. 175, 23 April 1300), p. 148-150 (no. 182-186, 18 – 20 May 1300). By the end of July, Charles Robert was already in Croatia, where they sent him grain from southern Italy, since a shortage could be expected if Andrew stopped deliveries from the interior. ADE. I, p. 156 (no. 195, 28 July 1300). According to a report by Andrew's fiduciary Pietro di Bonzana, written from Venice during a journey to Rome, Andrew was full of energy and not very worried about Charles Robert's arrival. Many of the barons, who had rebelled, apparently returned to the king. MSM. III, p. 433 (no. XCIV). CDAC. V, p. 260-261 (no. 168). Although Pietro's information may be considered doubtful in relation to his later information from Rome, it could have some real basis. Apparently Andrew and Tommasina had the situation under control in November 1300, when Tommasina was devoting her attention to routine matters connected with the administration of her duchy of Slavonia. CDAC. X, p. 375 (no. 248), p. 400-401 (no. 263).

40 JÁSZAY, M.: Ricordi di una regina d' Ungheria a Venezia. In *Annuario. Studi e documenti italo-ungheresi*. Rome-Szeged 2004, p. 102.

41 De REGIBUS, A.: Le contese, ref. 26, p. 267-269, 277.

was a privilege of king's sons, as stated in the document.<sup>42</sup> Another representative of the Morosini family in Hungary was Andrew's cousin Turco Morosini, who married the daughter of the important Hungarian magnate Henrich of Kőszeg<sup>43</sup> and so finally secured the support of this important family for Andrew. Another Morosini, Baldo was entrusted with the administration of extensive properties in Hungary. Andrew could also count on the support of his relations from Venice on some of the external frontiers and regions outside the Kingdom of Hungary, which were dangerous mainly in relation to the Angevin threat: the king's niece, Albertino's granddaughter Costanza was married to the King of Serbia Ladislav,<sup>44</sup> and various members of the Morosini clan were administrating Zadar and Dubrovnik as officials of the Venetian Republic.<sup>45</sup>

However, this favourable situation changed, when the king suddenly died on 14 January 1301. The direct cause of his death is unknown. The view of official historiography is that the king died as a result of exhaustion and grief over his mother's death. Tommasina's death is documented mainly by the *Styrian Rhyming Chronicle* of Ottokar von Horneck. According to him, she was poisoned when she wanted to get rid of an important magnate opposed to Andrew. Allegedly, she sent him a precious vessel containing poisoned venison. Before dying, he arranged for the same poisoned vessel, now containing pheasant, to be sent to the queen's table, where Tommasina unfortunately consumed it.<sup>46</sup> Thus, the queen fell into her own trap in the style of the Renaissance Borgias.

\* \* \*

The version about the poisoning and death of the Queen Mother from the *Styrian Rhyming Chronicle*, which is also an important literary monument and has received considerable attention as such, was generally accepted by the earlier historians. From them, it also found its way into newer syntheses, and as often happens in such cases, it became an almost unquestioned fact, actually on the basis of frequent repetition. It forms part of German, Hungarian and Slovak official historiography.

However, there are also sources and derived literature, which give a different story of the events. This is mainly Italian historiography, which already in the 19th century took into account the chronicle of Donato Contarini and other Venetian sources. On their basis, it is stated that Tommasina outlived her son Andrew and died only in 1311 or

42 CDH. VII/5, p. 545-547 (no. CCCLVI).

43 Report from Pietro di Bonzano to Michel Morosini, Turco's father and Venetian governor of Zadar. MSM. III, p. 433 (no. XCIV). CDAC. V, p. 260-261 (no. 168).

44 CDAC V, p. 92-93 (No. 58). JÁSZAY, M.: Ricordi ungheresi, p. 101.

45 Ruggiero Morosini in Zadar 1292 – 1295. CDCDS. VII, p. 113 (no. 93) – p. 196 (no. 175). Fiofio Morosini in Zadar 1295 – 1296. CDCDS. VII, p. 211 (no. 191) – p. 263 (no. 232). Michele Morosini in Zadar 1299 – 1300. CDCDS. VII, p. 329 (no. 286) – p. 402 (no. 358). Marin Morosini in Dubovnik 1295 – 1297. CDCDS. VII, p. 207 (no. 186), p. 265 (no. 234). The Morosinis were hereditary governors of the island of Osor in northern Dalmatia from 1280. CDAC. XII, p. 323-325 (no. 268).

46 Ottokar von Horneck: Steirische Reimchronik 77 930 – 78 026. In GOMBOS. III, ref. 4, p. 1 891 (no. 4 778).

1315 in her native city of Venice. This information was also taken over by the Hungarian Italianist Magda Jászay.<sup>47</sup>

So what exactly does Donato Contarini say? After describing Andrew's accession to the throne, he mentions the privileges of Albertino Morosini. He briefly states that Andrew died without an heir to the throne, after which Tommasina apparently stayed in Hungary for some time. According to Donato, all the property of Tommasina and Albertino was confiscated during the chaos of the succession struggle.<sup>48</sup> After the situation definitively turned out to their disadvantage, she returned to Venice with her brother Albertino. The latter had a palace built in the San Marco quarter and the queen spent the last years of her life there and finally died there.<sup>49</sup>

When we compare the two accounts from the logical point of view, the version about poison does not appear very trustworthy. It is rather difficult to imagine that the queen would accept without reservations a gift of food from somebody, who was her chief enemy and to whom she had just sent a similar poisoned "gift", even in the same container. If we take into account a certain degree of German aversion towards the Italians, which is more than clear in the case of the author of the *Styrian Rhyming Chronicle*, things appear in a different light. It is clear from the style of the chronicle that Ottokar von Horneck was striving to depict everything coming from contemporary Italy in the blackest possible colours. He put this dramatic story into a work with artistic as well as historical ambitions, since it is written in verse. According to the chronicler Ottokar, King Andrew was also treacherously poisoned.<sup>50</sup> For the author of the *Styrian Rhyming Chronicle*, death by

47 NANI MOCENIGO, F.: Veneziani ed ungheresi fino al secolo XV. In *Ateneo veneto 1905*, p. 19, TENCA-JOLI, O. F.: Principesse, ref. 6, p. 30-31. TASSINI, G. *Curiosita veneziane*, Venice 1863 (reprint 1990), p. 505. According to the copy of the notes of the Venetian archivist G. Soranzo, which are found in the Budapest manuscript collection of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences, Tommasina died in 1311. Soranzo states that this date comes from the most recognized expert on Venetian history, Professor Samuele Romanin. MTA-Kézírtattár, 4 976/7. Samuele Romanin mentions the retirement and death of Tommasina in Venice in his ten volume *History of Venice*, but without giving the date of her death. ROMANIN, S. *Storia documentata di Venezia*, Vol. II. Venice 1973, p. 233. Magda Jászay brought this information about the death of Tommasina in Venice into Hungarian historiography. JÁSZAY, M.: *Ricordi ungheresi*, ref. 40, p. 99-104. JÁSZAY, M. *Velence és Magyarország*. Budapest 1990, p. 36.

48 The testament of Albertino Morosini from 1305 indirectly confirms the information about the confiscation of property. The document is kept in the Venetian archives in the collections of the procurators of San Marco (no. 127). It bequeaths considerable sums from properties in Hungary and Slavonia to his daughter, if she will have the possibility to enjoy them. Thus, it appears that the Morosini inheritance in these countries was really confiscated. JÁSZAY, M.: *Ricordi ungheresi*, ref. 40, p. 103-104 (note 14).

49 "... Andreas nepote de lo dicto messer Albertin morì et non laso nisun eriede et conuene lo regno uiolentemente in man de realli tirani e prese per maior partido messer Albertin de recondur la sorela et la sua persona a ueniexia con quelle solamente perche la roba li fu tolta et venuto a Veniexia lo dicto messer Albertin el qual era spendidissimo et de degno prosepia esendo la sorela stata regina per honor suo et de la casa sua el feze edificar una posesion in S. Zulian in la ruga driedo le case del monastier de S. Zorzi avanti che se ariva al ponte de le balote et li abitò la dicta regina in fina che quella uisse et uegniva ciama da quella corte de la regina et cusi se ciamo fino al presente zorno et el da messer Albertin abitava in la caxa grande de cha Morexin a S. Zulian..." ÖNB, Handschriftensammlung, Cod. 6 260, p. 106 v.

50 Ottokar von Horneck: *Steierische Reimchronik* 78 198-78 330. In GOMBOS, III, ref. 4, p. 1 893-1 894 (no. 4 778).

poisoning is the typical end of highly placed people, and it is necessary to take his information with reserve. This view is already found in the older Austrian historiography.<sup>51</sup>

The question remains whether Tommasina really died before Andrew, regardless of the cause of death. The Styrian chronicler Ottokar states that she did. It is true that apart from Contarini's information no documents have survived about Tommasina's life in Venice. It is true that Ottokar lived closer in time to the events he described, but he wrote his work in an area hundreds of kilometres from where they happened. On the other hand, Contarini lived directly in the city, where Tommasina lived during the last years of her life according to his chronicle.

In that period, Venice had a hundred thousand inhabitants in an area of a few square kilometres. The Morosini Palace was located several hundred metres from the Piazza San Marco and the Doge's Palace, where the Venetian nobility met regularly for sessions of the Great Council and the Senate. There is no doubt that Contarini knew personally descendants of the Morosini family – the two families were among the most prestigious in the city.

Six to seven generations passed between Tommasina's time and Contarini's, and the strength of family tradition<sup>52</sup> and handing down of information in the educated environment of Renaissance Venice, certainly played its role in the writing of the chronicle.

Exact quotations from Morosini family Latin documents show that Contarini had access to them. It is understandable in relation to the fact that direct descendants of Albertino lived in Venice and the author of the chronicle was a Venetian.<sup>53</sup> It is difficult to judge whether the Morosinis could have invented the story of the queen's life in Venice, which then got into Donato's chronicle. But why would they have done it? It did nothing to change the most important thing: the connection of their ancestors with a royal family.

It is also impossible to under-estimate the fact that the lane and courtyard were already named after the Queen of Hungary at that time. The fact that they bear this name until today only confirms the strong and enduring tradition. Such traditions have their natural origin, in this case in the fact that the queen lived there after her return to Venice. Donato also gives an exact and undoubtable description of the location of the palace: in the parish of S. Zulian, in the lane by the monastery buildings just before the bridge. It can still be found today. If the modern visitor with an interest in history and Hungarian connections comes to Venice, he can see this place.

51 HUBER, A.: Studien, ref. 14, p. 230.

52 The Morosinis were naturally proud of their relationship with the Hungarian royal dynasty, and not only in connection with Contarini's chronicle. A little later – in the first half of the 16th century – Marco Barbaro described how he was invited to the house of Giovanni Battista – a descendant of Albertino Morosini, and how he saw the documents connected with their glorious Hungarian past in the family archive. MTA – Kézirattár, 4 976/7-8, Morosini V.

53 The general character of the relevant passages in the chronicle is directed more towards Albertino Morosini (described as *el grande*), especially his greatness, nobility and achievements, than towards the person of King Andrew or his mother Tommasina. Donato Contarini clearly wanted to flatter his descendants. In this period, it was apparently still possible to find Albertino's shield in many places in Slavonia, especially on his beautiful palace in Požega: "... *Apar anchora per molti luogi dela Sciaunonia l'arma del condan dicto messer Albertin con la crose dentro et cusi nela Posaga dove teniva el contado et dove fese far un notabilissimo palazzo in lo quale dicto messer Albertin abitava.*" ÖNB, Handschriftensammlung, Cod. 6 260, p. 106 v.

Thus, Ottokar's version of the early death of the Queen Mother stands against Donato's and reasons can be found for and against both. On the basis of the available sources, it is impossible to decide this matter certainly and unambiguously. However, it is at least necessary to take into account the second, less known and partially overlooked version of Donato Contarini.

#### DIE MOROSINIS IN UNGARN UNTER ANDREAS III. UND ZWEI VERSIONEN VOM TOD DER UNGARISCHEN KÖNIGIN TOMMASINA

MARTIN ŠTEFÁNIK

Der jüngste Sohn des Königs Andreas II., Stephan, lebte in Venedig im Exil, wo er die dortige Adlige Tommasina Morosini ehelichte und mit ihr einen Sohn hatte, den sie Andreas nannten. Nach Stephans vorzeitigem Tod übernahm Andreas Erziehung sein Onkel Albertino Morosini.

In Ungarn wurde unterdessen König Ladislaus IV. ermordet, der keine männlichen Nachkommen hatte. Mit der Unterstützung des heimischen Klerus wurde Andreas' Kandidatur erfolgreich durchgesetzt. Gegen seine Nachfolge stellte sich Ladislaus' Schwester Maria, die mit dem neapolitanischen König Karl II. von Anjou verheiratet war. Nach ihr hätte ihr Sohn Karl Martel König werden sollen.

König Andreas III. musste gegen die in- und ausländische Opposition kämpfen. Das wichtigste Problem im ersten Fall war der Widerstand der Magnaten vor allem im Süden des Königreichs (Köszeghy, Babonič, Šubič).

In der Außenpolitik musste er den Ansprüchen derer von Anjou die Stirn bieten. Im Gefecht mit ihnen stützte er sich Zuhause auf die Unterstützung des kleinen und mittleren Adels, im außenpolitischen Bereich arbeitete er mit seinem Vaterland, der Republik Venedig, zusammen. Hilfreich zur Seite standen ihm seine erfahrene Mutter Tommasina und Onkel Albertino, die in die Reihen des höchsten ungarischen Adels aufgenommen wurden. Nach zehn Regierungsjahren hatte Andreas III. die Situation voll im Griff, als er am 14. Januar 1301 unverhofft starb.

Die offizielle Historiographie ist der Meinung, dass der König infolge Erschöpfung und Kummer über das angebliche Hinscheiden der Mutter gestorben war. Ihr Tod ist belegt durch die bekannte österreichische Chronik Ottokars von Horneck, nach der sie an Vergiftung gestorben war.

Es gibt aber auch eine weniger bekannte Erzählung des Chronisten Donato Contarini. Nach ihm überlebte Tommasina ihren Sohn Andreas und starb einige Jahre nach ihm im heimatlichen Venedig. Ein toponomastischer Beweis dieses Berichts ist die Tatsache, dass die Gasse mit Hof schon seit dem Mittelalter nach der ungarischen Königin benannt ist.

Bei beiden Versionen lassen sich mehrere Gründe für und wider finden. Anhand der erhaltenen Quellen kann man nicht mit Sicherheit über die Angelegenheit entscheiden, man muss auch die häufig übersehene Version Donato Contarinis in Betracht ziehen.

# JOZEF TISO

Prejavy a články

(1938–1944)



*Jozef Tiso*



## NATION, NATIONALITY, STATE: ON THE POLITICS OF ETHNIC ENTHUSIASM

TIBOR PICHLER

PICHLER, Tibor. Nation, nationalities, state : On the politics of ethnic enthusiasm. *Historický časopis*, 2008, 56, Supplement, pp. 17-39, Bratislava.

The study presents an analytical description of key factors and an analysis of basic concepts in the transformation of a society of estates into a society of citizens in the Kingdom of Hungary against the background of contradictory nationalizing processes: ethnic and political. In relation to the actors, that is the types of elites involved in this process, differing in available resources, social and political capital, it was a matter of a clash of nationalisms generated from above – from the level of the government, and from below from the level outside the political institutions. It was a clash between official political and nationality nationalisms. Nationality or ethnic nationalism, its way of thinking, construction and instrumentalization of collective identity using historical argumentation is placed in the centre of attention.

History. Revival. Reform. Nation. Nationality. Identity. Equality.

**Introduction.** Freedom and equality were the most widespread slogans of the process of political and social transformation of a society of estates into a society of citizens during the 19th century. They were the dominant ideals, as stated by József Eötvös, the Hungarian political theorist, statesman and founder of political science in the Kingdom of Hungary.<sup>1</sup> He rightly added to them another – nationality – in our region of Europe the most important. The principle of nationality finally played a key role in redrawing the political map of former Habsburg Europe. It destroyed and created states, but before it came to this, it unleashed the process of formation of nations in multi-ethnic states, where the multi-lingual population could not be simply and smoothly transformed into the modern political body of a sovereign nation of citizens. In conditions with a tradition of multi-lingualism and lack of numerical predominance of one language group or the undoubted dominance of one of the regional languages, as in the Kingdom of Hungary, the problem of political transformation, that is of the introduction of civil freedom and equality, was complicated by the question of how to solve the problem of the equality and free use of the domestic languages in the public sphere. The former Kingdom of Hungary is a region, where internal multi-lingualism means that the problem of modernization of the state and society can be studied against the background of conflict between two nationalisms – state and “nationality”, with the linguistic component of the state meaning that the state nationalism was also perceived as a nationality nationalism.

**Linguistic revolutions.** From the end of the 18th century, Habsburg Europe experienced a change consisting of a series of linguistic revolutions,<sup>2</sup> namely the frequent

1 GÖLLNEROVÁ, Alžbeta. József Eötvös : Štúdiá literárne historická. In *Spisy Filozofické fakulty Univerzity Komenského v Bratislave číslo XXV*. Bratislava 1937, p. 215-217.

2 Benedict Anderson writes about the “lexicographical revolution”. ANDERSON, Benedict. *Imagined*

codification of the literary languages of nations, which often saw themselves as small.<sup>3</sup> The linguistic revolutions became the basis for new standard national cultures, the creators of which – scholars and ethnic enthusiasts – saw their activity as work for the *revival* of their nations. Although they were constructing something new, they were convinced that they were awakening to a new life, a nation, which was present “naturally” by its language, but was temporarily absent as a subject of history.

The concept of revival, constantly used in ethnocentric historiography, is outdated. Today, it is more usual to speak and write of nationalism. I think that the term “revival” deserves attention, because it accurately points to the ideology connected with it. This term designates the process of deliberate change in the status of a group with insufficient consciousness of belonging together by means of re-identification. Invention of a new identity, usually by means of return to the past, gradually became the basis for a reconfiguration of nations and the establishment of new states in our region of Europe. It was a process that changed the political geography of Central Europe. In place of the complicated “great” Habsburg state, the “need” for which was emphasized by both František Palacký and József Eötvös, although each in his own way, various “nation” states were created, although few of them could be considered entirely ethnically homogeneous. Slovakia was also “born” in the context of this change.

“Revival” was the process of change launched by the ethnic enthusiasts – nationally conscious intellectuals. Thus, “revival” of the nation was a sort of nation-forming strategy, starting from the idea of the contrast between the “artificial” state as an institution created by a group of people, and the “natural” community of language and culture existing independently of the state, but not always in an equally developed and prospering state. Therefore, revival is a strategy that aims at the “re-imagining” of a collectivity, which is thought to have declined, become weak, insufficiently self-conscious and unable to get itself included in the history books. We can regard revival, which begins with identification of weakness and the feeling that this situation is unacceptable, as a *romantic* strategy, in the framework of which the nation is seen as a collective being, comparable to the individual human being, as a sort of living *organism*, which can be “re-awoken” and led to a new life and new expression of its identity. It is primarily a matter of cultivation of self-awareness, of spreading the feeling of solidarity. It is not a matter of *reforming* existing state institutions, changing the method of exercising power or bringing previously excluded groups into the political process. It is not initially concerned with institutional reconstruction. Revival is connected with the process of cultural

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*Communities*. London : Verso, 1990, p. 70.

- 3 Perhaps with the exception of the Hungarian or Magyar nation, the protagonists of which relied on the strong political tradition of the noble nation – the *natio hungarica* and dreamed the romantic dream of a strong Hungarian state. Their competitors compensated for their “smallness” with the greatness of Slavdom, its numerical predominance and with the humanitarian messianism of the oppressed. However, the last political word of the Slavonic tribal nationalism of Ľudovít Štúr in *Slavdom and the World of the Future*, which addressed “our tribes” and pilloried the “foreign”, was the wish for a Slavonic-Russian Empire, because “Russia has power, immense power, and so also the mission and the right to sweep away all the Slavonic separatist tendencies and claim for herself hegemony over the whole family of Slavonic nations.” ŠTÚR, Ľudovít. *Slovanstvo a svet budúcnosti*. (Slavdom and the World of the Future). Bratislava : Slovenský inštitút medzinárodných štúdií, 1993, p. 140.

modernization of a multi-lingual population in the framework of a pre-modern state with a society segmented into estates. Revival is not initially a strictly political, but an *identity strategy*, which is only gradually politicized in reaction to the complex situation arising from state measures aiming to achieve the homogenization of the population, especially in the sense of introducing a new official language,<sup>4</sup> which threatens the variety of the existing pre-modern multi-lingualism and the educated elites and cultures based on it.

**The ethnic enthusiasts and their style of thinking – enthusiasm.** “Revival” was a process of change initiated by nationally conscious intellectuals. The *ethnos* and not the *polis* was in the centre of their attention. This fact is expressed in awareness of a dual loyalty,<sup>5</sup> expressed as “love of nation” and “love of homeland”, with the nation regarded as more valuable and more permanent than the homeland, which is only “dead soil”. In verse 244 of *Slávy dcera* (Sláva’s Daughter), Ján Kollár expressed it as follows: “*Do not hold sacred the name of the homeland,/ the name of land in which we live,/ we bear our true homeland only in our hearts.*”

Thinking related to the *ethnos* did not generate political theory or critical historiography, but mainly myths, national narratives and ideas, which aimed to achieve the spiritual mobilization of the language community. However, this activity finally led to politics in the form of demands for the recognition of the nation as a political entity. Thus ethnicity, originally manifested as a non-political matter, that is, as an emphasis on difference of cultural characteristics or the identity of a group of people, gradually became a political problem.

It is necessary to distinguish between revival as the mobilization of a group and reform as the adjustment of the political mechanisms of the country. However, this distinction between revival and reform, between activity directed towards shaping the identity of a nation and activity aiming at the reconstruction of institutions and the rules for their functioning concerns the initial situation, since the reconstituted nation, affirming its identity, began to act politically, when it wanted to anchor itself in the political space as an entity. Thus the group first constituted its identity with a national narrative and a codified written language, and then demanded political recognition for itself.<sup>6</sup> Codification of the written language is a sort of civilizing operation in the sense that it subjects the “natural” mother tongue to linguistic norms.

4 ŠUHAJDA, Ľudovít. Maďarizmus v Uhorsku z právnej, historickej a rečovej stránky. (Magyarism in the Kingdom of Hungary from the legal, historical and linguistic points of view). In ORMIS, Ján V.: *O reč a národ: Slovenské národné obrany z rokov 1832 – 1848*. Bratislava 1973, p. 275. Šuhajda’s polemic dates from 1834.

5 However, among Slovak intellectuals it was originally complementary, consciousness of ethnic identity was submerged in consciousness of patriotism towards the Kingdom of Hungary. See: BROCK, Peter. *Slovenské národné obrozenie 1787 – 1848*. (The Slovak National Revival 1787 – 1848). Bratislava : Kaligram, 2002, p. 40, 119. He refers to the text by Michal SEMIAN: *Kratičké Hystorycké Výpsánj Knžat a Králů Vherských* (A Concise History of the Princes and Kings of Hungary) (1786).

6 Enthusiasm is the initial conceptual movement, which should end, when the national movement acquires strength and is no longer dependent on mobilization strategies. At this moment, it already demands material thought and action.

Ethnic nationalism in support of a still unrecognized collective identity is characterized by a certain style of thinking, which we could call enthusiasm. It involves enthusiasm for a particular “we”, it is an enthusiasm for identity. This style of thought is romantic. There is no unity of view among the scholarly community on exactly what is romanticism or romantic thought. However, it is possible to state that it is thought, which starts from perception of a state of threat to existence, of disadvantage and dissatisfaction, that it is nourished by conflict between the inner and outer worlds. Collective identity is built by a series of constructs interpreting the relationship of the imagined community to itself and to the world, against the background of strained relations with the foreign.

Romanticism is associated with awareness of not being established in the world, of inability to act directly. It does not stimulate direct action on the basis of a natural feeling of power and natural love of action. Romantic thought manifested as enthusiasm for a particular “we”, in our case for the ethnic nation, the depressing present state of which has to be replaced by a bright future, is an expression of collective existentialism, attachment to self, it is an expression of an effort to make a weak group strong, or, to be more precise, to make a non-entity into an entity. This type of thinking reacts to an unfavourable reality with the pathos of resistance and the energizing gesture of “spiritual” creativity. Not for nothing does the “spirit of the nation”, as a sort of unconquerable essence of the collective life of the nation understood as an “individual organism” dominate in Central Europe over the “spirit of the law” as the institutional-political quality causing flourishing or decline by the same method of organized union of the inhabitants. It is not the “artificial state”, but the “natural nation” that represents the basic unit of “history” and functions as the stage for national characters.

In ethnic enthusiasm, history is not seen as the arena for memorable words and deeds, but as a *process* of development, in which nations are “tried and tested”.<sup>7</sup> Ethnic enthusiasm favours the *philosophy of history* over the philosophy of politics. From there, it is only a short step to the division of nations into historical and unhistorical. Hegel himself, we would now say politically incorrectly, mentioned “dark nations”<sup>8</sup> in his *Philosophy of History*, meaning nations without historical status, the spiritual life of which is dominated by fairytales and legends. However, the “darkness” was a state the ethnic enthusiasts wanted to overcome and replace with a new historicity.

Ethnic enthusiasm is not a spontaneous action, it is a reaction and is usually connected with the emotion of anger. It emerges from tension between “us” and the foreign “them”. The factor of hostility to the foreign has, to some degree, a constitutive function, which stimulates comparison and leads to the crystallization of a group consciousness, which feels itself to be under pressure and reacts through intellectuals able to present a new interpretation of the national group. We could say that the nation means the intellectuals. They are the authors of the myths or national narratives as a means of strengthening collective self-consciousness and in this sense, these myths are not only a sort of

7 However, this is more Hegelian than Herderian philosophy, since the latter is pacifist oriented and “green” with astonishment over the variety of national organisms forming the many coloured humanity.

8 HEGEL, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich. *Filozofia dejín*. (The Philosophy of History). Bratislava : Slovenské vydavateľstvo politickej literatúry, 1957, p. 10.

“invention”, but also a compensating mechanism, adequate to the situation and available power of the nation, which again has to prove itself as an entity.

Anger helps to identify an external enemy, but “internal” enemies also appear. They are the renegades, who have detached themselves from the nation to which they belong “by origin”. The occurrence of such a phenomenon indicates that such nationalism is not based on civil individualism, where the individual is given the possibility of choice, but is in the grasp of collectivist thinking that submerges the individual in the collective “we”, which is involved in a collision of groups. Such nationalism is holistic. Nations appear in the thinking of ethnic enthusiasts as individuals, the principle of individualism applies for nations, but not for the individuals as members of the nation.

The discourse of ethnic enthusiasm distinguishes between a defensive “us” and the aggressive “foreigner” as well as showing so-called groupism,<sup>9</sup> that is, a view of society and history based on national categorization. It is characterized by mythologizing returns to the past, on the basis of which a national narrative is produced. However, this is not critical historiography, rather it serves the aim of “revival”, which means reconstituting the national unit. This is assumed to have had its own state and budding civilization in the past, but as a result of defeat or other “unfortunate history”, this did not continue. If we want to cite a Slovak case, one of the founders of the current of Slovak nationalism, which became dominant, Jozef Miloslav Hurban stated that “*we have no history*” but “*only the prologue to it*” (Great Moravia), that “*the sons of the Tatras*” are “*only the primary characters, who have still never appeared in their own right.*”<sup>10</sup> However, this paradoxically nihilist historicism did not lead to capitulation before history, to renunciation of the claim to future historicity, but rather to a repeated appeal to history for a programme, which would express the will of the ethnic enthusiasts that the nation they represented would become a subject of history, that they would again appear under their national name. The text *Demands of the Slovak Nation* from May 1848 also reflects this theme. We can find in it the relevant terminology of ethnic revolution.

In fact, the nation and its members, identifiable by language, contributed to the “creation of history”, if we express it romantically, but they did so under the banner of ethnic or national estrangement and their achievement was on a foreign national account. At

9 Even the briefest look at nationally oriented texts from the 19th century informs us that disputes are solved in the coordinates of “national origin”. They speak of Slovaks, Magyars, Germans and so on. The term “Magyars” may designate native speakers of the Hungarian language, but if it means the originators of the assimilation policy, it indicates a political class with power, so that the “Magyars” are the ruling group. However, this group is exclusive, it relates only to persons with position and property, the great majority of whom supported linguistic Magyarization. This group did not include the great majority of native speakers of Hungarian from the so-called lower classes. The nation in the context of the Kingdom of Hungary meant people with privileges. Later, in the period of Dualism, the term “unitary Hungarian political nation” theoretically included all citizens, but in practice it meant only those, who fulfilled the criteria of the property census. It was more ideal than reality. Where the native speakers of Slovak were concerned, it is not clearly researched how they were segmented: ethnic enthusiasts, pro-Hungarian (“Magyaróni”), lower classes. In any case, contemporary texts show that they were not a solid mass with clear consciousness of belonging together. The population of the Kingdom of Hungary in the 19th century did not form a modern cohesive society.

10 HURBAN, Jozef Miloslav. *Životopisy a články*. (Biographies and Articles). Ed. Rudolf Chmel. Bratislava : Tatran, 1973, p. 116, 118.

this point, it is possible to identify some difference of approach between confessionally different Slovak ethnic enthusiasts on the question of the historicness of the Slovaks. I quoted Hurban's statement on the lack of history, but in the circle of Slovak intellectuals, especially among those who belonged to the Catholic Church, the Christian mission of Cyril and Methodius to the Slavs, had strong resonance, and it was presented against the background of ethnic tension and difference, with the competing position of the Frankish or German mission. Apart from this, in relation to the later opponents in the nationalizing movement – the Hungarians or Magyars – it provides evidence of earlier Christianization.<sup>11</sup> The Slavs in the region of the later Kingdom of Hungary became Christians earlier than the Magyars and it was concluded from this that the Slavs were more culturally advanced than the Magyars. The Slavonic origin of various Hungarian words related to agriculture and administration provided further evidence of this.<sup>12</sup> This approach deserves attention, because it illustrates the nation forming strategy of the nationally conscious intellectuals, who returned to history for the purpose of shaping the new identity of the future collective entity, which is not recognized, politically represented and institutionalized. In relation to the deficit of political resources and “direct” thinking and action, imagination ran ahead to that, which had to become the future reality. Myths, views and returns to the past emphasize any circumstances, which could compensate for present deficiencies with past glory, in which a promising beginning was interrupted. In this way, it is possible to imagine superiority over the rival or enemy in the present. The memory of early Christianization is a message of this type. The consideration of cultural achievement in imagined competition between ethnic groups or nationalities fulfills a compensating function and has to strengthen the self-consciousness of the group, which lacks political status. Thus, the strategy of building identity comes before the strategy of building institutions, or to be more precise, before political action with the aim of achieving political recognition of the nation and securing its political status.

The competition of nations projected into the past was part of a process of regrouping the population of a pre-modern multi-lingual state exposed to the imperative of modernization, which implied, as Ernest Gellner proved, cultural homogenization, but also the establishment of a political community of equal citizens, in contrast to the segmentation into estates. In fact, in the conditions of pre-modern multi-lingualism, the norm of individual equality of citizens before the law also generated the idea of *national or linguistic* equality in a state with a multi-lingual population.

11 ŠTÚR, Eudovít. Najstaršie príhody na zemi uhorskej a jej základy. (The earliest events in the territory of Hungary and its foundations). In *Dielo v piatich zväzkoch: II. diel*. Ed. Jozef Ambruš, p. 194-238, 236-237. Juraj Sklenár also expressed this view in his work: *Vetustissimus magnae Moraviae situs* (1784). See: BROCK, ref. 5, p. 26-27.

12 Ján Kollár also mentioned “thousands of Slovakisms in the Hungarian language”. KOLLÁR, Ján. *Pamäti z mladších rokov života*. (Memories from the earlier years of life). Bratislava : Mladé letá, 1957, translated by Karol Golán, p. 125. The list of Hungarian words of Slovak origin was a favourite item in national polemics. See e. g.: IVANKA, Milan. *Slováci a Maďari : Politicko-historická úvaha* (1910). Adapted by Anton Kret from a book published by the Komisia Academia Bratislava (1923). Bratislava : Kubko Goral, 1997, p. 18-22.

**Nation and nationalities.** In the Hungarian context of the 19th century, we can trace the competition of two nationalisms: the official state nationalism based on the concept of the political nation, although its symbolism did not lack Magyar ethnic ingredients, and the nationalism of the ethnic nationalities. We find a confrontation of the modernizing concept of the traditional privileged political nation with the Herderian concept of the “natural” organic nation, defined by language. This concept finally achieved historical penetration, because the inclusivity of the political nation remained only a theory and the apparently inclusive political nation was in reality based on exclusivity of property and position.

Before the revolutionary year 1848, the nation was usually understood only as a segment of society, the political nation of the privileged classes – *the natio hungarica*. Reform oriented members of the *natio hungarica*, forming a modernizing elite, worked on a project to transform the society of estates into a society of citizens, as a result of which the “nation” would be opened to the unprivileged inhabitants.<sup>13</sup> A sensitive point in this project of “citizenization” (*polgárosodás*) of Hungary was the later found to be naive linkage between the political and linguistic modernization of the country based on the assumption of obvious “Hungarianness”. Introduction of Hungarian or Magyar as the new official language accompanied by the verbal excesses of Hungarian linguistic enthusiasm<sup>14</sup> in the pre-March period of publicist writing, threatened the existing tradition of *multi-lingualism* and the associated cultural pluralism, as well as the educated elites, which created, continued and administered the different cultures.

The modernization plan combining social, political and economic reform with Magyarization<sup>15</sup> was not acceptable for the elites representing the “other linguistic groups”. Parallel linguistic revolutions were in progress in the Kingdom of Hungary. They had been stimulated by the Enlightenment reforms emphasizing the usefulness of the languages of the ordinary people for educating the lower classes. The languages of the ordinary people underwent standardization, which made them vehicles for high culture and autonomous national development. They also gradually became the basis for politi-

13 According to its first propagator István Széchenyi, this civil society, as László Péter pointed out, had to be a society in which the members would be equal before the law, which would apply equally for all. Up to 1848, the inhabitants of the Kingdom of Hungary were not administered according to the same laws. The clergy were subject to canon law, the nobility to Werbőczy's Tripartita, towns' people according to town law and the plebs by the noble county administrations. See: PÉTER, László. *Az Elbától keletre*. Budapest : Osiris, 1998, p. 156. According to Péter, Széchenyi's *Hitel* contributed to the view among the Hungarian public that laws are not unchangeable.

14 They evoked reciprocal reactions. For example, Michal M. Hodža swore against the “un-European, Magyaro-Finnish family”, against the Magyars, who he associated with un-European “Asiatic Uralic Siberianism”. HODŽA, Michal Miloslav. *Der Slowak*. Prague : Expedition der slawischen Centralblätter, 1848, p. IV.

15 However, it is necessary to bear in mind that Magyarization had various phases and initially, as a reaction to Jozeph II's reforms, it served the purpose of consolidation and distinction of Hungary as a country with its own constitution in the framework of the Habsburg Monarchy. This step, part of the Hungarian activating slogan *lex, lingua, vestis*, had a political character. The associated phenomenon of *Magyaromania* was independent of ethnic origin. See the novel written in German: CHALUPKA, Ján. *Bendegucz, Gyula Kolompos und Pista Kurtzforint*. Leipzig 1841 (first Slovak edition 1953). Magyaromania as a fashion wave differed in method from linguistic Magyarization.

cal demands, which the aristocratic Hungarian reformers underestimated. Therefore, we can speak of a *politicization of linguism* as a concept competing with “citizenization” associated with the Hungarian language. The competing concept of Hungarian-Magyar civil nationalism developed from linguism. Its representatives demanded political status for the linguistically represented nations. If nationalism is the “marriage of the state with culture”,<sup>16</sup> in the case of the Kingdom of Hungary, the problem arose of how to solve the fact of pre-modern multi-lingualism and the reality of multiple efforts to build a high culture with the aim of constituting a united nation of citizens. Did there have to be various “nationalities” but only one nation of citizens, or did the nationalities have to become political categories, that is nations?

In Hungarian political discourse, a *nation* was regarded as a political community or union of those inhabitants, who possessed political rights. The inhabitants of the country classified according to language and customs were regarded as nationalities. The nationalities consisted mainly of countrymen or peasants.<sup>17</sup> They were represented by their intellectuals – ethnic enthusiasts conscious of their origin, but especially of their roots in confessionally determined cultures connected to some degree with the popular and national language. The confessional cultures, Catholic and Protestant, have decisive importance as seed beds of popular nationalisms<sup>18</sup> and it is also impossible to overlook the stimulus the languages of the common people received during the Enlightenment as means for the most effective education of the masses.

**The popular nationalism of the ethnic enthusiasts.** As we already said, the Kingdom of Hungary was a land with two competing nationalisms: aristocratic – reformist and popular – patriotic. The latter was directed towards the “plebs”, that is the unprivileged classes excluded from political life.<sup>19</sup> The nationally conscious intellectuals took up the cause of the “plebs”,<sup>20</sup> that is the small farming population or “small farming nation” as Emil Stodola put it. In opposition to the nationalism of the aristocratic reformers, considering the abolition of privileges and the opening of the traditional privileged nation to the other classes in society, the linguistic *emancipation* nationalism of the *ethnic enthusiasts*<sup>21</sup> was formed to represent the “ordinary people” as a linguistic community

16 GELLNER, Ernest. *Podmínky slobody : Občanská společnost a její rivalové*. (Conditions of liberty. Civil society and its rivals.). Prague : Centrum pro studium demokracie a kultury, 1997, p. 94.

17 The terms *peasants/peasant populations* was not used in Slovak writings. The expression *rolník* is used instead of *sedliak*. It seems that the term *sedliak* has a negative colouring.

18 In this context, it is worth mentioning that in the 18th century, the word *nacio* was used in Slovakia to mean members of “this church or that language”. PRAŽÁK, Albert. Československý národ. In *Sbírka přednášek extense University Komenského v Bratislavě. Svazek 10*. Bratislava 1925, p. 47.

19 It is necessary to bear in mind that the aristocratic state-political nationalism also had a significant linguistic component, which the nationalities perceived as ethnic. In the end, the official nationalism was implemented under the slogan of *Magyarization* and not “citizenization”. The political publicist Gusztáv Beksics distinguished between voluntary and forced Magyarization.

20 The so-called *honoratiori* had an ambivalent position. Many of them were active in publicist writing and reflected the situation in the country on the basis of their knowledge.

21 From their point of view “citizenization” was manifested as Magyarization and Magyaromania. The politics of language and culture was in the foreground of their attention and not the possibility of acquiring purely civil and political rights. As a result of its linguistic component and symbolism, Hungarian



with an essence, culture or *Volksgeist*. The ordinary people, from the sociological point of view the lower classes were idealized and romanticized into a model linguistic and cultural unit represented by songs and poetry.<sup>22</sup> This ambivalent concept of the ordinary people was fully manifested in the dispute between the supporters of “Old Slovak” and Štúr’s finally successful “popular” new Slovak. The unflattering statements about the new Slovak, pointing to its social origin are eloquent testimony. Apart from this, we can observe throughout the 19th century, a difference in mentality between the ethnic enthusiasts and the ordinary people as a social group. It is enough to mention the name of Záborský,<sup>23</sup> but in the end also Hurban and Štúr. Škultéty also wrote the following sigh: “*All of us lovers of the Slovak people look at it theoretically, and so it seems that we do not love it as it is in reality, but only as each of us imagines it.*”<sup>24</sup> There was an abyss between the mostly romantic thinking of the majority of ethnic enthusiasts and the everyday practical thinking of the ordinary people. Long before Michal Chorváth, author of the text “The romantic image of Slovakia”, Štefan Marko Daxner wrote the following: “*But our people do not see this. They did not care what language was used in the offices, as long as Mr. district administrator and Mr. cashier at the payments office praised them for regular payments of tax. To them, a Hungarian from Lower Gemer was closer as an inhabitant of the County of Gemer, than a Slovak from another county such as Novohrad, Zvolen or Liptov. Our people did not have a feeling of national solidarity, it was as if they did not have national consciousness. Therefore, no manifestation or action in support of national equality could be based on the ordinary people. They were used to being an instrument in the hands of the powerful, they only looked at the powerful, and when the powerful quarrelled about their interests, the ordinary people said the familiar: ‘May God help those, who want the best’, but they did not go into action, because it could turn out badly and then they would give a person cause.*” Daxner proposed “multiplication of the intelligentsia” that is schools as medicine for this illness<sup>25</sup>. As Peter Kellner Hostinský said, the ethnic enthusiasts wanted to win for the Slovak people “the status of a nation”. The nation in this context meant the political status derived from the unit of the *natio hungarica*.<sup>26</sup>

However, on the other hand, the ethnic enthusiasts were dependent on the ordinary people as the potential basis for their influence. The ordinary people were more or less imaginary, but also a potential basis for the political activity of the ethnic enthusiasts, since the Slovak yeomanry remained a “dry branch”.

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nationalism tied to state political nationalism was seen through an ethnic lens.

- 22 According to Novalis romanticizing meant “*To bestow a high sense upon the common, a mysterious appearance upon the ordinary, the dignity of the unknown upon the well-known.*”. The quotation comes from ARENDT, Hannah. *Imperialism. Part two of the Origins of Totalitarianism*. New York : Harcourt, Brace & World, Inc. p. 47-48.
- 23 PICHLER, Tibor. *Národovci*, p. 100-106.
- 24 ŠKULTÉTY, Slovenské pohľady 1892, p. 66.
- 25 DAXNER, Štefan Marko. *Slovenské pohľady 1892*, p. 305, 306.
- 26 PICHLER. *Národovci*, p. 57.

**The modernization of states versus the “revival” of nations.** Saint-René Taillandier, a French expert on Central Europe, concluded that the centres of intellectual progress in Germany around the turn of the 18th and 19th centuries were the universities, but he stated that in the Austrian Monarchy, Vienna University was not such a centre. The natural sciences were taught there on a satisfactory level for the time, but not the humanities, and so Vienna allegedly could not fulfil the role of an intellectually stimulating centre. This allegedly contributed to the fact that, through their elites, the non-German speaking nations of the Monarchy began to consider their own cultural development. As was seen later, these elites preferred particular linguistic and cultural emancipation to the supra-national idea of civil freedom.<sup>27</sup>

We cannot say that Vienna lacked the will to change things, but it worked from the top down. It was a matter of the will of an absolutist monarch and bureaucratic rationalism with undeniable publicly beneficial features, which wanted to act “for the people without the people”. Josephinism was an attempt at change, which really evoked change – centrifugal change, in spite of its failure.

Josephine modernization was action by the centre, but it provoked a reaction by the periphery. Various centres of peripheral modernization arose and new modernizing elites formed. The parallel processes of the renewal of “historic” state identities and the revival of supposedly naturally existing nations as linguistic communities were launched. The modernization of historic state identities as in the case of the Kingdom of Hungary did not occur without cultural adjustment and homogenization was the Achilles heel of the modernization of Hungary, because it struck against the process of pluralist cultural modernization and later also the politicization of the ethnic nations of the country until then without political representation. Hungaro-Magyar modernization proceeded on two fronts: defensive towards Vienna, and offensive towards the mostly confessional cultures of the nationalities.

In the atmosphere of the time, charged with emotions, there was a division of loyalties and a question of priorities – *love of nation* or *love of country*. Love of nation or the feeling of nationality was a matter of the heart, the homeland was a practical matter, a matter of everyday life. Love of the nation, that is nationality in a form resembling religion (religion and nationality are sisters according to Ján Kollár) as an internal matter and a question of conscience did not establish a relationship to a political unit, but was actually apolitical. A culturally tolerant monarch was acceptable. The important thing was that he did not obstruct the development and use of the national language. In the first phase of the movement for nationality, the national gained a special character divided from politics.

This fact also came to the fore in the revolutionary years 1848-1849, when the Štúr – Hurban wing of the Slovak intellectuals did not attribute to the Vienna government an evaluation of its political quality. In reality it is impossible to ignore the fact that the movement for national linguism had reached the final stage of development into a political movement, when it demanded political recognition of national *individuality* (svojbytnosť) – a typical term of romantic Central European existential nationalism. It

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27 HORSKÁ, Pavla. *Sladká Francie*. Prague : Nakladatelství Lidové noviny, 1996, p. 22-23.

was existential because its creators and bearers – the ethnic enthusiasts – pressed for the recognition of the unrepeatable individuality of the nation as a form of humanity. Political recognition of the individuality of the nation by a unique constitutive act from the regime in power had to open the way to its full development. Štúr's ethnic enthusiasts strove to achieve this aim in the revolutionary years.

From the point of view of political methodology, emancipation politics had the character of presenting requests in the form of petitions. This term has great value as testimony. It indicates much about the style of political activity. Asking by means of a petition meant appealing to the authorities in power in the conviction that, on the basis of the justification for the request, the authorities would grant it and introduce the appropriate measures. It is not revolutionary activity, but action in the style of gravaminism – the traditional approach of the Hungarian estates to solving the problems of the country in relation to the crown, represented by the monarch. The Slovak patriotic elite with its national narrative directed against the Hungarian state also appropriated and applied this approach in the course of the 19th century.<sup>28</sup> Perhaps unconsciously they used in their own activity the political resources and political style they had learnt in Hungary.

Therefore, the first political programme of the Slovak national movement has the symptomatic title: *Demands of the Slovak nation to His Imperial and Royal Majesty, the Parliament of the Kingdom of Hungary, His Highness the Palatine of Hungary and Representative of the King, the Ministry for Hungary and all friends of humanity and the nationalities*.<sup>29</sup> The expression *demands* shows that the authors were not proclaiming their sovereign will, but presenting their claims and proposals for acceptance by the political authorities and the international public. In this context the reference in the title to the “friends of humanity and the nationalities” is interesting. This group obviously did not have the legal power to decide, but the authors apparently understood it as European public opinion, including similarly thinking people from whom they expected moral support. The document is an expression of the romantic imagination and romantic will to act, not taking into account the disproportion between the possible and impossible, between the attainable and the unattainable in relation to their own strength.<sup>30</sup>

From the point of view of the terminology used and of the national narrative, the reference to the *original nation* (pra-národ) in the Kingdom of Hungary reconstituting itself after nine centuries of suppression, during which the country behaved to it like a *step-mother*, is interesting. This historicizing preamble, starting from the period before the creation of the Kingdom of Hungary, deserves attention because through it, the authors postulate a sort of metaphorical historical right, a right of the more original or au-

28 Lubomír Lipták was accustomed to speaking of anti-Hungarian dissidents.

29 Quoted according to *Dokumenty slovenskej národnej identity a štátnosti I.* (Documents of Slovak national identity and statehood I.). Bratislava : Národné literárne centrum, 1998, p. 309. It is usually referred to as the *Demands* (Žiadosti) or *Demands of the Slovak nation*, but it is useful to quote the full title, which better informs us about the thinking of its authors.

30 Scotus Viator also perceived this aspect of the *Žiadosti* when he stated that: “the framers of the petition... have acted under the hysteria of the moment, in clear defiance of practical considerations”. He also cites the French saying *Qui trop embrasse, mal étreint*. SCOTUS, Viator. *Racial Problems in Hungary*. London : Archibald Constable, 1908, p. 97.

tochthonous inhabitants.<sup>31</sup> Thus the representatives of Štúr and Hurban's form of Slovak nationalism not only presented natural right demands for the public use of language, but also historically based claims in the form of historical memories.

This means that it is not a purely linguistic nationalism, but also a sort of historical idealism or "legal archaeologism".<sup>32</sup> The authors of the *Demands* thus testified to the era of the Slovak as a "mere appendix" by which the ethnic enthusiasts understood the state of lack of individuality of their nation and its covered existence.<sup>33</sup> This is also shown by the attention devoted to national symbols such as colours and the flag, although they still proposed red and white. They significantly spoke of the nationalities of the Kingdom of Hungary as "Hungarian nations", meaning that in the sense of Hungarian political discourse, where the nation has the meaning of a political community, the communities of inhabitants with "other languages" are described as nations, which attributes political status to them. This actually expresses an effort to achieve the pluralist nationalization of the Kingdom of Hungary, to guarantee of political status to the "nationalities", that is it was primarily about the rights of nations and only secondarily about the rights of individual citizens. The individuality of the nation was in the foreground of attention.

This preamble contains an indirect rejection of the existing character of the country and proposes nothing more or less than its reconstruction on the basis of equality of nationalities, which implies national territorialization. It proclaims the entry of the ethnic nation into the political space, and essentially proposes absolute linguistic equality, a sort of federalism of nations. The overall statement of the *Demands* is a symbolic detachment or distancing from the existing "Hungarist" tradition of the Kingdom of Hungary. It represents an idea and indication of a new concept of the Hungarian state without connection with the basic changes introduced by the Hungarian Parliament, the tradition of the *natio hungarica* or its reform oriented part in the revolutionary atmosphere as expressed in the March laws. This shows the incompatibility of Štúr and Hurban's current of the Slovak ethnic enthusiasts with the Hungaro-Magyar political elites and their action outside the Hungarian institutional framework.

It appears that Štúr, who belonged to the reformist parliament, established no contact with his parliamentary colleagues. Štúr and Hurban's ethnic enthusiasts were a sort of extra-parliamentary opposition in the revolutionary years. It seems that although the *Demands* were also addressed to parliament, it was not the decisive forum for political

31 The argument of autochthonicity, but with a different intention, is also given by Juraj PAPÁNEK in his work: *Historia gentis Slavae* (1780). See: TIBENSKÝ, Ján. *Chvály a obrany slovenského národa*. (Praises and defences of the Slovak nation). Bratislava : SVKL, 1965, p. 109-112.

32 The term archaeological politics was introduced to discourse about politics by Ernest Renan. In a letter to David F. Strauss, he wrote: "*Ihr (Deutschen) habt anstelle der liberalen Politik das Banner archäologischer und ethnographischer Politik entfaltet, diese Politik wird euch zum Verhängnis werden. Die vergleichende Philosophie, die ihr geschaffen und zu Unrecht auf das Feld der Politik übertragen habt, wird euch übel mitspielen. Die Slawen werden sich dafür begeistern: ... wie könnt ihr glauben, die Slawen würden euch nicht zufügen, was ihr andern antut?*" Quotation from: KROCKOW, Christian Graf von. *Von deutschen Mythen : Rückblick und Ausblick*. Stuttgart : DVA, 1995, p. 184.

33 On "being an appendix" see: PICHLER, Tibor. *Národovci a občania : O slovenskom politickom myslení v 19. storočí*. (Ethnic enthusiasts and citizens : On Slovak political thought in the 19th century). Bratislava : Veda, 1998, p. 52.

activity in Štúr's view. Nobody really regarded them as partners, and this also applies to the representatives of Vienna, in the eyes of which Štúr was a communist. However, with the benefit of hindsight, we can see that the group of Štúr and Hurban became the group, whose idea of national individuality or independence was fulfilled and whose national narrative became dominant. However, when considering history, it is necessary to avoid national narratives, which follow the line of the fulfilment of a particular pattern. Such an approach impoverishes and simplifies the picture of history. It is also necessary to say that Štúr's group did not represent the opinion of all Slovak intellectuals, who varied in their political views and their views on the development of their nationality. By reading contemporary sources, we can convince ourselves of the variety of views and positions.

**Launer's Central European Slavism and Hungarian political identity – Launer's Slovak Hungarianism.** As I already said, it is necessary to distinguish between the class of Slovak intellectuals and ethnic enthusiasts as an elite aiming at the development of a national movement with its conceptual component in the form of a national narrative and its practical component, in which we can include the codification of the new written language. The Slovak intellectual class was heterogeneous in its views and also included personalities, who disagreed with the approach of Štúr and Hurban. Their views on the cultural and political modernization of Hungary and of the whole of Central Europe deserve attention in spite of the fact that "history" did not confirm their efforts, or perhaps precisely in spite of this.

In this context, it is necessary to mention Launer's conception of cultural modernization among the Slavs, not on the basis of the romantic concept of the nation as an original community of language and customs, but on the basis of appropriation of the cultural, political and general civilized standards of the time, because according to his Hegel influenced ideas, a particular nation dominated in each period. However, it did not dominate as a "nation", but as a bearer of achievement in civilization. For his time, which he describes as Western European, Launer identifies the cultural functions of four countries: Italy, France, England and Germany. There was a cultural division of labour between them: the Italian spirit is responsible for art, the French for politics, the English for economics, the German for philosophy and speculation. He says that the Slavs, especially those of Central Europe will reach the modern level by appropriating the cultural achievements in these areas, while continuing the division of labour, on the basis of certain spiritual assumptions. The Poles were allegedly destined for "translation" of the French role, the Croats for the Italian, the Russians for the English and the Czechs, Moravians, Silesians and Slovaks for the role of the German spirit.<sup>34</sup> By "translation", Launer did not mean blind imitation, but intellectual and practical appropriation on the basis of their own needs. Štěpan Launer was author of the text: *The nature of Slavdom with special regard for the written language of the Czechs, Moravians, Silesians and Slovaks*

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34 Samuel HOIČ, author of the brochure *Sollen wir Magyaren warden?* (1833). Also emphasizes the important function of German mediated education for the Slovak, mainly Lutheran intellectuals, as also does Michal M. HODŽA in the introduction to: *Der Slowak* (1848).

published at Leipzig in 1847 and showing a definitely anti-Štúr undertone. Ctiboh Zoch placed him among the “*creatures of Slovak non-Slovakness*”.<sup>35</sup>

Launer did not identify with Štúr’s idea about the passivity of the Slovaks in Hungary, and he professed the consciousness and identity of a citizen of the Kingdom of Hungary. He accused Štúr of nihilism because he chose the uncultivated popular dialect as the written language and put it in place of the traditional literary language – that of the Czech Kralice Bible. He criticized Štúr as a teacher for undervaluing education in the form of learning important information from the fields of the natural sciences, humanities, mathematics, while indoctrinating the young with historicizing national enthusiasm and poetry. He also criticized the fact that Štúr’s movement and its ambitious project lacked financial resources. Launer’s idea of culture was not romantic, but enlightened. He explained the character of politics from the type of religion.

He identified Catholicism with authoritarianism, conservatism and emphasis on the external, and Protestantism with liberalism, constitutionalism and independent convictions. He declared himself to be a Protestant liberal, an opponent of absolutism and aristocracy. On this basis, he supported the Hungarian liberals of the revolutionary period. He saw revolutionary changes in Hungary as guarantees of political progress, which he intended to assist by publishing Hungarian newspapers in the Slovak language. He wanted to explain the achievements of the revolution and political events to the Slovak speaking inhabitants of Hungary. He was clearly one of the intellectuals, who accepted the political equation of the Hungaro-Magyar civil liberals, and he did not see an unacceptable demand in the appropriation of diplomatic language, if it was part of the change towards the formation of a citizens’ Hungary. However, his effort to publish pro-government newspapers in the Slovak language for the sake of political enlightenment may show the importance of the question of the non-Hungarian speaking inhabitants of Hungary and their participation in the social and political life of the country.

Participation in political activity in the Kingdom of Hungary and the building of a Hungarian civil society required communication in the national languages, although as Daniel Rapant put it, these had only an auxiliary function. As his project for publishing Hungarian newspapers in the Slovak or actually the Biblical Czech language shows, this task could not be secured exclusively by Hungarian as the official language.

Launer saw the Central European Slavs in the context of the development of Western Europe as nations involved in the context of European spiritual development,<sup>36</sup> in contrast to the Russians, who were still uncrystallized. After the appropriation of modern cultural standards, he thought they had the possibility of making their own spiritual contribution. He attributed to the Hungarians the practical, political talents of the English

35 COCHIUS, Ctiboh. Ohlas proti ohlášení. In *Orol tatránski III*, p. 606-607.

36 In 1841, E. Štúr saw things similarly, when he wrote: “*Unter die Aegide der Humanität flüchten sich daher die Slaven, besonders die im Herzen Europas siedelnden Westslaven, um unter diesem Schild für die Erhaltung ihrer Nationalität und ihrer Sprache, in welcher die Elemente ihrer religiösen und intellektuellen Bildung wurzeln, um sich anzuschliessen an die Reihe der westeuropäischen Völker; von denen das Licht und die Macht in alle Weltteile ausgeht.*” ŠTÚR, Ľudovít. Die Entnationalisierung der Slaven in Ungarn (1841). In RAPANT, Daniel. *Slovenský prosbopis z roku 1842. II. Diel*. Lipt. Sv. Mikuláš : Transcius, 1943, p. 266-267.

and French spirit, oriented towards practice, and to the Slovaks a talent for the purely theoretical and speculative. In the 1848 revolution, he supported the government, emphasizing his Slovak ethnic identity and Hungarian civil identity.<sup>37</sup> In the pamphlet: *The dangerous direction of Štúr's Slovakism* (1848), he stated that the Kingdom of Hungary contained *slavicae gentes* (nationalities), but not a *slavica natio*, and that the Slovaks of upper Hungary formed a nation only in combination with the Czechs and Moravians, but not a separate nation in Hungary, as history allegedly proved, since if the Slovak speaking inhabitants of Hungary were a separate nation with centre-forming ability, they would long ago have been territorialized or territorially distinguished.

Thus, he stated that a self-centring tendency had not appeared and allegedly this would not change in the future. However, this was the focus of the dispute between him and "Štúr's party", which represented the programme of Slovak nation forming, territorialization and simply the will to be a nation. Launer did not trust this programme and regarded it as unachievable.<sup>38</sup> He proved to be a bad prophet when he claimed that the Slovaks of Hungary would never form a separate nation, because they had not shown the ability to act under their own "symbol" and their own "colours". With an erroneous, although attractive optimism, he stated that *"these unavailing efforts lead only to anger leading to quarrels about nationality from our life and these are already gradually waning so that people will no longer be asked: 'are you Slovak or Magyar,'"*<sup>39</sup> but only *"are you a true citizen of our homeland Hungary"*.<sup>40</sup>

Launer was a Hungarian constitutionalist, who did not understand Štúr and Hurban's policy of demanding national rights outside the institutional mechanism of Hungarian politics and without appreciation of the civil and political achievements of the revolution. He regarded Štúr as a fanatic.<sup>41</sup> He thought the results of the revolution initiated by parliament in Hungary were progressive and deserved support from the citizens. He declared that he was a Slovak, but that he was one of those, who *"only learn and know Slovak so that we can inform our nationality about the aims of this country"*<sup>42</sup>. He stated that the Hungarian government only wanted to secure the diplomatic status of the Hungarian language in the Kingdom of Hungary, and not its introduction to the elementary schools and application in the teaching of religion, arithmetic, geography and so on, as was later enacted by the Apponyi laws, since that would be stupid.<sup>43</sup> In this sense, we can regard Launer as a supporter of Eötvös' liberalism and the concept of a Hungarian political nation.

37 Ladislav Bartholomeides formerly held a similar combination of Slovak ethnic and Hungarian political identity. See: BROCK, Peter, ref. 5, p. 142-143.

38 LAUNER, István. *A štúrféle tótság veszedelmes iránya*. Budán : Bagó Márton, 1848, p. 5.

39 Launer also noted enthusiasm for nationality and feelings of "rancour and hatred" on the Hungarian side. See: LAUNER. *Povaha Slovanstva*. (The nature of Slavdom), p. 202.

40 LAUNER, ref. 39, p.201.

41 LAUNER, ref. 38, p. 11.

42 LAUNER, ref. 38, p. 15

43 LAUNER, ref. 38, p. 10.

However, from the middle of the 1870s, the Hungarian political establishment gradually adopted the policy of forced assimilation, namely of pathological homogenization.<sup>44</sup> At the same time, the process of extending political rights stopped so that the declared aim of equality of citizens before the law remained a problem. Civil cohesion remained an ideal rather than the reality. The united Hungarian political nation declared as the aim, was theoretically inclusive because it related to all citizens of Hungary regardless of ethnic origin.

The right to vote was limited by the high property qualification, which also excluded the majority of speakers of Hungarian from participation in politics. The ethnic Hungarians or Magyars as a nationality were symbolically included in the state in this way. Launer's strategy was not concerned with identity but with modernization, and its author was interested in the quality of the political organization of society. He attached primary importance to the political values of constitutionalism and citizenship, rather than to nationality. Since he died in 1851, it is impossible to know how he would have commented on and analysed the further development in the Kingdom of Hungary. His combination of Czecho-Slovak linguistic and Hungarian political orientation, or to put it a little differently Czecho-Slovak linguist/cultural identity with Hungarian political identity was interesting and unusual. Launer held the view that the Hungarian revolution represented the Protestant political principle of constitutionalism, and he accused Štúr of treason to Protestantism.

**Eötvös on the nationalities and the value of a large state.** The period after the revolutionary years of 1848 – 1849 was an appropriate time for recapitulation and reflection. This was done both by Ľudovít Štúr in his German text: *Das Slawenthum und die Welt der Zukunft* and by József Eötvös, who published *Der Einfluß der herrschenden Ideen des 19. Jahrhunderts auf den Staat* (1851 and 1854) simultaneously in Hungarian and German. While Štúr's work is a symbol of conceptual departure from Central Europe and of a spiritual move to the east – to Russia, where his text was published twice in Russian translation and Štúr himself is regarded as a possible inspiration for Danilevsky's *Russia and Europe*,<sup>45</sup> Eötvös, the Hungarian Tocqueville,<sup>46</sup> broke his head on the organization of Habsburg Central Europe. For him, the dilemma was clearly the problem of the nationalities and analysis of the possibilities for their equalization, pursuing the aim of preserving the great historical states, having in mind the Monarchy as well as preserving the historical individuality of the Hungarian state within it.

44 RAE, Heather. *State Identities and the Homogenisation of Peoples*. Cambridge University Press 2002, p. 5.

45 Mac Master mentions Štúr's name in a passage where he interprets Russian Pan-Slavism. He noted the idea that the political unification of the Slavs has to precede the cultural unification based on the Russian language. See: MAC MASTER, Robert E. *Danilevsky : A Russian Totalitarian Philosopher*. Cambridge, Mass. : Harvard University Press, 1967, p. 293.

46 JOHNSTON, W. A. *Österreichische Kultur- und Geistesgeschichte. Gesellschaft und Ideen im Donauraum 1848 – 1938*. Vienna : Böhlau, 1974, p. 352. Johnston stated that Eötvös' work *Der Einfluß der herrschenden Ideen des 19. Jahrhunderts auf den Staat* (1851 – 1854) was comparable to Tocqueville's work *L' Ancien Régime* (1856). The Austrian historian Gerald Stourzh regarded Eötvös as the most important political thinker from the Habsburg Monarchy in the 19th century



He clearly perceived the fact that the national movement did not originate as a result of agitation,<sup>47</sup> but had its justification in cultural and social processes, manifested in the frequent occurrence of what we called linguistic revolutions. They proved that these languages and the associated intellectual communities were participating in the development of civilization in general.<sup>48</sup> Eötvös accepted the legitimacy of the linguistic demands of the nationalities and recognized that solution of the nationality question was the key to the stability of the region. Liberalization and civilization in the form of the “citizenization” of society remained a fiction in his view, if it was not linked to solution of the justified demands of the nationalities for public use of their languages and free development of their nationalities.

The question of nationality complicated implementation of the ideas of liberty and equality, which, in Western Europe, were legal claims linked to individuals, namely citizens. However, in Habsburg Europe, the decisive individuality from the nationalist point of view was the nationality, which was understood as membership of a linguistically defined community. The ethnic enthusiasts understood nations as living organisms, as individualities in which the individual was immersed.

In this region, the emancipation of the individual citizen was complicated or conditioned by the emancipation of the national communities acting as collective individualities demanding the loyalty and subordination of their members, namely those born into the particular language community. As a result of the “inborn” commandment of loyalty to the ethnic nation (holistic nationalism), the problem of lack of loyalty was seen as a moral failing, because, in the eyes of the nationalists, the nation was sacred and membership of it could not be a matter of choice. It is possible to say that emancipatory nationalism is not associated with freedom and equality from the point of view of the individual, but from the point of view of the group, namely the nation.

Eötvös understood nationalism – the effort to raise consciousness and the position of the nation – as a power aspiration, and, paradoxically, even in the case of a disadvantaged nationality. National feeling is always connected with the feeling of being exceptional.

*“The basis of every national feeling is the conviction of the priority of belonging to a particular nation, because its spiritual and moral properties surpass those of others, and these higher gifts were either proved in the past or will be applied in the future.*

*The aim is to fully apply this higher gift of the nation, above all so that the strength slumbering in the nation will develop in a way, which will enable it to gain dominance over others, which belong to it.”*<sup>49</sup>

However, Eötvös pointed out that the aim of a nationalism desiring total allegiance is not only recognition, but, in the end, also a dominant position in relation to other nations, but this is not all. He stated that weak, or, to put it better, aspiring nationalisms longed for superiority. They could imagine a feeling of dominance and so symbolically compensate for their temporarily weaker position. The declared aim of emancipatory nationalism was the equality of nations.

47 EÖTVÖS, Josef, Freiherr von. *Die Nationalitäten-Frage*. Budapest : Moritz Ráth, 1865, p. 41

48 EÖTVÖS, ref. 45, p. 30.

49 EÖTVÖS, Joseph, Freiherr von. *Ueber die Gleichberechtigung der Nationalitäten in Oesterreich*. Vienna : Jasper, Hügel & Manz, 1851, p. 17.

Eötvös held the view that it is only a stage on the way to achieving the long-term and final aim of supremacy. He was not only a political theorist, but also a Hungarian patriot, and as such he feared the state forming results of the nationalism of the nations of Hungary – countries with a complicated position in the union of the territories of the Habsburg dynasty. In the principle of equal rights, that is legally guaranteed political-legal status for the “nationalities” and their recognition as “nations”, he saw a means for the destabilization of the state. He did not regard equal rights as a stabilizing solution, because he regarded the achievement of equal rights as only the temporary aim of nationalisms, which were not strong enough to establish their supremacy. He was a supporter of the territorial integrity of the Hungarian state, of one Hungarian political nation, but as the author of the 1868 nationality act, also a politician, who was aware of the mistake of not taking into account the reality of the “multi-lingual character” of the country and the need to satisfy the justified linguistic and cultural demands of the “nationalities”. Satisfaction of the nationalities was a condition for the preservation of the Kingdom of Hungary as a state. Eötvös did not regard the agreement of Budapest with Vienna as a good deal for Hungary, because he realized the necessity and value of civil solidarity for the stability of the state.

The power-political solution was too dependent on the external and changeable constellations. Eötvös’ thinking started from the assumption of the value of a large state for all the nationalities and nations of Habsburg Europe, situated between strengthening and ambitious Germany and powerful Russia, as a guarantee of their independent development, which was possible only if they could find a model of civil cohesion of a nationally diverse population satisfactory for all sides. Eötvös regarded Hungary as a great state and he thought that it would be valuable for its inhabitants if a satisfactory solution to the nationality question was found.

Eötvös was the author of many texts on the question of nationalism, the organization and cohesion of the Monarchy,<sup>50</sup> but his ideas did not become “dominant” in Hungarian political life. In this sense, he shared the fate of many Central European intellectuals, whose thought gives proof of intellectual brilliance, but whose activity was faced with obstacles, or to put it differently, their intellectual gifts did not automatically include the ability to convince others of the correctness of their views. In spite of the fact that he was active in politics and became a minister, he was not a leader, who could put a lasting mark on Hungarian politics. His idea of a Hungarian political nation was potentially politically and civilly inclusive, it promised membership of the nation to every inhabitant of the state, but it would have required further work on the appropriate legislation and continual widening of the right to vote – the best measure of political inclusion. Since Eötvös died in 1871, we cannot know how his views would have developed. In any case, the nightmare of the Hungarian liberals – the break up of the historic state and fear of Russia – could not be solved other than by a consistent and realistic policy, also considering the eventual division of the state.

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50 EÖTVÖS, Joseph, Freiherr von. *Ueber die Gleichberechtigung der Nationalitäten in Oesterreich*. 2nd edition. Vienna : Jasper, Hügel & Manz, 1851. EÖTVÖS, Josef, Freiherr von. *Die Nationalitäten-Frage*. Budapest : Moritz Ráth, 1865.

In spite of its power-political advantage of controlling the state institutions, Hungaro-Magyar nationalism was, from the long-term point of view, a nationalism acting from a feeling of threat and fear. Its strength was uncreatively applied by Hungaro-Magyar political class to the task of blocking the free and open political game, not renouncing the romantic idea of a powerful Hungary. The founders of Dualist Hungary left the political scene and their caution, moderation and apprehensive patriotism retreated from political discourse, opening the way for an official state nationalism, building a nation state by political manipulation of a sort of internal imperialism, dreaming a romantic dream of a Hungarian empire, and blocking the development of political and civil inclusivity, postulated by a united Hungarian political nation.

Eötvös' conception of the free development of nationalities on the basis of the civil and political rights of individuals also had adherents on the Slovak side, for example, in Ján Palárik. Palárik's Austro-scepticism, Hungarian constitutionalism, trust in the productiveness of civil rights and in civil association were comparable to Eötvös' convictions about the value of citizenship for a viable modern political system. Palárik's political views remained to some degree unappreciated in the history of the Slovak national movement, apart from the positive evaluation he received from Bohdan Pavlů in the article *Progressivism and conservatism in Slovakia*,<sup>51</sup> in which he considered the need for the modernization of Slovak politics in the period before the outbreak of the First World War. In contrast to Štúr's posthumous publication *Slavdom and the world of the future*, he did not give up the Central European Slavonic identity. This was manifested in his critical attitude to Russian absolutism in his essay: *On Slavonic solidarity*, which did not hide his sympathy for the Polish national movement.

**The problem of inclusivity and Hungarian power romanticism.** My aim was a historically anchored reconsideration of the idea of nationality as a principle intervening in the political transformation of society during its transition from estates to civil organization. I relied on findings from research into contemporary texts relevant from the point of view of nationalism, with the aim of uncovering particular styles of thinking oriented towards different understandings of the term "nation". Basically, it is possible to identify two: ethnic enthusiasm or emotive thinking on one side, and a method of political thinking directed towards establishing a political community in Hungary on the other. I do not want to say that ethnic enthusiasm should not have a political end or charge. It was characterized by an effort to gain for the nation political recognition and so secure conditions enabling its full development. Ethnic enthusiasm was primarily concerned with the identity of the national community and only secondarily with its political organization. Its bearers did not participate in planning the reconstruction of the institutions of the existing state. Their primary interest was the nation, construction of its identity, codification of its language and its mobilization.

Dualist Hungary was not a stabilized state and neither was the whole Monarchy. The founding act of dualism did not have a strong continuation tending towards the deve-

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51 *Průdy II*, 1910 – 1911, p. 48-65. However, Pavlů was not alone. Palárik was also positively evaluated by "V", author of the series of articles: *Slovanská otázka a Ján Palárik*. In *Průdy II*, 1910 – 1911, p. 5-9.

lopment of a cohesive civil society. Political nation versus ethnic nationality was a hard nut, which was not successfully cracked. Although the Hungarian Parliament passed a nationality act in 1868, it was never implemented, which meant that the experiment of building a cohesive political community according to the concept of a united political nation, was interrupted.

Forcible assimilation was a doubtful and erroneous concept for building a Hungaro-Magyar nation, as István Széchenyi already stated. By blocking the question of widening the right to vote, it stopped the growth of inclusivity of the political community in Hungary. The nation as a political community was distinguished from the nationalities as ethnic communities, which were usually seen as rural.<sup>52</sup> The official Magyarizing nationalism displayed an inherent weakness: On one side, it stopped the growth of the political system because of fears that the development of individual political rights would strengthen the “nationalities” and enable an uncontrollable dynamic of development, but on the other, it massively supported the linguistic and symbolic incorporation of the inhabitants whose mother tongues were not Hungarian. In reality the Hungarian political nation was strongly exclusive and even the majority of ethnic Hungarians or Magyars were excluded from it from the point of view of possession of political rights. However, the ruling political elites refused to accept the fact and the position of the nationality politicians that from the ethnic point of view the native speakers of the Hungarian language were also a “nationality”: They did not want a state of nationalities. Dualist Hungary, especially beginning with the government of Kálmán Tisza, was not a fulfillment of the theory of liberalism proclaimed by Eötvös.

The Kingdom of Hungary did not become a stable political society during Dualism. Its political class did not succeed in working out what should follow the founding act – the building of a political community of citizens on the basis of widened inclusivity and participation, opening the possibilities of democratic development. The rules of fair competition in the political arena were not observed and the division of the historic Hungarian state on a legal basis and in the framework of a procedurally correct decision of the appropriate institutions of political life was an unacceptable and impermissible idea. Eötvös’ fears of an unsatisfactory or non-consensual solution of the nationality question were essentially fulfilled, because of failure to accept the test of the free development of the nationalities on the basis of the development of the civil and political freedom of individuals. Governments gambled on the card of forcible assimilation, political life was directed from the centre, and also according to supporters of a strong Hungarian state such as Gusztáv Beksics, there was no formation of a Hungaro-Magyar civil society, and the segmentation of social groups in the country persisted: *“Is the Hungarian nation not still divided by nationality, confession and social class? Where is the united educated Hungarian society with one centre? Where are the citizens? Where is the middle class developed from the elites of all groups?”*<sup>53</sup> Beksics doubted the effectiveness of external Magyarization, he emphasized the need for internal Magyarization, and although he

52 See e. g. the entry “Slovaks” in the *Pallas Nagy Lexikona*.

53 Beksics’ quotations from the pamphlet: *Társadalmunk és nemzeti hivatásunk* from 1884 are taken from: *Tanulmányok a Magyar és kelet-európai történelemből*. Budapest : Osiris Kiadó, 1998, p. 149.

thought overall assimilation engineering was unrealistic, he did not devote attention to consideration that a civil society, a cohesive society of citizens could be achieved in the nationality conditions of Hungary only on the basis of the application and perfecting of civil freedoms and extension of political participation.

The Hungarian chapter of political modernization can be read as a clash of elites and their concepts of the nation and nationalities. The Hungarian political class, which governed, maintained the political tradition of the noble nation. Under the term “nation” it understood the political community of the citizens of the state, the official language of which was Hungarian, while “nationalities” were understood as groups of inhabitants whose native language was not Hungarian. The category of nationality was not attributed a political, but only a linguistic or cultural character. The “nation” was regarded as a political category, and the “nationality” as an ethnographic category. On the other hand, the political opponents of the ruling circles, the nationality politicians or ethnic enthusiasts understood the “nation” on the basis of the “nationalities”, that is as linguistic-cultural communities, which, however, claimed a privileged position. Therefore, the nationalism of the nationalities demanded for the long-term an equal position for the linguistic nations and their recognition by law, and for the short-term, the application of the nationality act and adoption of universal suffrage.

The Hungarian political class, basing its position on the right of “historical individuals”, rejected division of the Kingdom of Hungary into national units, which also implied the need for cultural homogenization, since the country was not composed of clearly distinguishable nationality territories. It saw division as a serious threat of the disintegration of Hungary or its reduction to a weak state union between uncooperative nations, removing Hungary as a “great state” and possible power-political factor.<sup>54</sup> Thus only the alternatives remained – either grant the “other language” communities the right to free development of their nationalities and free use of their language in public, especially in the lower levels of the state administration (village, city, county), on the basis of recognition of the perfect civil freedom of the individual inhabitants of the country, including in the area of language; or to continue with the linguistically inclusive, but politically exclusive model of the united Hungarian political nation, to carry out linguistic assimilation of the population, especially by assimilating the middle classes of the nationalities. However, it is necessary to say in this context that there was a considerable amount of voluntary assimilation, as Daniel Rapant also stated, and it is also true that the way of life of the gentry was undoubtedly an attractive life-style and model of behaviour, which impressed not only many socially ambitious individuals.

In reality, the members of the Hungarian political nation were those, who fulfilled the property and educational requirements, which also excluded the majority of the ethnic

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54 The origin of dualist Hungary against the background of the foreign policy failures of neo-absolutist Vienna and the exclusion of Austria from German politics was seen by some Hungarian politicians as an unforeseen and unexpected opportunity for Hungary to become the new centre of the Monarchy. This dream of a powerful Hungary or “Hungarian Empire” gained increased intensity around 1900. Compare MERCATOR, *Die Nationalitätenfrage und die ungarische Reichsidee*. Budapest : Moritz Ráth, 1908, p. 33.

Hungarian or Magyar nation or nationality.<sup>55</sup> In spite of the declared principle of equality before the law, Hungarian society was not a society in the true, that is, modern sense of the word. It was segmented politically and socially into several castes and did not have internal cohesion. It is necessary to bear this in mind, when we speak of dualist Hungary as a semi-feudal state. It was a state with retarded processes of political and social inclusion. Its presentation as a united state was only a matter of rhetoric and symbolism. Its political culture was deformed, and *roguery* became part of the working method of politics. The still surviving view that politics is roguery of the powerful has its roots here. Territorial integrity was applied as a dogma and the dominant political circles did not have the courage to extend the right to vote and include a larger number of citizens in the political process, which was blocked in this way. Such a political game, resulting from the inability of the ruling political class, increased the risk of a break up in a macro-political or general European crisis.

Although the Hungarian economy showed dynamism, the country was modernizing, the capital city grew and became an attractive metropolis with extraordinary cultural and intellectual activity, politics remained in a dead end. The political elite gave itself up to power-political romanticism, which painted reality on the basis of unreal ideas and led to a blocking of common sense. This leads to the conclusion that romanticism as an idea, which projects an aim given by a wish, but not by sober reflection of reality, may be applied both in favour of an aspiring nation, which does not have a state, as well as by a nation, which has a state, but not firmly.

## NATION, NATIONALITÄTEN, STAAT: ÜBER DIE POLITIK DES ETHNISCHEN ENTHUSIASMUS

TIBOR PICHLER


Thematisiert wird (1) der Charakter der nationalen Wiedergeburten als Veränderungen, die, ausgehend von der Rekonstruktion der Kultur der Nation einschließlich der Kodifikationen der Schriftsprache, auch eine politische Fortsetzung hatten, das schließlich zur Gründung neuer mitteleuropäischer Nationalstaaten führten. Verwiesen wird auf die Differenz zwischen der politischen Transformation vom Typ „Wiedergeburt“, die auf die Politisierung der zuvor historisch konstruierten Ideologie der Identität der Nation gerichtet ist und der auf der Reform der Institutionen des politischen Lebens begründeten Transformation. Im Mittelpunkt der Aufmerksamkeit stehen theoretische Aspekte der „Wiedergeburt“ als einer Veränderung, die eine sprachlich definierte Nation im politischen Raum verankern will, als einer Veränderung, die wegen der kulturellen Unterschiedlichkeit einen politischen Status fordert.

55 Emil Stodola cites the following episode: “If e.g. Kossuth [the son of Lajos Kossuth – T. P.] wants the introduction of universal suffrage, the leader of the Liberal Party will immediately say: ‘the nationalities will also win by this’ – and so the Magyars cannot have real freedom and they suffer with us. These words from my programme speech were presented by Milan Hodža in parliament.” STODOLA, Emil. *Prelom : Spomienky – úvahy štúdie*. Prague; Bratislava : L. Mazáč, 1933, p. 98.

(2) Der zweite Problemkreis umfasst den konkreten historischen Rahmen der nationbildenden und Nationalisierungsinitiativen in Ungarn unter besonderer Berücksichtigung des slowakischen Falles. Gearbeitet wird mit dem weiteren Begriff der Klasse der slowakischen Gebildeten und mit dem engeren Begriff der slowakischen Nationalisten, was eine von den Nationalisten unterschiedliche Gedankenproduktion zu berücksichtigen erlaubt. Aus der Sicht der Geschichte des politischen Denkens in Ungarn und des Problems des Aufeinandertreffens von mehreren Typen des Nationalismus wird der Eötvös-Theoretisierung der Problematik der politischen Kohäsion Ungarns Aufmerksamkeit gewidmet.

(3) Der letzte Problemkreis betrifft die konzeptionelle Landkarte der widersprüchlichen Nationalisierung Ungarns, die durch die herrschenden Eliten und die Eliten der Nationalitäten initiiert wurde. Analysiert werden Stil und Ideen des slowakischen nationalistischen Denkens.







## THE SOCIAL REPRESENTATIONS OF THE SLOVAKS IN THE NORTH HUNGARIAN MAGYAR REGIONAL PRESS IN THE YEARS 1914 – 1918

LÁSZLÓ VÖRÖS

Vörös, László. The social representations of the Slovaks in the north Hungarian Magyar Regional Press in the Years 1914 – 1918. *Historický časopis*, 2008, 56, Supplement, p. 41-73, Bratislava.

In this study the author analyses the changes of social representations of the Slovak speaking population of the north-western part of the Hungarian Kingdom in the regional Magyar press during the years of the Great War. The article is based on analyses of five Magyar regional newspapers (issued in mainly Slovak inhabited areas), in which the author explores the usage of various categories (such as “people/folk”, “nationality”, “nation”, as well as notions of “loyalty”, “treachery”, and “Pan-Slavism”) and stereotypes as they were utilized in the representations of the Slovaks. The analyses follows how the seemingly subtle changes within the predominant Hungarian/Magyar nationalist ideology of the “Hungarian (political) nation” and particular events in the domestic policy and abroad (the policy of limited cooperation with the leaders of the non/Hungarian nationalist movements pursued by the prime minister I. Tisza on the eve of the World War, and the activities of Czech and Slovak politicians in exile, and of the Czech members of parliament in the Vienna Reichsrat during the last two years of the war) influenced and in fact changed the social representations of the Slovak population within the period Hungarian/Magyar discourse.

Social representations. Hungarian/Magyar and Slovak nationalism. Nationalist discourses. Social categories of nation, nationality and people` World War I, 1914–1918.

One of the central elements of the functioning of nationalism is the social categorization, stereotyping or social representation of “us” and in connection with this also the “self”, in contrast to the other, strange “them”, in a particular defined way universally understandable by the “initiated” “us”.<sup>1</sup> Social categorization, that is the classification of

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1 I use the notion of social representations coming from the Durkheimian tradition, particularly the concept developed by Serge Moscovici. In this understanding, in this paper, social representations refer to the concepts – functioning in the everyday social praxis – denoting (i. e. categorizing) particular parts of a population, usually defined according to a language and/or culture, as a homogeneous and coherent social group, either a “nation”, or a “nationality”, or a “people”. It is characteristic for such social representations to be strongly essentialized and reified in their understandings by the social actors. For them, the social representations of social collectivities are the signifiers (mere neutral labels) of the objective reality. See: MOSCOVICI, S. *Social Representations. Explorations in Social Psychology*. Edited by Gerard Duveen. New York, New York University Press, 2001; MOSCOVICI, S.: Notes towards a description of Social Representations. In *European Journal of Social Psychology*, 18, 1988, 1, p. 211-250; WAGNER, W. et. al.: Theory and Method of Social Representations. In *Asian Journal of Social Psychology*, 2, 1999, 1, p. 95-125; CHARTIER, R.: The World as Representation. In REVEL, J. - HUNT, L. (eds.). *Histoires. French Constructions of the Past*. New York University Press 1995, p. 544-558; CHARTIER, R.: The Powers and Limits of Representation. In CHARTIER, R. *On the Edge of the Cliff. History, Language and Practices*. Baltimore; London : The John Hopkins University Press, 1997, p. 90-103; BOURDIEU, P.: Identity and Representation. Elements for a Critical Reflection on the Idea of Region. In BOURDIEU, P. *Language & Symbolic Power*. Cambridge : Polity Press, 1991, p. 220-228; BRUBAKER, R.: Ethnicity without Groups. In *Archives Européennes de Sociologie*, 43, 2002, 2, p. 163-189; BRUBAKER, R. - LOVEMAN,

people into groups on the basis of a “set of traits”, when the individual is seen as identical in characteristics to the characteristics of the imagined group, with which he is identified, whether it is an “ethnic”, “national”, “class”, “religious” or other group, as well as in the case of stereotyping, is a complex cognitive process, which occurs in various social contexts. These processes became more intensive as individuals became more involved in social life outside their own microcosm, that is with the advance of the processes of modernization especially in the social sphere. The individual inevitably comes increasingly into a situation where he is not only subject to various categorization – by nationality, social position, employment and so on – by both institutions and individuals, he also becomes a chronic categorizer himself. He learns and perceives already existing “images” and stereotypes about himself, about “us” and those “others”, and participates in their reproduction and development. In the conditions of the modern societies of the 19th and 20th centuries, various “ethnic” or “national” classification schemes became widespread, universally understandable and finally essential for understanding the ever more nationalized public life. Categorization, stereotyping and representation are, therefore, complex and closely connected cognitive or mental processes, occurring in various social “fields” and in the most varied contexts. They spread into ever increasing spheres of social life as the processes of modernization progress. We will be concerned in this article with only one of the multitude of forms of categorization, stereotyping and representation, in a precisely defined historical period. As the title of the study already shows, I will analyse, using the example of selected Hungarian language weeklies from the mainly Slovak speaking environment of the northern region of the historic Kingdom of Hungary during the First World War, how categorization and stereotyping was applied to representation of the Slovak population in the press, and how subtle but significant changes in the representation of the Slovaks occurred in the conditions of the World War. However, before starting the actual analysis of the chosen periodicals, I will enable better understanding by briefly outlining the “nationalization context” in the Kingdom of Hungary in the second half of the 19th century, in which “national”, “nationality” and other categories were shaped. I will also very briefly outline how the Slovaks were represented in Hungarian or Magyar discourse in the second half of the 19th century, and how subtle changes and shifts occurred in the image of the Slovaks during this period.<sup>2</sup>

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M. - STAMATOV, P.: Ethnicity as Cognition. In *Theory and Society*, 33, 2004, 1, p. 31-64; MARUŠIAK, J. - FERENCOVÁ, M. (eds.). *Teoretické prístupy k identitám a ich praktické aplikácie*. Bratislava : Veda, 2005.

- 2 In relation to the character of the analysis, I am attempting in this study, I consider it important to devote some attention to questions of terminology. In this text I will not use some key categories inherent in the nationalist practice of the 19th century as *terms of analysis*, so that I can avoid the appearance that these terms objectively reflect in their meanings the social reality of the period in which they were used. Terms such as “nationality” (for example: “Slovak nationality”), “nation” (“Hungarian nation”, “Hungarian political nation”), “people” (“Slovak people”, “Magyar people”) or “pan-Slavists” were used in the discourse of the time and understood as categories naming or reflecting social reality, namely that “nationality” or “nation” are really existing substantial entities with particular qualities, by means of which they can be named and described as realities. Such a perception of these social categories persists to a large extent until today. These are reasons why I have placed these terms in quotation marks in the whole text. In this way, I would like to emphasize that I do not use them as terms of analysis (that is I do not use them to refer to the “social reality” of the 19th century), but only as a reference to a given term as it was *perceived* in the researched period. On the other hand, I will use the term *nationalism* as a category of analysis, and

Hungarian/Magyar nationalism passed through various phases in the course of the 19th century. In different periods, it had varying conceptual bases, thanks to which even the idea of the nation pursued by the nationalist elites in successive periods was not entirely the same.<sup>3</sup> However, the basic ideological starting point in all cases was the doctrine of the “united Hungarian political nation”, which was actually anchored in the preamble to the so-called nationality act of 1868.<sup>4</sup> The idea of the “Hungarian political nation” as a nationalist conception directed towards the linguistic or cultural homogenization of the state was not at all exceptional in 19th century Europe. The French nationalist elite in France, the English in Great Britain and the German in united Germany (especially in regions inhabited by Poles), applied similar policies of integration, homogenization, nationalization or assimilation. Efforts to achieve linguistic and cultural homogenization of the population of the state was the universal political model in the 19th century. It was not pursued only by the nationalist elites in the states of Western and Central Europe. With some time delay, we see similar homogenization or assimilation policies in Russia,

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without any negative connotations – starting from the work of John Breuilly, I will use the term “nationalism” in this work to mean first of all the political movement, which states that: 1. a certain group of people form a “nation” and the movement is its true representative, 2. the interests of the “nation” stand above any other interests, with the “nation” itself regarded as the highest value, 3. the final aim of the nationalist movement is to gain for the “nation” as high a degree of independence or political sovereignty as possible. (See: BREUILLY, J. *Nationalism and the State*. 2nd ed. Manchester : Manchester University Press, 1993, p. 2-3)

A still unsolved problem in Slovak historiography is how to deal with the terminological dichotomy between the terms “Hungarian” and “Magyar” when working with Hungarian language sources. This is caused by the fact that the Hungarian language does not distinguish between the state and ethnic aspects, and uses the word “magyar” for both. I think that this problem cannot be definitively solved. In this study, I will use the slightly untraditional form “Hungarian/Magyar”, when I speak of the nationalist movement pursuing the doctrine of the “Hungarian (political) nation”, that is the nationalism mostly, but certainly not exclusively, promoted by ethnic Hungarians. I think that “Hungarian/Magyar nationalism” before the break up of the historic Kingdom of Hungary should be distinguished from “Magyar nationalism” in the period after 1918 or 1920. The term “Hungarian/Magyar nationalism” more accurately emphasizes the mixed character of the dominant nationalist movement in the Kingdom of Hungary – on one side strongly statist (*Hungarian*) and on the other inevitably interwoven with “ethno-nationalist” sentiments (*Magyar*). A further argument in favour of using this category is the fact that the opinion forming representatives of Hungarian/Magyar nationalism, at least from the 1880s, made an immense effort – specifically in connection with the Slovak language – to remove the dichotomy of the terms “Hungarian” and “Magyar” (“uhorský” and “maďarský” in Slovak) and establish exclusive use of the word “Hungarian” and its derivatives in all possible contexts. On this see note 7. The word “nationality” in English speaking countries ordinarily means citizenship, similarly as the “nation” is usually equated with the citizenry of a state. In Central and Eastern European languages however, the term “nationality” nor “nation” does not refer to citizenship or state. “Nationality” refers 1. to an ethnocultural group (which could be and usually was imagined independently of the notion of the state and its borders); or 2. to a quality of being a member of a “nation” “Nation” was in turn imagined not as merely a sum of citizens, but also, and even more importantly, as a community of common descent, culture, language, habits, etc. Also see footnote 13.

- 3 For an analysis of Hungarian/Magyar nationalism in the 19th century see: KISS, E.: A Typology of Nineteenth Century Concepts of Nationhood. In *East European Quarterly*, 1996, 30, 1 (Spring), p. 47-62. See also the literature cited in note 6.
- 4 Act XLIV/1868 on the equality of nationalities. A Slovak translation of the act can be found in: *Dokumenty slovenskej národnej identity a štátnosti I.* (Documents of Slovak national identity and statehood I.). Bratislava : Národné literárne centrum, 1998, p. 361-366.

Rumania, Serbia and other states of Eastern or South-Eastern Europe as well as outside Europe.<sup>5</sup>

However, the doctrine of the “Hungarian political nation” was not static and in the course of the 19th century it also underwent some developmental changes. As a result of the limited extent of this study, I cannot devote more detailed attention here to the development of this doctrine, which is an integral and key part of the Hungarian/Magyar nationalism of the 19th century. For the needs of this text, we will have to be content with pointing to the shift in the understanding of the term “Hungarian nation” in the 1870s and 1880s. The classic liberal conception of the “Hungarian nation” or “Hungarian political nation”, as articulated in the preamble to the 1868 Nationality Act, declared that “*according to the basic principles of the constitution, all citizens of Hungary form one nation in the political sense: the indivisibly united Hungarian nation of which every citizen is an equal member, regardless of which nationality he belongs to*”. This conception – promoted especially by liberals of the type of József Eötvös and Ferencz Deák – assumed that loyalty to the “Hungarian nation” did not have to be in conflict with the loyalty of non-Magyars to their own “nationalities”. The Nationality Act attempted to find a practical balance between the two types of loyalty, which were assumed to exist, and to define what was and what was not a threat to the integrity of the “Hungarian political nation” or Hungarian state. However, this liberal conception was applied only partially and only for a short time. As I already indicated, in the second half of the 1870s and during the 1880s, there was a shift in the understanding of the conception of the “Hungarian political nation”: Loyalty towards a person’s own “nationality” began to be perceived as incompatible with loyalty to the “Hungarian political nation”. As a result the homogenization policy of the Hungarian/Magyar nationalist elites aimed not only at “political assimilation”, but also at the marginalization of the non-Hungarian languages and cultures in political life, and especially at the elimination of the non-Magyar nationalist movements, which were seen as a permanent threat to the integrity of the state. The shift in the understanding of the idea of the “Hungarian political nation” also brought with it a shift in “nationalist

5 For the case of France see the classic work of WEBER, E. *The Modernization of Rural France, 1870 – 1914*. London : Chato & Windus, 1977; ANDERSON, R. D. *France, 1870 – 1914 : Politics and Society*. London : Routledge, 1977; FORD, C.: Religion and the Politics of Cultural Change in Provincial France: The Resistance of 1902 in Lower Brittany. In *The Journal of Modern History*, 1990, 62, 1, p. 1-33; GUILLOREL, H.: France: Religion, Periphery, State and Nation-Building. In TORSVIK, P. (ed.). *Mobilization, Center-Periphery, Structures and Nation-Building. A volume in commemoration of Stein Rokkan*. Bergen; Oslo; Tromsø, 1981, p. 390-428. On English nationalism see: BAUCOM, I. *Out of Place : Englishness, Empire and the Locations of Identity*. Princeton : Princeton University Press, 1999; see also the already classic work of NAIRN, T. *The Break-up of Britain. Crisis and Neo-nationalism*. 2nd expanded edition. London : Verso, 1981; HECHTER, M. *Internal Colonialism. The Celtic Fringe in British National Development, 1536 – 1966*. London : Routledge & Keagan Paul, 1975, especially chapters 5 and 6. On the politics of German nationalism in the Prussian territories see: BLANKE, R. *Prussian Poland in the German Empire, 1871 – 1900*. Boulder 1981; the same: *Polish-speaking Germans? Language and National Identity among Masurians since 1871*. Köln; Weimar; Wien : Böhlau, 2001, p. 87-114. On the situation in Central and Eastern Europe see: ROSHWALD, A. *Ethnic Nationalism and the Fall of Empires. Central Europe, Russia and the Middle East, 1914 – 1923*. London; New York : Routledge, 2001, especially chapters 2 and 3; WEEKS, T. R. *Nation and State in Late Imperial Russia. Nationalism and Russification on the Western Frontier, 1863 – 1914*. DeKalb : Northern Illinois University Press, 1996, p. 92-109.

rhetoric” and in the representation of the “Hungarian nation” and of the “Non-Magyars”.<sup>6</sup> From the 1880s and especially from the beginning of the 1890s and the turn of the century, a significant shift in the forms of expression about the “non-Magyar nationalities” can be found in the press, in official correspondence and in textbooks for non-Magyar schools.<sup>7</sup> In contrast to the previous period, they spoke less about “nationalities” (“*nemzetiségek*”) and began to use in connection with the non-Magyar inhabitants, the phrases: “people/inhabitants/citizens of non-Magyar speech” or specifically “people of Slovak speech” or only “Slovak people” (“*nem magyar ajkú honpolgárok*”, “*tót ajkú nép*”, “*tót nép*”), or less frequently “citizens of foreign speech” (“*idegen ajkú polgárok*”). Obviously, the word “nationality – nationalities” did not disappear and was still used, but it appeared less frequently and hardly ever in connection with the “Hungarian political nation”. These shifts in means of expression reflect and are the results of changes in the perception of the concept: “(political) nation” in Hungary.

A further immensely important factor not reflected in expert historical literature, is the strict distinction between the Slovak speaking population indifferent to the Slovak national movement, namely the “Slovak people” and the Slovak nationalist elite, namely the “Pan-Slavists”, in Hungarian/Magyar nationalist discourse from the 19th century.

6 On the question of the conception of the “Hungarian political nation” see SZARKA, L. *Szlovák nemzetiségi fejlődés – magyar nemzetiségipolitika 1867 – 1918* (Slovak National Development – Nationality Policy in Hungary 1867 – 1918). Bratislava : Kalligram, 1999, p. 164-172; KATUS, L.: Egy kisebbségi törvény születése. Az 1868. Évi nemzetiségi törvény évfordulójára. (The birth of minorities legislation. On the anniversary of the Nationality Act of 1868). In *Regio. Kisebbségi Szemle*, 4, 1993, p. 99-128; the same: József Eötvös and Ferenc Deák: Laws on Nationalities. In ROMSICS, I. - KIRÁLY, B. (eds.). *Geopolitics in the Danube Region. Hungarian Reconciliation Efforts 1848 – 1998*. Budapest 1998, p. 133-160; GERGELY, A.: A 19. századi magyar nemzetifelfogások. (Hungarian concepts of the nation in the 19th century). In *Mozgó Világ* 1983, no. 3, p. 120-128; PÉTER, L.: Law XLIV of 1868 on the Equality of Nationality Rights and Language of Local Administration. In GLATZ, F. (ed.). *Modern Age, Modern Historian In Memoriam György Ránki (1930 – 1988)*. Budapest 1990, p. 211-218; GOGOLÁK, L.: Ungarns Nationalitätengesetze und das Problem des magyarischen National- und Zentralstaates. In WANDRUSZKA, A. - URBANITSCH, P. (Hg.). *Die Habsburgermonarchie 1848 – 1918. III/2. Die Völker des Reiches*. Wien 1980, p. 1 207-1 303; ISLAMOV, T. M.: From Natio Hungarica to Hungarian Nation. In RUDOLPH, R. L. - GOOD, D. L. (eds.). *Nationalism and Empire. The Habsburg Empire and the Soviet Union*. New York : St. Martin's Press, 1992, p. 159-183.

7 Textbooks are an especially good indicator of the changes that interest us. From the mid 1880s, a great revision of school textbooks began, whether they were in Hungarian or in other languages of the kingdom. The political and “national” as well as the educational points of view were taken into account in this revision. For example, in the case of the textbooks in Slovak, special care was taken to remove the distinction between the terms “uhorský” (Hungarian) and “maďarský” (Magyar). All the translations of Hungarian language textbooks into Slovak from the 1870s, which distinguished between “uhorský” and “maďarský”, were subjected to revision, and the word “maďarský” with its derivatives was entirely excluded. The word “uhorský” was used exclusively in every context. By the turn of the century, the word “maďarský” did not appear in textbooks at all. On the revisions of textbooks see the collection: Magyar Országos Levéltár, Vallás és Közoktatásügyi minisztérium (1867 – 1951), K 305 – Töredék iratok, 1867 – 1947, II. Közoktatási ügyek, Elemi és középiskolai oktatás (1871 – 1944), 96. cs., 1894, 11. tétel (Eltiltott könyvek és térképek jegyzéke). On the question of education and nationalism in Hungary (together with an extensive analysis of the contemporary history textbooks) see: PUTTKAMER, Joachim von. *Schulalltag und nationale Integration in Ungarn. Slowaken, Rumänen und Siebenbürger Sachsen in der Auseinandersetzung mit der ungarischen Staatsidee 1867 – 1914*. Munich : R. Oldenbourg Verlag, 2003.

This distinction was a logical part of the assimilative or integrative character of Hungarian/Magyar nationalism. The “Slovak people” were most frequently represented – and this applies to the whole second half of the 19th century – as peace-loving, hard-working, pious, obedient and, above all, loyal to the homeland.<sup>8</sup> The representatives of the Slovak national movement were perceived and represented, in contrast to the “loyal people” as self-appointed, who did not represent the “Slovak people” or “Slovak nationality”, and did not defend its interests as they claimed. The prototypes of such “rebels hostile to the homeland” were the people openly proclaiming Slovak nationalism and associated with the Slovak National Party. Its representatives were regarded as “pan-Slavists”, whose real aim was the disintegration of the historic Hungarian state. According to the prevailing stereotype, their “treacherous activities” were motivated mainly by greedy aims. The “pan-Slavist rebels” were after money, which they wheedled out of the “naive people” through their financial institutions, or received for acting as agents for St. Petersburg, Prague or Vienna.<sup>9</sup> The designation “pan-Slavist” was extremely negative and had

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- 8 The “Slovak people” were usually regarded as the most loyal and most patriotic “nationality” in Hungary. We find this representation of the Slovaks on various levels, from the press, as we will see in the analysis of weeklies, to official documents. Apart from the more or less positive stereotypes of being hard-working, skilled in manual work, obedient, pious and devoted to the homeland, there were also negative stereotypes of lack of skill, treachery, vindictiveness, alcoholism and stupidity. However, the negative stereotyping is almost entirely lacking in the above mentioned type of sources. It is found more in oral folk tradition. On this see: MARGALITS, Ede. *Magyar közmondások és közmondásszerű szólások* (Hungarian proverbs and sayings). VII. Budapest : Kiadás, 1897, p. 722-723. An excellent source in this area is the work of A. PECHÁNY: *A magyarországi tótok* (The Slovaks of Hungary). Budapest 1913. It was the first and actually the only serious ethnographic work in Hungarian about the Slovaks produced during the period of Dualism. Chapter III (*Characteristics of the Slovak People*) is especially interesting. The author, who knew the Slovak language, goes through the positive stereotyped characteristics of the “Slovak people” and documents them with sayings and proverbs current among the Slovaks. Pechány wrote this book as a result of an initiative from the Hungarian government, which decided to publish an impressive ethnographic work about each of the “non-Magyar nationalities” in the Kingdom of Hungary. It is also possible to seek here one of the causes – from the point of view of the “Hungarian state idea” – of the positive representation of the Slovaks as “people devoted to the Hungarian homeland”. Texts of a pamphlet, propagandist or merely informative character are also valuable for the study of stereotypes: see e.g. PELSŐCZI HÁMOS, G. *Magyarország és a tótok* (Hungary and the Slovaks). Budapest 1882; GÁSPÁR, I. *Hazánk tót népe* (The Slovak people of our homeland). Budapest 1879; JEKELFALUSSY, J. (ed.). *Az ezredéves magyar állam és népe* (The Thousand-Year Old Hungarian State and its People). Budapest 1896; BONKÁLÓ, S. *A szlávok. A szláv népek és a szláv kérdés ismerete* (The Slavs. The Slavonic peoples and the Slavonic question). Budapest 1913; or CZAMBEL, S. *A cseh-tót nemzetiség múltja, jelene és jövője* (The past, present and future of Czecho-Slovak national unity). Budapest 1902. The volumes about the counties of northern Hungary from the unfinished monumental work *Magyarország vármegyéi és városai* (The Counties and Towns of Hungary) from around 1900, are an interesting and valuable source. If we do not count the County of Komárom (Komárom), volumes were produced on the counties of Bratislava (Pressburg), Nitra (Nyitra), Hont (Hont), Tekov (Bars), Gemer-Malohont (Gömör-Kishont), Novohrad (Nógrád), Abov-Turňa (Abaúj-Torna) and Zemplén (Zemplén) from the territory of Slovakia. See also the study: NAGY, M.: *Nineteenth Century Hungarian Authors on Hungary’s Ethnic Minorities*. In Kontler, L. (ed.). *Pride and Prejudice: National Stereotypes in 19th and 20th Century Europe East to West*. Budapest : CEU Press, 1995, especially p. 37-39 (29-51); and KILIÁNOVÁ, G. - POPELKOVÁ, K. - VRZGULOVÁ, M. - ZAJONC, J.: *Slovensko a Slováci v diele „Rakúsko-uhorská monarchia slovom a obrazom“*. (Slovakia and the Slovaks in the work “The Austro-Hungarian Monarchy in Words and Pictures”). In *Slovenský národopis*, 2001, 49, 1, p. 5-31.
- 9 We have an incomparably larger quantity of sources available for study of the stereotyping of the “pan-

the aim of socially discrediting people. Even the representatives of the Slovak National Party considered it necessary to distance themselves as strongly as possible from such a designation. The category of “pan-Slavist” was extremely wide. The meaning of the term “pan-Slavism” was not unambiguously defined and to a large extent it depended on the context and the ideological orientation of the individual. With some degree of simplification, it is possible to identify three areas of meaning. The texts of the period clearly show that the basic meaning of this word was the imperialist doctrine of the Russian Czar, which had the aim of gaining control of all the territories inhabited by Slavs or bringing all the Slavs under the sovereignty of the Russian Czar.<sup>10</sup> However, it was more frequent for any demonstration of “Slavic solidarity”, whether in the spheres of politics, economics or culture, to be regarded as an expression of “pan-Slavism”. Thirdly, an understanding of “pan-Slavism” in more radical circles, especially in connection with the Slovaks, included any public expression of Slovak or Slavonic culture. For example, an official, usually the chief district administrator, might reject an application to have a Slovak language theatrical performance of entirely non-political character, only because the fact that it was in the Slovak language was regarded as an expression of “pan-Slavism”. Such a wide understanding of pan-Slavism was not always applied, but usually appeared only in crisis situations, such as during elections to parliament or town councils. Obviously, this is an analytical break-down of the meanings of the category of “pan-Slavism”. In practice, the meanings of this word freely fluctuated and varied according to the context in which this concept was being manipulated. Perhaps, it is superfluous to add that this term had a really powerful mobilizing effect in the framework of Hungarian/Magyar nationalism. It involved an extremely negative category, which was based on the panicky fear of Russian expansion or the growth of the dominance of “Slavdom” in general and the resulting dissolution of historic Hungary and the “Hungarian/Magyar nation” within it. However, it was also a sufficiently flexible category to be reliably usable in a very wide range of contexts. The category of “pan-Slavist” had much wider use than only in

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Slavists”. Again, it is enough to mention only the press, official correspondence and texts of varied character. Only from the period around the turn of the centuries, we have rich pamphlet, polemic and propagandist writings from Hungarian authors living in the counties of Upper Hungary inhabited by Slovaks. See e. g.: PECHÁNY, A. *A pánszlávizmus múltja és jelene*. (The past and present of pan-Slavism). Nyitra 1886; DUGOVICH, T. *A tót nemzetiségi mozkalmak fejlődésének története*. (History of the development of the Slovak nationality movement). Turócszentmárton 1903; the same: *Az általános választói jog és a Felvidék*. (Universal suffrage and Upper Hungary). Turócszentmárton 1905; SPECTATOR (Gerő, J.). *Egy időszervi nemzetiségi politikai kérdés. Magyarország és a panszlávizmus apostolai*. (A current nationality policy question. Hungary and the apostles of pan-Slavism). Budapest 1908; or (Gerő J.). *Ungarn und die Apostel der Panslavismus*. Von XYV. Berlin s. d. (1908); ESZTERHÁZY, J. *A szláv áramlatok és hazánk*. (Slavonic currents and our homeland). Budapest 1902; DEMKÓ, K. *Asszimiláció, reasszimiláció és a magyar kulturpolitika*. (Assimilation, re-assimilation and Hungarian cultural policy). Budapest 1897; KOSTENSZKY, G. *Nemzeti politika a Felvidéken*. (National policy in Upper Hungary). Budapest 1893. Another very interesting source is the work: KÖRÖSSY, J. *A felvidék elítótosodása. Nemzetiségi tanulmányok. I. Pozsony és Nyitra megyék. II. Bars és Hont megyék*. (The Slovakization of Upper Hungary. Nationality studies. I The Counties of Bratislava (Pressburg) and Nitra (Nyitra). II The Counties of Tekov (Bars) and Hont. Budapest 1898.

10 We also find such a definition in the representative Révai encyclopedia. *Révai nagy lexikona*, vol. 15. Budapest, s. d.

the narrow sphere of the Slavonic nationalist movements in the Kingdom of Hungary. Anybody, even a “non-Slav” could be labelled a “pan-Slavist”.<sup>11</sup>

It is immensely important to recognize this dichotomy in the social representations of the Slovaks in Hungarian discourse of the 19th century. It is not really necessary to explain why the representatives of Slovak nationalism<sup>12</sup> were separated from the “loyal Slovak people” and placed in the extremely negative category of “pan-Slavists”. The representation of Slovak nationalists as “pan-Slavists”, who only pursued their own financial aims or the interests of foreign powers hostile to Hungary, and never supported and represented the interests of the “Slovak people”, but rather the reverse, was first of all intended to delegitimize. However, in the case of the representations of the “Slovak people”, Hungarian/Magyar nationalism came into a contradictory situation at the end of the 19th century. On one side there was a persistent effort to represent the Slovak speaking people of Upper Hungary as entirely loyal to the “Hungarian nation” or as people who regarded themselves as part of the “Hungarian nation” and not as the “Slovak nationality”. On the other side, however, merely by representing the “Slovak people / Slovak nationality” as such, this group was treated as a “collective individuality” in the discourse of the time. Thus, whether they liked it or not, the “Slovak people/nationality” was represented as a separate *substantial entity*. This contradiction also explains why use of the word “nationality” was abandoned from the 1870s – 1880s, when the *ethnic homogenization* variant of Hungarian/Magyar nationalism became dominant, and the word “people” was used instead. In the understanding of the time, a “nationality” was understood as a sort of collective entity, just as the “nation” was also regarded as a collective political entity.<sup>13</sup> I emphasize, however, that these changes in vocabulary in the

- 11 For example, the Hungarian opposition political and social weekly *Nyitramegyei Szemle* (or its editor Dr. Lajos Franciscy) was repeatedly accused of pan-Slavism by the pro-government press in the 1890s, because it supported the programme of the Catholic People’s Party, which included full implementation of the 1868 Nationality Act. The articles in the weekly were actually fully in the Hungarian/Magyar nationalist spirit and did not show any sympathy for Slovak nationalism. POTEMRA, M. *Bibliografia inorečových novín na Slovensku do roku 1918*. (Bibliography of Other Language Newspapers in Slovakia up to 1918). Martin 1963, p. 126. Denunciations of “pan-Slavism” or “lack of patriotism” were one of the frequently used and favourite means of political struggle, especially in the “nationality” sensitive regions of Upper Hungary.
- 12 Apart from the regularly used designation of “pan-Slavist”, the designations: “tót nemzetiségiek” or “tót nemzetiségi érzelműek” (both can be freely translated as Slovak nationally oriented or feeling) and “tót túlzók” (Slovak extremists) were used in connection with the representatives of Slovak nationalism.
- 13 The extent of this study does not allow me to explain in more depth the differences between “nation” and “nationality”, as these terms were understood in 19th century Hungary. For the needs of this study, two somewhat simplifying observations should be sufficient: 1. In the first two-thirds of the 19th century, the word “nationality” in both Hungarian and Slovak often served as a synonym of the word “nation”. 2. In the last third of the 19th century, these two terms were clearly distinguished under the influence of the already described changes in Hungarian/Magyar nationalism. A “nationality” was understood as a linguistic and cultural group without political structures, namely what is often called an “ethnic group” today. However, a “nation” was perceived in the full statist sense, as all the inhabitants of a particular state, but clearly of a state, which is linguistically and culturally homogeneous. In simple terms, it is possible to say that in the understanding of the time, a “nation” was a “nationality”, which had its own state. If this logic was consistently applied, a “nationality” was a potential “nation”, which only needed to obtain its own state. This observation makes it much clearer why they spoke much more about “non-Magyar people” in the last quarter of the 19th century and stopped talking about “non-Magyar nationalities” in Hungary.



period from the 1880s were not absolute. Both terms – “people” and “nationality” – were used in parallel in representations of the Slovaks and other non-Magyars in Hungary, but the first strongly dominated over the second in this period. This trend continued until the period of the return of Count István Tisza to politics at the head of the National Party of Labour in 1910.

István Tisza, one of the most influential Hungarian politicians of the time, began to take a new course in the policy of Hungarian governments towards the non-Magyar nationalist movements, especially that of the Rumanians, with the aim of achieving a sort of final *modus vivendi* on the basis of some degree of cooperation. He gradually initiated various talks, at first only through mediators, but later directly, with representatives of the Rumanian National Party in Hungary, at which he went as far as expressing willingness to retreat from some sensitive aspects of the Hungarian assimilation policy, for example, in the areas of administration and education.<sup>14</sup> Sharp polemics arose in 1912 – 1914 around Tisza’s new course, in parliamentary debates, on the level of local government in the counties and in the local press. Tisza’s policy of *appeasement*, which could never be implemented because of the outbreak of war, undoubtedly had many opponents, but it was also able to attract a group of supporters, especially on the county level. However, it is interesting for us to see how Tisza’s policy of cooperation with the non-Magyar movements was reflected in the social representations of the “nationalities”. Especially the liberal press oriented towards Tisza and his National Party of Labour showed some change. In comparison with the previous years a tendency appeared to pay less attention to the way of using the terms “people” and “nationality”. Several years before the outbreak of war, the terms “Slovak nationality” again began to appear in articles in addition to “Slovak people”, sometimes even within the same sentence. This softening was undoubtedly connected with some degree of relaxation of the strict nationalist atmosphere, which had dominated public and private life in Hungary since the end of the 19th century. The public speeches of I. Tisza himself from the period 1910 – 1914 show a marked shift, even more significant in comparison with his diction in the period before 1905, in the way he spoke about the “nationality rebels” and their political parties. In July 1910, on the occasion of his first talks with the Transylvanian Rumanian politician Ioan Mihiu, he demanded the dissolution of the “Rumanian *nationality party*”, which had been officially banned in 1894, but which actually continued to function as the organizational basis of the Rumanian nationalist movement in Hungary. However, in February 1914 in the Hungarian Parliament, again in connection with talks with representatives of the Rumanian National Party for the third time in three years, he already declared: “*Obviously, it is understood that the Rumanian speaking citizens have full equality with the*

14 Extensive literature exists on I. Tisza, his political career and his political discussions with non-Magyar politicians with a nationalist programme. See: SZARKA, *Szlovák nemzetiségi fejlődés*, ref. 6, p. 265-275; the same: *Végzet és Gonviselés*. In: the same: *Duna-táji dilemmák. Nemzeti kisebbségi politika a 20. századi Kelet-Közép-Európában*. Budapest 1998, p. 74-93; HITCHINS, K.: The Nationality Problem in Hungary: István Tisza and Rumanian National Party, 1910 – 1914. In *The Journal of Modern History*, 1981, 53, no. 4, p. 619-651; PÖLÖSKEI, F. *Tisza István nemzetiségi politikája az első világháború előestéjén*. (The nationality policy of István Tisza on the eve of the First World War). In *Századok*, 1970, 104, no. 1, p. 3-33; the same: *István Tisza. Ein ungarischer Staatsmann in Krisenzeiten*. Budapest 1994; VERMES, G. *István Tisza*. New York 1985.

other citizens from the point of view of political rights. They can fully participate in the political life of the country within the framework of the valid legislation, they can form their own Rumanian party... Free citizens of a free state cannot be deprived of the right to form a political party, including one **based on nationality**." A month later, at another session of parliament, he added: "*The programme of the Rumanian **National** Party is very incorrect..., but this programme is not directed towards the fragmentation of the Hungarian state.*" As a result of this, its existence was not in conflict with Hungarian laws according to Tisza.<sup>15</sup> The always scrupulously pedantic Tisza already spoke in 1914 about the right to organize political parties on a *nationality basis* or about a Rumanian *National Party*, although earlier, if he mentioned it at all, he always spoke only of a *nationality party*, or even more frequently about "Rumanian nationalists" or "Rumanian extremists". However, these apparently banal shifts in vocabulary had great significance. They were both an expression of his new course in "nationality policy" and they reflected changes in the representation of "nationalities" and "nationality politicians" (in the given case mainly the Rumanians) in Hungarian/Magyar nationalist discourse.

The brief outline of the changes in the social representations of the Slovaks in Hungarian/Magyar discourse from the last quarter of the 19th century and the first decade of the 20th century is important for understanding the changes in the image of the Slovaks during the Great War.<sup>16</sup> In the following text, I will use the example of the analysed weeklies to identify the changes in the way of representing the Slovaks, the "Slovak people" and the (Slovak) "pan-Slavists" in the course of the First World War.

I directed my research into the local Hungarian language press of Upper Hungary towards publications from the counties of Bratislava (Pressburg), Nitra (Nyitra), Liptov (Liptó) and Trenčín (Trencsén). About 16 Hungarian language political and social weeklies were published in these counties in the years before the war, but only about half of them continued to appear through the whole period of the war. Although, my choice of

15 Cited according to: KEMÉNY, G. *Iratok a nemzetiségi kérdés történetéhez Magyarországon a dualizmus korában (1867 – 1918)*. (Documents on the history of the nationality question in Hungary in the period of Dualism (1867 – 1918). Vol. VI (1913 – 1914). Budapest 1985, p. 97 and 127. (Emphasized cursive – L. V.). On the policy of I. Tisza during his first government (1903 – 1905) see: SZÁSZ, Z. *A román kérdés Tisza István első kormányának politikájában (1904)*. (The Rumanian question in the policy of the first government of István Tisza (1904). In *Történelmi Szemle*, 1968, no. 3, p. 254-293.

16 According to my knowledge, no existing work gives a systematic study of the question of the use, development and changes of the most basic categories inherent in the nationalist discourse in 19th century Hungary: „nation“, „nationality“, „people“, „patriot/patriotism“, „pan-Slavist/pan-Slavism“, „traitor/treason“ and so on. Therefore, the observations presented here are only preliminary and partial findings from my thematically more widely conceived research concerning questions connected with the processes of politicization and „nationalization“ of the Slovak speaking rural population in the north-western part of the Kingdom of Hungary around the turn of the 19th and 20th centuries. We find supporting information on the questions of the contemporary understanding of the terms „nation“ and „nationality“ in the cited study: GERGELY, ref. 6; see also the study: SZABÓ, M. *Magyar nemzetfelfogások a 20. század első felében*. (The Hungarian conception of the nation in the first half of the 20th century). In *Mozgó Világ* 1983, no. 3, p. 50-60; and the work: SZARKA, *Szlovák nemzetiségi fejlődés*, ref. 6, p. 164-182. From the point of view of this problem, the following recently published study is interesting: KÖVÉRA, G. *Középrend vagy középosztály(ok)?* (Middle estate or middle class?). In *Századok*, 137, 2003, no. 5, 1 119-1 167, in which the author analyses the formation of the terminology used in representing the middle or bourgeois social classes in Hungary in the 19th century.

publications for analysis was to a large extent influenced by their availability and the completeness of year sets, I attempted to select the most relevant from each county, namely those published in the county town and also more or less known in neighbouring counties, and those produced throughout the period of the war. Only the weekly *Nagyszombat és Vidéke* is an exception to these criteria. Finally, in the selection of weeklies for analysis, I took into account their political orientation, attempting to include each of the dominant political currents, namely papers sympathizing with the National Party of Labour of István Tisza, factions of the Hungarian Independence Party and the Catholic People's Party.<sup>17</sup>

I analysed the following weeklies from the County of Bratislava (Pressburg): *Nagyszombat és Vidéke*,<sup>18</sup> from the County of Nitra (Nyitra): *Nyitravármegye* and *Nyitramegyei Szemle*,<sup>19</sup> from the County of Liptov (Liptó): *Liptó*,<sup>20</sup> and from the County of Trenčín

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- 17 Socialist oriented papers are missing from the analysed publications. The Hungarian Social Democrats did not place much emphasis on publishing regional papers. Although there were several German and Hungarian language weeklies oriented towards the workers in the pre-war years, during the war no socialist oriented Hungarian language papers were published in the counties of Upper Hungary. POTEMRA, ref. 11, p. 203-216.
  - 18 It was published every week in Trnava (Nagyszombat) until 1916. The weekly functioned as the press supporter of the Hungarian Independence Party, but after 1914 it was loyal to the government of I. Tisza. The editor was Árpád Ujházy, deputy chairman of the Trnava (Nagyszombat) organization of the Hungarian Independence Party. POTEMRA, ref. 11, p. 250, 550. Unfortunately, my research had to be limited to the issues from 1914; those from the next two years were not available.
  - 19 *Nyitravármegye* was published every week in Nitra (Nyitra) until 1918. It was inclined to the liberal National Party of Labour of I. Tisza. The responsible editor was the lawyer Dr. Fülöp Faith and the assistant editor was János Zsirkay, originally an employee of the Hungarian Post Office, who became a journalist only in 1914. In the inter-war period, he intensively engaged in public life in Hungary and belonged to the immediate circle of Gyula Gömbös, prime minister 1932 – 1936. POTEMRA, ref.11, p. 247-249, 586-587. *Nyitramegyei Szemle* was also published in Nitra (Nyitra) every week until the end of the war. Before the war, it was definitely in opposition to the government and supported the Catholic People's party, but during the war it shifted to a position of loyal opposition. It was mostly edited by Catholic priests and relied on the Catholic clergy of the Diocese of Nitra (Nyitra). The chief editor was Dr. Lajos Franciscy, also a priest. POTEMRA, ref.11, p. 235-237, 242-244, 585-586.
  - 20 It was published every week in Liptovský Sv. Mikuláš (Liptószentmiklós) until 1918. It was loyal to the government of I. Tisza and hostile to the Catholic People's Party both before and during the war. The responsible editor was József László Tholt, who also acted as the county archivist of the County of Liptov (Liptó). However, a more important figure in the editorial office of Liptó was the executive editor Lajos Steier, son of the founder of the newspaper, the Liptovský Sv. Mikuláš (Liptószentmiklós) printer Izidor Steier. POTEMRA, ref.11, p. 270-274, 524-525. Apart from journalism, Lajos Steier devoted attention to history. He took an interest in the history of the Slovaks and the "Slovak nationality movement", and in his works he devoted great attention to the development of Czecho-Slovak relations from the 18th century to his own time. His book: *A tót kérdés. I. A tót nemzetiségi mozgalom felődésének története* (The Slovak Question. I. History of the Development of the Slovak Nationality Movement). Liptószentmiklós 1912, was one of the recognized historical works of its time. Steier was also active in political life. He was one of those, who systematically pointed to the danger of the influence of the Czech political elite on the Slovaks. In 1913, he wrote a memorandum to the prime minister I. Tisza on this subject. He held the view that it was not necessary to see enemies in the Slovak politicians, who were striving to achieve their "Slovak nationality demands" in the framework of respect for the unity of the historic Hungarian state. Precisely the reverse, it was necessary to support this part of the Slovak movement against the Czechs, because the Czechs represented the real threat to Hungary. Steier was an active supporter of Tisza's new course

(Trencsén): *Vágvölgyi Lap*.<sup>21</sup> Unfortunately, I have not succeeded in finding exactly how many copies of these weeklies were printed, but the number probably varied between 1,000 and 6,000. In the case of the weekly *Vágvölgyi Lap*, the number of copies could have considerably exceeded 6,000 because this paper also reached the counties surrounding the County of Trenčín (Trencsén). All the chief editors and editors of the selected papers belonged to the local intelligentsia, in the wider sense including the lawyer, Catholic priest, county archivist and historian, they had various political orientations, and clearly, all of them were protagonists of Hungarian/Magyar nationalism. The majority of the articles in the newspapers were written by the editors, but representatives of the local intelligentsia such as teachers and priests, and of the county administration (especially the chief district administrator) or people politically active in the given county, including members of parliament, sometimes contributed to them. However, this varied between different weeklies. We know that the *Nyitrai megyei Szemle* or *Vágvölgyi Lap* had external correspondents, but in the case of the *Nagyszombat és Vidéke*, the articles came from the pen of the editor apart from some rare exceptions. In all the weeklies studied here, the number of external correspondents declined from the beginning of the war, and their pages were almost entirely filled by articles written by the editors.<sup>22</sup> All five analysed weeklies were published in ethnically mixed or mainly Slovak regions, and although they had various political or ideological orientations, all of them, without exception, made struggle against the disintegrative efforts of “pan-Slavism” and promotion of the “Hungarian state idea” one of their aims. Therefore, it was relatively simple to trace the ways of representing the Slovaks, because both in the pre-war and war periods, much space on the pages of these newspapers was devoted to articles of varied character about “pan-Slavism”, the “Slovak nationality rebels”, the “Slovak people” and “Slovak nationality”.<sup>23</sup>

The first event in the relevant period, which was associated with extensive writing about the Slovaks in the analysed weeklies, was the declaration of mobilization before the declaration of war on Serbia. The first day of mobilization was 28 July. The fact

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in “nationality policy”. On Steier see: GLATZ, F. A “tót” kérdés és Steier Lajos (The Slovak Question and Lajos Steier). In *Történetíró és politika*. Szekfű, Steier, Thim és Miskolczy nemzetéről és államról. Budapest 1980, p. 26-38.

- 21 The *Vágvölgyi Lap* was published every week in Trenčín (Trencsén) until 1918. After 1910, this weekly supported the programme of Tisza's National Party of Labour. Its chief editor Ferencz Sándor also became a member of the Trenčín (Trencsén) local organization of the party. POTEMRA, ref. 11, p. 253-254, 679.
- 22 The majority of quotations given in this study come from articles with no indication of the author. Such anonymous articles were almost certainly written by the editor of the weekly.
- 23 This is also a reason why I chose to research regional papers and not the national political dailies published in Budapest, such as the *Budapesti Hírlap*, *Pesti Hírlap*, *Pesti Napló*, *Alkotmány*, *Az Újság*, *A Nap* or *Esti Újság*. A brief examination of these papers made it clear that they did not contain enough material for meaningful analysis. The leading Budapest dailies only rarely contained anything about the Slovaks in the first years of the war. For example, the daily *Alkotmány* published an extensive article in April 1915, emphasizing the sacrifices of the Slovaks on the battlefield and in the rear, but it was taken over from the Reichspost of Vienna. *A magyarországi tótok a háborúban* (The Slovaks of Hungary in the War). In *Alkotmány* year 20, no. 99 from 10 April 1915). The situation changed only in the second half of 1918, when the „Slovaks of Upper Hungary“ also became a theme for the leading Budapest dailies in connection with the efforts to join the counties of Upper Hungary to the Czech Lands.

that the mobilization occurred without problems also in the counties inhabited by Slovaks, was surprising to some degree in spite of the familiar stereotypes about the loyalty of the "Slovak people". The weekly *Liptó* wrote with appreciation that: "*The Slovak people showed their love for the homeland and welcomed the war with enthusiasm... The Slovaks – and we say this with pride in the heart – do not believe in anything other than the inevitability of the unity of Hungary and the brotherly solidarity of the nationalities of our Monarchy... They cannot believe in anything other, because if even one voice spoke out, which did not see the way forward from the present situation in our historic community, it would provoke not only intervention from the state authorities, but also the hostility of the Slovak people, who will show him that they will not tolerate anybody among them, who wants to disturb our brotherly solidarity*".<sup>24</sup> The *Vágvölgyi Lap* in an article entitled *Our Soldiers (A mi katonáink)* also evaluated very positively the enthusiasm of the Slovaks in the first days of the war: "*We look with special joy and pride at our excellent and faithful Trencsén Slovak population, which has shown unexpected willingness to answer the call of our homeland*".<sup>25</sup> The "Slovak people" was represented precisely in harmony with the constantly positive image from the previous period. At the same time, the representatives of the Slovak National Party were represented in these weeklies in accordance with the familiar image of the "treacherous pan-Slavists". At the beginning of August 1914, after the outbreak of the First World War, the leadership of the Slovak National Party issued a declaration expressing its loyalty to the monarch and to the Hungarian homeland, and declaring that the activity of the party would stop during the war.<sup>26</sup> The weekly *Nagyszombat és Vidéke*, published in Trnava (Nagyszombat), sharply attacked the chairman of the Slovak National Party Matúš Dula and the party itself. It described Dula as a "treacherous pan-Slavist", who was conspiring with Russia. The declaration was said to be insincere, because it was issued under pressure to avoid the "*just intervention of the authorities*".<sup>27</sup> The *Vágvölgyi Lap*, on the other hand, welcomed the declaration from the Slovak National Party, although also with doubts about its sincerity.<sup>28</sup> Surprisingly, the other analysed weeklies contained no reports

24 The article continues: "*Down there in the south, our cannons thunder against Belgrade... The sons of our Slovak people are in our army. The whole Slovak nationality without exception looks with love towards our units fighting in the south. The glory that our brave soldiers will win by their heroic deeds, will be the glory of the whole Hungarian nation and so also the glory of our Slovak people so faithful to the throne.*" *A kormány kiáltványa* (The Declaration of the Government). In *Liptó*, year 22, no. 33 from 2 August 1914.

25 *Vágvölgyi Lap*, year 41, no. 33 from 15 August 1914. In the article *Sereglés a trón köré* (Assembly around the Throne), the *Nyitrai megyei Szemle* appreciated that: "*love for the homeland with its sacred ardour unites every one of the faithful sons of our homeland*". In *Nyitrai megyei Szemle*, year 22, no. 32 from 9 August 1914.

26 "*It matters to us that our homeland and our monarchy be preserved in its full integrity, that it should not be harmed by the war and will emerge from it victorious. We also commit our lives and property to this*". In *Národnie noviny*, year 45, no. 91 from 6 August 1914.

27 *A tótok manifestuma* (The Declaration of the Slovaks). In *Nagyszombat és Vidéke*, year 8, no. 34 from 20 August 1914. However, in the same article, the author positively evaluated the patriotism of the Slovak soldiers, who showed a sharp contrast to "*Dula's alleged pan-Slavist regiment*".

28 *Vágvölgyi Lap*, year 41, no. 33 from 15 August 1914.

about the declaration from the Slovak National Party.<sup>29</sup> In spite of the fact that the Slovak National Party declared its loyalty entirely unambiguously, its declaration was received with distrust. The category of “treacherous pan-Slavist”, which automatically included everybody associated with the Slovak National party, was too unambiguously defined and did not allow “objective” evaluation and assessment. The articles in *Nagyszombat és Vidéke* are a typical example of this. On 6 August 1914, this newspaper published two articles, in which the author appealed for vigilance against “*subversive individuals*”, by which he clearly meant the representatives of the Slovak National Party.<sup>30</sup>

An important part of the positive representation of the “Slovak people” as an element loyal to the homeland was the regular publication of reports about the military successes of units that included Slovak soldiers or direct reports about the heroism of Slovak soldiers. Articles about the courage of Slovak soldiers on the battlefield only confirmed and reproduced the stereotype of the patriotism of the “Slovak people”. The five regional weeklies researched here followed the principle of mainly following the destiny of the regiments, which included men from the county where the paper was published. For example, the *Nyitravármegye* and *Nyitrámegyei Szemle* included reports on the 14th Nitra Honvéd Regiment in almost every issue; the *Vágvölgyi Lap* informed about the 71st Trenčín (Trencsén) Infantry Regiment, the 15th Trenčín (Trencsén) Honvéd Regiment and sometimes also the 72nd Bratislava (Pressburg) Infantry Regiment. *Liptó* regularly celebrated the heroism of the 67th Prešov (Eperjes) Infantry Regiment, in which men from Liptov (Liptó) also fought.<sup>31</sup> Articles and then regular columns<sup>32</sup> traced the deaths and decorations of individual soldiers as well as the movements of units on the battlefield. They gave information about life at the front, the mood of the soldiers, the

29 Even the leading Budapest dailies reported the declaration from the Slovak National Party, although this was mostly limited to publishing a translation of the declaration without commentary. See, for example: *Alkotmány*, year 19, no. 187 from 7 August 1914; *Az Újság*, year 12, no. 187 from 7 August 1914, or *Budapesti Hírlap*, year 34, no. 187 from 7 August 1914.

30 *A belső ellenségek ellen. Felhívás a közönséghez* (Against the Internal Enemy. An Appeal to the Community) and *A spionok aratási idenye* (Time for a Harvest of Spies). In *Nagyszombat és Vidéke*, year 8, no. 32 from 6 August 1914. M. Dula complained about these and other articles and about the internment of various representatives of the Slovak National Party during the first days of the war, in a letter, which he personally delivered to prime minister I. Tisza on 25 August 1914. (Dula's letter from 25 August 1914 is preserved in the SNA, Fond M. Dula, c. 9, 206). Tisza reacted promptly and immediately on the next day, he sent a circular to all the government commissioners in Upper Hungary. He requested that they strictly ensure that the local Hungarian language press not write in a suspicious and provocative spirit against the Slovaks (Letter from I. Tisza to the Upper Hungarian government commissioners: Viktor Molnár, Baron Lajos Kürthy, István Szinyei-Merse, Aurél Bartal, Gyula Szalavszky and István Crausz from 26 August 1914. In *Tisza István összes munkái* (TIÖM). Vol. II. Budapest 1924, p. 92). Tisza's intervention was clearly effective. From the end of August 1914, these five weeklies stopped attacking the representatives of the Slovak National Party or did not write about them at all. However, the general image of the “pan-Slavist” enemies of the homeland and of the patriotic “Slovak people” remained present in the press. This “quiet period” lasted until 1917, when the Slovak National party again came into the centre of attention, thanks to the activities of the Czech politicians in exile and in the Vienna Reichsrat.

31 On the representation of Slovak soldiers in individual regiments and their battles at the fronts of the First World War, see: HRONSKÝ, M. *Slovensko pri zrode Československa* (Slovakia at the Birth of Czechoslovakia). Bratislava 1987, p. 67-74.

32 For example the *Nyitrámegyei Szemle* had the columns *Kitüntetés* (Decorations) and *Signum Laudis*.

reactions of the population of the war zone and so on.<sup>33</sup> Articles directly from the pens of participants in the battles at the front were a special genre. Each of the analysed weeklies contained longer or shorter series of articles written either by army veterans or serving soldiers, usually officers, at home on leave. The longest series of articles appeared in the *Nyitrávrmegyei Szemle*. From the beginning of 1915, this weekly published a series of 53 articles by Dr. József Tiszo.<sup>34</sup> However, these articles usually described the military situation, the heroism of units and individual soldiers, without distinguishing soldiers according to their “nationality”.

Although all these weeklies followed the destiny of their regiments up to the end of the war, not all of them represented the Slovak soldiers in the same way. In September 1914, *Nagyszombat és Vidéke* explicitly stated in an article that the Budapest press<sup>35</sup> had especially emphasized the heroism of the 72nd Bratislava (Pressburg) Infantry Regiment in the battle at Krasnik, “in which apart from Hungarians, Slovaks also fight... They also give a shining example of self-sacrifice and loyalty to the homeland and the ruling house”. The editor of *Nagyszombat és Vidéke* stated that it was superfluous to especially emphasize the loyalty of the Slovaks on the battlefields, because “the Slovak people have never given us reason to doubt their faithfulness to the Hungarian homeland and the King of Hungary. The Slovak is just as much a faithful son of the homeland as the Hungarian, and only the pan-Slavist rebels without soul and conscience deceive and mislead him. But now the people already know that they have been misled onto a false course and we are seeing the anger of the people turned against their deceivers”.<sup>36</sup>

On the other hand, when “Slovak regiments” distinguished themselves in battles against the Russians at Krasnik, Rudnik, Polichna and Lublin in the first months of the war, *Liptó* and *Vágvölgyi Lap* especially pointed to the heroic behaviour of the Slovak soldiers on the battlefield. *Liptó* wrote: “Far to the north, in Russian Poland, our soldiers from the 67th Regiment are fighting heroically. They include many men from Liptó. The Ministry of War only recently published the latest list of decorated soldiers from this regiment. When reading the list of names, we are filled with pride, great national pride, still further strengthened by looking at the unshakeable loyalty of our Slovak brothers to the Hungarian nation and the Monarchy... The sons of the Slovak nationality are

33 The degree of reality of these “reports” was obviously strongly limited by military censorship and propaganda.

34 Dr. József Tiszo, that is Jozef Tiso, later President of the Slovak state during the Second World War, published under the title *Napló az északi harcterről* (Diary from the Northern Front), his daily notes, written directly on the battlefield. In the first months of the war, Tiso served as a field curate with the 71st Trenčín (Trencsén) Infantry Regiment, in precisely those battles on the Galician Front (Krasnik, Polichna and Lublin, in which the Slovak soldiers distinguished themselves. In his articles, he gave suggestive descriptions of battles and of everyday life on the battlefield. He wrote his articles in the Hungarian patriotic spirit. He did not specifically mention Slovak soldiers, but emphasized the heroism of the troops from Hungary or the “Upper Hungarian regiments”. The first article appeared in the *Nyitramegyei Szemle*, year 23, no. 2 from 10 January 1915 and the last on 23 January 1916 in no. 4. Slovak translations of these articles were published in: *Jozef Tiso. Prejavy a články*. (Jozef Tiso. Speeches and Articles). Editors: Miroslav Fabricius – Ladislav Suško. Bratislava : AEP, 2002, doc. no. 2, p. 17-84.

35 With the greatest probability, this was a reaction to a short article in the daily *Az Ujság*, year 12, no. 211 from 31 August 1914.

36 *Nagyszombat és Vidéke*, year 8, no. 36 from 3 September 1914.

giving clear proof that their souls have not been infected by the illusion of pan-Slavism, which has threatened us for decades".<sup>37</sup> The *Vágvölgyi Lap* stated: "And our Slovaks, as always up to now, are fulfilling their duties on the battlefield and in this way refuting the claims about the rottenness of the Monarchy spread by their false apostles." "According to reports coming from the commander's headquarters, the soldiers of Slovak nationality from the 72nd Infantry Regiment are fighting the Russians with the greatest heroism."<sup>38</sup> The editors of the analysed weeklies also evaluated very positively "the patriotic attitude and self-sacrifice" of the Slovak population at home.<sup>39</sup> They stated that after the outbreak of war, all the misunderstandings and tensions caused "by nationality agitators and pan-Slavists" vanished and "the whole population of the country, without distinction of nationality, joined together in an invincible phalanx against the treacherous enemy".<sup>40</sup> In May 1915, *Liptó* informed about the celebration, which broke out in Liptovský Sv. Mikuláš (Liptószentmiklós) on the occasion of the successful offensive of the Austro-Hungarian and German armies around Gorlice. According to the article, six thousand people, mostly Slovaks from the surrounding villages, participated in the celebrations accompanied by music and torches.<sup>41</sup>

When we look more closely at the way individual editors of newspapers wrote about Slovak soldiers, we find that the basic picture is the same: the "Slovak people" is represented as patriotic, faithful and willing to make sacrifices. We notice that *Liptó* and the *Vágvölgyi Lap* already usually wrote about the "Slovak nationality", while, for example, *Nagyszombat és Vidéke* strictly maintained use of the term "Slovak people". However, representations of the Slovak soldiers, who are naturally perceived as "sons of the Slovak

- 37 *A hős 67-esek* (The Heroic 67th). In *Liptó*, year 23, no. 3 from 17 January 1915. In further "reports", *Liptó* told the story of three Liptov (Liptó) Slovaks, who joined the army as "dangerous pan-Slavists", but on the battlefield, they changed into exemplary Hungarian patriots, who did not hesitate to lay down their lives for the Hungarian homeland. *A hazai rög* (The Soil of Home). In *Liptó*, year 23, no. 5 from 31 January 1915.
- 38 *Háború* (The War). In *Vágvölgyi Lap*, year 41, no. 34 from 23 August 1914, and *A 72-ik pozsonyi gyalogezred dicsérete* (Homage to the 72nd Bratislava (Pressburg) Infantry Regiment). In *Vágvölgyi Lap*, year 41, no. 36 from 6 September 1914.
- 39 In an article from November 1915, the *Nyitrai megyei Szemle* very positively evaluated the self-sacrifice of the Slovak population of the County of Nitra (Nyitra). It stated that the often artificially evoked chauvinism saw enemies where they did not exist, as was shown by the actions of four Slovak settlements in the County of Nitra (Nyitra). According to the article, the Slovak inhabitants of the village of Dolný Lopašov (Absólopássó) donated to a certain monastery in Budapest several cartloads of grain, 140 pillows and 110 sacks of potatoes. They also collected a wagon load of essential clothing for the soldiers. The villages of Dechtice (Dejte), Lančar (Lancsár) and Krakovany (Krakovány) also participated in this action by sending smaller amounts of food. *Hazafias községek* (Patriotic Villages). In *Nyitrai megyei Szemle*, year 23, no. 48 from 28 November 1915.
- 40 *A mi katonáink* (Our Soldiers). In *Vágvölgyi Lap*, year 41, no. 33 from 15 August 1914.
- 41 *A nyugatgalíciai győzelem híre Liptószentmiklóson* (Report about the Victory in Western Galicia at Liptovský Sv. Mikuláš (Liptószentmiklós)). In *Liptó*, year 23, no. 19 from 9 May 1915. Reports on similar celebrations in June 1915 after the recapture of Lviv and in August 1915 after the capture of Warsaw and Ivangorod were published by *Liptó* in no. 26 from 27 June 1915 and no. 33 from 15 August 1915. However, only a few hundred people participated in these celebrations. The weekly *Liptó* was most active in providing information about the heroism of Slovak soldiers on the battlefield. While the other analysed weeklies stopped especially emphasizing the Slovak soldiers in their articles in the course of the first half of 1915, *Liptó* continued to stress the heroism and patriotism of the Slovak soldiers in 1916.



people/Slovak nationality”, already showed differences. While *Liptó* and the *Vágvölgyi Lap* especially emphasized the courage of Slovaks in the framework of Hungarian regiments as the clearest proof of the patriotism of the “Slovak people” or “nationality”, *Nagyszombat és Vidéke* took a different position. Its editor considered it superfluous or offensive to especially emphasize the heroism of the Slovaks serving in Hungarian units, because he considered it natural, since the “Slovak people” were just as much faithful sons of the homeland as the Hungarian speaking people. They were all integral parts of the “Hungarian nation” or “Hungarian people”. Special emphasis on the heroism of the Slovaks – as a separate entity – allegedly cast doubt on the unity of the “nation”.

An article in *Nyitravármegy*e from the beginning of December 1914 is an excellent example of the internal contradictions, or to put it better, contextual conditionedness of the category “Hungarian/Magyar” and the conception of the “Hungarian nation”, and in connection with this also the social representations of the Slovaks. The author of the article entitled *The Nitran Slovaks* states in the introduction that the fears concerning the behaviour of the Slovaks after the outbreak of the war had proved to be unjustified, because “among all the nationalities, precisely the Slovaks are closest to the Hungarian heart. They are so close to us, that it may already be impossible to separate them from us. We feel that our heart’s beat together... we experience hardships and joys together. The Slovaks have flowed into the concept of the Hungarian nation and in my view it is no longer possible to separate them from it. I can prove the truth of my words best by pointing to our Slovaks from the County of Nyitra. They have not only proved that they can be Hungarians, but that they want to remain Hungarians not only in peace times but also in war. They offer us their help, sacrifice their lives and blood in struggle against the common enemy... We support each other..., because we form a single whole, because we are Hungarians. Indeed, the Slovak is also a Hungarian. He has lived here with us for centuries. For centuries, he has eaten our bread, lived on our land and been under our protection”.<sup>42</sup> The writer of the article represents the Slovaks as people, who are part of the “Hungarian nation” – the same Hungarians as, for example, the author of the article, but he also unavoidably contradicts this picture, when he speaks of the Slovaks from his point of view as “them”. From the author’s perspective, the Slovaks are closest to “us”, they offer “us” help, for centuries the Slovaks have eaten “our” bread and lived in “our” land. It is clear that the author really wants to see the Slovaks as part of the “Hungarian nation” or “we Hungarians” as citizens of Hungary and he represents them as such, but he also betrays the fact that his mental world also contains a narrower definition of the term “Hungarian nation” with “we Hungarians” as ethnic Magyars, a group which certainly did not include the Slovaks. The statist and ethnic perceptions of the “Hungarian nation” freely overlap, with one conception prevailing over the other depending on the situation and context in which the expression is used. However, this did not mean that the Hungarian/Magyar nationalists were internally disturbed by this

42 The author goes on to state the conviction that the Slovaks can no longer be fooled by pan-Slavists agitators, because pan-Slavism is only an empty term. Such rebels are not really concerned with the good of the Slovak people, but only with deceiving them and extracting money from them, so that “first they are deprived of money and then of their hearts and souls”. NYÉKHEGYI, I. *Nyitravármegy*e tótók (The Nitran Slovaks). In *Nyitravármegy*e, year 5, no. 48 from 4 December 1914.

contradictory understanding of conception of the “Hungarian nation”. It is clear from this quotation, as from most of the others given in this study that both understandings of the “Hungarian nation” – the statist and the ethnic – were complementary on a subconscious level to such a degree that they could occur in the framework of the same sentence and not appear illogical or disturbing to the reader of the time. It is important for us historians to be aware of this dichotomy in the understanding of the meaning of the conception of the “Hungarian nation”, which is found in the whole of Hungarian/Magyar nationalist discourse from at least the 1840s. When interpreting statements from this period, we must give increased attention to the context of the statement and constantly bear in mind the conditionedness of the different categories and their meanings.

In connection with the image of the Slovaks represented in the analysed weeklies during the first months of the war, two new features associated with the specific wartime situation are observable: 1. The idea that precisely the war had completed the unification work of the previous generations and made the “Hungarian nation” a firm reality. 2. The representation of the “Slovak people” as an active entity in the rejection of “pan-Slavism”.

Although pre-war Hungarian/Magyar nationalist discourse represented the “Hungarian nation” as a really existing entity and the loyalty of its members, including the “Slovak people”, was always emphasized, in the first months of the war, the Hungarian language press and members of the Hungarian/Magyar elites showed noticeable surprise over how smoothly mobilization occurred in the “nationality regions” and how the units including non-Magyar soldiers were reliable and courageous in battle. The view spread that now, thanks to the war, the “Hungarian nation” had really been created and the population was now “*locked into an invincible phalanx*” and was proving that it formed “*one indivisible nation*”. The reports about the heroic deeds of Slovak soldiers in battles against the Russian army and similar reports about the regiments in which Rumanian soldiers served, further strengthened this idea.<sup>43</sup> Expressions of similar optimism also appeared on the pages of the weeklies studied by us. Even at the beginning of 1916, the annual report of FEMKE<sup>44</sup> contained a self-confident declaration that the greatest and bloodiest struggle in world history, which had already lasted for 17 months, was the best

43 For example, at the end of August 1914, the prime minister I. Tisza wrote the following to the chairman of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences, under the influence of the first military successes on the Eastern Front: “*For twenty painful years, I have suffered from the idea that the Monarchy and the Hungarian nation are doomed to disintegration because the Lord God wants to curse those whom he deprives of reason. The situation began to improve in the last few years, with encouraging events constantly bringing us new hope that world history had not forgotten us. Now in the turbulent days of this great period, this matter will be decided, but this (Hungarian) nation, which is placed among such threatening dangers, cannot be condemned to death by Providence.*” Letter from I. Tisza to A. Berzeviczy from 27 August 1914. In *TIÓM. II.*, ref. 30, p. 92-93.

44 FEMKE (Felvidéki Magyar Közművelődési Egyesület) was a Hungarian/Magyar nationalist educational association founded in 1884. Its aim was to promote and spread Hungarian language, culture and the nationalist ideology of the “Hungarian nation” among the Slovak speaking population of Northern Hungary. During its existence FEMKE engaged in several controversial activities (the most disputed being the forced moving of Slovak orphans to southern parts of Hungary, where they were given into the care of Hungarian families in order to Magyarize them) which earned them an extremely ill fame among the Slovak intelligentsia of the time. See SZARKA, ref. 6; and GOGOLÁK, ref. 6.

proof that the decades of “nationality propaganda” had not penetrated into the depth of the soul of the “nationalities” and had not corroded “*the inviolable unity of the Hungarian state*”.<sup>45</sup>

The second new factor in the image of the “Slovak people / Slovak nationality” appearing in the initial months of the world war, is the representation of the Slovaks as an active entity. In the pre-war period, the “Slovak people” was represented as a passive victim of “pan-Slavist agitation”. It was exposed to enticement by the “pan-Slavists”, but it resisted. With the outbreak of war, a change is noticeable in the articles in the analysed weeklies. The “Slovak people/nationality” ceased to be represented as a passive element and became an active entity, which opposed the “pan-Slavists” and rejected “pan-Slavism”. The passively patriotic “Slovak people” had become actively patriotic, which only confirmed the representation of the Slovaks as a separate “nationality”. It is impossible to doubt the existence of a direct connection between the unproblematic course of the mobilization in Slovak populated regions, the positive reports on the bravery of the Slovak soldiers on the battlefield and the perception of the “Slovak people/nationality” as an “anti-pan-Slavist” group.

It is not surprising that after the outbreak of the war more began to be written about the Slovaks. Starting from the deeply rooted images and stereotypes, the press continued the dichotomous representation of the Slovak speaking population as the loyal “Slovak people”, also often referred to as the “Slovak nationality”, and of the representatives of the Slovak nationalist movement as the treacherous “pan-Slavists”. Although the basic forms of representation remained unchanged in both cases, small changes are noticeable, and these were the beginnings of further more substantial changes. The Slovaks were beginning to be more clearly represented as a “nationality”, which was actively opposing the “pan-Slavists” and fighting for the Hungarian homeland.

The weeklies analysed here, retained their image of the Slovaks until the end of the war. However, a change occurred from about May 1917, especially in the image of the representatives of Slovak nationalism. It was mainly connected with the development of the situation beyond the frontiers of Hungary. At the beginning of 1917, the Entente powers published their war aims, which included “*the liberation of the Czechoslovaks from foreign domination*”. However, the attention of our weeklies was attracted by the declaration of the Czech members of the Vienna Reichsrat on 30 May 1917. The Czech members of parliament demanded unification of the Czechs and Slovaks in the framework of a federalized Austro-Hungarian Monarchy.<sup>46</sup> After some delay, *Liptó* published an extensive article in its 1 July 1917 issue on the Czech constitutional declaration and the Slovaks. The article stated that: “*the Slovak political groups have become ever more interwoven with the Czechs in recent years, but only the political groups, not the Slovak people*”. The writer of the article again emphasized the patriotism of the Slovaks:

45 It continues: “(rebellion) remained the business of the nationality rebels and only the more superficial and weaker souls fell victim to it. The Hungarian nation state, its foundations and the loyalty of the mass of citizens could not be shaken by this shameful work.” In *Liptó*, year 24, no. 2 from 9 January 1916.

46 The leading Budapest dailies devoted relatively little attention to the Czech constitutional declaration. Most gave only a brief report on the course of the session of the Reichsrat and they described the Czech declaration as ridiculous and unrealistic.

*“Among the country’s nationalities, our brothers the Slovak people adhere to Hungary the most firmly and self-consciously. They have the strongest consciousness of Hungarian state citizenship. Their behaviour has given constant testimony to this, and so it would be very relevant if the leaders of the Slovak nationality oppose the Czech declaration with a Slovak declaration... The Slovak nationality needs such a declaration to remove all misunderstandings and doubts, to again make it clear that they condemn Czech irredentism... Hungary would joyfully welcome such an act of the leaders of the Slovak nationality protesting against the Czech declaration, and is expecting them to do it.”* The article continued with sharp criticism of the “leaders of the Slovak nationality” – it is clear that the author had in mind the representatives of the Slovak National Party – for their silence and warned them that their silence harmed first of all themselves, because *“the aim of the Czechs is the destruction and assimilation of the Slovak nationality... The Hungarian political elite, which aimed to preserve state unity, did not pursue such a self-fish and greedy aim. It is preserving the culture of the Slovak nationality in its uniqueness and originality, and if there were also some misunderstandings on the internal political scene, these cannot be a reason for the Slovak nationality to pursue a suicidal policy.”* The article progressed to a condemnation of the irresponsible pro-Czech policy of the “Slovak political leaders” and appealed to the activity of those Slovak men who are qualified by their work, education and property to lead the *“political elite of the Slovak nationality”*, to take the initiative into their own hands and establish *“an entirely new political elite based on understanding and brotherly cooperation with the Hungarian nation”*.<sup>47</sup> A similar article accusing the Slovak politicians of silence also appeared in the *Vágvölgyi Lap*. Here, the editor even doubted whether the Slovaks were still faithful sons of the homeland, when they did not protest at all against the Czech demands, and he came to the conclusion that: *“part of the Slovak people sympathizes with the Czechs and their plans”*.<sup>48</sup>

The Czech constitutional declaration from May 1917 also provoked a statement from the municipal committee of the County of Liptov (Liptó). Its declaration protested against the Czech demand for the counties of Upper Hungary and stated the conviction that the *“citizens of Slovak nationality”* would certainly reject any attacks on the integrity of the Hungarian homeland with outrage. The Liptov (Liptó) County Committee finally appealed for the issuing of similar declarations by every county in the Kingdom of Hungary. In the following months, the weekly *Liptó* gradually published the protests of individual counties.<sup>49</sup> In November 1917, the assembly of the County of Nitra (Nyitra) issued a declaration condemning the Czech efforts to bring about the disintegration of Hungary.

47 *A cseh deklaráció.* (The Czech Declaration.). In *Liptó*, year 25, no. 26 from 1 July 1917.

48 *A Slovenská Národná Strana.* (The Slovak National Party.). In *Vágvölgyi Lap*, year 44, no. 33 from 1 July 1917.

49 Apart from the counties with Slovak populations, counties in other parts of the Kingdom of Hungary responded to the appeal from the Liptov (Liptó) County Committee, for example, the counties of Somogy, Baranya and Vas. *Megjegyzések. A Vasvármegye határozata* (Comments. Resolution of the County of Vas). In *Liptó*, year 25, no. 38 from 23 September 1917; *Megjegyzések. A törvényhatóságok tiltakozása* (Comments. Protests of Municipal Committees). In *Liptó*, year 25, no. 41 from 14 October 1917; *Árvamegye a csehek ellen* (The County of Orava against the Czechs). In *Liptó*, year 25, no. 48 from 2 December 1917. The other weeklies also reported the protests of Liptov (Liptó) and some other counties.

A considerable part of this protest was devoted to the position of the Slovaks living in the County of Nitra (Nyitra): *"In the immense suffering of the world war, our Slovak brothers have persisted with unwavering faithfulness in the gigantic struggle waged to maintain and preserve the unity of the Hungarian homeland; in the jointly spilt blood and common suffering, we also see a firm guarantee that the Slovak people of our county condemn with equal outrage and patriotic indignation all the efforts of the Czechs to lead them into rebellion and treason."*<sup>50</sup>

In the cited passages, it is immediately obvious that the Slovaks were now unambiguously represented as a "nationality", which had its own originality and uniqueness and which was threatened by the assimilation efforts of the Czech politicians. They had the politicians of the Slovak National party as representatives – *"leaders of the Slovak nationality"*. It is interesting that these changes happened suddenly with no sign of them before May 1917. In fact, apart from the weekly *Liptó*, articles with information about the Slovaks in any context greatly decreased in the weeklies considered here from the second half of 1915. From the beginning of 1916 to June 1917 articles about the "Slovak people/Slovak nationality" and the "pan-Slavists" appeared only rarely.<sup>51</sup> The weeklies continued to follow the fortunes of their regiments, to inform about their movements and to publish articles from the pens of front-line soldiers, usually officers, but they completely stopped placing special emphasis on the heroism of Slovak soldiers. Only *Liptó* was an exception in this respect, but here the diction of the articles was also the same as in the previous years.<sup>52</sup> In a sense it is not really surprising that instead of the "Slovak people", they began to write unambiguously about a separate "Slovak nationality", and they completely stopped talking about the Slovaks as part of the "Hungarian nation". It is more surprising that they made a sudden and complete change from representing the active members of the Slovak National Party as "pan-Slavists" to representing them as the "leaders of the Slovak nationality", although as incompetent leaders, who should be replaced by better qualified persons. The causes of this change must be sought in the foreign policy situation.

In the course of 1915 – 1916, the Czech and Slovak exiled politicians organized in the Czecho-Slovak National Council in Paris proved able to organize the recruitment of Czecho-Slovak legions from the prisoners of war and send them into battle on the

50 The text of the resolution of the municipal committee was published in full with a commentary in the article: *A cseh támadások* (Czech attacks). In *Nyitrármegyei Szemle*, year 25, no. 46 from 18 November 1917.

51 For example, in January 1917, *Nyitrármegye* published an article by a certain Ágoston Petrás, probably a Catholic priest from a village in the County of Nitra (Nyitra): *A tót nép és a sajtó* (The Slovak People and the Press), in which he rejected the chauvinism of both sides – Hungarian/Magyar and Slovak – as harmful, because chauvinism only harmed the "Slovak people". Its enemies could more easily misuse its *"backwardness, sincerity and sheep-like patience"* in their favour. However, the article also condemned *"the extremist Slovak nationality press"*, which was mostly in the hands of Lutherans. Its influence needed to be balanced by establishing cheap loyalist newspapers in the Slovak language.

52 *Liptó* continued to emphasize the toughness, heroism and loyalty of the Slovak soldiers in the course of 1916. *Hatvanheteseink dicsősége* (The Glory of Our Sixty-seventh). In *Liptó*, year 24, no. 27 from 2 July 1916; *A 67. Gyalogezred hősiességei* (The Heroic Battles of the 67th Infantry Regiment). In *Liptó*, year 24, no. 33 from 13 August 1916; *Megjegyzések. A 67-esek újabb dicsőrete* (Comments. Further Praise for the Sixty-seventh). In *Liptó*, year 24, no. 35 from 27 August 1916.

Eastern Front. They developed effective political activity in support of their aims on the government level in France, Great Britain, Russia and partly also the USA. They were able to develop effective propaganda activity in the Entente states and the USA, which led to the *“liberation of the Czechoslovaks from foreign domination”* being included among the war aims of the Entente from the beginning of 1917. A no less significant factor was the fact that the representatives of the Czecho-Slovak exiles made exclusive use of the term “Czechoslovak nation” in their propagandist materials and documents issued by the Czecho-Slovak National Council. It was even more important that they got the term “Czechoslovak nation” included in the vocabulary of the leading representatives of the Entente powers. This was an important factor because it meant that they did not speak of the Slovaks, the “Slovak nationality” or “Slovak nation”, but exclusively about the “Czechoslovak nation”, one branch of which was systematically represented as suffering under the yoke of oppression in Hungary. This suffering could be ended only by their separation from Hungary and union with the Cis-Leithanian Czech branch. The activities and aims of the Czech, Slovak, Yugoslav and Polish politicians in exile from Austria-Hungary were closely watched by the Austro-Hungarian and German governments and information about them also inevitably penetrated to the public.<sup>53</sup> At first, the activities of the exiled groups were represented only as an enemy propaganda activity financed by the Entente states, and not as a real threat to the internal stability and integrity of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy. However, the situation was radically changed by the declaration of the Czech members of parliament and by the similar declarations from the Yugoslav Club and the Ukrainian members of parliament, which quickly followed it. The presentation in the highest political forum of the Cis-Leithanian lands of the demand for the union of areas of northern Hungary with the Czechs into one unit in the framework of a federalized Monarchy, gave the question of the disintegration of Hungary a new dimension of a legitimate political programme accepted by the Cis-Leithanian government. Naturally, the Hungarian government sharply condemned the declaration of the Czech members of parliament. Prime minister István Tisza made a vigorous speech to the Hungarian Parliament sending a message of *“hands off”* to anybody who wanted to violate the integrity of Hungary and its equal position in the dualist organization of the Monarchy.<sup>54</sup> However, apart from this rejection of efforts to violate the integrity of the state, the Hungarian government circles did not devote further public attention to the question of the Czech declaration until 1918.<sup>55</sup>

53 Although our weeklies began to write about the Czecho-Slovak exiles only after May 1917, there can be no doubt that their editors knew of the existence of the Czecho-Slovak National Council and of Czecho-Slovak units on the Eastern Front months earlier.

54 VERMES, ref. 14, p. 442.

55 In August 1917, an 80 member deputation of Slovaks was allegedly organized to go to Budapest to demonstrate to the Hungarian prime minister their loyalty and their rejection of the Czech constitutional declaration. However, the only source for this information is a claim in the memoirs of Vavro Šrobár: *“In the first half of August 1917, the rumour flew through Slovakia that the Slovak patriots from all the counties had to go to Budapest... for an audience with prime minister Count I. Tisza... that he gave us the prospect of a county administration, gymnasium, language, administrative and judicial concessions and relaxation of censorship of the Slovak press... The whole action started from T. Sv. Martin and I guess that it happened on the initiative of the frontier captain B. [Jenő Berzeviczy] and Dr. M. [Ján Mudroň].”*

The May act of the Czech members of parliament provoked considerably more disturbance among the local Hungarian/Magyar elites of Upper Hungary. As we could see, apart from rejection of any violation of the integrity of the Kingdom of Hungary, the articles published in the researched weeklies also show an effort to gain the support of the “loyal Slovak people-nationality”. To oppose the claim that the Upper Hungarian counties were inhabited by “Czechoslovaks”, the Slovak speaking inhabitants were already fully represented as a separate “nationality entity” with an original and unique individuality. The problem was that there was no organized pro-Hungarian Slovak political force, which could provide a convincing declaration in support of the integrity of the Kingdom of Hungary.<sup>56</sup> The only alternative was to persuade the representatives of the Slovak National Party to provide the declaration of loyalty.<sup>57</sup> The result was a radical shift from rejection of the Slovak National Party politicians as “treacherous pan-Slavists” to their acceptance and representation as “leaders of the Slovak nationality”. In the course of the second half of 1917 and even more clearly in 1918, a paradoxical situation arose in which the editors of analysed weeklies – seeing the unwillingness of the representatives of the Slovak National party to declare their rejection of the Czech demands for the region of northern Hungary – warned the “Slovak leaders” against the threat of Czech assimilation, emphasizing that the Slovaks were a separate “nationality” not a part of the “Czech/Czechoslovak” or the “Hungarian nation”, although the last was not stated explicitly yet.

In the months after the May declaration of the Czech Club in the Vienna Reichsrat, the Liptov (Liptó) and Nitra (Nyitra) county weeklies devoted ever greater space to the

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Both the named men, J. Berzeviczy and J. Mudroň, had already cooperated in activities of a similar character (see note 56), which could testify to the authenticity of this information. On the other hand, no other source confirming Šrobár's statement about the preparation of an 80 member deputation has been found up to now. Šrobár's memory does not gain reliability from his statement that I. Tisza was prime minister in August 1917 (he resigned on 15 June 1917) and finally the list of “concessions”, the Slovaks were to receive from the government as a reward for their demonstration of loyalty, sounds very improbable. ŠROBÁR, V. *Pamäti z vojny a z väzenia (1914 – 1918)*. (Memoirs from the War and Imprisonment (1914 – 1918). Second edition, Turčiansky Sv. Martin 1946, p. 57-64, quotation from p. 57-58.

56 In 1915, the Liptovský Mikuláš frontier captain J. Berzeviczy and the Upper Hungarian government commissioner Baron Lajos Kürthy attempted to establish a new Slovak political party loyal to Hungary by means of Dr. J. Mudroň, son of the long-serving chairman of the Slovak National Party Pavol Mudroň, and, at the same time, to obtain from the representatives of the Slovak National Party a declaration of the loyalty of the party to the government of Hungary, but they did not succeed. For further information see: VÖRÖS, L. *Tisza István nemzetiségi politikája és a szlovákok (1913 – 1915)*. (The nationality policy of István Tisza and the Slovaks (1913 – 1915). In *Fórum Társadalomtudományi Szemle*, 6, 2004, no. 1, p. 155-164; and SZARKA, *Szlovák nemzetiségi fejlődés*, ref. 6, p. 265-275.

57 The idea of accepting the Slovak National Party or its so-called Martin group as a legitimate political force was not really new. In 1913 – 1914, Tisza's policy of communication with representatives of the non-Magyar parties gained the support of parts of the local nationalist circles in Upper Hungary. The most important was the already mentioned initiative of Lajos Steier, editor of the weekly *Liptó*, who promoted a policy of support for the conservative wing of the Slovak National Party in the interest of neutralizing the strengthening radical “Czechoslovakist” oriented generation of young Slovak nationalists. This policy had to include concessions to the minimal demands of the Slovak National party in the fields of education and culture. Therefore, it is not really surprising that among the weeklies analysed here, it was *Liptó* that set the tone in writing against “Czechoslovakism” and emphasizing the threat to the “Slovak nationality” from “Czech imperialism”. See the literature cited in notes 20 and 56.

question of the Czech demands. The depiction of the Slovak National party politicians as representatives or leaders of the “Slovak nationality” did not change up to the end of the war. In the case of the social representations of the “Slovak nationality” less emphasis was placed on its loyalty to the Hungarian homeland and more on explaining the dangers threatening the Slovaks from an orientation towards the Czech political groups. The editors of the analysed weeklies attacked the Czechs in their articles, accusing them of treason and irredentism. They condemned the Czech soldiers, who were deserting in great numbers, and contrasted them with the Slovak soldiers, who were bravely fighting for the homeland. On the basis of reports from the Budapest and Vienna press, they also began to inform about the Czecho-Slovak National Council in Paris and the Czecho-Slovak legions in Russia and later also in France. They repeatedly accused the Slovak politicians of helping the Czechs with their silence, and appealed to them to protest against the Czech demands.

In August 1917, the *Nyitra megyei Szemle*, *Nyitravármegye* and *Liptó* published very sharp articles reacting to reports published in the Vienna *Reichspost*.<sup>58</sup> The article in the *Reichspost* referred to a report in a Czech daily that the Hungarian interior minister had proposed the possibility of establishing a Slovak autonomous region in the form of a Principality of Nitra (Nyitra), to which would be attached the Czechized, but originally Slovak region of Moravia. All three weeklies strongly denied the truth of this information and published official statements from the Hungarian government denying it. However, they also criticized the Hungarian government for overlooking the Czech provocations and not solving the problem with sufficient vigour. They also criticized the Vienna press for taking the “Czech ravings” too seriously and by providing regular information about them, arousing the impression of their political reality and weight. The Austrian government and its censors received similar criticism. In the following months, especially *Liptó* devoted ever more attention to the Czech territorial demands. The *Nyitra megyei Szemle*, *Nyitravármegye* and *Vágvölgyi Lap* also gave this question increased attention, although less frequently than *Liptó*. Apart from attacks on the Czech politicians, the articles were dominated by sharp criticism of the Austrian or Viennese press and the Austrian censors. Growing nervousness caused by the silence of the Slovak politicians was also noticeable. The appeals for the representatives of the Slovak National Party to distance themselves from the Czechs were repeated ever more urgently. Articles from autumn 1917 repeatedly emphasized the loyalty of the “Slovak people” and its rejection of the Czech efforts to detach the counties of Upper Hungary.<sup>59</sup> Apart from not distancing themselves from the disintegrative demands of the Czechs, the Slovak politicians were especially accused of not protesting when the Czech politicians spoke of a “Czechoslovak nation”. By

58 *A nyitrai fejedelemség* (The Principality of Nitra (Nyitra)). In *Nyitra megyei Szemle*, year 25, no. 34 from 26 August 1917; *A nyitrai tót fejedelemség* (The Slovak Principality of Nitra (Nyitra)). In *Nyitravármegye*, year 8, no. 34 from 24 August 1917; *A cseh fantázia* (The Czech Fantasy). In *Liptó*, year 25, no. 34 from 26 August 1917.

59 *Megjegyzések. A cseh követelések* (Comments. The Czech Demands). In *Liptó*, year 25, no. 40 from 7 October 1917; *A tót megyék* (The Slovak Counties). In *Nyitravármegye*, year 8, no. 38 from 21 September 1917; *A cseh támadások* (The Czech Attacks). In *Nyitra megyei Szemle*, year 25, no. 46 from 18 November 1917.



their silence, the Slovak politicians were allegedly indicating that they did not object to the Czechs appropriating the right to speak in the name of the Slovaks. This accusation against the representatives of the Slovak National Party became especially important after 16 December 1917, when the President of France Raymond Poincaré issued a decree approving the establishment of an autonomous Czecho-Slovak army in France politically subject to the Czecho-Slovak National Council in Paris.<sup>60</sup> *Liptó* commented as follows: “*The Czechs want to compromise the Slovaks in this way at any price, so that they can prove the truth of the lie according to which the Czechs and Slovaks form one nation.*” In the same article, the author warned: “*However, such a representation of the Slovaks could have very unpleasant results (for the Slovaks), if their leaders do not protest more vigorously against these tactics of the Czech traitors.*”<sup>61</sup>

The articles continued into 1918 in a similar spirit, although the weeklies analysed by us did not react so intensively to the 6 January 1918 Declaration<sup>62</sup> of the Czech members of parliament as they had to the May constitutional declaration of the previous year. Only the weekly *Nyitrávámegye* published a longer article and that was delayed. The article on the title page included the text of a protest declaration, which the chief district administrator Dr. Gyula Filberger submitted for approval by the representatives of all the towns and villages in the district of Myjava at the end of January 1918. The declaration, allegedly supported with enthusiasm by the local Slovak population, protested against the Czech annexation attempts and against the fact that an army recruited among “*Czech traitors*” was spoken of as the “*Czechoslovak army*”. According to Filberger, the Myjava Slovaks, who in “*long past times*” had been among the most active supporters of “*Slovak nationality agitation*”, had proved that they decisively rejected the “*Czech robbery plans*” because “*the brave soul of the Slovak people, the Slovak people, who have given the most beautiful proof on the battlefield, that they do not reject loyalty to the homeland and that the Czech plans will not find support among them. Therefore, they have used the unique opportunity to reject through their local representatives the attempted robbery by the Czechs and the international lies about oppression of nationalities*”.<sup>63</sup> This article

60 ŠEDIVÝ, I. *Češi, české země a velká válka 1914 – 1918*. (The Czechs, the Czech lands and the Great War 1914 – 1918). Prague : NLN, 2001, p. 335-336.

61 *Megjegyzések. A cseh-tót brigád* (Comments. The Czecho-Slovak Brigade). In *Liptó*, year 25, no. 52 from 30 December 1917. In the next issue, *Liptó* returned to this question in connection with a book by E. Beneš: *Bohemia's Case for Independence*, published in London in 1917. Among other things, Beneš stated in it that more than 350 thousand Czechoslovaks had deserted from the Austro-Hungarian army up to the beginning of the year. *Liptó* protested against this claim, because: “*the Slovaks had always faithfully fought for their king and country*”. It continued that the Czechs were striving to manipulate the Slovaks in this way, because this “*fraudulent Czecho-Slovak National Council contains hardly any Slovaks*”. *Megjegyzések Benesch Dr. könyve* (Comments. The Book by Dr. Beneš). In *Liptó*, year 26, no. 1 from 6 January 1918.

62 This second declaration of the Czech members of parliament in the Vienna Reichsrat went even further than the previous one from May 1917 and already demanded political independence for the Czechs and their “*Slovak brethren suffering under the yoke of oppression*” in Northern Hungary. See ŠEDIVÝ, ref. 60.

63 It is also worth quoting from the text of the protest declaration approved by the representatives of the Myjava communities: “*The population of Slovak speakers in our community protest... against the naming of an army recruited by our enemies from among Czech traitors, as Czecho-Slovak. They declare that they condemn and despise the traitors with disgust. There are some Slovaks abroad, who after a long time far*

is also interesting as one of the few claims about the patriotism of the “Slovak people” backed by concrete evidence.<sup>64</sup>

The theme of Czech political aspirations and the silence of the Slovak politicians came strongly into the foreground again from April and May 1918. In these and the following months until the end of the war, especially the articles in *Liptó* were concerned with the questions concerning Czech policy and Slovak political passivity.<sup>65</sup> This weekly continued to emphasize that the “Slovak people/Slovak nationality” did not agree with the Czech demands, was opposed to the separation of the Upper Hungarian counties from Hungary and “looked with contempt on the treacherous Slovaks” who joined the Czechs. Articles continually protested against use of the expression “Czechoslovak nation”. They entirely stopped talking about the Slovaks belonging to the “Hungarian nation”, and instead emphasized their separateness, uniqueness and difference from the Czechs. They warned the Slovak politicians against flirting with the Czech plans, because the Czechs only wanted to expand to the east and strengthen their “nation by assimilating the Slovaks”. In March 1918, *Liptó* again appealed to the Slovak National Party politicians to abandon their passivity and protest against the Czech demands in the interest of the separate identity of the Slovaks: “*It would be appropriate and wise... for the Slovak Nationality Party to abandon its passivity and take up a position towards the Czechs demanding a separate and independent individuality for the Slovak nationality. Such activity is the only way to secure a more beautiful and better future for the Slovaks... We hope that the leading men of the Slovak nationality include weighty men with sober judgement*”, who will be able to stop the Czech subversion, the only aim of which is “*to harm the Slovaks*”.<sup>66</sup>

At the same time, articles appeared showing a tendency to some degree of self-reflection and inclination to recognize Slovak linguistic and cultural rights especially in

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*from the homeland, have gone astray into paid agitation against Hungary and lowered themselves to the repulsive sin of treason, but they are no longer regarded as Slovaks. They state full consciousness that all our Slovak nationality soldiers fighting for their king and country faithfully and consciously, have performed and continue to perform their service. Not even one traitor has left their ranks, so this naming of the Czecho-Slovak brigade is nothing other than world deceiving disparaging humbug, which they reject in the name of all the Slovaks in the Kingdom of Hungary.*” Tiltakozás (Protest). In *Nyitrávámegye*, year 9, no. 5 from 1 February 1918.

- 64 Clearly, it is extremely improbable that the Slovak inhabitants of the Myjava district would support such a declaration, and the communal councils of the Myjava towns and villages cannot be regarded as democratically elected representative institutions of the local communities. In spite of this, the report that the “Slovak people of Myjava” supported such an anti-Czech declaration of Hungarian patriotism was in harmony with the traditional social representations of the “Slovak people” as a loyal element, so it may not have appeared untrustworthy in the given period.
- 65 It is interesting that *Nyitrávámegye* as well as the *Vágvölgyi Lap* almost entirely stopped expressing views on these questions after June 1918. They wrote much more rarely about political questions and about the situation on the war fronts. The majority of articles were devoted to regional matters, supply difficulties, information about the threat of epidemics and so on. In the case of these weeklies, my research stopped with issues from September 1918, because, as with the great majority of Hungarian local weeklies, their publication stopped at the end of September 1918. The *Nyitramegyei Szemle* was published until the end of 1918, but I have not been able to find issues from autumn 1918 for study. I had the possibility to study issues up to November 1918 only in the case of the weekly *Liptó*, which generally provided the most material for analysis.
- 66 *Passzivitás vagy aktivitás* (Passivity or Activity). In *Liptó*, year 26, no. 13 from 31 March 1918.

the field of education, which formed the basic programme of the Slovak nationalists. At the beginning of May 1918, the *Vágvölgyi Lap* published an article in which the author criticized the representatives of the Slovak National Party for remaining passive and not adopting any position on the Czech demands, but also admitting that the cause of this was partly also the mistaken nationality policy of the Hungarian governments. The writer of the article saw no good reason why the Slovaks could not have Slovak schools, since among the “nationalities” they were closest to the Hungarians and the “nationality act” gave them the right to their own schools. It had also been a mistake to close the three Slovak gymnasias and Matica Slovenská. They should not have been dissolved, it was only necessary to change their leadership.<sup>67</sup>

In April 1918, a meeting of Czech politicians in Prague with the main aim of protesting against sharp statements by Count Ottokar Czernin attacking the Czech politicians, provoked a vehement reaction from the press.<sup>68</sup> However, the wider purpose of this meeting was to demonstrate against the Monarchy. This was expressed in the so-called national oath of the Czech politicians, in which they spoke of the “Czechoslavic nation”.<sup>69</sup> According to the weekly *Liptó* several Slovak politicians also participated in this assembly. They are described as traitors, who do not represent the “Slovak people”. The same article observed: “*Although it was directed against Czernin, the Prague meeting was actually a demonstration in favour of Czecho-Slovak unification because the manifesto issued by the assembly is addressed to the Czecho-Slovak nation. Thus, it was an assembly of Czecho-Slovaks.*”<sup>70</sup>

Two events in May 1918 provoked vehement reactions: the May day demonstration in Liptovský Svätý Mikuláš, which approved the so-called Mikuláš resolution on the initiative of Vavro Šrobár, and the celebration of the fiftieth anniversary of the foundation

67 The article continues by stating that the unfortunate result of their dissolution was that Slovaks sent their children to Czech schools, from where “we get back the ultra-Czech spirit of enthusiastic ultra-Slovaks, who hate the Hungarians”. *Tót dolgok* (Slovak Matters). In *Vágvölgyi Lap*, year 45, no. 18 from 5 May 1918. An article written in a similar spirit appeared in *Nyitra vármegye* no. 23 from 7 June 1918 and no. 24 from 14 June 1918.

68 ŠEDIVÝ, ref. 59, p. 330. The meeting occurred on 13 April 1918 and reacted to Czernin’s speech to Vienna city council on 2 April, in which the foreign minister of the Monarchy sharply criticized the Czech politicians. Czernin distinguished between the “Czech nation”, which is “loyally Austrian in the full sense of the expression” and the “pitiful Masaryk” and similar traitors among the Czech politicians within the Monarchy. Among other things, he accused them of wanting to “separate parts of the Hungarian state”. Czernin’s speech is published in: *Sborník dokumentů k vnitřnímu vývoji v českých zemích za 1. světové války 1914 – 1918. V. Rok 1918.* (Volume of Documents concerning the Internal Development in the Czech Lands during the First World War, 1914 – 1918. V. 1918). Prague 1997, doc. no. 38, p. 146–148. In connection with Czernin’s speech, the *Vágvölgyi Lap* stated that: “What Count Czernin... said about the Czech people, namely that it is loyal and Austrian thinking, we can also say in the Hungarian context about our Slovak people... so it is not acceptable for soulless rebels to blacken his good name.” *Tót dolgok* (Slovak Matters). In *Vágvölgyi Lap*, year 45, no. 18 from 5 May 1918.

69 ŠEDIVÝ, ref. 59, p. 330–331. The text of the national oath, which was presented to the meeting by Alois Jirásek, is published in: *Sborník dokumentů k vnitřnímu vývoji v českých zemích za 1. světové války 1914 – 1918. V.*, ref. 66, doc. no. 42, p. 151–153.

70 *Megjegyzések. Nad Tatram sa blíska* (Comments. There is lightning on the Tatras). In *Liptó*, year 26, no. 16 from 21 April 1918.

of the National Theatre in Prague, with the participation of a Slovak delegation led by Pavol Országh Hviezdoslav.<sup>71</sup>

According to the weekly *Liptó*, the Czech and Viennese press interpreted the Mikuláš resolution as a declaration of the Slovaks in favour of the “Czechoslovak nation”. The editor of *Liptó* most emphatically rejected such an interpretation with the claim that the resolution did not express the will of the Slovaks: “(Czech) *irredentism cannot put down deep roots in Hungary because the Slovaks know that the Czechs are attacking their existence and want to absorb them to add to their own strength.*”<sup>72</sup> The participation of a Slovak delegation in the Prague celebrations was also a disappointment for *Liptó*. It stated that sober and responsible elements were retreating from Slovak politics and leaving the space to “*entirely incapable, amateurish and irresponsible people*”, who listen to the Czech politicians in spite of the fact that “*thousands of Slovaks are heroically fighting the enemy and speak with scorn about the Czechs*”. It concluded that the Hungarian authorities were not as bad as the Austrian in this area. They would deal with these traitors to the homeland, because Hungary contained “*only a small isolated group of adherents of Czecho-Slovak unity and the Slovak people scorn and despise the Czechs*”.<sup>73</sup>

These two events in May 1918 made it clear that one part of the Slovak political elite was unambiguously oriented towards the Czech efforts to create Czecho-Slovakia, while the other part was waiting to see how events would develop. In the following months, the weekly *Liptó* limited itself to a few protest articles, in which it constantly repeated that the Slovak politicians were not representing the interests of the “Slovak people/Slovak nationality”, when they worked for union with the Czechs. It appealed to the Slovak politicians to seriously and conspicuously protest in the name of the “Slovak people” against the Czech attacks before it was too late.<sup>74</sup> A feeling of despair and helplessness can

71 The celebrations were held from 15 to 17 May 1918 in Prague. Apart from the 20 member Slovak delegation, Croatian, Slovene, Bosnian, Polish and Italian politicians also participated in these grand celebrations, which were also a demonstration against the Monarchy. HRONSKÝ, ref. 31, p. 247-250.

72 *Egy körmenetről* (About a local procession). In *Liptó*, year 26, no. 18 from 5 May 1918. Šrobár's action aroused great attention from the editors of the weekly *Liptó* since they also returned to it in an article about the celebration of the 50th anniversary of the foundation of the National Theatre in Prague (see note 72) and they published an extensive article on the 1 May demonstration in Liptov (Liptó) a month later. They again denied that the Liptovský Mikuláš assembly was a demonstration of the allegiance of the Slovaks to the “Czechoslovak nation”. The Czech “annexationist policy” was described as entirely unrealistic and the Slovak politicians were warned that associating with the Czechs meant suicide. The article concluded with the conventional statement that “*the Slovaks, with the exception of one or two adventurers, are against the Czech aspirations and the Slovak soldier considers it an insult to be called a Czech*”. *Volt-e Liptószentmiklóson cseh-tót manifesztáció?* (Was there a Czecho-Slovak demonstration in Liptovský Sv. Mikuláš?). In *Liptó*, year 26, no. 22 from 2 June 1918; see also note no. 73.

73 *A prágai események* (The Prague Events). In *Liptó*, year 26, no. 21 from 26 May 1918. *Nyitrávámegye* published only a brief report on the Prague celebrations, in which it incorrectly stated that Croats, Slovenes, Bosnians and Serbs participated in the celebrations, but the “*the Slovaks of Hungary did not come, which resulted in considerable disappointment*”. *A tótok nem jöttek el* (The Slovaks did not come). In *Nyitrávámegye*, year 9, no. 22 from 31 May 1918.

74 *Magjegyzések. A cseh-tót nemzeti tanács.* (Comments. The Czecho-Slovak National Council). In *Liptó*, year 26, no. 31 from 28 July 1918; *Ismét kísért a Liptószentmiklósi népgyűlés* (A People's Assembly in Liptovský Sv. Mikuláš (Liptószentmiklós) again threatens). In *Liptó*, year 26, no. 36 from 1 September 1918.

already be felt in these articles. In mid October 1918, *Liptó* stated that the Slovak politicians bore a great responsibility, because they had to decide the direction they would choose. If they joined the Czechs, they would very soon lose their nationality, their language and the possibility to freely do business.<sup>75</sup> Two weeks later, the day before the declaration of Czecho-Slovakia, *Liptó* already wrote of the Slovaks as a “people” with the right to independent “national existence” (!): “Why don’t they (the Slovaks) declare their complete independence on the basis of the Wilsonian right to self-determination. Why don’t they declare that at this fateful moment they clearly see their situation and don’t want to be drowned in either one or the other nation?” According to the author of the article, this is the only correct direction for pursuing the interests of the “Slovak people”. The Slovaks should not allow the Czechs to speak and decide in their name before the whole of Europe and the world, because “today the Slovak people is already in such a situation that the whole world will listen and hear its words. As a people, which wants to pursue its own national interests, it should not fear a plebiscite”. The writer of the article appealed to the Slovaks to decide their destiny freely in a plebiscite as a free “nation”.<sup>76</sup>

The analysis of our five weeklies has brought surprising results to some degree. The gradual change from representation of the Slovak speaking population as a “nationality” instead of a “people” immediately before the war was further confirmed in the first years of the war. It is possible to derive from the cited articles the clear conclusion that although the category of “people” was still used alongside the category of “nationality”, these two terms became fully synonymous in this period. The difference in meaning between these terms, found from at least the 1880s to the end of the first decade of the 20th century, disappeared. In the last two years of the war, the influence of political events beyond the frontiers of Hungary – the activities of Czech and Slovak politicians in exile, the declarations of the Czech politicians in the Vienna Reichsrat – led to an important change in the image of the Slovaks. The originality and uniqueness of the Slovak culture and language were emphasized and said to be entirely distinct from the Czechs. The danger of “Czech imperialism”, which was striving to absorb the Slovaks and destroy their “existence as a nationality”, was also pointed out. This reversal in representation was clearly connected with the need to deny the idea of the “Czechoslovak nation”, which meant a political programme threatening the integrity of Hungary. The representation of the Slovaks as a “separate nationality” was combined with the stereotype of their loyalty and patriotism, but the idea of the Slovaks as members of the “Hungarian nation” entirely faded away. After May 1917, the loyalty and patriotism of the Slovaks was connected only with the state framework of Hungary, not with the “Hungarian nation”. In parallel to this, there was a radical change in the representation of the representatives of the Slovak National Party. Designation of them as “pan-Slavists” suddenly stopped and they were presented

75 *A béke* (The Peace). In *Liptó*, year 26, no. 42 from 13 October 1918.

76 The article begins with the declaration that the position of Upper Hungary should be decided in a plebiscite, but the Czech and Slovak press were opposed, because “an oppressed people cannot vote in the shadow of bayonets”. However, if the Slovaks came under the rule of the Czechs, in 10 – 15 years the whole of Upper Hungary would be Czech and “the Slovaks ordinary day-labourers of Czech expansion”. Therefore, the Slovaks would have to realize their “national interests” and not succumb to Czech promises and enticements. *A népszavazás* (A Plebiscite). In *Liptó*, year 26, no. 44 from 27 October 1918.

as the representatives or “leaders of the Slovak people/Slovak nationality”. This change is a logical counterpart to the representation of the Slovak speaking population as a “separate nationality”, which should demand its own independent national existence.

\* \* \*

The results of our analysis fully confirm the assumption that ethnic or “nationality” or “national” categories and representations based on them were not static in Hungarian/Magyar nationalist discourse during the period of dualism, that they were conditioned and subject to change. When critically interpreting them, it is necessary to take into account this conditionedness and the context in which they occur.

The five weeklies I subjected to analysis in this study can be regarded as a representative sample of the Hungarian/Magyar nationalist discourse of the time (obviously in connection with representations of the Slovaks. The editors of these weeklies, who were the authors of the great majority of the articles in their newspapers, were active participants in the discourse of the time and standard representatives of Hungarian/Magyar nationalism. In this article we were interested in specific categories, stereotypes and the associated representations of the Slovak speaking population of the north-western regions of Hungary. The editors of the five analysed weeklies used them, manipulated them and shared in their reproduction and changes just as much as other participants in public discourse, although here we must be cautious and carefully consider the social position of participants. The case of the editors of newspapers is specific only to the extent that they were institutional creators of discourse. When writing an article, the journalist decided which of the existing categories and stereotypes would be applied and which would not. It was undoubtedly a subconscious process of choosing between mental images and it clearly depended on the political orientation of the author and other circumstances, what image of the Slovaks he created and into what context he put it. The editor of *Nagyszombat és Vidéke* and partly also the editors of the *Nyitramegyei Szemle* and *Nyitrávámegye* consequently used the category of the “people” in their representation of the Slovak speaking population, and emphasized the patriotism and loyalty of the “Slovak people” towards the “Hungarian nation”, of which it was an integral part. On the other hand, the editors of *Liptó* and *Vágvölgyi Lap* made equal use of the categories “people” and “nationality” with both serving as synonyms. They both repeated the stereotypes of patriotism and loyalty, but they already represented the Slovaks as a separate entity, not as an integral part of the “Hungarian nation”. It is impossible to avoid seeing a connection between the political orientation of the editors and their way of representing the Slovaks. The editors of *Nagyszombat és Vidéke*, *Nyitrávámegye és Vidéke* and *Nyitramegyei Szemle* were active supporters of the opposition Hungarian Independence Party or the Catholic People’s Party, which supported the more radical *ethnic homogenization* variant of Hungarian/Magyar nationalism, especially in comparison with Tisza’s new policy of communication with the non-Magyar nationalist movements. The editors of the weekly *Liptó*, especially Lajos Steier, and the editor of the *Vágvölgyi Lap* were adherents of Tisza’s new policy. The question arises of the character of the relationship between the various categories and stereotypes used to represent the Slovaks and the real

political situation. We could see that the significant change in the policy of the Hungarian *establishment* towards the non-Magyar nationalist parties at the beginning of the era of Tisza's second government was reflected in a change in the way the supporters of I. Tisza represented the non-Magyar inhabitants of the country. Events on the international scene during the war and obviously the specific military conditions led to important changes in the social representations of the Slovaks and the representatives of the Slovak nationalist movement. The shifts in the prevailing mental images can be interpreted as changes resulting from and reflecting political and undoubtedly also social changes.

Study and analysis of the categories, stereotypes and social representations – “ethnic”, “national” or “nationality” – enable us to better understand one of the important mechanisms in the functioning of the phenomenon of nationalism. However, they also help the historian to, at least partially, warn against the frequent error of identifying the categories, stereotypes and associated representations with social reality. It is important to realize that the social categories and stereotypes do not serve only to simply describe phenomena or name realities. They also play a large part in creating and shaping the virtual content of the given phenomenon and its representation as the real, fundamental reality. Clearly, no serious historian would take seriously the claim that before 1918, the “Slovak people” was always zealously patriotic and hated the “pan-Slavists”. The idea that the politicians of the Slovak National Party were “fanatical pan-Slavists”, whose only aim was the disintegration of Hungary does not stand up to confrontation with the historical facts either. However, it is necessary to deal just as critically with the categories, stereotypes and representations occurring in the Slovak nationalist discourse of the time. Here, the Slovaks were represented as the oppressed “nation” suffering under Hungarian rule, because it could not freely develop its “national life” and so on. In these cases, it is also a matter of a representation of reality, which more created reality than reflected it. Categorization, categories, stereotypes and the representations based on them can tell us little about the *categorized*, because they are not based on “facts”, but they can tell us more about the *categorizers*. Categories and stereotypes betray much about those, who use and reproduce them, because the images of the “others” are always shaped in relation to the self-image of the categorizers. In connection with the groups that are objects of social categorization, it is possible to study how they stood in relation to the external categorizations and social representations, which came from the “others”, how the external representations shaped their own self-image and self-representation.

\* This study is an extended version of a paper given at the conference: *The First World War – reflections in public life, socio-economic conditions and social consciousness*, 11 – 12 June 2002 in Bratislava. I wish to thank Elena Mannová and Andrej Findor for their stimulating comments on an earlier version of this article.

VERÄNDERUNGEN DES BILDES DER SLOWAKEN IN DER  
UNGARISCHSPRACHIGEN OBERUNGARISCHEN REGIONALPRESSE  
IN DEN JAHREN 1914-1918

LÁSZLÓ VÖRÖS

In den mitteleuropäischen nationalen Historiographien, die sich mit dem letzten Jahrhundert des Habsburgischen Reiches beschäftigen, d.h. mit der Epoche der sich etablierenden und aufstrebenden nationalistischen Bewegungen, wurde bisher den sozialen Kategorisierungen und Stereotypisierungen innerhalb der einzelnen nationalistischen (nationalen) Diskurse nur minimale oder gar keine Aufmerksamkeit geschenkt. In der vorliegenden Studie werden fünf ausgewählte regionale ungarischsprachige Wochenzeitungen analysiert, die während des Ersten Weltkriegs in den nordwestungarischen, mehrheitlich von Slowaken bevölkerten Komitaten Pressburg, Neutra, Trentschin und Liptau erschienen. Am Beispiel dieser Periodika werden zeitgenössische soziale Kategorien („Volk“, „Nationalität“, „Nation“) und Stereotype im ungarischen nationalistischen Diskurs und die auf diesen begründeten (mental)en Repräsentationen der slowakischsprachigen Bevölkerung in Ungarn analysiert. Beachtet wird die Bedingtheit dieser Repräsentationen durch den Zeitkontext (innen- und außenpolitische Ereignisse), es wird versucht, deren Entwicklung zu erfassen und diese Entwicklung zu periodisieren.

In der vorliegenden Studie werden die Arten und die Änderungen der Repräsentationen von Slowaken in Ungarn von den 1870er Jahren bis zum Ende des Ersten Weltkriegs verfolgt, wobei der Schwerpunkt auf der Kriegszeit liegt. Die gegenüber der slowakischen nationalistischen Bewegung und der von dieser Bewegung durchgesetzten nationalen Ideologie indifferente slowakischsprachige Bevölkerung (d.h. im zeitgenössischen ungarischen Diskurs: „slowakische(s) Volk/Nationalität“) wurde während des ganzen 19. Jahrhunderts bis zum Ende des Ersten Weltkriegs im ungarischen nationalistischen Diskurs im Wesentlichen als eine dem ungarischen Vaterland treue, sich loyal zur „ungarischen Nation“ bekennende Bevölkerung repräsentiert. Im Gegensatz zu diesem Bild wurden slowakische nationalistische Eliten bzw. im weiteren Sinne auch die Sympathisanten der slowakischen Nationalbewegung als „Panslawen“ und „Verräter des ungarischen Vaterlandes“ repräsentiert, die die Auflösung des Landes zum Ziel haben und auf keinen Fall die Interessen des „slowakischen Volkes“ vertreten, wie sie das von sich selbst behaupten. Im Laufe des Kriegs erfahren beide diese Bilder Veränderungen. Die Slowaken werden sukzessive eindeutig als eine „selbständige und einzigartige Nationalität“ repräsentiert, die im „brüderlichen Einvernehmen“ mit der ungarischen Nation ihr nationales Dasein im Rahmen des ungarischen Staates entfalten kann. Die slowakische nationalistische Elite wird nicht mehr als „verräterisch“ und „panslawisch“ repräsentiert, sondern sie wird zunehmend als legitimer Vertreter der „slowakischen Nationalität“ wahrgenommen. Diese radikale Veränderung in der Präsentation der Slowaken, die in den letzten zwei Kriegsjahren eingetreten ist, hängt eindeutig mit der aktuellen außenpolitischen Situation zusammen. Konkret ist diese Veränderung als Folge der Aktivität der tschechischen und slowakischen Emigration in Paris (Tschechoslowakischer Nationalrat), der Veröffentlichung der Kriegsziele der Entente (zu denen auch „die Befreiung der Tschechoslowaken von fremder Herrschaft“ gehörte) und nicht zuletzt auch als Folge der Auftritte von tschechischen Abgeordneten im Wiener Reichsrat im Mai 1917 und Januar 1918 (wo sie den Anschluss der von Slowaken besiedelten Gebiete Nordungarns an die Länder der Böhmischen Krone und die Föderalisierung von Österreich-Ungarn forderten) anzusehen.

Mit dieser Studie soll zugleich darauf hingewiesen werden, dass Studium und Analysieren von „ethnischen“, „nationalen“ und „Nationalitäts“- Kategorien, Stereotypen und Repräsentationen eine bessere Einsicht in das Funktionieren eines der wichtigen Mechanismen des Phänomens



Nationalismus ermöglichen, und den Historikern zumindest teilweise helfen können, den oft begangenen Fehler - nämlich die Gleichsetzung von Kategorien, Stereotypen und darauf gegründeten Repräsentationen mit der sozialen Wirklichkeit - zu vermeiden. Es ist wichtig, sich zu vergegenwärtigen, dass Kategorien und Stereotypen nicht nur zur einfachen Beschreibung von Phänomenen, zur Benennung der Wirklichkeit, dienen, sondern dass sie in hohem Maße den virtuellen Inhalt eines bestimmten Phänomens und dessen Repräsentationen als tatsächliche, fundamentale Wirklichkeit mitgestalten. Ebenso wichtig ist es, sich zu vergegenwärtigen, dass jedes erhaltene historische Dokument, das heutzutage einer kritischen Analyse unterzogen werden kann, ein Teil des zeitgenössischen Diskurses - bzw. verschiedener sich überschneidender Diskurse - war, und als solches den „Regeln“ - der Logik - des gegebenen Diskurses unterlag. Dieser Tatsache müssen wir uns als Historiker bewusst sein. Bei der Interpretierung einer historischen Quelle dürfen wir nicht vergessen, dass diese vor allem den Diskurs (und die „diskursiven Praktiken“) ihrer Zeit widerspiegelt, und dass jede Interpretationsweise, die diese Tatsache nicht berücksichtigt, zwangsläufig anachronistisch ist.

# *THE ROLE OF MAGIC IN THE PAST*

*Learned and Popular Magic, Popular Beliefs  
and Diversity of Attitudes*



*Edited by Blanka Szeghyová*

## THE ROLE OF THE COMMERCIAL BANKS IN ARYANIZATION IN SLOVAKIA, 1939 – 1945

EUDOVÍT HALLON

HALLON, Eudovít. The role of the commercial banks in Aryanization in Slovakia, 1939 – 1945. *Historický časopis*, 2008, 56, Supplement, pp. 75-92, Bratislava.

In the conditions of the wartime Slovak Republic, the commercial banks with Slovak management played a key role in extending the control of Slovak capital over areas of business controlled by other nationalities, especially Czechs and Jews. However, they had only a secondary position in capital expansion, because the most important businesses in Slovakia were controlled by the banks and companies of Nazi Germany. From autumn 1940, the Slovak commercial banks and other financial institutions fulfilled an entirely new role in the process of state directed Aryanization of Jewish property. They became passive mediators of the transfer of Jewish property from the hands of the Jewish community into the possession of the state. The commercial banks also became the main source of finance for further anti-Jewish actions including the deportations to extermination camps. A wave of opposition began to arise against participation in Aryanization and actions against the Jewish community.

History. Slovakia. The role of the commercial banks in Aryanization in Slovakia, 1939 – 1945.

The problem of Aryanization, namely the confiscation of the property of the Jewish community in the period 1939 – 1945, has already been the subject of research by Slovak historiography for several decades. It is especially necessary to mention the research results of the historian Ivan Kamenec and, on questions of anti-Jewish legislation, the work of Katarína Zavacká. However, up to 1989 there were ideological obstacles to research and especially publication on the Jewish problem. Research and publication developed more extensively during the 1990s. Since then, the historian Eduard Nižňanský has devoted very intensive attention to the questions of the Holocaust including Aryanization. Among other historians it is possible to mention Katarína Hradská. Thanks to Nižňanský, Kamenec and others, more students, young researchers and regional historians are now directing their attention to this problem. Nižňanský and Kamenec have also been mainly responsible for the systematic publication of archive documents concerning the Holocaust since 2001. These authors have evaluated the dispersal of the property of the Jewish community after 1938 from various points of view. We also encounter here the question of the position of the financial institutions in the process of Aryanization.<sup>1</sup>

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1 See for example: KAMENEC, Ivan. *Po stopách tragédie*. Bratislava 1991. English translation: *On the Trail of Tragedy, the Holocaust in Slovakia*. Bratislava 2007; NIŽŇANSKÝ, Eduard. *Židovská komunita na Slovensku medzi československou parlamentnou demokraciou a slovenským štátom v stredoeurópskom kontexte*. (The Jewish Community in Slovakia between Czechoslovak Parliamentary Democracy and the

However, Slovak historiography still lacks a monograph directed towards this problem. Therefore, in the following study I will evaluate the specific role of the financial institutions, especially the commercial banks, in the process of Aryanization on the basis of wider research, especially in the collections of the Slovak National Archives and the Archives of the National bank of Slovakia.

In the period from the end of the 1930s to the middle of the forties, European banking became one of the most important objects and, at the same time, one of the most active participants in Aryanization, that is the forcible confiscation of the property of inhabitants of Jewish origin. A large part of the financial system controlled by Jewish capital already fell victim to Nazi dominated banking groups, especially the groups of the Deutsche Bank and Dresdner Bank, in Nazi Germany during the thirties. Through the Jewish Banks, the Nazis penetrated into the heart of the German business sphere.<sup>2</sup> The power structures of the wartime Slovak Republic also undertook Aryanization on the basis of special legislation. However, the position of the commercial banks in Aryanization was substantially different from the situation in Germany as a result of specific conditions in Slovakia. The capital potential of the Slovak banks and the associated division of spheres of influence in the financial and business system, as well as the overall character of the Aryanization process had decisive influence among the specific conditions. General factors common to the different countries also appeared, especially the installation of a totalitarian regime, state intervention in the economy and the ever-present political and economic influence of Germany.

If we have to assess the position of Slovak financial capital, we must state that in spite of political support from the regime in the form of measures and interventions in the economy, its potential was not sufficient for it to play the dominant role in Aryanization in Slovakia. It is necessary to realize that the value of the balances of commercial banking in Slovakia in 1938 amounted to slightly less than 14 % of the total value of the balances of the commercial banks in the Czecho-Slovak Republic. National Slovak financial capital controlled only about 40 % of the total deposits in all the commercial banks in Slovakia. The proportion in the company sector was even lower, with only about 11 % of

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Slovak State in the Central European Context). Prešov 1999; LIPSCHER, Ladislav. *Židia v slovenskom štáte 1939 – 1945*. (The Jews in the Slovak State 1939 – 1945). Banská Bystrica 1990; NIŽŇANSKÝ, Eduard. *Holokaust na Slovensku 1. : Obdobie autonómie* (The Holocaust in Slovakia 1. : The Period of Autonomy) (6. 10. 1938 – 14. 3. 1939). Bratislava 2001; NIŽŇANSKÝ, Eduard – KAMENEC, Ivan. *Holokaust na Slovensku 2.: Prezident, vláda, Snem SR, Štátna rada o židovskej otázke* (The Holocaust in Slovakia 2. : The President, Government, Slovak Parliament and State Council on the Jewish Question) (1939 – 1945). Bratislava 2003; NIŽŇANSKÝ, Eduard. *Holokaust na Slovensku 4. : Dokumenty nemeckej proveniencie (1939 – 1945)*. (The Holocaust in Slovakia 4. : Documents of German Origin, 1939 – 1945) . Bratislava 2003.

2 For comparison see the latest works by German historians on the role of the largest commercial banks in Germany, especially the Deutsche Bank and Dresdner Bank, in the Aryanization process, e. g.: JAMES, Harold. *Die Deutsche Bank und die Arierisierung*. Munich 2001; ZIEGLER, Dieter. *Die Dresdner Bank und die deutschen Juden*. Munich 2006 (work published in the framework of a four volume work under the common title: HENKE, Klaus Dietma (Hgs.). *Die Dresdner Bank im Dritten Reich*. Munich 2006); KOPPER, Christopher. *Bankiers unterm Hakenkreuz*. Munich 2005; WIXFORTH, Harald. *Auftakt zu Ostexpansion. Die Dresdner Bank und Umgestaltung des Bankwesens im Sudetenland 1938/1939*. Dresden 2001.

the total share capital. The two largest Slovak banks, the Tatra banka and the Slovenská banka were only middle sized financial institutions in the context of the financial system of the Czecho-Slovak Republic.<sup>3</sup>

The share of nationally Slovak banks in the financial system increased during the war years as a result of non-economic interventions from the government. However, the capital expansion of these banks into the company sector, where Jewish capital had a substantially greater presence, achieved much more modest results. The key positions here were dominated by the largest Czech banks and cartels, which controlled about two-thirds of the share capital of the joint stock companies in Slovakia. In 1939 – 1942, the position of Czech capital was taken over by German banks and corporations, when they penetrated into the capital centres of the Czech Lands. The share of German capital in industrial joint stock companies increased from 4 % to 52 % in the period 1938 – 1942.<sup>4</sup>

From the total of 14 nationally Slovak banks at the end of 1938, only the two largest institutions – the Tatra banka and the Slovenská banka with their headquarters in Bratislava and partially also the two most important regional banks – the Ľudová banka with its seat in Ružomberok and the Národná banka, later the Stredoslovenská banka with its seat in Banská Bystrica, were able to significantly participate in the Aryanization of large companies. The leading banks also included two multi-national institutions – the Slovenská všeobecná úverná banka (Slovak General Credit Bank) and Dunajská banka. However, already in the 1930s, these came into capital dependence on stronger partners, namely the Czech Legiobanka and the centre for people's banking, the Zväz roľníckych vzájomných pokladníc (Union of Small Farmers' Mutual Savings Banks).

The space for the expansion of the Slovak banks was considerably narrowed by this. In the end, even this space remained largely unused. Slovak financial capital achieved more substantial success only in the Jewish businesses of the food processing industry. Since the majority of large Slovak companies fell into the hands of German capital, the subject of Aryanization was mainly smaller companies, small businesses and Jewish agricultural land in the framework of the later phase of land reform, when it acquired the character of confiscation of Jewish land by the state. The main wave of Aryanization happened approximately from the middle of 1940 to the summer of 1942. In spite of the fact that it was carried out on the basis of the so-called Aryanization laws, in the culminating phase, it actually escaped from the control of the government economic circles. Its implementation fell into the hand of the most radical wing of the ruling regime and opportunist careerists, who succeeded in applying the so-called revolutionary conception of Aryanization. This brought anarchy and disintegration into the Aryanization process, and finally caused serious economic damage. Especially the banks were seriously affected by the negative effects of Aryanization, because repayment of loans to the Jewish owners by the new owners of their Aryanized property was entirely voluntary. Therefore, vari-

3 *Statistická ročenka Republiky československé*, 1938, p. 186-188; *Zprávy státního úřadu statistického 1938* (Reports of the State Office of Statistics, 1938), p. 334-337; LIPTÁK, Ľubomír. *Ovládnutie slovenského priemyslu nemeckým kapitálom*. (The domination of Slovak industry by German capital). Bratislava 1960, p. 88-89; HORVÁTH, Štefan – VALACH, Ján. *Peňažníctvo na Slovensku 1918 – 1945*. (Finance in Slovakia 1918 – 1945). Bratislava 1977, p. 174-176.

4 LIPTÁK, ref. 3, p. 88-89, 153.

ous captains of the Slovak economy, including representatives of the banks, gradually began to distance themselves from the Aryanization process. The business of the banks was also damaged by various government interventions with the aim of gaining control of Jewish property. They involved especially the freezing of Jewish deposits, which the state then took from the banks. The leading personalities in Slovak finance ever more frequently stated their open criticism of these phenomena and began to perceive the whole Aryanization process as something negative.

In connection with these facts, the relationship of the Slovak banks to Aryanization developed in two basic stages. The dividing line between the two stages was the period of summer 1940, when the radical wing of the regime asserted its influence in the government leadership under pressure from Germany. Precisely these political changes opened the way to the so-called revolutionary conception of Aryanization. In the first stage, up to summer 1940, the representatives of banking actively engaged in solving the economic aspect of the Jewish question, in which they preferred so-called voluntary Aryanization by the evolutionary route. The position of Jewish capital in the financial system of Slovakia was already considerably weakened during the inter-war period in the framework of the process of merging banks. All the so-called Hungarian-German-Jewish institutions were the target of the government supported and nationally coloured policy against banks not under Slovak or Czech management. There were 193 such banks in Slovakia in 1918, but by the end of 1938 only 10 remained. They held 23.7 % of the total deposits in Slovak banks in 1938.<sup>5</sup>

The question of the relationship to Jewish business and to Jewish ownership in general became topical in Slovakia during the brief existence of the second Czecho-Slovak Republic from October 1938 to March 1939. Especially the leaders of the radical wing of Hlinka's Slovak People's Party demanded Aryanization. However, in this period, the conception of so-called gradual voluntary Aryanization and an evolutionary approach to the Jewish community still prevailed. The moderate centrist group in the ruling party was also inclined to these conceptions. The majority of leading bankers had similar views. At talks between representatives of the economic sphere at the Ministry of the Economy at the beginning of November 1938, the leading personalities in banking fully identified with the views of the minister Pavol Teplanský, who said: *"The government has declared that it will solve the Jewish problem, but it did not say that it will do it in a revolutionary way. I already spoke in a radio speech about the plan of the government to solve the matter in a gradual, evolutionary way... It will be better to solve the problem over 10 – 15 years than to ruin the nation and throw it into the arms of Germany..."*<sup>6</sup>

Views on the methods of Aryanization became substantially more radical after the creation of the independent Slovak Republic, which became a political and economic

5 SKORKOVSKÝ, Jaroslav. *Banky a peňažné ústavy na Slovensku a Podkarpatskej Rusi*. (Banks and financial institutions in Slovakia and Sub-Carpathian Ruthenia). Bratislava 1923, p. 134; *Statistická ročenka Republiky československé*, 1938, p. 186-188; *Zprávy státního úřadu statistického*, 1938, p. 334-337; HORVÁTH – VALACH, ref. 3, p. 174-176.

6 *Zápisnica z porady na ministerstve hospodárstva 9. novembra 1938*. (Minutes from a meeting at the Ministry of the Economy on 9 November 1938). Slovenský národný archív (Slovak National Archives – hereinafter SNA), Tatra banka, carton (hereinafter c.), inv. no. 410.

vassal of Nazi Germany. The moderate, gradual conception of Aryanization remained dominant among the economic policy leaders of the regime until the middle of 1940. In this period, the government circles promoted an attractive, populist idea of the nationalization of Jewish and Czech capital. In the case of Jewish businesses, nationalization by means of “voluntary” Aryanization was planned. Slovak financial capital, represented by the nationally Slovak commercial banks in cooperation with the new state controlled financial institutions, the Slovak National Bank and the Slovenská hypotečná a komunálna banka (Slovak Mortgage and Communal Bank) as centres for rediscounting and Lombard loans, was seen as the instrument for nationalization.

Parallel to the expansion of the Slovak banks in the company sphere, the financial institutions had to be merged into several so-called concentration points, which would fulfill the role of the most important banks. The smaller institutions and branches of foreign, especially Czech, banks with a numerous Jewish clientele, were the targets of the concentration of finance. The concentration was done on the basis of the government decree with the force of legislation no. 111 from 19 May 1939, by which the government granted itself the legal power to order the merging of financial institutions. Among other things, the decree limited the right to freely trade company share capital worth more than 0.5 million Slovak crowns. This deepened the legal uncertainty of Jewish and Czech capital in the whole economic life of Slovakia, which assisted the progress of “voluntary” Aryanization.<sup>7</sup>

The finance sector was successfully concentrated by means of non-economic pressures from the power-political apparatus. However, as a result of the capital potential of the Slovak banks, the nationalization projects were limited to a few middle-sized Jewish and Czech companies. The Tatra banka, as the institution with the largest total on its balance sheet, founded, gained capital control or more closely attached with an increased share holding, 15 joint stock companies with a total share capital of 50.8 million Ks. By means of “voluntary” Aryanization, it took over the important Turčianske Teplice based timber company Lichtenstein and Wilček with which it had a long-term commercial connection. Gaining control of the Jewish shops of the Slovenská obilná spoločnosť (Slovak Grain Company), which served the needs of the grain monopoly, had considerable economic importance. The concentration of finance brought into the possession of the Tatra banka, the flour milling business of its affiliated institution – the Eskontná a hospodárska banka (Discounting and Economic Bank) of Bratislava, which had a mainly Jewish management and clientele.<sup>8</sup>

The second largest institution – the Slovenská banka – engaged in the Aryanization of companies to a substantially larger extent. It was in a more favourable economic position during the period of the initial wave of expansion of Slovak financial capital in the period 1939 – 1940. In spite of the democratic past of its representatives, this bank openly declared its support for Aryanization at the beginning of May 1939, when it accepted the programme of capital participation in five Jewish companies. They included,

7 Slovenský zákonník 1939, government decree no. 119/1939 Sl.z.

8 *Výročné správy Tatra banky 1939 – 1944*. (Annual reports of the Tatra banka 1939 – 1944). SNA, Tatra banka, c. 353.

for example, the largest beer producer in Slovakia, the company Stein of Bratislava. Aryanization took a longer time and further Jewish firms were added, especially in the food processing sector, as well as some “Aryan” companies. At the end of 1944, the Slovenská banka controlled 24 joint stock companies with a total share capital of 63.2 million Ks.<sup>9</sup>

Among the provincial banks, the politically favoured Ľudová banka (People’s Bank) of Ružomberok, until 1938 headed by Andrej Hlinka, the founder of the People’s Party, showed the most substantial results. During the period considered here, it increased its holdings from 4 to 10 companies with share capital of 10.2 million Ks. It took over some of the new companies together with liquidated Jewish institutions in the course of the process of merging banks, for example, the distillery in Prešov. Two other provincial banks – the Stredoslovenská banka and the Myjavská banka – gained smaller holdings in several companies with share capital of 0.8 million Ks.<sup>10</sup>

However, the centre for people’s finance – the Zväz roľníckych vzájomných pokladníc – had the most advantageous position for successful Aryanization. It continued to increase its capital participation in the food processing industry, which had started in the last period of the existence of the Czechoslovak Republic with generous political support from the Agrarian Party. It used the weakened economic and restricted personal situation of the Jewish businessmen to gain advantageous conditions in its transactions. For example, in talks with the Jewish entrepreneur Löw Beer, living in exile in Switzerland, it succeeded in agreeing the purchase of three important sugar refineries and a group of flour milling firms with its headquarters in Nitra. The government supported the activity of the Zväz and created various bodies and commissions to mediate talks with Jewish businessmen. However, the real aim of the representatives of the regime was to gain control of the companies into which the Zväz gradually penetrated.<sup>11</sup> The People’s Party placed its representatives in the leadership of the Zväz, and it reassigned the share capital of its 13 large companies, amounting to 37.4 million Ks, in favour of a new, government controlled Sedliacka banka (Small Farmers’ Bank). This was established in autumn 1941 in connection with the final phase of the concentration of finance. By taking over the branches of Czech banks and in other ways, the Sedliacka banka extended its holdings to 30 companies with share capital of 76.2 million Ks, the majority of it derived from Jewish companies. For example, it gained by Aryanization the important Nitra construction company Ferrenit – A. Kramer and shares in the middle sized chemical company producing industrial fertilizer of the Weiser family of Kostol’any nad Hornádom.<sup>12</sup> In the period 1939 – 1942, nationally Slovak financial capital gained control of a total of about

9 Zasadnutie správnej rady Slovenskej banky 6. mája 1939. (The session of the Board of Directors of the Slovenská banka on 6 May 1939.). Archív Národnej banky Slovenska (Archive of the National Bank of Slovakia – hereinafter ANBS), Slovenská banka, c. 15; *Výročné správy Slovenskej banky 1939 – 1944*, ibid. c. 5.

10 *Výročné správy Ľudovej banky 1939 – 1944*, ASNB, Ľudová banka, c. 207; *Výročné správy Stredoslovenskej banky 1939 – 1944*, ASNB, Stredoslovenská banka, c. 115; *Výročné správy Myjavskej banky 1939 – 1944*, ASNB, Myjavská banka, c. 2.

11 CAMBEL, Samuel. *Slovenská dedina 1938 – 1944*. (The Slovak Village 1938 – 1944). Bratislava 1996, p. 131-141.

12 *Výročné správy Sedliackej banky 1942 – 1944*. ANBS, Sedliacka banka, c. 10.



30 important formerly Jewish owned companies with share capital of about 70 million Ks.

German financial capital also penetrated into Slovakia by means of the concentration of finance. The Union banka in Bratislava represented the interests of the leading capital centre of Nazi Germany, the Deutsche Bank. It originated by transformation of the Bratislava branch of the Česká banka Union, which came under the control of the Deutsche Bank. The Nemecká obchodná banka (German Commercial Bank) in Bratislava represented another leading German bank: the Dresdner Bank. It was formed from the older Bratislavská obchodná banka, which was taken over by the Dresdner Bank as an affiliate of the Aryanized Česká eskomptná banka a úvěrná ústav (Czech Discount Bank and Credit Institute). Precisely the Deutsche Bank and the Dresdner Bank, as well as the strongest corporations in Nazi Germany – the Hermann Göring Werke and I.G. Farben – occupied the key positions in the company system in Slovakia.<sup>13</sup>

An active relationship of the financial institutions to the Aryanization projects prevailed up to the middle of 1940. The Land Reform Act of 22 February 1940, which was almost exclusively concerned with Jewish agricultural and forest land with an area of 101,400 hectares, and the so-called first Aryanization Act (no. 113) from 25 April 1940, directed towards the company sector, were adopted in this period. The philosophy of this legislation still corresponded to the conception of a gradual “voluntary” Aryanization. The first Aryanization Act allowed compensation for the original owners of the property and preferred “voluntary” Aryanization with the entry of “Aryan” partners to Jewish companies with a share of 51 %.<sup>14</sup> The beginnings of distrust of the Aryanization process by the financial institutions were manifested in this period in the reserved attitude to the government project of a so-called Aryanization Fund for loans to Aryanizers.<sup>15</sup>

The turning point in the relationship of the captains of banking to Aryanization was connected with the radicalization of the totalitarian regime under pressure from Germany in the summer of 1940. The influence of the national socialist wing represented by Alexander Mach and Vojtech Tuka prevailed in the government. This meant the application of the “revolutionary” form of Aryanization for a considerable time. The conception of the solution of the Jewish question developed under the strengthening influence of the representatives of Nazi Germany. On the basis of the so-called Enabling Act from 3 September 1940, the government received the legal power to introduce anti-Jewish measures by decree for a period of one year. From the middle of 1940, Aryanization was directly controlled by a new institution: the Central Economic Office (Ústredný hospodársky úrad). It was headed by an unqualified party careerist – Augustín Morávek. The further development of Aryanization happened according to the often voluntary directives of this office.<sup>16</sup> The economic results of the so-called “revolutionary” or rather “wild”

13 *Projekt koncentrácie peňažníctva z 13. decembra 1939.* (Project for the Concentration of Finance from 13 December 1939). SNA, ministerstvo financií, c. 55.

14 *Slovenský zákonník*, 1940, act no. 46/1940 Sl.z.; Ibid., act no.113/1940 Sl.z.; CAMBEL, ref. 11, p. 47-48.

15 *Rokovania bánk s vládou v máji 1940.* (Talks between the banks and the government in May 1940). SNA, *Hospodárska úradovňa predsedníctva vlády* (Economic Office of the Prime Minister's Office), c. 36.

16 *Slovenský zákonník*, 1940, constitutional act no.210/1940 Sl.z.

Aryanization, associated with encroachments and violations of the valid legislation, later led to intervention by the government authorities against the leadership of the Central Economic Office. In the middle of 1942, Morávek had to give up the post of chairman of this institution, where he was replaced by Ľudovít Paškovič. In 1943, revision of some government decrees and acts of parliament concerned with Aryanization enabled limitation of the powers of the Central Economic Office, which was transferred from the control of the prime minister's office to the Ministry of the Economy. Consistent revision of the Aryanized companies started. Especially the possibility of depriving the Aryanizer of his ineptly managed company was important for preserving the value of the already confiscated Jewish property.

A comprehensive register of Jewish property was a pre-condition for radical Aryanization. It was produced on the basis of government decree no. 203/1940 up to 2 September 1940.<sup>17</sup> The following table gives the results of the register in partially modified form for 1st January 1941, according to data from a speech by A. Morávek to a session of the State Council in March 1942.

Table 1:

The value of Jewish property on 1 January 1941 after deduction of debts to creditors

Type of Jewish property	Value of property in millions of Ks.
Deposits in financial institutions	350
Domestic property	950
Company property	530
Other types of property	1 920
Total	3 150

Source: Správa A. Morávka, predseda Ústredného hospodárskeho úradu, zo zasadnutia Štátnej rady 28. marca 1942. (Report by A. Morávek, chairman of the Central Economic Office to the session of the State Council on 28 March 1942). SNA, Úrad predsedníctva vlády – Štátna rada, c. 242.

The moderate Aryanization Act (no. 113) from April 1940 remained valid for only a short time after the radical forces came to power. In the subsequent period, companies were Aryanized on the basis of the government decree with the force of legislation no. 303 from November 1940, known as the so-called Second Aryanization Act. This did not enact compensation of the original owners at all, and it recognized voluntary Aryanization only formally. Since the division of the key Jewish companies had already been decided in principle in the previous period, the subject of Aryanization according to act no. 303/1940 was 11,823 mostly small or middle sized craft and commercial businesses.

17 *Slovenský zákonník*, 1940, government decree no.203/1940 Sl.z.

Aryanizers received only 1,888 of the more lucrative of these, the others had to be liquidated.<sup>18</sup> The participation of the leading financial institutions in the wild Aryanization of small businesses was only marginal. However, the results of this process had a very negative impact on the financial sector.

According to act no. 303/1940, the liquidation value of an Aryanized business had to be officially determined and subsequently paid. The payments went into the hands of the state. The liquidation value payments were also supposed to satisfy the demands of creditors. The core of the creditors consisted precisely of the commercial banks and other types of financial institution. However, the irregular direction of Aryanization had the result that the new owners avoided payment of the liquidation value and so also of the obligations towards creditors. The liquidation values of only 288 from the total number of 1,888 Aryanized businesses were determined up to July 1942. The commercial banks understandably protested against this situation and refused to grant new loans to the Aryanizers. The concentration of finance concentrated the problematic Jewish loans in the most important institutions, which also took over the Jewish debts of the branches of foreign banks. For example, the Sedliacka banka recorded 69 million Ks of taken over Jewish loans at the end of 1943.<sup>19</sup> The frozen loans on Jewish domestic property, loans covered by Jewish deposits, securities and insurance policies, as well as investments in Jewish land, also caused serious difficulties for the banks. According to the register of Jewish property on 2 September 1940, the total obligations of Jewish owners towards creditors reached a total sum of 1.135 billion Ks. In relation to the total amount of credit investment by the commercial banks at the of 1940, this sum represented 51 %. The Slovak financial system overcame the impact of Aryanization without more serious economic damage only thanks to the rapid growth of the economic results of the banks against the background of the growing wartime boom. The overall value of the balances of the commercial banks grew by almost 90 % in the period 1939 – 1944.<sup>20</sup>

The change in the overall character of Aryanization and the ever deeper disputes of the representatives of finance with the regime meant a retreat of the commercial banks from the position of an active factor in the Aryanization process. The anti-Jewish legislation from autumn 1940 up to 1944 attributed the financial institutions the role of passive media for the transfer of financial resources, securities and valuables from the hands of the Jewish community to the possession of the state. On the basis of government decrees numbers 271 and 272 from October 1940, Jewish money, securities, gold, platinum, pearls and precious stones had to be concentrated in controlled accounts and deposits in selected financial institutions. The right of Jews to use their blocked resources was limi-

18 *Slovenský zákonník*, 1940, act no. 303/1940 Sl.z.; Správa A. Morávka, predsedu Ústredného hospodárskeho úradu, zo zasadnutia Štátnej rady 28. marca 1942. SNA, Úrad predsedníctva vlády – Štátna rada, c. 242.

19 Ref. 18; *Zasadnutie správnej rady Sedliackej banky 22. decembra 1943*. (The session of the board of director of the Sedliacká banka on 22nd December 1943). ANBS, Sedliacka banka, c. 6; KAMENEC, *Po stopách tragédie*, ref. 1, p. 112-113.

20 *Hlásenie Tatru banky na ministerstvo financií z 23. novembra 1943*. (Report of the Tatra banka to the Ministry of Finance from 23rd November 1943). SNA, Tatra banka, c. 20; *Štatistická príručka Slovenska*, 1947, p. 268-269; KAMENEC, *Po stopách tragédie*, ref. 1, p. 87-88.

ted to withdrawals of a maximum of 1000 Ks, later 500 and finally 150 Ks per week.<sup>21</sup> Later anti-Jewish laws, government decrees and declarations from 1941 – 1944 led to the confiscation and gradual removal of the blocked resources from the commercial financial institutions through state controlled financial institutions to the state treasury.

Government decrees numbers 271 and 272 from 1940 removed the right to use the blocked deposits and valuables not only from the Jews, but also from the financial institutions that administered them. The commercial banks, savings banks and more important centres of peoples' banking entrusted with the administration of Jewish valuables had until the end of 1940 to declare the state of the frozen accounts and deposits to the Central Economic Office. All transaction of Jewish businesses had to pass through the blocked accounts, and all payments to persons of Jewish origin and to their "Aryan or mixed" family members also came here. In August 1941, the Slovak government declared under number 194, an amendment to the above mentioned government decrees from October 1940. The provisions of the amendment emphasized the duty to place in the blocked account books the financial resources of Jews exceeding the sum of 1000 Ks for each family member, or 5 % of the previous year's turn over in the case of Jewish businesses.<sup>22</sup>

Up to the summer of 1941 the property of Jews concentrated in financial institutions remained formally in the hands of the original owners. The situation radically changed in autumn 1941 and in the course of 1942, when the anti-Jewish measures of the regime culminated and all types of Jewish property were gradually transferred to the ownership of the state. In the conditions of the wartime Slovak Republic, these measures placed the state in the position of the most important Aryanizing entity. The exploitation of Jewish property by the state grew in direct proportion to the cost of the persecution of Jews, culminating in their deportation to extermination camps in the first half of 1942. The costs exceeded the potential possibilities of the state budget. In the end, the deportation to concentration camps was largely financed by the looting of the property of the deported Jews themselves.

The first great intervention in the property of the Jewish population in relation to the resources deposited in the financial institutions was the government decree number 186 from 12 August 1941, which banned the original owners from carrying out legal actions with Jewish property worth more than 500 Ks. Apart from further limitation of the property rights of the Jewish community, the decree also included a paragraph on the establishment of the Fund to Support Jewish Emigration. Fifty percent of the total Jewish deposits in the financial institutions, deposit account books, deposit certificates and bills of credit had to be transferred to the new fund within eight days of the declaration of the decree. From the total sum deposited in the account books of Jews of about 350 million Ks. according to the situation on 1 January 1941, about 175 million Ks. had to be transferred to the fund in the course of August 1941.<sup>23</sup>

21 *Slovenský zákonník*, 1940, government decree no.271/1940 Sl.z.; *ibid.*, government decree no. 272/1940, Sl.z.; *Slovenský zákonník*, 1941, government decree no. 194/1941 Sl.z.

22 Ref. 21.

23 *Slovenský zákonník*, 1941, government decree no. 186/1941 Sl.z.; Správa predsedu ÚHÚ A. Morávka v Štátnej rade 28. marca 1942. SNA, Úrad predsedníctva vlády – Štátna rada, c. 242.

It was not necessary to wait long for further legislation creating new channels for the removal of Jewish property from the financial institutions. A substantial part of the existing anti-Jewish legislation was summarized and its anti-human character deepened by government decree number 198 from 9 September 1941, known as the Jewish Code. The decree summarized the whole anti-Jewish legislation and placed it on a racial basis. A separate paragraph ordered all persons covered by the term "Jew" to immediately establish a controlled account in one of the designated financial institutions and deposit cash in the blocked account book. The issuing of the code was followed by the culminating phase of Aryanization and of the persecution of the Jewish population. The resources for financing the planned actions had to be substantially increased with an extraordinary charge of 20 % of all types of Jewish property. The government imposed this with decree number 199, issued the day after the Jewish Code. A key role in collecting the extraordinary charge fell precisely to the financial institutions. As a guarantee for the implementation of this payment in the planned amount, it was necessary to secure up to 40 % of the volume of the blocked Jewish deposits, the full amount of the clearing receivables deposited in the banks and the full value of the securities and valuables deposited by Jews. Non-fulfillment of the 20 % charge ordered by the decree by 31 July 1942 would be sanctioned by all the secured property falling into the possession of the state. The original Jewish owners guaranteed the observance of the deadline for the payment with the whole of their property. Only Jewish deposits serving as coverage for loans or as the working capital of businesses were exempt from the obligatory payment. The Jews had to make the payments in five two-monthly instalments starting on 15 November 1941.<sup>24</sup>

However, up to the spring months of 1942 the financial institutions only succeeded in mapping the state of the Jewish resources and distinguishing the part secured for the extraordinary charge. The mapped state of Jewish deposits in selected banks and some other types of institution on 31 December 1941 is given in table 2.

Only a fragment of the huge planned sum of 560 million Ks for the extraordinary charge on Jewish property was successfully obtained by the deadline of 31 July 1942. The original Jewish owners no longer controlled their property and the majority of them were deported to extermination camps in the spring and summer months of 1942. A substantial part of the Jewish property, especially that of businesses, had also lost much of its value in the anarchy of "revolutionary Aryanization". The government financial institutions really needed the resources they were expecting to get from the extraordinary charge. They financed especially the progressing deportations from them. For these purposes they arranged a state loan of 500 million Ks in May 1942. Provision of the loan was divided between eleven financial institutions of various types. The state borrowed 200 million Ks from the financial institutions on the basis of the extraordinary charge even before it was paid. Obtaining state loans became ever more problematic because of the acute shortage of liquid financial resources.<sup>25</sup>

24 *Slovenský zákonník*, 1941, government decree no. 198/1941 Sl.z.; *ibid.*, government decree no. 199/1941 Sl.z.

25 *Správa o rokovaniach bánk s ministerstvom financií v marci 1942*. (Reports on talks between the banks and the Ministry of Finance in March 1942). SNA, Tatra banka, c. 19; KAMENEC, *Po stopách tragédie*, ref. 1, p. 221.

Table 2:

State of the controlled Jewish deposits in deposit books and current accounts in financial institutions up to 31 December 1941 and the sums secured for the extraordinary charge on the Jews.

Financial institutions	Deposit books		Secured for charge on Jews	Current accounts		Secured for charge on Jews
	number	thous Ks	thous Ks	number	thous Ks	thous Ks
Tatra banka	5 570	26 631	13 051	2 101	12 123	5 396
Slovenská banka	2 030	12 279	5 025	1 442	11 159	4 359
Sedliacka banka	3 580	18 974	8 541	1 187	8 635	4 305
Stredoslovenská banka	415	2 636	1 276	222	2 134	1 142
Myjavská banka	225	940	322	68	809	347
Ľudová banka	195	461	247	45	398	166
German and Hungarian banks in Slovakia	1 300*	9 600*	4 100*	450*	4 200*	1 700*
Branches of Živnobanka and Moravská banka	592	6 248	2 451	290	3 349	1 423
Commercial banks	13 907	80 769	35 013	5 805	42 807	18 838
Slovenská komunálna a hypotečná banka	179	1 708	772	67	656	335
Communal savings banks	2 090	9 303	4 292	159	1 117	568
Roľnícke vzájomné pokladnice	1 300*	4 743	2 080	250*	1 727	653
All financial institutions	17 476	96 523	42 157	6 281	46 307	20 394

Note: \* - data calculated on the basis of approximate figures.

Source: SNA, Ministry of Finance, c. 28, 32, 34, 37-41, 163.

By the beginning of summer 1942, it was clear that the collection of the extraordinary charge on Jewish property had ended in fiasco. In an effort to obtain at least part of the planned resources, the government applied the provisions of decree number 199/1941 about sanctions for non-fulfillment of the charge by confiscating the property secured as a guarantee for the payment of the charge. The Ministry of Finance declared the confiscation by a decree from 1 August 1942. However, an earlier decree from 13 July included in the advance payments for the extraordinary charge all the Jewish financial resources, going beyond the amount already secured for the charge. Thus, the state confiscation was widened to the whole sum of Jewish financial resources deposited in the financial institutions. At the same time as these legislative measures, constitutional act number

68, legalizing the deportation of Jews was already valid from 15 May 1942. According to this act, the whole property of emigrating Jews and that of Jews who left Slovakia illegally, fell to the state.<sup>26</sup>

In the subsequent declarations from 11 August and 16 September 1942, the Ministry of Finance set the mechanism for the transfer of Jewish financial resources, securities, precious metals, precious stone and other valuables from the financial institutions into the possession of the state. The financial resources had to be transferred to the sub-account of the Ministry of Finance in the Poštová sporiteľňa (Post Office Savings Bank) no. 1 x 6 391 in three equal instalments by 31 August, 7 September and 14 September 1942. The financial institutions had to remit bonds of the internal state debt directly to the Central State Treasury by 1 February 1943. This freed the state from obligations towards former creditors. The financial institutions had to transfer other types of security to deposit number 1 884 of the state owned Slovenská komunálna a hypotečná banka (Slovak Communal and Mortgage Bank) under the name Ministry of Finance – Jewish valuables. The Ministry of Finance regularly drew profits from these securities until the dissolution of the wartime Slovak Republic. The valuables deposited in financial institutions had to be concentrated at local tax offices during the period from 1 to 30 October 1942. In Bratislava they had to be delivered directly to the Central State Treasury. The valuables of “Aryan” partners of Jews, “mixed people”, Jews with foreign citizenship, Jewish organizations, valuables covering the claims of non-Jewish third persons, legal deposits and orphan’s deposits were preliminarily exempted from the state confiscation action.<sup>27</sup>

According to official data from Slovak government circles, the Ministry of Finance drew a total sum of 281 million Ks from Jewish blocked accounts and deposits of valuables.<sup>28</sup> We will attempt to illustrate the concrete results of the transfer of Jewish wealth from the financial institutions to the ownership of the state in the period 1941 – 1943 using the example of the transfers of financial resources from the deposit account books and current accounts of the most important commercial banks according to the state up to 31 December 1943. Their state can be compared with the data given in table 2.

Table 3:

State of the blocked Jewish deposits in the commercial banks on 31 December 1943.

Commercial banks	Deposit books		Current accounts		Judicial deposits	
	number	thous Ks	number	thous Ks	number	thous Ks
Tatra banka	810	4 974	826	16 748	362	11 877

26 *Slovenský zákonník*, 1942, *ústavný zákon* (constitutional act) no. 68/1942 Sl. z.; Declaration of the Ministry of Finance no. 139/1942 Sl. z.; Declaration of the Ministry of Finance no. 369/1942. In *Úradné noviny*, 1942, year 24, no. 46, p. 1 065.

27 *Výhláška ministerstva financií* (Declaration of the Ministry of Finance) no. 375/1942. In *Úradné noviny*, 1942, year 24, no. 47, p. 1 080-1 081; *vyhláška ministerstva financií* no. 413/1942, *ibid.*, no. 53, p. 1 183-1 184.

28 KAMENEC, *Po stopách tragédie*, ref. 1, p. 221.

Slovenská banka	479	5 162	1 090	10 814	62	2 381
Sedliacka banka	381	2 458	425	7 425	33	2 557
Stredoslovenská banka	94	323	84	1 995	-	-
Myjavská banka	37	63	13	491	-	-
Ľudová banka	45	565	29	92	26	815
German and Hungarian banks in Slovakia	345	1 922	167	3 583	-	-
Branches of Czech banks	36	511	46	1 010	-	-
Commercial banks total	2 227	15 978	2 680	42 158	483	17 630

Sources: SNA, Ústredný hospodársky úrad, (Central Economic Office) c. 680-688, 690, 691.

The leading commercial banks, especially the Tatra banka and the newly formed Sedliacka banka, took over a substantial part or the whole of the Jewish deposits in the liquidated institutions in the framework of the concentration of finance. This involved especially the Slovak business of the formerly leading Banka československá légií, taken over by the Tatra banka. This business included the important Slovenská všeobecná úverná banka and its three affiliates with a rich Jewish clientele. Among the dozens of liquidated banks, which had formed the basis for the Sedliacka banka, those significantly oriented towards a Jewish clientele included the Bratislavská všeobecná banka, Dunajská banka and some smaller institutions. The nationally Slovak and German minority banks in Slovakia, designated as so-called concentration points, took over about 80 million Ks of Jewish deposits from liquidated financial institutions during the period 1941 – 1942. However, these deposits later had to be blocked and handed over to the Ministry of Finance. The only profit to the financial institutions from the transfers of Jewish wealth was the deposit fees for storing valuables and the fees for managing accounts, which could hardly satisfy the institutions.<sup>29</sup> These facts further deepened the opposition of the representatives of finance to the negative effects of Aryanization and finally also to the government of the time. At a session of the organization of financial institutions, the Advisory Council on Financial Affairs (Poradný zbor vo veciach peňažníctva) in May 1943, the Slovak economist Professor Rudolf Briška expressed the following view of the extraordinary charge on Jewish property in the name of the banks and other financial institutions: *"I observe that the Jewish charge is scandalous, unique and the worst measure published in the Slovak statutebook. They (the Ministry of Finance) themselves understand that they are depriving us of resources, in spite of the fact that we have a right to them..."*<sup>30</sup>

The size of the withdrawals from the blocked accounts in individual financial institutions in August and September 1942 depended mainly on the proportion of items

29 *Hlásenia peňažných ústavov o stave židovských viazaných účtov.* (Reports of the financial institutions on the state of the Jewish blocked accounts). SNA, Ministry of Finance, c. 28, 32, 34, 37-41, 163.

30 *Zasadnutie Poradného zboru vo veciach peňažníctva 13. mája 1943.* (Session of the Advisory Council on Financial Affairs, 13 May 1943). SNA, Ministry of Finance, c. 69.



temporarily protected from confiscation by the state. However, the data in table 3 show that other criteria also appear to have been applied in the selection of items. After the fulfillment of transfers decreed by the declaration from 11 August 1942, the Ministry of Finance continually took further sums. The banks also paid contributions to the Jewish Centre (Ústredňa Židov) and Jewish religious communities, resources for the social and other needs of Jews, payments in favour of non-Jewish third persons and some other items. However, interest payments were continually added to the blocked deposit books and current accounts, as were also other payments intended for Jewish individuals and organizations as well as payments for Aryanized property.<sup>31</sup>

The blocked current accounts and judicial deposits showed clear growth by the end of 1943. It was the result of the first instalments of payments for Aryanized Jewish businesses. According to the appropriate paragraphs of government decree no. 198/1941 (the Jewish Code), the liquidation value of the Aryanized business after payment of creditors had to be paid into the blocked account of the former owner in a financial institution or into a judicial deposit at the local district court. After settlement of judicial claims, the court would send the remaining money to a financial institution or directly to the Ministry of Finance, if it came from the business of a Jewish owner, whose property had already been confiscated by the state. However, payment discipline where liquidation values were concerned improved only very slowly. A turning point came only with the adoption of act number 148 from 28 October 1943, which significantly tightened the penalties for Aryanizers, who did not make payments to the state or irresponsibly managed Aryanized small businesses or agricultural enterprises. The aim of the act was also partial satisfaction of the claims of the financial institutions and other creditors towards their former Jewish clients. However, the degree to which the claims of creditors had to be satisfied, depended on the decision of the Central Economic Office. By July 1944, the Aryanizers paid a sum of about 200 million Ks towards the liquidation value and share-holdings in the businesses they had taken over.<sup>32</sup> However, the Ministry of Finance immediately withdrew the resources concentrated from these payments in the financial institutions, for the needs of the extremely strained state finances. As a result, only a fraction of the above mentioned resources appears in the data from the financial institutions from the end of 1943. The in-flow of money was visible mainly in the current accounts and judicial deposits (table 3), but some also went into the deposit books.<sup>33</sup>

Act number 148/1943 strengthened the position of the state as the owner of Aryanized property, especially in relation to Jewish immovable property. They had to be let, directly sold or auctioned with the aim of immediate profit and the gaining of liquid financial resources. The act decreed the concentration of profits from rents and direct

31 *Hlásenia peňažných ústavov o stave židovských viazaných účtov a súdnych depozitov.* (Declaration of the financial institutions on the state of the Jewish blocked accounts and judicial deposits). SNA, Central Economic Office, c. 680-688, 690, 691.

32 *Slovenský zákonník*, 1940, government decree no. 198/1940 Sl.z.; *ibid.*, act no.148/1943 Sl.z.; Štátny oblasťný archív (State Regional Archive) Bratislava, Ľudový súd (People's Court) Bratislava, A. Morávek, 4/48.

33 *Hlásenia peňažných ústavov o stave židovských viazaných účtov a súdnych depozitov.* (Declaration of the financial institutions about the state of blocked Jewish accounts and judicial deposits). SNA, Central Economic Office, c. 680-688, 690, 691.

sales in the Slovenská komunálna a hypotečná banka and the Bratislava Mestská sporiteľňa (City Savings Bank). The profits from auctions had to be transferred to the Fund to Support Jewish Emigration after settlement of debts. In the interest of rapidly obtaining cash from immovable properties, the government reduced their estimated price by 30 % in December 1943. Sales and auctions occurred from the beginning of 1944 and mainly involved houses. The government again entrusted the main role to the financial institutions, because in the conditions of Slovakia, other interested parties did not have an adequate capital potential.<sup>34</sup>

The financial institutions performed the final act of the whole tangled game of transferring Jewish property in autumn 1944. The last more important transfers were connected with the critical development of state finances, which had come to the edge of an abyss. The causes of this situation lay in the immense burden on the state treasury from financing foreign trade with Nazi Germany and its satellites on the basis of clearing. Clearing transactions were actually paid in the name of the German partner by the Slovak state or specifically by the Ministry of Finance and the Slovak National Bank. By this time, they had already exhausted all the more substantial sources of liquid financial resources, arising from the relatively successful economic development of 1940 – 1943 and precisely from the exploitation of Jewish property. Therefore the government consistently sought out and drew the remaining financial resources from various sources including the blocked accounts in the financial institutions. One of the directors of the Slovak National Bank Štefan Virsik described the situation in this period of 1944 as follows: *“Already in March-April, the Ministry of Finance was in such a situation that it had exhausted all the sources from which it had drawn money to finance clearing... We (the Slovak National Bank – note L. H.) said to the Ministry of Finance: you must round up some money... The ministry struck silver 50 Ks coins... the state seized Jewish money in the banks, and again plundered the treasury...”*<sup>35</sup>

The Ministry of Finance in cooperation with the Central Economic Office gained a substantial part of the resources remaining in the blocked accounts of the financial institutions by drawing the remnants of the already confiscated items and widening the obligatory payments to items not previously subject to confiscation. In mid September 1944, the Central Economic Office distributed two circulars to the financial institutions. The first went to all the headquarters and branches. It decreed that the remaining money in the accounts of Jews, who had already left the territory of Slovakia or had lived in unknown places for at least three months, had to be placed at the disposal of the Ministry of Finance by being deposited in account number 903 at the Poštová sporiteľňa (Post Office Savings Bank). The second circular went to selected institutions and some branches of the larger banks. It ordered that the whole sum remaining in Jewish accounts had to be transferred to account number 17 at the Poštová sporiteľňa and the blocked accounts had to be liquidated.<sup>36</sup> So that the transfers could include all items, the foreign currency

34 *Slovenský zákonník*, 1943, Act no. 148/1943 Slz.; SNA, Ministry of the Economy, Prezídium-P-1951.

35 *Zasadanie revízneho výboru Slovenskej národnej banky 14. februára 1945*. (Session of the Revision Committee of the Slovak National Bank on 14 February 1945). ANBS, Slovak National Bank, unsorted collection of the Revision Committee.

36 *Obežníky Ústredného hospodárskeho úradu bankám z 13. až 18. septembra 1944*. (Circulars of the Cen-

department of the Slovak National Bank gave permission on 25 October 1944 for the transfer to account number 17 at the Poštová sporiteľňa of the resources of Jews with citizenship of other states as well.<sup>37</sup> The transfers decreed by the circulars in September 1944 completed the tasks connected with the administration of blocked Jewish resources for some financial institutions. However, the largest banks still had remnants of Jewish financial resources in some branches, especially of current accounts, which included the liquidation values of businesses and other items not taken over by the state. Only smaller items were taken from the blocked accounts in the period from January 1945.<sup>38</sup>

After the dissolution of the wartime Slovak Republic, the remnants of the Jewish resources, concentrated in various accounts and deposits of state-controlled financial institutions, were transferred to the Commission for Finance (Povereníctvo financií) and some other central financial institutions. The handful of Jewish citizens, who had survived the Holocaust, could reclaim their confiscated property according to the restitution act from May 1946. However, in the majority of cases there was already nobody to make a claim. For example, from the total number of about 80,000 surviving pieces of jewellery and other valuables, only about 4,000 pieces were returned to their original owners. Financial resources and other used or liquidated resources had to be returned in the form of financial compensation. However, the government circles of the time, under the influence of the Communist Party postponed compensation until May 1949, when claims to restitution according to the 1946 act expired. The remaining Jewish property passed to the newly established communist regime. It amounted to 470 million crowns in the post-war Czechoslovak currency, including 110 million Kčs in Jewish deposits and 300 million Kčs in valuables, securities and immovable property.<sup>39</sup>

The results of the actions of the Slovak commercial banks and other financial institutions in the Aryanization process fell far short of the great ambitions from the period of the establishment of the totalitarian regime of 1939 – 1945. The loudly propagated transfer to Slovak national control of the Jewish business capital by the Slovak banks was narrowed to some middle sized companies. The greater German banks and companies gained control of the core of business capital in Slovakia. Radicalization of the anti-Jewish measures according to the example of German National Socialism from the middle of 1940 and the uncontrolled course of the Aryanization of small Jewish companies had serious economic consequences, which dissuaded the representatives of banking

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tral Economic Office to the banks from 13 – 18 September 1944). SNA, Central Economic Office, c. 681, 688, 690, 691.

37 *Devízový odbor Slov. nář. banky Ústřednému hospodářskému úřadu 9. novembra 1944*. (The Foreign Currency Department of the Slovak National Bank to the Central Economic Office, 9 November 1944). SNA, Central Economic Office, c. 691.

38 Hlásenia peňažných ústavov o stave židovských viazaných účtov a súdnych depozitov. SNA, Central Economic Office, c. 680-688, 690, 691.

39 *Sbírka zákonů a nařízení Československé republiky* (Collection of Acts and Decrees of the Czechoslovak Republic), 1946, act no. 128/1946 zbierky; *Zváz fašistickým režimom rasovo prenasledovaných na ministerstvo financií v Prahe 17. september 1949*. (Union of Victims of Fascist Racial Persecution to the Ministry of Finance in Prague 17 September 1949). SNA, Povereníctvo financií (Commission of Finance), c. 1345.

from an active role in the Aryanization process. The financial institutions became some of the main critics of the economic effects of Aryanization. The legislative measures introduced from September 1940 with the aim of blocking and then confiscating Jewish financial resources, securities and valuables placed the financial institutions in the position of passive mediators of the transfer of resources from the Jewish community to the hands of the state. In the end, precisely this was the main role of the commercial banks and the majority of other types of financial institutions in the Aryanization process.

#### DIE ROLLE DER KOMMERZBANKEN IN DER ARISIERUNG IN DER SLOWAKEI 1939 – 1945

EUDOVÍT HALLON

Die Kommerzbanken mit slowakischer Verwaltung sollten nach den Perspektivplänen des Regierungsregimes der Slowakischen Kriegsrepublik eine Schlüsselrolle im Prozess der Beherrschung des fremdländischen Unternehmenssektors, vor allem tschechischer und jüdischer Betriebe durch das national slowakische Kapital spielen. Trotz des intensiven Druckes der Regierungskreise im wirtschaftlichen und außerwirtschaftlichen Bereich vermochten nationalslowakische Banken angesichts ihres begrenzten Kapitalpotentials nur einige mittelgroße jüdische Betriebe der Leichtindustrie zu beherrschen. Die bedeutendsten Betriebe der Slowakei gelangten unter die Kontrolle der Banken und Konzerne Nazideutschlands. Eine ganz neue Rolle begannen nationalslowakische sowie andere Kommerzbanken im Prozess der staatlich gelenkten Arisierung jüdischen Vermögens seit Herbst 1940 zu spielen. Auf der Grundlage der antijüdischen Legislative der Slowakischen Kriegsrepublik gerieten die Kommerzbanken zusammen mit anderen Typen von Geldinstituten in die Position eines passiven Mediums, das den Übergang von finanziellen Mitteln, Edelmetallen, Wertsachen und Wertpapieren aus den Händen der jüdischen Gemeinde in den Besitz des Staates vermittelte. Gleichzeitig wurden die Kommerzbanken durch staatliche Darlehen und andere Formen zur Hauptfinanzierungsquelle judenfeindlicher Maßnahmen, vor allem der Lasttransporte in die Vernichtungslager. Große Verluste brachten den Banken die ungedeckten Forderungen an arisierte und liquidierte jüdische Betriebe sowie an deportierte Personen. Im Banksektor erhob sich ein immer größerer Widerstand gegen die unfreiwillige Beteiligung an der Arisierung und den antisemitischen Maßnahmen.

## THE VIEWS OF SLOVAK ECONOMISTS ON THE ECONOMIC POSITION OF SLOVAKIA AT THE TURN OF THE YEARS 1967 – 1968

MIROSLAV LONDÁK

LONDÁK, Miroslav. The views of Slovak economists on the economic position of Slovakia at the turn of the years 1967/1968. *Historický časopis*, 2008, 56, Supplement, pp. 93-110.

The author concerned himself with the views of Slovak economists at the end of 1967 and in the first half of 1968 on the problem of the position of the Slovak economy in the economic unit of the whole state. The freer political atmosphere enabled criticism of the course of economic reforms up to then and pointed to various problems accompanying the development of the Slovak economy during the era of “building socialism”. In the course of spring 1968 this problem acquired importance in connection with the overall solution of the Slovak national question in this period, and came into the foreground especially in connection with the preparations to federalize the state. The study also points to the variety of views of Slovak and Czech economists on the problem of the economic content of the federation. The quantity of new ideas from Slovak economists produced during the spring of 1968 also shows their preparedness to solve problems on a new level. History. Czechoslovakia. The views of Slovak economists on the economic position of Slovakia at the turn of the years 1967/1968.

From the beginning of the 1960s, the situation in the field of economic theory gradually began to change in connection with the general movement in Czechoslovak society. The period of pedantic repetition of Marxist-Leninist principles came to an end. The economists began to research the relevant economic phenomena and processes and to some degree overcome the simplified theoretical ideas about the functioning of a socialist economy. They began to write critically about the existing methods of managing the economy, which were soon described as bureaucratic. The problems of product – money relations, the market in socialism and the questions of a new economic reform gradually came into the foreground.<sup>1</sup>

An important part of the questions concerning Slovak economic theorists in the mid sixties derived from the political position of Slovakia in the structure of the state given by the 1960 constitution and the fact that the real place of the Slovak economy in the national economy of Czechoslovakia and its contribution were not sufficiently known. For example, the national income of Slovakia was not regularly calculated,<sup>2</sup> and various relevant statistics about the economic development of Slovakia were unknown or given

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1 For further details see: LONDÁK, M.: *Ekonomický vývoj na Slovensku na v rokoch 1960 – 1967* (Economic Development in Slovakia in the Period 1960 – 1967). In LONDÁK, M. - SIKORA, S. - LONDÁKOVÁ, E. *Predjarie. Politický, ekonomický a kultúrny vývoj na Slovensku v rokoch 1960 – 1967*. Bratislava 2002, p. 183.

2 Ref. 1, p. 194.

only for the whole of Czechoslovakia. Therefore, the so-called regional problems were in the foreground of the interest of various economic theorists, since Slovakia and its economy appeared in the structure of the state only as a region comparable to other regions and districts. Numerous important questions – from the methods of socialist industrialization in Slovakia, the problems of equalizing its economic and social level with the level of the Czech Lands and its measurement, to the problems of calculating the national income, the effects of the economic reforms from the mid sixties on the Slovak economy or efforts to grasp its real state using scientific methods – could, in practice, be called regional problems.

So much priority was given to so-called regional questions in Slovakia that a separate research institution – the Research Institute for Regional Planning – was established to deal with them. It was located in Bratislava and was directly subordinate to the Slovak Planning Commission. It cooperated with the Economics University in Bratislava and with foreign research institutions. The institute researched subjects such as the spatial structure of the reproductive process of the Czechoslovak national economy. It was concerned with the questions of the socio-economic backwardness of Slovakia, structural changes, the dynamizing factors of development and especially regional planning, including long-term planning.<sup>3</sup>

An effort to ascertain the real state of the Slovak economy was especially typical of the period immediately preceding the year 1968. On the basis of a resolution of the Commission of the Speaker's Office of the Slovak National Council for administration from 14 March 1967, a working group headed by the director of the Economics Institute of the Slovak Academy of Sciences P. Turčan worked out an extensive analysis.<sup>4</sup> The study concluded that Slovakia as a whole was significantly behind the Czech Lands where industrial development was concerned. Slovak industry was also fragmented and there was minimal cooperation between Slovak enterprises. There were insufficient enterprises to process the preferred basic commodities, many of which were transported to the Czech Lands for the production of finished products.<sup>5</sup> These were the results of the existing methods of socialist industrialization, and the established method of managing the economy of Czechoslovakia in separate sectors.

Another symptomatic feature of this period was the effort to use scientific methods to assess the effects of the economic reforms then being applied to the Slovak economy. These were subjected to scrutiny especially after 1 January 1967, when wholesale prices were reformed. The first reports already showed a significant worsening of the position of raw material enterprises in comparison with those involved in processing and pro-

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- 3 The Research Institute for Regional Planning (Výskumný ústav oblastného plánovania) was established in Bratislava in 1964. From 1964 to 1968 its director was J. Ferienc. In this context see e. g. his work: FERIANEC, J.: *Teória a metódy rastu oblastí. (Štúdiá k prognóze dlhodobého oblastného rozvoja)*. (The Theory and Methods of Regional Growth. (Studies of the prognosis of long-term regional development). Bratislava : Výskumný ústav oblastného plánovania, September 1967.
  - 4 Slovenský národný archív (Slovak National Archives) (hereinafter SNA), fond (hereinafter f.) Kancelária SNR, Tajné, carton (hereinafter c.) 33. For further details see: LONDÁK, M. *Ekonomický vývoj na Slovensku v rokoch 1960 – 1967*, ref. 1, p. 209-211. The aim of the working group was also to analyse the effects of the economic reforms on the Slovak economy.
  - 5 Ref. 4, p. 209-211.

ducing finished products. As a result of the importance of the raw material sector in the structure of Slovak industry, further negative effects could be expected, especially when the economic reform policy required individual enterprises to develop on the basis of their own resources in the immediate future.<sup>6</sup>

The fears of the Slovak industrial enterprises and institutions turned out to be really justified in the course of 1967 and various analyses confirmed this.<sup>7</sup> The unfavourable impact of the economic reform was becoming a serious problem for the whole national political sphere.<sup>8</sup> It was because the instruments of economic reform intended to have a positive influence on the development of more backward regions, were insufficiently prepared and actually had minimal influence on real economic life. Practice proved the correctness of the criticism expressed, for example, by V. Pavlenda from the beginning of the preparation of the economic reforms in 1964.<sup>9</sup>

Two extreme positions immediately appeared in the discussions of these questions among Slovak economic theorists. According to one group it was necessary to leave everything in the so-called economic system of management,<sup>10</sup> which had to be created by the economic reforms, including the problem of regional development, to the market. Others argued that these methods could not secure the development of a backward region, and they supported return to central direction with its administrative forms. However, with the passage of time, these extreme positions retreated into the background. The primary interest was to work out, either for the national or regional level, a set of macro-regulators and micro-regulators, which would form a logical integrated whole

6 See also: LONDÁK, M. *Ekonomický vývoj na Slovensku v rokoch 1960 – 1967*, ref. 1, p. 238.

7 For example, the analysis of the Slovak Planning Commission from June 1967, from autumn 1967, or the Economics Institute of the Slovak Academy of Sciences in Bratislava. According to the Slovak Planning Commission, the centre had no economic instrument or directive to secure the correct regional development in relation to the state of preparedness of the economic reform at the time. In its view, it was not possible to rely only on enterprises' own resources for further development in Slovakia. SNA, f. Kancelária SNR, Tajné c. 31.

8 Summaries of the more unfavourable impact of the economic reforms in Slovakia compared to the Czech Lands appeared in the first half of 1967, with the statement that only 21,9 % of Czechoslovak industrial investment was being invested in Slovakia, although the original planning directives said that at least 28 % should go to Slovakia. Alexander Dubček pointed to this fact at a session of the Central Committee of the Czechoslovak Communist Party at the end of September 1967.

9 See: LONDÁK, M. *Ekonomický vývoj na Slovensku v rokoch 1960 – 1967*, ref. 1, p. 223. Viktor Pavlenda criticized the preparation of the economic reforms from the so-called regional point of view, for example, at a session of the Central Committee of the Slovak Communist Party at the end of November 1964. His criticism was based on the Stanovisko Vedeckej rady Vysokej školy ekonomickej v Bratislave (Position of the Scientific Council of the Economics University in Bratislava). He later returned to this problem in the work: PAVLEND, V. *Ekonomické základy socialistického riešenia národnostnej otázky v ČSSR* (The Economic Foundations of the Socialist Solution of the Nationality Question in the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic). Bratislava 1968, p. 230.

10 This term was used for the system of management, which actually had to be created by the economic reforms and had to create an alternative to the so-called administrative-directive system of management of the socialist economy. The expression decentralized model in contrast to the centralized model was also used, on the basis of the publication: BRUS, W. *Modely socialistického hospodárství* (Models of the Socialist Economy). Prague 1964.

with the aim of the best possible regional development,<sup>11</sup> and which would replace the existing state. In this period, on the threshold of the year 1968, they sought instruments to solve the problems of the current economic situation in Slovakia, as well as instruments of a long-term nature. At the same time, the political situation was such that the question of moving to a federal structure, in which these questions could be solved on a qualitatively different level, could not be opened or even mentioned, but was absolutely taboo.

Likewise, economists concerned with the long-term perspective began to express the view that Slovakia did not need only the consideration of development, but the preparation of a comprehensive conception, which would not just reproduce the already outdated structure of the economy, but which would bring positive structural changes to the Slovak economy. The view prevailed that such changes could not be achieved by partial measures in the field of economic reform or by the automatic action of the market. A long-term conception for the development of Slovakia had to be an organic part of the conception for the economic development of the whole state, and Slovak national institutions needed the right to participate in taking decisions.<sup>12</sup>

According to A. Lantay, at the given stage of development, the centre had enough possibilities to positively influence the development of backward regions (Slovakia can be seen here as a national-political region),<sup>13</sup> and there were no arguments for entirely relying on the behaviour of individual enterprises in the marketplace, which could be to a large extent spontaneous. In this period even capitalist countries were applying their influence on investment activity in areas where market criteria had failed, whether through infrastructure projects or in the interest of long-term macro-economic change. Lantay did not see the ideal in a simple return to command methods of management. In his view, the state needed to have sufficient resources to secure the aims of the whole society and it was not possible to rely only on the behaviour of enterprises in the marketplace<sup>14</sup> and base the whole development of the economy on that. At this time, he sought a general solution in the creation of an independent organization of an economic character: the Fund for the Development of Slovakia (Fond rozvoja Slovenska), which would implement the policies of the centre in this specific case. The fund would be granted financial resources<sup>15</sup> and would act independently on the basis of directives and rules, which would be decided jointly by the central and national authorities. Some degree of independence could be a guarantee for the achievement of a long-term conception for the development of Slovakia.

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11 For further details see: LANTAY, A. *K problematike ekonomických nástrojov rozvoja Slovenska* (On the problem of economic instruments for the development of Slovakia). In *Ekonomický časopis*, 1968, no. 3, p. 225-226.

12 Ref. 11, p. 227-229.

13 The economic and social backwardness of Slovakia compared to the Czech Lands in this period can be documented with various statistics, such as the level of national income per person, the amount of resources invested in each worker, low average pay and total incomes in Slovakia.

14 In the cited study, A. Lantay also gave more detailed attention to the instruments of the socialist state available for management of the regional economy.

15 The author sought financial resources, for example, in deductions from the depreciation of basic resources up to 31 December 1966. LANTAY, A. *K problematike ekonomických nástrojov Slovenska*, ref. 11, p. 236.



Lantay's solution to the economic problems is typical of the given period and the political situation of 1967. He sought a solution to the effects of the economic reforms on the threshold of 1968, he considered the long-term perspective, but still perceived these problems as part of the so-called regional problem.

At this stage of economic reform, it was as if socialist Czechoslovakia relied excessively on the market and so renounced the possibilities to solve inequalities in regional development or to secure the proportionate economic development of the different regions of the state.<sup>16</sup> However, at this time, the developed capitalist states used a whole range of measures to correct inequalities in regional development or to accelerate the development of backward regions. On the theoretical level, they started from the theory of balanced growth or the theory of polarized development.<sup>17</sup> It is clearly no accident that R. Lacko informed the wider expert public in Slovakia about the development in this field in the countries of the European Economic Community (EEC) in two articles<sup>18</sup> at precisely this time. He gave a review of the numerous instruments these countries were using in the interest of accelerating the economic development of more backward regions – measures in the interest of building up the economic and social infrastructure, financial policy and fiscal measures,<sup>19</sup> or measures to reduce the burden on economically excessively “over-heated” regions. The wide range of instruments in capitalist countries described in detail by Lacko, brought into the foreground the inadequate preparedness of the Czechoslovak economic reforms in this area.

Direct capital participation by the state in the building up of industry was a special type of instrument used by capitalist countries in favour of development in more backward regions, although it was not frequently used. It was applied especially in countries with a strong state economic sector. For example, in Italy, legislation from 29 July 1957 required that state enterprises place 40 % of their investment resources in southern Italy.

16 In the course of 1967, two instruments were applied: 1. Granting of 15 % intervention from the centre in investment costs. 2. A reduction by one third of deductions to basic funds, partly compensating for the higher operating costs compared to regions with a better infrastructure. However, these measures had minimal positive influence.

17 For more details see: LACKO, R. *O regionálnopolitických opatreniach a nástrojoch vyspelých kapitalistických štátov* (On the regional policy measures and instruments of developed capitalist states). In *Ekonomický časopis*, 1968, no. 3, p. 270. On this problem see: TURČAN, P. *Teoretické a metodologické problémy perspektívneho modelu územného usporiadania národného hospodárstva* (Theoretical and methodological problems of a promising model for the territorial organization of a national economy). In *Ekonomický časopis*, 1967, 15, no. 3; and TURČAN, P. *Prístupy k rozvoju zaostávajúcich oblastí v priemyselných štátoch* (Approaches to the development of backward regions in industrial states). In *Ekonomický časopis*, 1966, 14, no. 8.

18 LACKO, R. *O regionálnopolitických opatreniach a nástrojoch vyspelých kapitalistických štátov*, ref. 17, p. 269-285; LACKO, R. *Inštitucionálne problémy a predpoklady oblastného rozvoja (Skúsenosti kapitalistických štátov)*. (Institutional problems and the conditions for regional development (Experiences of the capitalist states). In *Ekonomický časopis*, 1968, no. 4, p. 384-395.

19 For example, state supports and subsidies, interest rate subsidies, loans with advantageous interest rates, state guarantees on loans serving regional development, authorization of extraordinary depreciation for companies located in more backward regions. For more details see: LACKO, R. *Regionálnopolitické opatrenia kapitalistických štátov*, ref. 17, p. 276-281.

Similarly, the French state car producer Renault built its new works in a more backward region of north-western France.<sup>20</sup>

Almost all the EEC countries created so-called industrial zones<sup>21</sup>, that is sites designated for the construction of various enterprises, in backward regions during the 1960s. Although the intensity of state interventions in this area varied, the idea was the same: to obtain an appropriate site, prepare it, install infrastructure and perhaps erect factory buildings. The specific form varied between different countries.<sup>22</sup> Lacko seems to have presented these ideas for the first time in Slovakia.

The minimal positive influence of the instruments of economic reform in Czechoslovakia on the backward region, namely Slovakia, was made more puzzling by the fact that the experience of some countries in Western Europe already showed that “*an incorrect structure of the use of regional financial resources may accelerate growth not in the region where they are used, but in other more developed regions*”.<sup>23</sup> This idea is especially valid when investment in the backward region flows mainly into raw material production, which makes a relatively low contribution to the national income, per unit of production.

I. Šujan also mathematically analysed this fact using the simplest possible inter-regional model – the so-called netto structural model and without taking into account within branch turnover. He mathematically proved that “*in the case of an inappropriate structure of investment in a region, it will stimulate a growth in gross national income in region  $\beta$  greater than the growth achieved in region  $\alpha$* ”.<sup>24</sup> These facts were extraordinarily important for the Slovak economy from the long-term point of view and especially in connection with the continuing economic reforms. In particular, the price restructuring associated with the economic reforms,<sup>25</sup> gave a further advantage to producers of finished products. According to the already prepared price recalculation, it not only meant a decline in the profitability of Slovak enterprises, but also a fall in the size of the national income of Slovakia in absolute terms.<sup>26</sup>

All these facts were extraordinarily important for the Slovak economy, whether from the point of view of bringing the level of Slovakia up to the level of the Czech Lands or from the long-term point of view. Moreover, sometime in 1963 or 1964, Slovakia completed the primary task of its industrialization,<sup>27</sup> and its economy was faced with

20 See: LACKO, R. *Regionálnopolitické opatrenia kapitalistických štátov*, ref. 17, p. 277.

21 In Slovakia now called industrial parks (priemyselné parky).

22 For more details see: LACKO, R. *Regionálnopolitické opatrenia kapitalistických štátov*, ref. 17, p. 272-273.

23 See: ŠUJAN, I. *Zostavovania a využitie úhrnnej finančnej bilancie za Slovensko* (Backwardness and the use of the overall financial balance in Slovakia). In *Ekonomický časopis*, 1968, no. 2, p. 109. Šujan started from the study *Economic Planning in Europe*, Geneva 1965, chapter V.

24 See: ŠUJAN, I. *Zaostavanie a využívanie úhrnnej finančnej bilancie za Slovensko*, ref. 23, p. 109-111.

25 The restructuring of wholesale prices valid from 1 January 1967.

26 See: KLAS, A. - FUNÁREK, M. - KOLEK, J. *Štúdia o dlhodobej prognóze rozvoja ekonomiky Slovenska* (A study of the long-term prognosis for the economic development of Slovakia). In *Ekonomický časopis*, 1968, no. 6, p. 521.

27 In the years 1963 – 1964, the number employed in industry in Slovakia exceeded the number employed in

new challenges – transition to the use of intensive forms of growth, the use of new technologies, or in the terminology of the time to the use of the achievements of the scientific-technical revolution. On the threshold of the year 1968, the Slovak economists A. Klas, M. Fundárek and J. Kolek, using growth models based on the theory of economic growth, proved that economic development in the period 1950 – 1965 was not very effective for Slovakia and had been carried out mainly according to quantitative factors. Deviations in the direction of more intensive use of the factors of growth had prevailed up to 1955, but the opposite tendency had prevailed after 1955.<sup>28</sup>

These authors also researched the possibility of further economic development in Slovakia under the assumption that the conditions of the preceding period did not change, and development on the basis of the quantitative factors of growth continued. However, the method of extrapolation was not used here with the aim of prognosis, but as an analytical method with the aim of making clear the hidden tendencies of the previous period. The results showed that if the national income of Slovakia developed at its existing rate up to 1980, its absolute size would increase by two and a half times. However, the low effectiveness of the basic funds meant that these funds would have to grow by seven and a half times up to 1980. This emphasized the extraordinary ineffectiveness of the economic development in Slovakia since 1950.<sup>29</sup>

As far as future prospects were concerned, the calculations<sup>30</sup> of these authors unambiguously showed that further economic growth in Slovakia or growth of the national income, was not conditioned so much by the rate of growth of investment, but much more by the growth of technical-economic progress, especially when the demand for an appropriate rise in the standard of living of the population was taken into account. The calculations showed that if investment in Slovakia up to 1980 did not exceed 23 % of the accumulation in the national income and if it did not grow at a rate of 6,2 %, a huge technical leap forward would be necessary to secure a rise in the standard of living.

Klas, Fundárek and Kolek also considered the possibility of bringing the economic and social level of Slovakia up to the level of the Czech Lands. They considered a 5 %

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agriculture and the country began to change from a mainly agricultural to a mainly industrial economy. In 1963, Slovakia had 461,573 workers in industry and 476,724 in agriculture. In 1964 there were 471,247 people employed in industry and 462,897 in agriculture. Figures according to: *Historická statistická ročenka ČSSR* (Annual of Historical Statistics of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic). Prague 1985, p. 661.

28 KLAS, A. - FUNDÁREK, M. - KOLEK, J. *Štúdiá o dlhodobej prognóze rozvoja ekonomiky Slovenska*, ref. 26, p. 509-517.

29 Ref. 26, p. 518.

30 The authors worked out an aggregate model of the development of the Slovak economy in the period 1950 – 1965 with a simulation of development up to 1980. It was actually the first econometric model of the long-term development of the Slovak economy. The authors started from use of the principle of mutual interchangeability of the productive factors in the production process. They worked it out at the request of the Slovak Planning Commission, starting from consideration of the whole state and from the methodology of the model of the Research Institute for National Economic Planning. (TLUSTÝ - STRNAD. *Agregační model dlouhodobého rozvoje ekonomiky ČSSR* (Aggregate model of the long-term development of the economy of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic). Research work VÚNP, no. 77). KLAS, A. - FUNDÁREK, M. - KOLEK, J. *Štúdiá o dlhodobej prognóze rozvoja ekonomiky Slovenska*, ref. 26, p. 518, 510.

increase in national income in the Czech Lands – that is 5,5 % in relation to population growth.<sup>31</sup> For Slovakia and the Czech Lands to have an approximately equal level by 1980 under these conditions, the national income in Slovakia would have to grow by 8,6 % each year and a much higher level of technical-economic production would be required.<sup>32</sup>

All these calculations strongly underlined the rather ineffective nature of the economic development of Slovakia in the post-war period, as well as the fact that insufficient attention had been given to its special character. Industrialization was carried out with excessive emphasis on raw materials, too small a share of finished products and not enough connections between processing enterprises in Slovakia. As a result the Slovak economy and society were faced with the historic tasks of greatly raising the scientific and technical level in all sectors of production and achieving the best possible structural reconstruction of industry. This actually meant the progress of the industrialization of Slovakia into a new phase. This was how the economists of the time discovered one of the basic conditions for achieving not only a higher standard of living for the population, but also the equalization of the economic and social level of Slovakia with the level of the Czech Lands.

At this time, official economic science in Slovakia understandably moved only within the limits set by the socialist organization of society and so it did not consider the positive impulses flowing from free private enterprise, but this did not mean that it was not beginning to consider the positive effects of certain instruments of capitalist economics, which could be applied in the socialist system. In the end, the economic crisis since the beginning of the 1960s, had led to Czechoslovak theorists attempting to connect socialist economics with the advantages of the market.

If we look at economics as the sphere which has to secure a certain social and living standard, with a tendency towards growth, then the demanding nature of its task in Slovakia in the period then beginning comes into the foreground when we take into account the demographic situation. According to the long-term demographic projection for the population in the period 1965 – 1980, the number of people of working age was going to increase by more than 680 thousand during the period 1965 – 1980. In the context of the whole state, Slovakia was going to produce 63 % of the total growth in the number of people of working age in Czechoslovakia. Taking into account inter-regional migration, Slovakia would still have 56 %.<sup>33</sup> In reality, the productive population of Slovakia grew by more than 485 thousand in this period, which represented 64,78 % of the growth in the whole of Czechoslovakia.<sup>34</sup>

31 The Committee for Perspective Planning of the Slovak Planning Commission set this condition for the authors. Ref. 26, p. 519.

32 Ref. 26, p. 521.

33 The Central Commission for Population Monitoring and Statistics (Ústredná komisia ľudovej kontroly a štatistiky) worked out the projection. For more details see: BARTOŠ, E. *Zdroje pracovných síl na Slovensku a problémy ich využitia* (Labour resources in Slovakia and the problems of their use). In *Ekonomický časopis*, 1968, no. 5, p. 448.

34 Calculated on the basis of the data in the publication: *Historická statistická ročenka ČSSR*. Prague 1985,

The question remained, what would be the results of the economic reforms, according to which growth was expected to occur mainly on the basis of enterprises' own resources. The first results, known after the first half year, did not give much reason for optimism. Some data from the years of the so-called administrative-directive system of management in Czechoslovakia are noteworthy in this context. In the course of the period 1948 – 1966, the number of inhabitants of productive age increased by 370,058 in Slovakia and by 108,506 in the Czech Lands, so that the growth in Slovakia represented 77,32 % of the growth in the whole state. On the other hand, from the total number of 1 031 000 new jobs in the national economy, more than 800 thousand or 77,72 % were located in the Czech Lands.<sup>35</sup> Thus, the proportions in this area were entirely opposite, and this does not take into account the departure of many thousands of inhabitants of Slovakia to work in the Czech Lands. This method of economic development, which did not adequately reflect the demographic point of view, actually reduced the share of Slovakia in the total number of people employed in the national economy of Czechoslovakia from 27,53 % in 1948 to 26,70 % in 1966.<sup>36</sup>

It was especially alarming that according to the preliminary calculations and with the assumption that there were no radical changes in conditions, a "surplus" workforce of 250 – 260 thousand could be expected in Slovakia by 1980. It did not appear bearable even from the economic point of view to have relocation or inter-regional migration of hundreds of thousands of workers to the territory of the Czech Lands.<sup>37</sup>

Many of these facts were known to the first secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Slovakia A. Dubček and they had significant influence on him. Therefore, at the end of September 1967, he addressed a session of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia on the problems of the national economy. His speech was open, critical and had not been authorized in advance. He pointed to the contradiction between the labour resources and distribution of investment, with the Czech Lands receiving 71 % of the investment in industry, although the growth of the workforce there amounted to only 30 % of the total in the whole state. He did not see the solution in "movement of people", as the material submitted to the session demanded. In his view, hundreds of thousands of people from Slovakia would have to migrate to the Czech Lands for work by 1980, and the extent of the migration could reach about half a million people.<sup>38</sup>

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p. 66, 625.

35 Ref. 34, p. 424, 437, 625, 638. 749,325 new industrial jobs were created in the Czech Lands in the period 1948 – 1966, but only 319,012 jobs in Slovakia. Thus, 70,14 % of the total number of newly created industrial jobs were created in the Czech Lands. Calculated on the basis of the same publication p. 524, 725.

36 Calculated on the basis of the publication: *Historická statistická ročenka ČSSR*. Prague 1985, p. 66, 625.

37 See: BARTOŠ, E. *Zdroje pracovních sil na Slovensku a problémy ich využitia*, ref. 33, p. 455.

38 *Záznam z plenárneho zasadania ÚV KSČ (26. – 27. 9. 1967)*. (Record from the Plenary Session of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia), (26 – 29 September 1967). Archiv Ústavu pro soudobé dějiny Akademie věd České republiky (Archives of the Institute for Recent History of the Academy of Sciences of the Czech Republic), p. 28-29. For further information see: LONDÁK, M.

In mid January 1968, at a closed discussion of the leadership of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Slovakia, A. Dubček returned to his speech from September 1967:<sup>39</sup> *“At the September plenary session, Comrade Dubček was extremely outspoken. When Comrade Novotný came back from his holiday, he submitted a proposal to the Leadership of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia, that when Slovakia is already solved in principle, that the development of industry, the health service etc. needs to be oriented to the frontier regions of Bohemia and Moravia. Comrade Dubček said that there are also other more backward regions here in Slovakia. This was also presented at the plenary sessions of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia in April and September. On page 47 was the conclusion that it is necessary to intensify the transfer of people to Bohemia etc. Comrade Dubček saw a danger that it would go further and this was why he spoke so strongly. This certainly helped and made an obstruction.”*

Events in the political arena, involving the departure of A. Novotný and the appointment of A. Dubček to the highest party function in the country, associated with the beginning of 1968, meant the beginning of several months of reconstruction of civil society both in the Czech Lands and in Slovakia. In this process, one event followed another, changes that had required years happened in weeks. Consideration of the federalization of Czechoslovakia had been unthinkable, but suddenly it was on the programme of the day.

After A. Dubček became first secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia, there were also personnel changes in Slovakia. On Dubček's recommendation, V. Biľak became the top man in the party in Slovakia. The Slovak economists, who had not long before been criticized by the central authorities, also gained important positions. At the beginning of April 1968, V. Pavlenda was elected to be a member of the Leadership of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Slovakia, and he became chairman of the economic committee of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia. H. Kočtuch was also drawn into politics. When a working session or conference of Mlynář's inter-disciplinary team *Development of the political system in the socialist society*, was held in Smolenice at the beginning of March, it was precisely H. Kočtuch, who presented the theoretical hypothesis about the economic federation of the state and the organization of economic relations within it, although it had been expected when the event was prepared that V. Pavlenda would do it.<sup>40</sup> However, the Slovak authors did not do enough theoretical preparation on this problem, discussion of which had not been allowed until recently.<sup>41</sup>

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*Ekonomický vývoj na Slovensku v rokoch 1960 – 1967*, ref. 1, p. 246-247.

- 39 SNA, f. ÚV KSS, c. 1 199. Zasadnutie Predsedníctva ÚV KSS 15 January 1968. The uncorrected stenographic record of Dubček's speech is in the third person.
- 40 See: ŽATKULIAK, J. *Federalizácia československého štátu 1968 – 1970. Vznik česko-slovenskej federácie roku 1968*. (The Federalization of the Czechoslovak State 1968 – 1970. The Origin of the Czecho-Slovak Federation in 1968.) Prague; Brno 1996, p. 29-32. The conference was held from 6 – 8 March 1968.
- 41 In the course of 1968, V. Pavlenda published: *Ekonomické základy socialistického riešenia národnostnej otázky v ČSSR* (Economic Foundations of the Socialist Solution of the Nationality Question in the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic), but it was determined by the fact that it originated before 1968 and was often ambiguous, although the author declared support for the need to strengthen the position of the

According to the record of the conference, which appeared only in October 1970, H. Kočtúch did not start from the initial thesis that federalization of the state was needed for economic reasons, but rather he attempted with the help of analysis of economic facts to work towards the conclusion that federalization would mean a powerful and positive impulse for the development of the Slovak economy and for the whole state. The explanation with the use of graphs was apparently too abstract for the non-economists, and the audience did not have the written version of the lecture available in advance because of the short time of preparation.<sup>42</sup>

The Smolenice conference at the beginning of March 1968 was originally intended as a session of Mlynář's team of Slovak and Czech social scientists concerned with the problem of the development of the political system, but in the end it was concerned mainly with the Slovak national question, and it also raised the possibility of a federal constitutional arrangement. According to the author of the written record, M. Řehůřek from the Institute of State Law of the Slovak Academy of Sciences, the importance of the conference lay *"in breaking through the almost universal antipathy, lack of interest and underrating of this problem"*, but it was clear that various Czech participants were still not prepared for such an idea.<sup>43</sup>

In the course of the following weeks, pressure from the Slovak national institutions in favour of federalization of the state gradually increased. At the same time, the Slovak economists progressed in their consideration of theoretical questions, and by the end of April 1968, they had prepared a document with the title *Principles of the Economic Federalization of the Nations of Czechoslovakia*, which was intended to provide a basis for further discussion. The document started from the view that Czechoslovakia was a state of two equal nations and its economy was understood as an integrated synthesis of the two national economies. The existing integration had been applied by the authorities, administratively from the top and was irrational. In the end it was against the economic interests of both national political regions. The deformations derived from it were always more strongly manifested in the Slovak economy, as in the case of the impact of the economic reform. It was necessary to eliminate the negative features resulting, for example, from the one-sided sector structure, the weakness of the production programmes in Slovakia and the irrational investment policy, which did not take into account the situation in the area of labour resources.<sup>44</sup>

According to this document, the new economic integration must remove the conditions discriminating against Slovakia and in harmony with the *Action Programme of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia* secure equalization by 1980. A single currency, common market and free movement of workers was planned for the future. The national institutions of Slovakia and the Czech Lands would work out their own conceptions and plans for economic development and the central institutions would coordinate them. The

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Slovak national institutions during the existence of the so-called economic system of management. In spite of this, he came to the conclusion on p. 280 that the most advantageous solution was *"a consistent economic and political federation"*, but he stated that this idea was connected only with the year 1968.

42 See: ŽATKULIAK, J. *Federalizácia československého štátu 1968 – 1970*, ref. 40, p. 32.

43 Ref. 40, p. 34, 32.

44 Ref. 40, p. 74-75.

new form of economic management would be associated with an appropriate banking system, in which currency issuing and commercial activity would be divided. National currency issuing centres were proposed.

This conception started “*from the principle of the national institutions as the bearers of the original state-forming sovereignty*”. The federal institutions would only have the powers granted to them by the national institutions, which would be primary and would decide about further economic growth of the individual national economies. The document also contained the thesis that the national economy could be dynamized by the important moving force of national initiative. This conception of an economic-political federation was intended to exclude the possible approach to federalization that would involve only “*high politics*” and “*little economics*”.<sup>45</sup> However, the socialist organization of society and the associated ownership of the means of production were absolutely accepted, and the whole document contained no sign of doubts in this direction. For example, private or small enterprise were not considered at this time and further development of the economic reforms in Czechoslovakia were considered obvious.

This document with the title *Principles of Federalization of the Economies of the Nations of Czechoslovakia* was prepared from the Slovak side by the main authors H. Kočtůch, V. Pavlenda and J. Ferianc, and submitted to the joint meeting of Slovak and Czech economists in Bratislava on 29 April 1968.<sup>46</sup> Its aim was to gain the support of the leading Czech economists for its main ideas, especially for the conception of two national economies, which would form the economy of Czechoslovakia only by their integration. However, the ideas of the Slovak economists did not encounter a positive reception, and a critical attitude to them prevailed on the Czech side. The reason was allegedly the fact that the tendency to apply market principles in the economy did not require the creation of new barriers between individual closed economies, but rather the overcoming of such barriers in the interest of the maximal integration into the world economy.<sup>47</sup>

However, the text of the document does not indicate an effort to build closed national economies, but mentions problems such as economic integration and the single market in various places. According to Z. Šulc, the discussions closed with the Slovak authors agreeing to amend the submitted document in accordance with the critical comments. However, in reality, these reservations received little attention and the document was published in the daily papers without substantial changes. The Czech economists objected to this that their signatures under the document did not mean agreement with the published text, but only that they had participated in the discussion of it.<sup>48</sup> Thus, immediately at one of the first discussions between Slovak and Czech economists on the economic problems associated with the preparations to federalize the state, controversial

45 Ref. 40, p. 74-77.

46 Ref. 40, p. 73-78.

47 See: ŠULC, Z. *Stručné dějiny ekonomických reforem v Československu (České republice) 1945 – 1995*. Studie národohospodářského ústavu Josefa Hlávky. (A Brief History of Economic Reforms in Czechoslovakia and the Czech Republic, 1945 – 1995.). Study 3, 1996, p. 53. Šulc personally participated in the above mentioned meeting of Slovak and Czech economists.

48 Ref. 47, p. 53. The document was published in *Rudé Právo* and *Pravda* on 18 May 1968. Compare: ŽATKULIAK, J. *Federalizácia československého štátu 1968 – 1970*, ref. 40, p. 73-78.



points emerged, resulting from differences of point of view and conception. These were essentially solved only by the passing of the constitutional act.

However, in the new social atmosphere of spring 1968, the Slovak side saw not only the further gradual working out of the economic and political federation, but also the public presentation of the multitude of ideas silenced in the preceding period. They not only concerned criticism of various aspects of the economic development of Slovakia in the time of socialism but also numerous ideas for promoting further positive growth from both theoretical and practical economists. They were fully expressed at an academic conference with the title *Economic Problems of the Development of Slovakia in the Federal Organization* held by the Economics University in Bratislava from 6 – 8 May 1968.<sup>49</sup> One of the important theoretical lectures was given jointly by J. Ferianc and J. Kuřka.<sup>50</sup> They were concerned with the economic content of the federation, which they regarded as the “central problem of the political model of socialist democracy in Czechoslovakia”. In their view, the federation would not only enable the constituting of the Czechs and Slovaks as modern socialist nations, it would also be a guarantee of the permanence of the further democratic development of socialist society in Czechoslovakia. It would overcome the monopoly of power with its bureaucratic system and the equality of two equal partners in Czechoslovak statehood would bring a plurality of power.<sup>51</sup>

Then they presented the main ideas of the economic-political federation. The first principle had to be national sovereignty. From it derived the originality of economic power and the politics of the national institutions. The central, federal institutions would hold legal power only in agreed, delegated matters. The territorial-organization structure of the enterprise and budgetary sphere would also have to coincide with the activity of the national institutions. A further basic feature of the new economic functioning of the state or of economic reform had to be the overcoming of statism, recognition of the economic principle of the regulated market economy<sup>52</sup> and the autonomous position of enterprises in the economic sphere. The constitution of socialist enterprise had to be accompanied by legislation on enterprise. The functioning of the federal model had to include completion of the historic task of the economic equalization of Slovakia in a way appropriate to the conditions of the culmination of the industrial phase of growth of the Slovak economy. The basis of the economic policy of the state had to be the national economic plan in a new form, which would be a source of knowledge and information rather than endless dirigism of the enterprise sphere. It was necessary to work out a conception

49 *Ekonomický problémy rozvoja Slovenska vo federatívnom usporiadaní. Zborník zo sympózia Vysokej školy ekonomickej 6. – 8. mája 1968* (Economic Problems of the Development of Slovakia in the Federal Organization. Volume of Papers from the Symposium of the Economics University, 6 – 8 May 1968). Bratislava : Edičné stredisko VŠE, 1968.

50 At this time both were working in the Research Institute for Regional Planning in Bratislava.

51 FERIANC, J. - KUŘKA, J. *Ekonomický obsah federatívneho modelu* (The economic content of the federal model). In *Ekonomické problémy rozvoja Slovenska vo federatívnom usporiadaní*, ref. 49, p. 113.

52 In the course of 1968, neither Ján Ferianc nor other Slovak economists cast doubt on the socialist system.

for the development of the national economy with the aim of clarifying the possibilities for optimal growth, both on the level of the federation and in the national states.<sup>53</sup>

H. Kočtúch was first to speak at the conference. In his paper he considered the truth about the existing state of the Czechoslovak and Slovak economies, while also presenting a prognosis for their long-term development. In his view, the problem was that for 35 years the national wealth of Czechoslovakia had not been calculated. The official statistical offices had produced a large quantity of data, but they did not give a reliable picture of reality.<sup>54</sup> For example, in connection with basic funds or circulating resources, they used data derived from various prices, but these were cut off from real market prices<sup>55</sup> and were not comparable to internationally recognized statistical data.

There was a similar situation with calculation of the national income in Czechoslovakia, not to mention the fact that it had not been regularly calculated in Slovakia during the period of socialism.<sup>56</sup> Only four factors were taken into account when calculating it,<sup>57</sup> but modern system analyses used abroad took into account up to 26 factors, and the results gave a much more accurate picture of economic reality – not to mention the fact that the method of calculating national income in Czechoslovakia artificially increased it, for example, with useless and opposite direction transport costs, which were actually losses from the point of view of the national economy. Therefore, Kočtúch declared support for the idea of working out a standard methodology for calculating the national income to create a basis for a genuinely realistic comparison of international economic levels.

According to Kočtúch it was important for the future that real economic development should be compared not with the planned level, but with the potentially possible. Deviation of the planned development from the actual development meant almost nothing. He also gave concrete data in this context. He estimated the minimum national income of Slovakia in 1965 as about 25 billion Kčs, the maximum as 81 billion Kčs and the actual level as almost 43,7 billion Kčs. Thus, the real national income was only 53,6 % of the potential maximum. At the same time, according to Kočtúch, the speed of economic growth in Slovakia was lower and reached 83 % of the level in the Czech Lands.<sup>58</sup> Fur-

53 See: FERIANC, J. - KUŤKA, J. *Ekonomický obsah federatívneho modelu*, ref. 51, p. 114-120.

54 According to the paper by M. Abrahám, the official statistics of the given period included a multitude of figures, concerning more than 1 000 items, but often the data gave no real information. It was often possible to obtain data of the type: "total number of live rabbits captured" but the official statistics did not give such indicators as "turnover of foreign trade by individual sectors", which were necessary for calculation of the social product or national income of the region. See: ABRAHÁM, M. *Pohľad na niektoré problémy štatistiky na Slovensku v novom modeli štátoprávneho usporiadania*. (A view of some statistical problems in Slovakia in the new model of constitutional organization). In *Ekonomické problémy rozvoja Slovenska vo federatívnom usporiadaní*, ref. 49, p. 178.

55 KOČTÚCH, H. *K vecným problémom rozvoja ekonomiky Slovenska*. (On factual problems in the development of the Slovak economy). In *Ekonomické problémy rozvoja Slovenska vo federatívnom usporiadaní*, ref. 49, p. 9-10.

56 For more details on this problem see: DŽUBAN, A. – KOČTÚCH, H. – PRAČKO, E. *Národný dôchodok Slovensku*. (The national income of Slovakia). In *Ekonomický časopis*, 1966, 14, no. 8. See also: LONDÁK, M. *Ekonomický vývoj na Slovensku v rokoch 1960 – 1967*, ref. 1, p. 195.

57 The influence of the growth of employment, growth of productivity of direct labour, social labour, the point of view of saving of material costs.

58 According to Kočtúch's calculations, with an equal rate of growth of national income in Slovakia and the

ther extrapolation of such development would, understandably, push the equalization of the economic and social level of Slovakia with the Czech Lands “into the very distant future”.<sup>59</sup>

After the end of the Second World War, the national economists of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia planned that Slovakia would catch up with the Czech Lands in the course of the 3rd – 4th five year plan, that is about 1965. According to Kočtúch, one of the reasons for the failure to achieve this aim was the failure of the so-called administrative model of management. This was also why the level of the national income of Slovakia per person was about 30 % lower in Slovakia compared to the Czech Lands, and there was a similar situation in the level of fixed assets per person. Therefore, only application of the so-called economic model of management could lead to the setting of such aims as an effort to equalize the economic and social level of Slovakia with the level of the Czech Lands by the year 1980.<sup>60</sup> H. Kočtúch also pointed to further negative phenomena deriving from the application of the administrative model of management, but the shift in thinking, thanks to which he could have begun to seek the causes of the economic problems of the time in the very existence of a socialist economy or in the effects of socialist production relations, did not happen at that time in his consideration or in that of other Slovak economic theorists.

According to J. Rosa,<sup>61</sup> introduction of the new system of management created by the economic reforms was only the beginning of the road to the removal of some restricting elements. These were: 1. absence of an integrated programme of economic policy; 2. uncomprehensive and fragmented decision making by the ministries; 3. that the enterprises were not constituted as independent producers in the market, they could not freely form integrated groupings, bureaucratic and uneconomic management of enterprises still prevailed. According to Rosa, the preservation of divisions between ministries and administrative, bureaucratic management of the economy were the main obstacles to the development of a socialist regulated market.<sup>62</sup>

The bureaucratic apparatus controlling not only the economy, but the whole of Czechoslovak society after February 1948 was constantly growing.<sup>63</sup> However, the numeri-

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Czech Lands, the national income in 1965 would have had the level of 49.3 billion Kčs.

59 See: KOČTÚCH, H. *K vecným problémom ekonomiky Slovenska*, ref. 55, p. 14.

60 Ref. 59, p. 14.

61 Jozef Rosa was Rector of the Economics University in Bratislava.

62 ROSA, J. *Sústava ekonomických nástrojov riadenia národného hospodárstva*. (The system of economic instruments for managing the national economy). In *Ekonomické problémy rozvoja Slovenska vo federatívnom usporiadaní*, ref. 49, p. 29-31. According to A. Baránik, excessive application of ministerial divisions, or the branch principle in conditions of the asymmetrical model meant that “the Slovak national economy became only an appendage in the framework of the economy of the whole state”. See: BARÁNIK, A. *Usporiadanie výrobnotechnickej základne pri federizácii ekonomiky ČSSR*. (The organization of the productive-technical base in relation to the federalization of the economy of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic). In *Ekonomické problémy rozvoja Slovenska vo federatívnom usporiadaní*, ref. 49, p. 244.

63 According to O. Šik, the “absolute government of specific bureaucracy” arose in the countries of the Eastern Bloc and this was an obstacle to real socialism. See: ŠIK, O. *Komunistický mocenský systém*. (The Communist Power System). Uncorrected translation of the publication: Das Kommunistische Machtsys-

cal size of this apparatus did not appear in the official statistics and data about it were essentially unavailable. In spite of this, views sometimes appeared about the inflexibility of the bureaucratic system, especially in connection with the emerging economic crisis at the beginning of the 1960s. According to the statistical materials, the bureaucratic apparatus grew by 38 thousand people only in the period from June 1961 to the end of 1962. There was a tendency towards continual growth. At the end of 1962, more than 750 thousand people worked in the bureaucratic apparatus managing the socialist sector of the national economy (without farming cooperatives – JRD), with almost 22 thousand people in the central ministries.<sup>64</sup> In spite of some measures, the growth of the apparatus continued in the course of 1963. As a result, measures to reduce the size of this bureaucratic apparatus were prepared in connection with the economic reforms from 1964. For example, in connection with a shift in the main role of the ministries from operational to planning management, a reduction of the ministry apparatus by 20 – 25% was expected, and of up to 50 % with the fulfillment of optimal conditions.<sup>65</sup>

This bureaucratic apparatus included a large number of influential people, not only in the ministries, but also at other levels of management, branch directorates or in the management of economic production units. If the economic reforms threatened their further careers and influential positions, it was not surprising that they became a hindrance to its development. Therefore, it was not only J. Rosa, but also other authors, who considered the continuing problem of bureaucracy in this period. In the new model of management, this problem had to be solved to a large extent by the new position of the productive enterprises in the structure of the economy. This was to be finally decided by legislation on the socialist enterprise. A large number of office jobs at various levels of management would suddenly be unnecessary, because the operational management would be left in the hands of the enterprises themselves. Various Slovak economists stated their views on this question in the spring of 1968,<sup>66</sup> although it was clear that many political struggles would occur over this question.

The spring of 1968 with its political relaxation and general liberalization, enabled the Slovak economists to present such a large number of ideas and themes from various fields of economic life, that it is difficult to name them in a brief account.<sup>67</sup> However, it is possible to summarize at least the basic ideas, theses and orientations of thinking. The

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tem. Hamburg : Hoffmann und Campo, 1976, published in Prague in 50 copies, p. 10.

64 Státní ústřední archiv České republiky (Central State Archives of the Czech Republic) (hereinafter SÚA), f. 1. tajemník ÚV KSČ Antonín Novotný, c. 136. The contemporary term “riadiaci a správny aparát” (managing and administrative apparatus) is used for the bureaucratic apparatus.

65 SÚA ČR, f. 1. tajemník ÚV KSČ Antonín Novotný, c. 137.

66 See e. g.: SEDLÁK, M. *Socialistický podnik v podmienkach federatívneho štátoprávneho usporiadania a regulovaného trhového hospodárstva* (The socialist enterprise in the conditions of a federal constitutional system and regulated market economy). In *Ekonomický problémy rozvoja Slovenska vo federatívnom usporiadaní*, ref. 49, p. 41-80.

67 Let us mention at least some: a new position for labour resources in the economic model of management, problems in the use of qualified workers, university educated people in Slovakia, the problems of introducing computer technology, the new place of statistics, the management of foreign trade in Slovakia, the new organization of banking in the federal model, the need to establish a currency issuing bank in Slovakia, the need for a new tax system and so on.

causes of the existing problems in the economy or in the development during the period of socialism up to then, were seen mainly in the existence of the so-called administrative directive model of management, and where the constitutional system was concerned, in the asymmetrical model. Therefore, a starting point for the future was seen in the consistent development of economic reform, in the introduction of the so-called economic model of management, in the structural reform of the economy and in the consistent application of the federal constitutional system. However, the political situation and general social conditions apparently did not lead to the Slovak authors considering that the causes of the unfavourable phenomena and processes in the Slovak economy could lay in the existence of the socialist system and directly flow from it.

However, they realized that the development in Czechoslovakia in the spring of 1968 was entering a new phase, in which political struggle would decide which of the presented ideas would be implemented in real life. According to A.M. Húška, development "was uncertain" in its further direction. A period followed, in which the further development was to be decided at meetings of various commissions and sub-commissions. They also had to consider the question of how to successfully implement the idea of federalization of the state in practice. There was also the danger that "federation as the model for Czechoslovak equalization could actually fail, but only if it was an inconsistent federation".<sup>68</sup>

#### ANSICHTEN SLOWAKISCHEN ÖKONOMEN ZUR WIRTSCHAFTSLAGE DER SLOWAKEI UM DIE JAHRESWENDE 1967 – 1968

MIROSLAV LONDÁK

Der Autor widmet sich in dem vorliegenden Aufsatz dem wichtigsten Kreis dieser Fragen, mit denen sich die slowakischen Ökonomen Ende des Jahres 1967 und in der 1. Hälfte des Jahres 1968 auseinander setzten. Die entspanntere politische Atmosphäre ermöglichte es ihnen, Kritik am damaligen Verlauf der Wirtschaftsreform, die seit 1965 vonstatten ging, sowie Kritik an der so genannten administrativ-direktiven Steuerung der sozialistischen Wirtschaft zu üben, mit der vor allem jene Probleme verbunden waren, die sich aus dem Industrialisierungsprozess in der Slowakei „in der Ära des Sozialismus“ ergaben. Nach dem Januar 1968 traten alle diese Probleme mit um so größerer Dringlichkeit in den Vordergrund, da sie zu einem organischen Bestandteil der neuen Lösung der slowakischen Nationalfrage wurden, die allmählich in die Formulierung des Föderalisierungsprogramms des Staates überging. Im Frühjahr 1968 konnten slowakische Ökonomen mit einem Quantum neuer Ideen aufwarten, die ihnen nicht nur die Fähigkeit der Kritik an der vergangenen Entwicklung, sondern auch der praktischen Lösung der neu aufgeworfenen Fragen der wirtschaftlichen Weiterentwicklung der Slowakei bescheinigten. Da nach dem Frühjahr 1968 die Frage der Föderalisierung der Tschechoslowakei in den Vordergrund rückte, verweist der Autor

68 See: HÚSKA, A. M. *Ekonomická integrácia a federácia vo svetle systémovej teórie a kybernetiky*. (Economic integration and federation in the light of systems theory and cybernetics). In *Ekonomické problémy rozvoja Slovenska vo federatívnom usporiadaní*, ref. 49, p. 122.

auch darauf, welche Reaktion sie bei slowakischen und tschechischen Ökonomen fand, auf ihren gegenseitigen Dialog und die Unterschiedlichkeit ihrer Haltungen zur Problematik des ökonomischen Inhalts der Föderation, was schließlich ebenfalls durch die Liberalisierung der politischen Verhältnisse in der Tschechoslowakei im Frühjahr 1968 möglich geworden war. Der Autor weist darauf hin, dass die damalige offizielle Wirtschaftswissenschaft in der Slowakei sich zwar nur in den durch die sozialistische Gesellschaftsordnung bestimmten Grenzen bewegte, jedoch auch bestrebt war, eine Reihe von Anregungen, die von Ökonomen westlicher Länder kamen, zu nutzen.

## THE ATTEMPT TO CONSTRUCT A MARXIST MASTER NARRATIVE IN THE PERIOD 1948 – 1955

ADAM HUDEK

HUDEK, Adam. The Attempt to Construct a Marxist master narrative in the Period 1948 – 1955. *Historický časopis*, 2008, 56, Supplement, pp. 111-131, Bratislava.

The study is concerned with the development of Slovak historical science in the period 1948 – 1955. Its institutional and personal development is analysed, together with the methods of control and direction by the communist regime. The main interest is devoted to the problems of applying Marxism to Slovak historiography. The second part of the study consists of an outline of the way Marxist historiography interpreted and evaluated the key periods of Slovak history. Attention is also devoted to the formation of the Marxist periodization of Slovak history. The result was a framework for the Slovak Marxist national story, used in later synthetic works.

Master narrative. Marxist historiography. Concept of Czechoslovak history.

English term “master narrative”, in Slovak “národný príbeh” (national story) together with the Marxist „national history“ are expressions designating a dominant generally accepted account of the history of a nation (or in Czechoslovak case, of the state). The official interpretation of national history always was and still is an important political question. In general, it is possible to say that if a society is freer, the historians have more autonomy in formulating their versions of the national story. In totalitarian societies, on the other hand, shaping of the master narrative is mostly controlled by the government, which ensures that it is appropriate to the ideological demands of the regime. After the coup d'état of 1948 and the installation of communist totalitarianism, the new regime realized the importance of gaining control over historical research. The creation of its own, Marxist, conception of Slovak or Czechoslovak history had to be one of the important means of legitimizing the claim of the Communist Party to power.

In spite of the fact that the communist regime was established in Czechoslovakia relatively quickly, the application of Marxism-Leninism to Slovak historical science struck against various problems. Apart from some insignificant exceptions, Marxist historiography did not exist in Slovakia before 1948. The Marxist approach to history appeared only in popular articles by prominent Slovak communists like Ladislav Novomeský, Gustáv Husák or Vladimír Clementis.<sup>1</sup> However, their ideas about the Marxist version

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1 They were especially concerned with key periods in the national story – the revolution of 1848 – 1849, the origin of Czechoslovakia and the Slovak National Uprising. The first Marxist historical work in Slovakia appears to have been the dissertation of the history graduate Alexander Markuš *Sedliacke povstanie v Zemplíne v roku 1831* (The Peasants' Revolt in Zemplín in 1831). Markuš submitted this work in 1936, but it appeared in book form only in 1951. See: KAMENEC, Ivan. *Začiatky marxistického historického myslenia na Slovensku* (The Beginnings of Marxist Historical Thought in Slovakia.). Bratislava : Veda, 1984.

of national history mostly encountered rejection from the Slovak historical community,<sup>2</sup> although Ladislav Novomeský developed some activity to popularize it among historians.<sup>3</sup> However, the struggle against bourgeois nationalism in the fifties, which meant the imprisonment of Husák and Novomeský and the execution of Clementis, prevented the Slovak historians even declaring their connection with the activity of these representatives of Marxist thought in Slovakia. Thus, Slovak historiography was in a different situation to its Czech and Hungarian counterparts, which could connect with the tradition of Marxist historical schools from before the Second World War. In the case of Slovak historiography, the communist ideologists installed Marxism-Leninism in its Stalinist form, only after 1948. It was a relatively long time before the Slovak Marxist historical school actually began to produce relevant work in our conditions. Until then, the Marxist master narrative existed mainly in the speeches of functionaries and in plans for work.

When analysing the institutional base of Slovak historiography after 1948, it is first of all necessary to record the rise of the Institute of History of the Slovak Academy of Sciences and Arts (after 1953 the Slovak Academy of Sciences) to the leading position in historical research. The institute replaced the Department of History of Comenius University (in the period 1939 – 1954 the Slovak University) as the leading institution shaping the character of Slovak historiography. The university department had held the leading position under the first Czechoslovak Republic, and the Department of History of Matica Slovenská had occupied an important position during the period of the Slovak state. Both these institutions were pushed into the background, the university department only for a time, although it never regained equality with the Institute of History, while the Department of History of Matica Slovenská was definitively dissolved in 1950. Thus, the new regime created new institutions and shaped them according to its needs,<sup>4</sup> while the old ones, excessively connected with the preceding periods, were marginalized. The Institute of History of the Communist Party of Slovakia<sup>5</sup> and the Department of History of the Czechoslovak Republic and the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia at the Central Political School, were entirely new institutions, associated with the establishment of the communist dictatorship. However, these research centres could never really compete in the field of historical research with the Institute of History or with the university department. Up to 1956, the Institute of History of the Communist Party of Slovakia devoted its attention mainly to publishing the writings of Gottwald and to various propagandist and educational tasks entrusted to it by the party authorities.

Analysis of the institutional changes in Slovak historiography after 1948 leads to the hypothesis that the aim of the regime was to rationalize and improve the effectiveness of scientific research by concentrating it in one large institution. However, centralization

2 For example, theses about the “counter-revolutionary” activities of Slovaks in 1848 – 1849 presented by Novomeský in the article: *Marx a slovenský národ* (Marx and the Slovak nation), 1933.

3 As commissioner for education and culture, he participated in the founding conference of the Slovenská historická spoločnosť (Slovak Historical Society) in 1946 for this purpose.

4 Although the Institute of History of the Slovak Academy of Sciences originated in 1943, its real development into a leading academic institution came only after 1948.

5 This institute was established in 1953 as a result of the reorganization of the Institute of the History of the Slovak National Uprising.



and the closely associated aim of easier control was also one of the basic concepts of the communist government, which only shows the problem of distinguishing between ideological and practical measures in this field. Support for the Institute of History of the Slovak Academy of Sciences and Arts in the competition with the Department of History of Matica for the leading position also had the support of the historians themselves.<sup>6</sup> However, the liquidation of the academic research departments of Matica Slovenská was actually an expression of revenge on an institution regarded by the new regime as a centre of anti-communist and Ľudák thinking (in the meaning of supporting the ideas of the fascist Slovak state).<sup>7</sup> The organizational changes at Comenius University<sup>8</sup> in Bratislava also bear the mark of ideological decisions. The introduction of the inflexible Soviet model of large departments must be assigned to this type of change, but when this system did not succeed, the regime was willing to gradually reform it. Thus, a system of historical research was gradually established in the form of a relatively functional, but not unreservedly accepted model.

A mixture of rational decisions and political considerations also prevailed from 1948 in the personnel policy of the institutions concerned with history. The purges of historians in Slovakia after the communist seizure of power did not mean immediate liquidation. They were limited to historians, who had previously declared their opposition to Marxist historiography.<sup>9</sup> The communist regime started political selection of historians to a larger extent only at the beginning of the 1950s. The new regime found only two Marxist historians in Slovakia: Jaroslav Dubnický and Miloš Gosiorovský,<sup>10</sup> others declared their support for Marxism mostly because of the need to continue their research work. The party authorities formally criticized the ideological shortcomings of the majority of historians, but were in reality actually solving the problem of the desperately small number of qualified research workers. The regime could not afford mass dismissal, because there was nobody to replace the “inappropriate” scholars. Thus, purges affected only a small

6 For example, František Bokes, who worked for both the Academy and Matica, wrote: “*The former fragmentation has to be removed by concentration in the Institute of History of the Slovak Academy of Sciences and Arts. The division with Matica Slovenská was not beneficial, because it divided the limited human and financial resources. (...) The proposed concentration of historical research in the Institute of History of the Academy should increase both the productivity of the research and its quality.*” In Central Archives of Slovak Academy of Sciences (hereinafter CA SAS), fond (hereinafter f.) SAVU, carton (hereinafter c.) 4, *Návrh organizácie historického výskumu na Slovensku* (Proposal for the organization of historical research in Slovakia.)

7 At a session of the Leadership (Presidium) of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Slovakia, it was explicitly stated that Matica would not be entirely abolished only because of its tradition, in spite of its faults, mistakes and politically inappropriate membership. Slovak National Archives (hereinafter SNA), f. Predsednictvo (Presidium) ÚČ KSS, c. 800. *Protokol zo zasadnutia Predsednictva ÚV KSS* (Minutes from a session of the Leadership (Presidium) of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Slovakia), 3 November 1950.

8 Until 1954 the Slovak University.

9 This was the case of the most prominent Slovak historian Daniel Rapant, who was forbidden to lecture, but he could still do research work with some limitations. Regarding other anti-communist historians, Belo Polla was imprisoned in 1950, and Vendelín Jankovič already in 1947.

10 Miloš Gosiorovský was self-taught and lacked adequate education, while Jaroslav Dubnický was originally an art historian.

number of historians, and only for a limited time, after which they usually returned to their original work.<sup>11</sup> In general, the regime often overlooked political inadequacies as long as historians expressed loyalty to the regime and its ideology in their work.<sup>12</sup> Thus, in this situation the main historical research institutions had to devote much attention to finding young, promising research workers.<sup>13</sup> In the personnel policy, there was considerable difference between the declared strict political criteria and the real situation, where much greater tolerance prevailed. The leadership of the Institute of History and of the whole Academy were even more benevolent in this respect than the party authorities.<sup>14</sup> The regime was finally forced to accept the real situation in history and other academic fields in Slovakia and instead of purges, it endeavoured to attract important personalities in academic life to Marxism more on the basis of persuasion. However, this did not change the fact that the domination of the regime over the academic institutions was always absolute and the actual situation depended only on the extent and intention with which this power was used. This was fully confirmed by the situation after 1968, when, in contrast to the situation in the 1950s, the regime had no problem with replacing “inappropriate” scholars.

The first condition for the creation of a Marxist master narrative after 1948 was the thorough ideologization of historiography, which had to be built exclusively on the foundations of Marxism-Leninism in its Stalinist form. In connection with the application of Marxism to historiography in the first half of the 1950s, it is necessary to comment, that it was often only “playing at Marxism” or Marxism adapted to the understanding and current needs of the communist regime. The party ideologists, who had the task of applying Marxism in the field of historiography, usually had only very superficial knowledge in the form of a mixture of basic phrases and axioms, their own ideas and current party political aims. Especially in the 1950s, it was enough for historians to learn a few Stalinist axioms and quickly adapt to the current power-political and ideological changes.

However, in spite of this, the process of formation of a Marxist historical science occurred relatively slowly. When Jaroslav Dubnický lectured to the Institute of History of the Slovak Academy of Sciences and Arts in 1949 on *Historical materialism as a method of historical research*, he found that the majority of the historians present either disagreed with this method or did not know how to actually apply it in their historical work.<sup>15</sup> A breakthrough in the ideologization of Slovak history came only when the party autho-

11 This concerned, for example, historians Vojtech Ondrouch and František Bokes.

12 This was the case, for example, with medievalist Peter Ratkoš who was recorded in the 1950s as a clerical and former member of the Hlinka Guard (during the existence of the Slovak state).

13 Thus Ján Tibenský and Ján Dekan from Matica Slovenská and Ľudovít Holotík from the University of Political and Economic Sciences in Prague came to the Institute of History of the Slovak Academy of Sciences.

14 There are various examples of the director of the institute Ľudovít Holotík, one of the most prominent, but also most dogmatic Marxist historians of this period, intervening in favour of threatened historians.

15 For example, it was not clear to Branislav Varsik how scientific materialism had to be applied to Slovak history in practice. After the lecture, Belo Polla gave the critical comment that historical research must start from facts and not from ideas. The administrative director of the institute Teodor Lamoš held a similar view.

rities began to take a more serious interest in this question, in the context of a generally increased interest in science and research. The social sciences had to serve communist propaganda and the promotion of Marxist ideology at home and abroad. However, such tasks could only be fulfilled by scientists who not only formally declared Marxism, but were really able to apply it in historical work.

The ninth congress of the Communist Party of Slovakia held from 24 to 27 May 1950 outlined the main, obligatory direction of historical science in Slovakia. The speech of the general secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Slovakia Štefan Bašťovanský criticizing the existing development of historical research was distributed to all the institutions concerned with historical research<sup>16</sup> and became a compulsory instruction for their activity: *“Slovak historical science has fallen behind the socialist development of Slovak life and is not assisting the constructive effort of the working class. (...) We expect from our historical science, the working out of important periods in our national history, especially with regard for the fight and struggle of our people, the struggle of the progressive classes of our national past, and we expect it to do this on the basis of the method of historical materialism. (...) Therefore, historical science must develop in connection with the concrete tasks of our economic and public life.”*<sup>17</sup> Thus, history had to be a propagandist science reacting flexibly to the current ideological demands of the party leadership. This also meant that historians had to begin devoting their attention selectively to the periods and events, which the communists considered of key importance.

Štefan Bašťovanský also outlined how the further development should look: *“Science must be freed from the deposits of hostile foreign ideologies and elements: from formalism, decadence, cosmopolitanism, clericalism and bourgeois nationalism, lack of conceptual principles, aesthetic play and so on. (...) We hold the view that our scientific researchers should more bravely draw on the rich well of our national history than they have up to now. It is necessary to place the whole of Slovak science on the firm foundation of Marxism-Leninism, and adopt without any reservations the methods of dialectical and historical materialism (...)”*<sup>18</sup> This speech ordering science on the basis of Marxism-Leninism “without reservations” ended all discussions about its application in historical science. Stalinist dogmatism did not allow any sign of deviation from the “canon” approved by party ideologists. The development of Slovak historical science in

- 16 CA SAS, f. SAVU, c. 13, K IX zjazdu KSS – referát s. Bašťovanský, *Hlavné smernice kultúrnej politiky na Slovensku*. (Ninth Congress of the Communist Party of Slovakia – speech by Comrade Bašťovanský, Main Directive for Cultural Policy in Slovakia). However, this document also contains passages not found in the official written record of the congress. See: *Protokol IX. Zjazdu Komunistickej strany Slovenska v Bratislave dňa 24. – 27. Mája 1950* (Record of the Ninth Congress of the Communist Party of Slovakia in Bratislava, 24 – 27 May 1950).
- 17 CA SAS, f. SAVU, c. 13, K IX zjazdu KSS – referát s. Bašťovanský, *Hlavné smernice kultúrnej politiky na Slovensku* (Ninth Congress of the Communist Party of Slovakia – speech by Comrade Bašťovanský, Main Directive for Cultural Policy in Slovakia). This text appears in shortened form in the speech of Štefan Bašťovanský according to the record of the Ninth Congress of the Communist Party of Slovakia.
- 18 *Protokol IX. Zjazdu Komunistickej strany Slovenska v Bratislave dňa 24. – 27. Mája 1950. Bratislava 1950* (Record of the Ninth Congress of the Communist Party of Slovakia in Bratislava, 24 – 27 May 1950), p. 220.

the 1950s was strongly influenced by the campaign against bourgeois nationalism. This problem, which arose as a mixture of power struggle in the party and the application of the Stalinist theory<sup>19</sup> of sharpening the class war, also had a basic and long-term influence on the construction of the Slovak Marxist national story.

The leadership of the Slovak Academy of Sciences and Arts immediately declared that Bašťovanský's speech was the general line for scientific research. Thus, we can regard the Ninth Congress as the official beginning of the period of dogmatic Stalinism in Slovak historical science. The reaction to its results was increased interest in the ideological level of researchers. This was followed by obligatory criticism and self-criticism among historians, especially admission of ideological inadequacies "from the point of view of Marxism-Leninism and the constructive efforts of the republic". Jaroslav Dubnický presented his idea of Marxist historical science at the Institute of History on 6 July 1950: "*Today our society needs only highly ideological science. Historiography must be connected with the practice of the class struggle and the historian must be on the side of the class struggle of the proletariat. The objectivist method in history is a masked form of bourgeois partisanship.*"<sup>20</sup> At the Institute of History, it was actually the first clear definition of Marxist historiography as understood in the 1950s. The definition stated its demands and identified its difference from the positivist method, which was rejected as ideologically incorrect.

Thus, the theoretical starting points of Marxist historiography were clearly defined at the beginning of the 1950s. However, their real application was still not occurring in the Slovak environment. In 1951, the Institute of History was forced to cancel a project to produce a brief Marxist overview of Slovak history, which had been planned in 1949 as an obligation to the Ninth Congress of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia in 1949.<sup>21</sup> The preparation of this work had great ideological importance for the party authorities.<sup>22</sup> The facts from older syntheses and monographs were to be reinterpreted in a Marxist way for the needs of the overview, to avoid the need for time-consuming archive research. The supposed basic advantages of Marxist historical science were expected to enable fast completion of the project. Jozef Štolc, head of the research institutes of the Slovak Academy of Sciences and Arts wrote: "*The matter cannot be assessed from the point of view of bourgeois historiography, which claims that it is not possible today to write Slovak history (that is from the objectivist point of view), that monographic works are necessary first.*"<sup>23</sup> However, the whole original plan proved to be unrealistic. The

19 According to the Stalinist theory about sharpening of the class war, it was necessary after installation of the dictatorship of the proletariat, to struggle for the "*protection and development of socialist ownership and to strike at its enemies*". Therefore, it was necessary to seek out and uncover the so-called internal enemies.

20 CA SAS, f. SAVU, c. 2, *Zápisnica o zasadnutí všetkých pracovníkov SAVU 6. 7. 1950* (Minutes of meetings of all workers of the Slovak Academy of Sciences and Arts, 6 July 1950).

21 The members of the preparatory commission composed of Jaroslav Dubnický (head of the project), Miloš Gosiorovský, Ján Dekan and Ján Tibenský had to prepare the outline of the work in 1949 and the whole work was to be published on 1 January 1951.

22 The book was intended for use first of all as a textbook and guide for history teachers.

23 CA SAS, f. SAVU, c. 12, *Obežník všetkým vedeckým ústavom* (Circular to all the Research Institute.)

older historiography did not devote attention to the themes considered of key importance by Marxists,<sup>24</sup> and Marxist history also required a new division into periods. Thus an incompatibility appeared in Slovak historical science between the real possibilities and the plans imposed on the Institute of History by the party authorities and the “zealous” Marxist historians such as Jaroslav Dubnický.

The chairman of the institute Dubnický derived no new conclusions from the failures. On the contrary, the form of the plan for 1951 shows that it was written more for the party representatives, and its main aim was to show the effort the institute was putting into satisfying the demands of the ninth congress. The plan was oriented towards the current demands of the communist regime,<sup>25</sup> and promised to provide what the party demanded from Marxist historiography. However, these promises remained on the level of general declarations. In spite of the fact that the failure to produce the Marxist overview of Slovak history pointed to the need for analysis of sources, the plan for 1951 rejected a long-term project of archive research.<sup>26</sup>

Basic changes to the work of the Institute of History came in mid 1951, when Ľudovít Holotík was appointed its administrative director.<sup>27</sup> He started the conceptual transformation of this institution into the main centre for Slovak Marxist historical science. Failure to fulfill the work plan required the holding of a crisis meeting in the middle of 1951, at which Holotík spoke of the setting of unfulfillable aims: “*The proposers understood the solution of topical historical problems, but they did not give enough thought to their order and achievement.*”<sup>28</sup> This was an accusation aimed directly at the chairman of the institute Jaroslav Dubnický. The meeting resulted in the working out of a new plan, which already bore the organizational handwriting of Ľudovít Holotík. The plan set two basic directions for further development. Firstly, it demanded rapid and collective scientific growth, which in practice meant regular professional training, both scientific and ideological. Without knowledge of historical materialism, it was not possible to shape a Marxist national story. As the quality of the research workers grew, they had to start work on the Slovak part of the handbook of Czechoslovak history. In the framework of the ideological training, the plan had to strongly emphasize the current ideological campaigns – especially the on-going struggle against bourgeois nationalism.<sup>29</sup>

The beginning of the 1950s is important for analysis of the development of Slovak Marxist historiography, as the period when the main tasks of Slovak historical scien-

24 These were especially class struggle, economic history, the history of the proletariat and the Communist Party.

25 To work out the history of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia, the history of the revolution, the history of the proletariat and the Communist Party.

26 The official reason was that archive research “(...) does not bear in mind ideological deepening and the application of Marxism-Leninism in creative historical work. It also hindered the consistent development of new collective forms of historical work based on the theory of historical materialism”. In CA SAS, f. SAVU, c. 14, *Zhodnotenie roku 1950* (Evaluation of the Year 1950).

27 He had worked at the institute since the beginning of 1951 as an assistant.

28 CA SAS, f. SAVU, c. 13, *Nový plán na obdobie 1. 9. – 31. 12. 1951* (The New Plan for the Period 1 September – 31 December 1951).

29 A volume of papers was to be published, to which the historians had to contribute a study on this theme.

ce were defined. However, the main themes of the new national story did not derive directly from the historical community, but were introduced from the environment of the Communist Party. The historians were forced to quickly adopt them and on their basis begin to shape the required new version of the master narrative, under constant supervision from the party. In the first years of communist totalitarianism, the revision of key events in Czechoslovak or Slovak history according to the ideological needs of the new regime was often emphasized by the party authorities more than new research. For example, this was the case with the history of the origin and functioning of the First Czechoslovak Republic. The picture of a democratic state, which arose from the will of the Western powers, on the basis of the activity of people like Tomáš Garrigue Masaryk, Milan Rastislav Štefánik or Edvard Beneš and the struggle of the Czechoslovak Legions against the Bolsheviks, was absolutely unacceptable for the communist regime. The new conception, based on the writings of the main communist ideologists, emphasized the fundamental influence of the Russian October Revolution and the “struggle of the workers” on the origin of the republic. At the same time, the most important personalities from the past had to be “demythologized”, the important role of the communists during the existence of Czechoslovakia had to be emphasized and the oppression of the proletariat by the regime pointed out. The anti-fascist Slovak National Uprising (1944) was a further subject for re-evaluation. It was treated as the heroic period of the communists and the basis of their claim to power in the state. The works of the leading communist functionaries also played a leading role in this case. The evaluation of the Slovak revolutionary years 1848 – 1849 also underwent a fundamental revision. The revolution was changed from a period of national glory to a period of failure and “counter-revolutionary” struggle against the progressive Hungarian (Magyar) revolution. The struggle against “clericalism” also had an important role in Marxist historiography. Finally, there was the specifically Slovak need to support the struggle against bourgeois nationalism, which meant emphasizing the brotherly relations between the Czech and Slovak nations during the whole course of their histories.

However, these tasks often represented only the basic schemes and forms created by the party authorities, but still not filled out by the results of the work of the historians. In an effort to train its staff as quickly as possible in the theories of Marxism-Leninism, the Institute of History largely abandoned scientific work.<sup>30</sup> The only noteworthy work from this period is the monograph by Miloš Gosiorovský *A Contribution to the History of the Slovak Workers' Movement (Príspevok k dejinám slovenského robotníckeho hnutia)* (1951) – the first Slovak Marxist historical work. Although it was described as pioneering after its publication, its factual content is actually compiled from Czech and Hungarian works.<sup>31</sup> It is also symptomatic that the first Marxist monograph came from

30 At the beginning of 1951, Jaroslav Dubnický already declared: “*There is a critical situation in historiography because of the ideological-political re-orientation*”. CA SAS, f. SAVU, c. 13, *Pracovný plán na rok 1951* (Work Plan for 1951).

31 The historian Ján Mlynárik states that Gosiorovský actually copied the essay of the Slovak social democrat Ján Počisk *Z dejín sociálnej demokracie na Slovensku* (From the History of Social Democracy in Slovakia). MLYNÁRIK, Ján. *Rozdvojené dejepisectvo* (Separated history). In *Slovenské rozhlady*, 1995, year 2, no. 5 (supplement).

the pen of a self-taught author, while the learned historians had to complete ideological and scientific training before they could publish their works.<sup>32</sup>

The director of the Institute of History Ľudovít Holotík<sup>33</sup> presented extensive plans and tasks for Marxist historiography in Slovakia, at the founding meeting of the section for social sciences on the occasion of the origin of the Slovak Academy of Sciences in 1953.<sup>34</sup> From the point of view of Marxist historiography, the national story before 1948 had served the class interests of the bourgeoisie<sup>35</sup> and supported its ruling position.<sup>36</sup> The new Marxist historical science had to support the struggle of the working classes for a just, communist society. Since the history of the Slovak people had to be offered from the point of view of the “victorious” Marxism-Leninism, the national story had to be freed from the “bourgeois falsification of the past”. Slovak historiography, consistently using the methods of historical materialism, had to uncover the principles of social development in the conditions of Slovak history. The greatest attention had to be devoted to the history of the class struggles of the Slovak people, which had to fully prove the principles of the route of the working class to victory.

To prevent the historians deviating from the basic Marxist postulates, even stricter party direction of historical science was introduced in 1953. The academy had to submit its plan of work to the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Slovakia every year, for examination from the expert and ideological points of view, and it was definitively approved by the Leadership (presidium) of the Central Committee. The defined task of the social sciences was “(...) *to assist the breaking up of the hostile ideologies and the spread of the new socialist, Marxist-Leninist ideology*”,<sup>37</sup> which actually placed history in the position of a propagandist science. The party authorities stressed the need to formulate realistic and fulfillable plans. In this case, the regime demanded rationally formulated documents, based on real possibilities, rather than lofty phrases. However, the highest party authorities set the priorities for research. Themes emphasizing the close connections between Czech and Slovak history had the highest priority in the first half of the 1950s. These demands were undoubtedly closely connected with the struggle against

32 Miloš Gosiorovský was outside the environment of the professional historians in this period. He worked only externally at the university and in the Institute of History. His main occupation was a position in the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Slovakia.

33 After the formation of the Slovak Academy of Sciences, the position of chairman was abolished and institutes were headed by their directors. Thus, Ľudovít Holotík formally headed the Institute of History only from 1953.

34 Miloš Gosiorovský was originally proposed as one of the candidates for chairman of the Slovak Academy of Sciences. Ľudovít Holotík was the main candidate for the position of secretary. However, political reservations arose during the course of the year against Gosiorovský and he was dismissed from all party functions. Holotík was finally rejected because of inexperience and lack of scientific results.

35 On the basis of the class view of society, which claimed that all science serves the current ruling class and strengthens its position.

36 HOLOTÍK, Ľudovít. *Nová etapa v rozvoji slovenskej historickej vedy* (A new stage in the development of Slovak historical science). In *Slovenská akadémia vied, jej uzákonenie a ustanovenie*. Bratislava : SAV, 1954, p. 146-149.

37 SNA, f. Predsedníctvo ÚV KSS, c. 854, *Smernice na zostavovanie plánov* (Directive for the Compilation of Plans).

bourgeois nationalism and the associated Slovak nationalism and Ľudákism (support for the wartime Slovak state). A report on the situation in the social sciences in Slovakia<sup>38</sup> produced by the fourth department of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Slovakia (for education and science) stated: “*We urgently need scientific works clarifying the brotherly relations between the Czech and Slovak peoples from the Marxist point of view. It is necessary to explain the influence and importance of the Hussite movement in the struggle of the Slovak people against oppression, the unity of the Czech revival movement with the Slovak, the revolutionary years in the mid 19th century, the importance of the Czech workers’ movement for the development of the Slovak workers’ movement, and the importance of the origin of the Czechoslovak Republic for the development of the Slovak nation.*”<sup>39</sup> This urgent demand was repeated in 1955: “*The central theme of some institutions in the first section will be theoretical working out of the questions of the brotherly coexistence of the Czechs and Slovaks. (...) Special attention will be devoted to the struggle against the hostile ideologies – bourgeois nationalism and Ľudákism.*”<sup>40</sup> It appears that the aim of historical science had to be the creation of a new version of Czechoslovak history, in which the Slovak national narrative was a partly autonomous, but not entirely independent part of the Czechoslovak master narrative. Apart from suppressing the “specifics” of Slovak national development, working Slovak history into the line of Czech history had the advantage that a Marxist version of history already existed in Czech historiography at the beginning of the 1950s,<sup>41</sup> while it had been absent in Slovakia.

In the campaign for “clarification of the brotherly relations of the Czechs and Slovaks”, great attention was concentrated on the period of the Hussite movement, which was supposed to prove the revolutionary traditions of the Czechs and Slovaks. For the Hussite tradition to be really Czechoslovak, its influence had to be found among the Slovaks. The problem of the influence of Hussitism in Slovakia was a topical subject in Slovak historiography from its origins in the 18th century.<sup>42</sup> The last works by Slovak historians before 1948<sup>43</sup> minimized the influence of the Hussites, but the communist ideologists needed the image of Hussitism as a movement, that was also strong in the Slovak environment. Historian Peter Ratkoš took up this problem and published his first study of it in 1953.<sup>44</sup> He presented the Hussite movement as an integral part of Slovak

38 SNA, f. Predsedníctvo ÚV KSS, c. 865, *Pripomienky IV. odd. ÚV KSS o situácii v spoločenských vedách* (Comments of the Fourth Department of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Slovakia on the Situation in the Social Sciences).

39 SNA, f. Predsedníctvo ÚV KSS, c. 865, *Pripomienky IV. odd. ÚV KSS o situácii v spoločenských vedách*.

40 SNA, f. Predsedníctvo ÚV KSS, c. 910, *Perspektívny plán rozvoja vedeckých pracovísk SAV v rokoch 1956 – 1960*. (Long-term plan for the development of the scientific institutes of the SAS in the period 1956 – 1960).

41 From the Hussite period, the national revival and the origin of Czechoslovakia as a result of the October Revolution in Russia to the installation of the communist regime in 1948.

42 An 18th century Slovak scholar Matej Bel was already concerned with this problem.

43 These were mainly the syntheses of Slovak history by František Hrušovský, František Bokes and partly also the study by Branislav Varsík

44 RATKOŠ, Peter. *Husitské revolučné hnutie a Slovensko* (The Hussite Revolutionary Movement and Slo-



history, and on two connected levels. The first was the old Czechoslovakist idea of the Hussite movement as a common historical tradition of the Czechs and Slovaks. The second was the anti-feudal, anti-Church and proto-communist ideology attributed to the Hussite movement, which, according to Peter Ratkoš, was also spread in Slovakia.

In the field of recent history, great attention was devoted to the anti-fascist Slovak National Uprising.<sup>45</sup> The struggle against bourgeois nationalism and its representatives required the working out of a new conception, in which the activity of the compromised leaders of the Communist Party of Slovakia had to be minimized and credit given to the Moscow leadership of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia. All Slovak national demands had to be removed from the aims of the uprising, and its Czechoslovak character as a struggle for a united republic had to be emphasized. In the strictly Marxist interpretation, the uprising was interpreted as a classic culmination of the class struggle, where the struggle against fascism merged with the struggle of the proletariat against the bourgeoisie. The Slovak National Uprising could be presented as the beginning of the so-called people's democratic revolution. On 3 November 1953, the chairman of the Slovak Academy of Sciences Ondrej Pavlík called for the leadership of the Communist Party of Slovakia to call a conference on the Slovak National Uprising with these intentions:<sup>46</sup> *"After the unmasking of the bourgeois nationalists and Slánský's band, the events of the uprising were not properly researched and evaluated. A theoretical evaluation, periodization of the battles and evaluations of the activities of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Union are lacking."*<sup>47</sup> The aim of the conference was to create a partisan interpretation of the uprising, which would be used in the planned synthetic works. The ideologically acceptable picture of the Slovak National Uprising was established only in 1955 and presented mainly in the studies of Bohuslav Graca and Miroslav Kropilák.<sup>48</sup> Apart from the already mentioned leading role of the Moscow leadership of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia, this version emphasized the role of the partisan movement and marginalized the activity of the army. The army officers, non-communist elements in the uprising and the so-called bourgeois nationalists were described as traitors. On the other side, the Slovak historians had to reject some statements arising from the strict application of earlier ideological views. In an effort to avoid any sign of "Slovak nationalism", the description of the Slovak National Uprising changed to such a degree that at a conference in 1953, the Slovak historians were forced to comment that *"the Slovak National Uprising cannot be presented as non-nationalist"* and *"the*

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vakia). In *Historický časopis*, 1953, year 1, no. 1, p. 26-41.

45 The theme of the Slovak National Uprising occupied by far the greatest space in the *Historický časopis* in 1953 – 1955, whether in the form of studies, discussions or reports on conferences.

46 It is necessary to emphasize that the Institute of History did not organize or initiate this conference.

47 SNA, f. Predsedníctvo ÚV KSS, c. 850, *Návrh na usporiadanie vedeckej konferencie SNP* (Proposal for the holding of an academic conference on the Slovak National Uprising).

48 GRACA, Bohuslav. *Slovenské národné povstanie roku 1944* (The Slovak National Uprising of 1944). In *Historický časopis*, 1954, year 2, no. 1, p. 3-38 or KROPILÁK, Miroslav. *Národnoslobodzovací boj na Slovensku roku 1945* (The National Liberation Struggle in Slovakia in 1945). In *Historický časopis*, 1955, year 3, no. 3, p. 305-325.

*main burden of the fighting was still carried by the Slovak people*".<sup>49</sup> It was similar with the fact that the official interpretation identified such a large number of "traitors" in the Slovak National Uprising, that some monographs mainly by Czech authors described the uprising as a "history of treason", which also provoked disagreement among the Slovak historians.<sup>50</sup>

Slovak historiography at the beginning of the 1950s also had to react to the radical re-evaluation of views on the origin of the First Czechoslovak Republic and on the role of Masaryk, Štefánik and Beneš in this process. This trend did not begin immediately in 1948. At first, especially Masaryk was regarded as a progressive personality in Czechoslovak history.<sup>51</sup> The change came only in 1951, when the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia, on the basis of ideological needs, declared war on the "bourgeois legends about the origin of Czechoslovakia". Masaryk, Beneš and Štefánik became "agents of Western imperialism" carrying out an "anti-people and anti-national policy". Czech Marxist historiography was directed especially towards denigrating Masaryk and Beneš,<sup>52</sup> while Štefánik was "left" to the Slovak historians. Ľudovít Holotík took on this task himself and published the article *On the legend of Štefánik* in 1952.<sup>53</sup> The study evaluated the former interpretation of Štefánik as a "bourgeois legend" and it designated him as an "agent of French imperialism". Holotík's further studies on the activities of the French and Italian military mission to Czechoslovakia after 1918, published in the *Historický časopis*, had a similar aim.<sup>54</sup>

The conference *Exposing the Legends about Masaryk, Beneš and Štefánik* held on 20 May 1953 on the initiative of the Faculty of Philosophy of the Slovak University proceeded in a similar spirit. The aim of the conference was "*a really scientific and objective*<sup>55</sup> *revision of the disorienting and demobilizing anti-people legend*"<sup>56</sup> on the basis of the methodological assumption and directives of Klement Gottwald, Václav Kopecký

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- 49 KROPILÁK, Miroslav. *Vedecká konferencia o slovenskom národnom povstaní* (An academic conference about the Slovak National Uprising). In *Historický časopis*, 1954, year 2, no. 1, p. 105-120.
  - 50 GRACA, Bohuslav. *Doležal, Jiří. Slovenské národné povstání. Praha : Státní nakladatelství politické literatury, 1954* (review) (The Slovak National Uprising). In *Historický časopis*, 1955, year 3, no. 3, p. 233-237.
  - 51 However, views about the connection of the origin of the Czechoslovak Republic with the October Revolution in Russia were promoted in the communist environment from the 1940s.
  - 52 For example, Václav Král: *O Masarykově a Benešově kontrarevoluční protisovětské politice* (On the counter-revolutionary, anti-Soviet policies of Masaryk and Beneš), Jiří Háček: *Wilsonovská legenda v dějinách ČSR* (The Wilsonian legend in the history of the Czechoslovak Republic).
  - 53 HOLOTÍK, Ľudovít. *K štefánikovskej legende* (On the legend of Štefánik). In *Historický sborník SAVU*, 1952, year 10, p. 256-275.
  - 54 HOLOTÍK, Ľudovít. *Úloha talianskej a francúzskej vojenskej misie na Slovensku roku 1919* (The role of the Italian and French military mission in Slovakia in 1919). Parts 1 and 2. In *Historický časopis*, 1954, year 2, no. 1, p. 37-70.
  - 55 The objectivity of a historian unreservedly applying a class position based on Marxism-Leninism is obviously meant.
  - 56 PÍŠCH, Mikuláš (ed.). *Za odhalenie legiend o Masarykovi, Benešovi a Štefánikovi. (Vedecká diskusia 20. 5. 1953 v Bratislave)*. (Uncovering the legends about Masaryk, Beneš and Štefánik. (An academic discussion 20 May 1953 in Bratislava).). In *Historický časopis*, 1953, year 1, no. 3, p. 521-537.

and Zdeňek Nejedlý.<sup>57</sup> The pre-determined result was a declaration that “(...) *the bourgeois legend of liberation is a false image of the character of the imperialist First World War (...) This legend is anti-Soviet, but also anti-national and anti-people, its purpose is to disorder and ideologically disarm the working people, who are the real makers of history.*”<sup>58</sup>

Substantial changes were also made to the evaluation of the Slovak participation in the revolutions of 1848 – 1849, after a series of discussions. As I already mentioned, after 1948, the story of the revolution changed from a period of national glory to a period of failure and “counter-revolutionary” struggle against the progressive Hungarian (Magyar) revolution. The new evaluation of these events was based on an article by Karl Marx.<sup>59</sup> He described the behaviour of the Slavonic nations as counter-revolutionary, and the evaluation of the actions of Ľudovít Štúr (leader of the Slovak national movement in the 19th century) and his followers had to be adapted to this view, which could not be doubted in the 1950s. A positive evaluation of the Slovak expeditions of 1848 – 1849 meant the placing of nationality problems above the economic problems for which the Hungarian (Magyar) revolutionaries were fighting according to the Marxist view, and this was not allowed in Marxism.<sup>60</sup> This unambiguous judgement of the communist ideologues divided the academic community into two camps. The “dogmatists” such as Vladimír Matula<sup>61</sup> and Ľudovít Holotík claimed that “*the only criterion for evaluation here can be the Marxist criterion of the European bourgeois revolution*”.<sup>62</sup>

On the other side was a group of historians such as Karol Goláň and Július Mésároš, who did not openly cast doubt on the official Marxist interpretation, which was not possible in the 1950s, but who attempted to moderate it. Karol Goláň pointed to the fact that the nationality question in the Kingdom of Hungary was solvable and the demand for equality between nationalities was not in conflict with the European revolution. Goláň also stated that Štúr’s “counter-revolutionary” activity was excessively emphasized and that it was in the interest of Slovak historiography to stress the positive aspects of the national revival. However, these moderate views were ignored in the 1950s.<sup>63</sup>

Dogmatism in the evaluation of this period appears especially in comparison with the works of Soviet historians. In 1951, the Slovak Academy of Sciences and Arts published a volume of translations of Russian articles about the problem of the activity of

57 PÍSCH, ref. 56.

58 PÍSCH, ref. 56.

59 In the newspaper: *Neue Rheinische Zeitung* from January 1849.

60 This was also the main reservation against the works of Daniel Rapant on the revolution of 1848 – 1849.

61 In a study from 1954, Vladimír Matula gave an extensive criticism of Rapant’s works on the revolution of 1848 – 1849 from the point of view of Marxist methodology. See: MATULA, Vladimír. *K niektorým otázkam slovenského národného hnutia štyridsiatych rokov 19. storočia* (On some questions concerning the Slovak national movement of the 1840s). In *Historický časopis*, 1955, year 2, no. 3, p. 375-406.

62 TIBENSKÝ, Ján. *Konferencia slovenských historikov o tézach slovenských dejín* (A conference of Slovak historians about views on Slovak history). In *Historický časopis*, 1955, year 3, no. 2, p. 299-303.

63 It is interesting that Jaroslav Dubnický, who was responsible for this period in the preparation of synthetic works, did not participate in the discussion.

the Slavonic nations in 1848 – 1849.<sup>64</sup> It is interesting that these articles evaluated the activities of Štúr and his followers much more positively than Slovak historiography did at the time. Although, the Soviet historians described the activities of the Slavonic nations as counter-revolutionary, they clearly attributed this position to the “*chauvinist nationality policies of the German and Hungarian [Magyar] revolutionaries*”,<sup>65</sup> which drove the Slavonic nations directly into the arms of Vienna. A further example pointing to the stronger “Marxist radicalism” of Slovak historiography is the fact that while in the “official” evaluation of Slovak historiography, Štúr’s uprising was unambiguously described as “counter-revolutionary”, the Soviet historians only designated the actions of Slovaks in the framework of the Austrian army in 1849 as reactionary activity. Thus, in this period the Soviets clearly evaluated Štúr more positively than the “dogmatic” Slovak historians.

One of the most important preconditions for the creation of a Marxist master narrative was the new periodization of history. In the period of preparation of Marxist syntheses, it was of key importance from both the academic and political points of view, as Ľudovít Holotík emphasized at a conference on the periodization of Slovak history in Liblice (19 – 20 December 1952):<sup>66</sup> “(...) *determination of at least the main developmental stages, which should reflect the universal laws of social development, recognized by the classics of Marxism-Leninism, in the history of Slovakia and the Slovak people, is inseparably connected with the struggle for a scientific, Marxist-Leninist Slovak historical science.*”<sup>67</sup> Marxist historiography rejected the terms “prehistoric”, “ancient”, “medieval” and “modern” as empty constructions of “bourgeois” historiography. According to the Marxists, they did not grasp the basic social formations, “*which deeply reflect and explain social relations, their causes and character*”.<sup>68</sup> In spite of the fact that Marxist periodization relied mainly on changes in economic relations, which are supposed to condition historical development, Ľudovít Holotík emphasized that “*economic phenomena cannot be unambiguously regarded as the main principles of periodization, although they are the decisive factor in the results of the historical process*”.<sup>69</sup> This statement can be regarded as an “apology” for the fact that in the Marxist periodization of Slovak history there were relatively few economic milestones, and the difference from the periodization applied before 1948 was not very large. A specific feature of Slovak periodization and one of the methods of depicting Czecho-Slovak historic closeness was

64 HOLOTÍK, Ľudovít (ed.). *Revolučné dedičstvo rokov 1848 – 1849* (The Revolutionary Heritage of the Years 1848 – 1849). Bratislava : SAVU, 1951.

65 UDAECOV, Ivan Ivanovič. *Slovanské národy Rakúskej ríše v revolučnom hnutí r. 1848 vo výskumoch sovietskych historikov* (The Slavonic nations of the Austrian Empire in the revolutionary movement of 1848 in the research of Soviet historians.). In HOLOTÍK, Ľudovít (ed.). *Revolučné dedičstvo rokov 1848 – 1849*. Bratislava : SAVU, 1951, p. 74-86.

66 HOLOTÍK, Ľudovít. *K periodizácii slovenských dejín v období feudalizmu a kapitalizmu* (On the periodization of Slovak history in the periods of feudalism and capitalism.). In *Historický časopis*, 1953, year 1, no. 1, p. 42-73.

67 HOLOTÍK, ref. 66.

68 HOLOTÍK, ref. 66.

69 HOLOTÍK, ref. 66.

the inevitability of following Czech periodization, although Ľudovít Holotík stated that Czech and Slovak periodization could not be entirely identical,<sup>70</sup> because “*periodization has the role of reflecting the specific process of development of the particular nation*”.<sup>71</sup>

The years 1848 representing the transition from feudalism to capitalism and 1945, which brought the transition to a people’s democratic regime or the so-called national and democratic revolution, were regarded as key turning points in the Marxist national story from the beginning. Areas of uncertainty were the beginning of the epoch of feudalism<sup>72</sup> and the periodization of the historical processes within individual social formations. The break up of Great Moravia and “*the subjugation of Slovak territory by nomadic Magyar tribes*” was still an extraordinarily important milestone in the Slovak national story.<sup>73</sup> Marxist historiography dusted down the old idea of a thousand years of oppression, with Holotík writing “*the history of Slovakia up to 1918 is the history of an oppressed nation*”.<sup>74</sup> Marxist historians usually understood under the expression “Slovak nation” only the lower class elements in the population, and separated the privileged classes from the nation. In some cases, the term “nation” was also still used in the sense of all the inhabitants of a certain territory, who spoke the same language. This can cause difficulties in deciding which concept of nation is being used in individual cases.

In the periodization of the medieval period of Slovak history, the Hungarian Marxist periodization of the history of the Kingdom of Hungary was largely accepted.<sup>75</sup> The first specifically Slovak milestone<sup>76</sup> after the fall of Great Moravia was the Hussite period. The more extensive people’s so-called anti-feudal uprisings also acquired the position of important events. Since the so-called Dóžas peasants uprising in 1514 (a turning point in the Hungarian Marxist division into periods) touched the territory of Slovakia only marginally, a true turning point in the Slovak national story came only with the miners’ uprising of 1525 – 1526.<sup>77</sup> The period 1526 – 1848 was described as the developmental period of the so-called second serfdom, in which the Slovaks became, in the Habsburg Monarchy “*an even more cruelly oppressed nation subjected to pressure from the Hungarian feudal lords and imperial officials and mercenaries*”.<sup>78</sup> This formulation already makes it relatively clear that here the nation is seen as the unprivileged people and mainly economic oppression is considered. The declining period of feudalism up to 1848 was characterized by the gradual development of capitalist relations, which caused the origin of the so-called “national-bourgeois” movement. However, in the eyes of Marxist

70 How different it was in reality was shown six years later by the *Přehled československých dějin* (An overview of Czechoslovak History).

71 HOLOTÍK, ref. 66.

72 The main question was whether Great Moravia could be regarded as a proto-feudal state.

73 HOLOTÍK, ref. 66.

74 HOLOTÍK, ref. 66.

75 Ľudovít Holotík justified this by the inadequate research on this period by Slovak historians.

76 In the sense that it did not apply to the whole territory of the Kingdom of Hungary.

77 Peter Ratkoš provided its interpretation in the Marxist spirit. See: RATKOŠ, Peter. *Predohra baníckeho povstanie v našich banských mestách v rokoch 1525 – 1526* (The prelude to the miners’ uprising in our mining towns in 1525 – 1526). In *Historický časopis*, 1953, year 1, no. 3, p. 353-406.

78 HOLOTÍK, ref. 66.

historiography, this was discredited by the priority it gave to nationality and cultural questions, rather than to the problem of the abolition of feudalism. This led to the problem of the relativization of the importance of Štúr's movement in the 1840s, while raising the importance of the peasants' revolt of 1831 in eastern Slovakia: "*The road to 1848 does not lead from the beginnings of the more conscious activities of Štúr and his followers, but from 1831, from the eastern Slovak peasants' revolt*".<sup>79</sup> This uprising had to be forerunner of the decisive phase of the class struggle, namely of the Hungarian revolution of 1848 – 1849. On the other hand, according to Marxist historiography, Štúr's movement did not understand the events of 1848, and it sided with "reactionary" Vienna against the "progressive, Hungarian (Magyar) bourgeois revolution". The main importance of 1848 was its designation as the turning point between feudalism and capitalism in the Austrian Monarchy. From the point of view of Marxist historiography "*class antagonism was reshaped into conflict between capitalists and those working for wages*".<sup>80</sup> The year 1867 also remained an important milestone in the national story. Apart from its traditional meaning as the beginning of the greatest national oppression after the Ausgleich (the creation of the dualist Austro-Hungarian Monarchy), for Marxist historiography it symbolized the beginning of the period, when the Slovak bourgeoisie definitively turned against the working class movement as its main enemy.

The origin of the Czechoslovak Republic obviously remained one of the most important milestones in Slovak history, but it was adapted according to the demands of the communist ideologues. This led to the creation of a version according to which the first republic arose on the basis of a revolutionary movement of the Czech and Slovak people, inspired by the October revolution in Russia. The next milestone was the fascist era of Slovak history, which was considered to begin with the declaration of Slovak autonomy in 1938: "*the so-called Slovak autonomy headed by the Lúdák-fascist representatives is a fascist formation*".<sup>81</sup> Marxist historiography regarded the Slovak National Uprising and the liberation of Czechoslovakia by Soviet forces as the beginning of the people's democratic period.<sup>82</sup>

After at least general establishment<sup>83</sup> of the required forms of interpretation and evaluation of the individual events in the Slovak national narrative, the work *Theses on the History of Slovakia* (Dejiny Slovenska (tézysy))<sup>84</sup> appeared in 1955 as a supplement to the *Historický časopis*. It was a result of cooperation between all the historical research institutions in Slovakia. According to the overall editor Ľudovít Holotík the theses "*are*

79 HOTOTÍK, ref. 66.

80 HOLOTÍK, ref. 66.

81 HOLOTÍK, ref. 66.

82 The historians did not rely on the results of research in this case either, but on the views of party functionaries, specifically on the speech of prominent communist ideologist and prime minister of the Czechoslovak government Viliam Široký, who declared that the Slovak National Uprising was the beginning of the era of the building of socialism.

83 It is impossible to speak of discussions because the Slovak historians received weighty and undoubtable instructions directly from the party authorities.

84 It was intended that after discussion it would become the basis for the synthesis of the history of Slovakia.

*the first attempt to re-evaluate our history on new methodological foundations, and on the basis of bringing together older information and new findings, especially about the development of productive forces and relations, the history of class struggles, the workers' movement and the Communist Party*".<sup>85</sup> They found the subject of the history of Slovakia in the development of productive forces and relations, the history of working people<sup>86</sup> and the class struggle. The declared main role of the Marxist national story had to be proof of the consistent development of the Slovak people from a primitive society through feudalism and capitalism to the people's democratic system.

The theses contained some changes compared to the periodization proposed in 1952. The most significant of them was shifting of the origin of feudal relations from the 10th to the 8th century.<sup>87</sup> In the Marxist national story, Great Moravia retained its „first republic“ significance as the first common state of the Czechs and Slovaks.<sup>88</sup> Also the return to a 19th century like view of Great Moravia as a defensive wall against German expansionism is interesting.<sup>89</sup> The class view of history also appeared in the account of the origin of the Kingdom of Hungary. According to the Marxist interpretation, class interests brought the Slavonic feudal lords and chieftains of the Magyar tribal union together after the coming of the Magyars. This was the origin of the class of the Hungarian feudal lords, who subjugated the Slovak people in the 10th century. Church institutions also attached the Slovaks to the new state. The theses devoted considerable space to the oligarch Matúš Čák, who created a semi-autonomous dominion in the Slovak territory in the 13th century. The fact that he created conditions, which gave the Slovak nobility increased influence in his territory, was positively evaluated. It seems that the historians, in this case Alžbeta Gácsová, were not always able to entirely exclude the nobility from the Slovak nation.

From the point of view of the demands stated in the process of shaping a Marxist master narrative, the importance attributed to Hussitism as a movement is not surprising. It was described as an anti-feudal movement supporting the strengthening of relations between the Czech and Slovak peoples. The fact that claims about Hussite influence strengthening the Slovak nationality and Czecho-Slovak cultural relations were not sup-

85 HOLOTÍK, Ľudovít (ed.). *Dejiny Slovenska (témy)*. (Theses on the history of Slovakia). In *Historický časopis*, 1955, year 3 (supplement), p. 11.

86 The idea of the so-called plebeian nation was definitively established here. The history of the privileged classes had to be left out of the national story.

87 The reason was that Soviet historians described 9th century Kievan Rus as an early feudal state, and it was a state similar to Great Moravia. On the basis of this example, Peter Ratkoš proved in his study in the *Historický časopis* from 1954, that Great Moravia also had features of a feudal state, although he still only offered this view as a hypothesis. See: RATKOŠ, Peter. *Počiatky feudalizmu na Slovensku (K problematike raného feudalizmu v našich krajinách)*. (The beginnings of feudalism in Slovakia (On the problem of early feudalism in our countries)). In *Historický časopis*, 1954, year 2, no. 2, p. 252-279.

88 Since the Czechs were part of Great Moravia only briefly and involuntarily, the Moravians were declared to be their forerunners.

89 However, in the Marxist class understanding of history, they did not speak of Germans, but of Eastern Frankish feudal lords. This view can also be regarded as showing the influence of Czech historiography, which was strongly anti-German, especially in the 1950s.

ported by concrete facts, may point to a certain difficulty in confirming the expected conclusions with relevant sources.

People's revolts and uprisings had a very important place in the new national story. Separate chapters are devoted to events, which had been largely ignored by non-Marxist historiography before 1948, for example, Dóža's revolt and especially the central Slovak miners' uprising of 1525 – 1526, which Marxist historiography put into the national story as one of the most powerful anti-feudal movements of the Slovak people.<sup>90</sup> All medieval people's movements were emphasized in national history, and in the framework of "proletarian internationalism", cooperation between ordinary people of different nationalities was emphasized in accounts of these movements. The greatest contribution of Slovak Marxist historiography to medieval history was the attention directed towards the economic and social aspects of development.<sup>91</sup> Even in the theses, this problem is considered in more detail and at greater length than in any earlier Slovak historical work, although with an obviously one-sided emphasis on the living conditions of the unprivileged parts of the population.

The account of the Slovak national revival in the theses showed fewer tendencies to undervalue it and be strongly critical.<sup>92</sup> However also this changed interpretation relied mainly on the ideas of the classics of Marxism-Leninism, since especially their judgement decided the positive or negative character of historical phenomena. The Slovak national movement is described as "*an essentially progressive phenomenon*",<sup>93</sup> because it helped to create the so-called bourgeois concept of the nation, which Lenin described as the starting point for the struggle against the feudal estates obstacles.<sup>94</sup> In contrast to Holotík's proposed periodization from 1952, the road to the revolution of 1848 – 1849 already develops from Štúr's movement. His programme was described as more democratic<sup>95</sup> and more radical than Kossuth's. However, from the dogmatic viewpoint of the time, Štúr's decision to fight as an ally of Vienna and Russia against the Hungarian (Magyar) revolution had to be evaluated negatively: "*This Slovak national movement (...) played an objectively reactionary role, and by subordinating the issue of the European and Hungarian revolution to the limited national interests of the bourgeoisie, it actually harmed the interests of the Slovaks themselves.*"<sup>96</sup> The "celebratory" attitude to the activities of the Slovaks in 1848 – 1849 was considered non-Marxist: "*the apologetic attitude to the Slovak expeditions (...) became one of the main resources for the ideological struggle for Slovak bourgeois nationalism*".<sup>97</sup>

90 Its existence was important evidence of the class struggle in our territory, which also meant artificial raising of its importance in Slovak history.

91 Since from the point of view of Marxist historiography, it was precisely economic factors that represented the cause of historic changes.

92 The author of this chapter was Jaroslav Dubnický.

93 HOLOTÍK, ref. 85, p. 96.

94 HOLOTÍK, ref. 85, p. 96.

95 In the Marxist conception "democraticness" means support for revolution.

96 HOLOTÍK, ref. 85, p. 123.

97 HOLOTÍK, ref. 85, p. 123.



History after the establishment of the capitalist system in 1848 was narrowed in the Marxist master narrative to a brief account of political history and an analysis of the economic and political position of the industrial workers and farm labourers. Marxist historiography largely excluded the “Slovak bourgeois movement” from the national story after 1867 as something cut off from the core of the nation.<sup>98</sup> The emerging workers’ movement received most of the space. The common approach and contacts between the Czech and Slovak working classes was also emphasized.<sup>99</sup> The origin of Czechoslovakia was combined with the Great October Socialist Revolution in Russia into one of the most important milestones in the national story. The description of the origin of the first republic is one of the peaks of the falsification of history by Marxist historiography in the 1950s. The main thesis of the Marxist construction was the claim that: *“The bearer and moving force in the national liberation struggle was the Czech and Slovak working class, but as a result of the treason of the rightist social democrats, the Czech and Slovak bourgeoisie came to power in the new state”*.<sup>100</sup> From the point of view of Marxist ideology, the main shaper of history was the working class, and it was unacceptable that one of the key events in Czechoslovak history could have happened without its decisive influence. The new national story had, first of all, to be acceptable from the ideological point of view. The facts were of secondary importance, and in an effort to confirm the Marxist laws of historical development, they could be distorted or completely ignored.<sup>101</sup>

The claim that *“the Czechoslovak Republic united two brother nations, the most closely related by language and culture among the Slavonic nations, whose whole development was directed towards unification in a common state”*,<sup>102</sup> was almost immediately devalued in the theses by the highly positive evaluation of the occupation of part of Slovakia by the Hungarian Soviet Republic. The idea of a communist state also had priority over the “irreversible union of brother nations”. The account of development after 1918 already had the form of a propagandist-ideological text about the tireless struggle of the proletariat led by the Communist Party against all other elements in society. The most recent history of Slovakia was radically limited to a history of the Communist Party and the proletariat, from which new groups of “traitors” were constantly breaking away. The account of the Slovak National Uprising as a milestone in the transition to the people’s democratic system, continued in the already outlined form of the struggle led by the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia, not the Communist Party of Slovakia, which was “tainted” by bourgeois nationalism. It is surprising that the theses lack attacks on bourgeois nationalism and its representatives, although this was supposed to be one of the

98 However, if a political group such as the Hlasists took an interest in the position of the working people, they were described as opportunist and “petit bourgeois oriented”.

99 The interests of other components of society in Czechoslovak community was evaluated as a profit-seeking effort of the Czech bourgeoisie to penetrate into Slovakia.

100 HOLOTÍK, ref. 85, p. 191.

101 The activity of the struggle abroad entirely disappeared from the account of the origin of Czechoslovakia for a long time. The name Milan Rastislav Štefánik did not appear in the national story at all, not even in a negative light.

102 HOLOTÍK, ref. 85, p. 192.

main tasks of Slovak historiography.<sup>103</sup> It appears that a tendency not to criticize, but to entirely ignore undesirable events and exclude them from the national story was applied here.

The theses on the history of Slovakia, with their stereotyped economism, one-sided, ideologically and methodologically utilitarian explanation and evaluation of the historical development of Slovakia, faithfully reflected the dogmatism of the Stalinist period. However, it is necessary to comment that the basic form of the new master narrative was not created by the historians, but by the communist ideologists.<sup>104</sup> The role of historical science was only to confirm, not to prove the truth of dogmas, which could not be doubted. The high degree of dependence of the historians on the decisions of the party ideologists is best documented by a quotation from a study by Bohuslav Graca, a research worker and later director of the Institute of History of the Communist Party of Slovakia: "*The orientation points must be the speeches and articles of our leading party functionaries, in which the view of the party is expressed.*"<sup>105</sup> The historians were expected to "create" a form of national history, which would fulfill the scheme determined in advance.<sup>106</sup> A specific problem in the 1950s was the struggle against bourgeois nationalism, which led to the Slovak national narrative becoming a part of the new Marxist form of the Czechoslovak story, although with some autonomy. The master narrative, created in the 1950s, was also presented in synthetic works and maintained up to the middle of the 1960s, when the absence of direct ideological controls and greater freedom for historical research led to the breakdown of the basic constructions of the Stalinist version of the Slovak national history.

# VERSUCH DER KONSTRUIERUNG EINER MARXISTISCHEN MEISTERERZÄHLUNG IN DEN JAHREN 1948 – 1955

ADAM HUDEK

Der Antritt der kommunistischen Diktatur brachte für die Geschichtsforschung so grundsätzliche Veränderungen, dass das Jahr 1948 für die Geschichte der slowakischen Historiographie einen

103 However, the account of the Slovak National Uprising contained no sign of the national demands, which had been included in its programme.

104 The exaggerated economism in describing the most recent history became the subject of criticism in the historical community. See: TIBENSKÝ, Ján. *Konferencia slovenských historikov o tézach slovenských dejín* (The conference of Slovak historians on the theses of Slovak history). In *Historický časopis*, 1955, year 3, no. 2, p. 299-303.

105 GRACA, Bohuslav. *Slovenské národné povstanie roku 1944* (The Slovak National Uprising of 1944). In *Historický časopis*, 1954, year 2, no. 1, p. 3-38.

106 For example, under the first republic, historical science played an important part in creating the idea of a Czechoslovak nation. Under the communist regime, the need for the existence of the common state of the Czechs and Slovaks was explained by the communist ideologists and the role of historical science was only to describe the "*natural character of the formation of the state union of the Slovak nation with the Czech*".

ihrer wichtigsten Meilensteine darstellt. Aber, obwohl das kommunistische Regime sich in der Tschechoslowakei relativ rasch etablierte, stieß die Durchsetzung des Marxismus-Leninismus in der slowakischen historischen Wissenschaft auf mehrere Probleme. Die Jahre 1948 – 1955 stellten für die slowakische Historiographie eine „Vorbereitungszeit“ dar, in deren Verlauf die Regierungsmacht ihre Vorstellungen von einer marxistischen nationalen Geschichte definierte. Bis 1955 war die neue institutionelle Basis der historischen Forschung in den Grundzügen fertiggestellt und die neue Generation der marxistischen Historiker trat an.

Die Studie analysiert die Problematik der Konstruierung einer nationalen marxistischen Geschichte auf zwei Ebenen. Ein Teil verdeutlicht die Beziehung zwischen der kommunistischen Regierungsmacht und der mit der historischen Forschung befassten Institutionen. Da die historische Wissenschaft der Politik und Ideologie der Regierungspartei vollkommen untergeordnet war, ist es notwendig, die Entwicklung der nationalen Geschichte in den 50er Jahren vor allem aus der Sicht der Bedürfnisse und Forderungen kommunistischer Ideologen zu untersuchen.

Der zweite Problemkreis umfasst Entwurf und Analyse der Gestalt der nationalen Geschichte während der ersten Regierungsjahre der kommunistischen Partei. Die Jahre 1948 – 1955 waren eine Zeit der Formung der marxistischen Sichtweise der wichtigsten Perioden der slowakischen Geschichte. Bis 1955 entstand so die Grundkonstruktion des marxistischen nationalen Geschichte, die anschließend in synthetischen Arbeiten verwendet wurde.

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# The Byzantine Struggle over the Icon

On the Problem of Eastern European Symbolism



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AEP

## REVIEWS

DVOŘÁKOVÁ, Daniela. *HORSE AND MAN IN THE MIDDLE AGES. On the co-existence of man and horse in the Kingdom of Hungary*. Budmerice : Rak, 2007, 293 pages.

The leading expert on late medieval history Daniela Dvořáková has succeeded in combining several of the requirements of a high quality work in her latest book. Apart from consistent work with the sources, she includes her own practical experience of breeding, riding and caring for horses, which makes the problems considerably more understandable for the reader. The result is an attractive and precisely written monograph, which fulfills the strictest demands on a scientific publication, while also presenting information in an attractive and accessible form.

Just as the car is characteristic of the recent period, horses were an essential part of the life of medieval society. They were not only important as a means of transport, but also as an essential and often decisive factor in war, economic activity, trade, mentality, culture and art during the given period. The horse was the basic attribute of the knight, that typical embodiment of the Middle Ages. As the author mentions in the introduction (p. 19), Hungarian horses were widely known for their strong constitution, which led to much demand for them among foreigners. The horse as a product for export already made it more important for Hungarian history than for other countries.

Apart from the introduction, the book is divided into 10 chapters. The first of them: *The horse and the world of the pagan gods* is actually an introduction to the problem. It gives the author's selection of information about the breeding and use of horses in the prehistoric and ancient periods. She describes the rituals and cult of horses in the pagan mythologies of Eastern nations, the Romans, Slavonic and Germanic peoples. She devotes considerable attention to evidence from the territory of Slovakia. In the absence of written records from earlier periods, depictions on vessels or coins are preserved. The Avar period, when riders were buried with horses, had an extraordinary position from the point of view of the horse in our history. Riders' graves provide a large amount of archaeological material on the history of the use of horses, the methods of breeding and riding them, as well as the development of harnesses. They illustrate not only the position of the buried person in society, but also his personal relationship to the horse. From the Great Moravian period, we already have written texts by Arab authors about horses and some aspects of their breeding. The coming of the nomadic Old Magyar tribes to Central Europe represents a further important epoch from the point of view of horse breeding in our territory. The character of the ways of fighting and living of the Old Magyars was so closely connected with horses that they can be regarded as participants in shaping our history. On the basis of historical, etymological and literary sources and using the findings of modern biology (DNA analysis), Daniela Dvořáková reconstructs the probable appearance of Old Magyar horses and compares it with the ideas of other experts. In the conclusion to the chapter, she summarizes noteworthy parallels between the nomadic peoples connected with Slovak history from the point of view of their relations with horses: the Avars, Old Magyars and Mongols.

The second chapter: *The Horse in the Kingdom of Hungary* is devoted to the methods of breeding horses in medieval Hungary on the basis of archive documents and testimony from the chronicles. The author devotes attention to the personnel connected with horses, the places where they were kept and the legal framework of their ownership. In the case of evaluations of Hungarian horses by foreign observers and travellers, she emphasizes what was distinctive in Hungarian practice. This comparison is also noteworthy from the point of view of the development of breeds

of horse. The Hungarian horse was “made more refined” by successive cross-breeding with Arab horses. The author documents this with evidence from chronicles and documents. A description of the method of feeding and stabling horses in Hungary, often different from “Western” practice directed more towards collision tournament or battle use of the horse, is supplemented with explanations of the causes and results of these differences. On the basis of these practices, the reader can come to the conclusion to which the author leads him in the various chapters in a gradual and unforced way: The breeding of horses in Hungary was more connected with nature and with the nature of the horse, and so was rather “more considerate” towards them. Many of the outlined themes are considered further in the following chapters. In the conclusion, the author returns to comparison of the medieval breeding of horses among the steppe peoples (Tatars) and on the basis of reports from medieval travellers, she points to connections with the ancestors of the Christian Hungarians – the Old Magyar nomads.

The third chapter has the Latin title *Equus valde bonus* (A very good horse) and the sub-title *Hierarchy, Types and Colours of Horses* more precisely describing its content. On the basis of contemporary testimony, the context of sources and depictions of horses, the author defines what it actually meant for a medieval person to describe a horse as “good” or “beautiful”. A large number of illustrations in this chapter enable the reader to directly confront the statements and conclusions of the author with his own views on the appearance of horses. What every lover of history actually subconsciously guesses – that horses were subject to social hierarchization according to the status of their users – is analysed in concrete detail concerning the use of horses by noble warriors, ladies, travellers or peasant farmers. The author names each type of horse on the basis of analysis of the sources, with their contemporary Latin designations, and explains the etymological connections, which extend to the modern European languages. Numerous examples of depictions of famous people (autor navrhuje persons alebo personalities) from Hungary and Europe concretely document the symbolic importance attributed to the colour of horses, which often expressed legal claims or paying of homage especially at ceremonial presentations of royal status.

A separate chapter is devoted to the price of horses. Its title *A Castle for a Horse?* is a deliberately exaggerated comparison, which symbolically expresses the perception of the horse as a great treasure. Apart from examples of huge sums or even whole territories that some eccentric individuals were willing to sacrifice for a desired horse, the author also devotes attention to the ordinary “practical” value of the horse. She not only uses the monetary expressions from the sources, which are often not very understandable because of their variety and changing exchange rates, but also comparative prices from the period for real estate, clothing, weapons or food. Like other possessions, horses were the subject of inheritance, they were of interest to thieves and appeared as the subjects of crime, revenge or as compensation in specific judicial cases. They represented the embodiment of the wealth of the country, they were sometimes the decisive factor in war, and as in the case of precious metals, their export was prohibited without special permission. The author also devotes attention to the development of the price of horses over time. She comes to the noteworthy conclusion that prices in the Kingdom of Hungary tended to decline, but this did not apply to neighbouring countries such as Poland.

The chapter *Breeding of Horses in the Middle Ages* gives more detailed analysis of the themes of the second chapter, namely feeding, pasturing, stabling or free breeding in the natural environment, as well as various other practical aspects. A special phenomenon, which emerged precisely in the Middle Ages, was the shoeing of horses. There is discussion of the not entirely clear circumstances of the origin, needs and method of shoeing horses. Daniela Dvořáková provides expert information on this and clarifies the biological characteristics of horses and the urban conditions (roads, stables) connected with them. She provides information about the medical treatment and castration of horses, including curious details derived from these activities. The Slovak translation

of the basic work on horse medicine in the Middle Ages, the *Book on Horse Medicine* by Master Albrant from the 13th century is very praise-worthy. The original text in medieval German and its translation form a supplement at the end of the book. The analysis of it is given in the conclusion to the chapter devoted to the breeding of horses.

The sixth chapter: *Working Horses* is devoted to the basic medieval invention connected with the use of horses for work and transport – the collar. The comparison of the effectiveness of the work of horses and oxen in agriculture with examples of the relative representation of these animals in some villages according to surviving records is an interesting passage. Ownership of horses by serfs determined the extent and character of their services to the feudal lord and so substantially influenced the organization of medieval society. Fast post horses represented a special group. The method of changing horses for messengers and postmen carrying important letters changed over the centuries and is illustrated by numerous examples. Attention is also devoted to draught horses and the associated subject of the construction of medieval vehicles with noteworthy details on the brakes, turning, steering and so on, given in an accessible and comprehensible form in spite of being a relatively distant theme from the modern point of view. The conclusion of the chapter describes a special type of light vehicle – the coach – which was invented in Hungary at the end of the Middle Ages and spread from there to the world.

The following chapter: *On and off the Roads* is more or less a continuation of the previous one because the basic function of the horse was transport. The author looks at the transport role of the horse again from a different point of view – that of the conditions for it. She describes medieval roads and their state, seasonal and weather influences. She turns to the examples of the best known medieval travellers and offers a picture of the extraordinarily strenuous and difficult conditions they had to confront. “Travel” is perceived today more as relaxation, but in the Middle Ages, it always had some specific aim, because it was very difficult and sometimes ended with serious consequences or the death of people and horses. An extraordinarily interesting passage gives a calculation of the average speed of the horse and cart on the basis of source information from chronicles and documents about the overcoming of well-known routes and supplemented with analysis of the possible performance based on the author’s knowledge of present-day horse endurance competitions.

The eighth chapter: *The Fighting Horse* begins with a detailed description of the characteristic event: the death of King Louis II caused by an inappropriate choice of horse when escaping from the Battle of Mohács in 1526, which is the conventional date for the end of the Middle Ages in Hungary. As a result of the attention all chroniclers, writers of documents and authors of chivalrous romances devoted to military matters, the author has an extensive source base to illustrate the functions of horses in war. By means of various stories told in a literary style, she brings the reader closer to the authentic experience of medieval battle. She directly analyses the role of horses in the basic medieval strategy of frontal collision, the horse as a weapon, its armourment, various ways of injuring horses and so also the fighting ability of their riders, as well as their specific and to modern eyes rather drastic training. She returns to the thesis of the Hungarian “alternative” breeding (p. 187-194). In contrast to the harsh training and painful bar bits used in Western Europe, horses in backward Hungary were treated more moderately and considerately. According to the author, these differences derived at least partly from the method of fighting by light cavalry with rapid movements of small groups. This was an inheritance from the original Old Magyar tactics.

The penultimate chapter: *The Horse and Entertainment* is devoted to areas that formed an important part of the life of medieval people and derived especially from their military role. The classic pastimes of the nobility – hunting and tournaments – were not only leisure and exciting entertainment, but also a form of training of horses. Numerous mentions in chronicles of accidents while hunting, with important personalities almost always mounted on horses, testify to the role

of horses, almost equal to that of people. Hunting was unthinkable without them. Even more dangerous entertainments were the tournament and equestrian competitions called *mêlée*, which actually imitated real battles between enemies. The author points out the difference between the tournament and the *mêlée*. They spread from Western Europe to Hungary as part of chivalrous and courtly culture, but respected local customs. From the multitude of surviving sources, Daniela Dvořáková chose especially those depicting the role of horses.

The final chapter: *Man and Horse* is less technically oriented and more personal. The author admits to her love of animals, compares the state and level of modern horse breeding with that of the Middle Ages and attempts to enter into the spirit of the relationship between man and horse in the past. Not only on the basis of historical research, but also of her own experience with horses and confrontation with the knowledge of experts on their breeding, she defines the basic features of horse "psychology", which pre-destined them for centuries of existence by the side of and under the authority of man. In spite of occasional situations, when horses were against people, usually as a result of manipulation by other people, their coexistence was mostly positive for people. One of the expressions of this relationship was the positive role of the horse in superstitions, stories and proverbs over many centuries. The chapter shows a strong personal emotional relationship to the horse, which may be disturbing in places, but this high quality work on horses would clearly not have originated without it. The work is supplemented with tables on types, colours and prices of horses in the Middle Ages with references to the year and specific documentary or chronicle source. There is also the translation of the 13th century *Book on the Treatment of Horses* by Master Albrant, already mentioned in the fifth chapter.

The work of Daniela Dvořáková is the first Slovak monographic treatment of a problem of this type in Slovakia and the surrounding countries. It is a high quality original work about the use of horses in the Middle Ages, enriched with knowledge of riding and practical aspects of horses. It is especially necessary to emphasize the fact that various aspects of the use of horses and their breeding are worked out on the basis of thorough analysis of domestic, that is Hungarian source materials, and as far as possible, the author uses information directly connected with the territory of Slovakia. Where the necessary data is lacking, she uses parallels and comparisons with the practice of other regions or other countries in Europe and the world. These deviations are necessary not only for the overall picture of the problem, but also to place Hungary in its European context, that is to show how the breeding and use of horses in Hungary or Slovakia was similar to the situation in neighbouring and more distant parts of Europe and the world, how it differed and what were the important specific features.

The comprehensible language and interpretation accessible to both expert and lay readers shows excellent mastery of the problem in a pioneer work opening a theme practically unknown in expert circles up to now. Like every first work of this type, its publication has opened themes that await further analysis. The trade in horses deserves special attention. Systematic research in domestic and foreign sources will certainly bring more precise information. In this case, the book by Daniela Dvořáková will be a basic reference work, which will serve everybody even partially concerned with the subject in future.

Martin Štefánik



DANGL, Vojtech. *THE ARMY AND SOCIETY AROUND 1900*. Bratislava : Veda, 2006, 256 pages.

Vojtech Dangel is the best expert in Slovakia on the military history of the “long” 19th century. If I add that he is also the only one, this does not diminish the previous sentence in any way, but rather expresses the unfortunate state also prevailing in other branches of the discipline of history. I do not count as equal historians, those who “find themselves” in this period occasionally or more permanently, but in relation to the source base and lack of knowledge of Hungarian, it is possible to have serious reservations towards the professionalism of their products. The uniqueness of V. Dangel lies in the fact that his conclusions and evaluations need to be taken as the position of a mature historian, who knows the foreign literature, reflects it and deepens it with sources of practically every available type – from the daily press, sources of a local, urban or whole-state character, institutional and military sources to personal legacies. I should emphasize especially the work with the original text of parliamentary debates, which Slovak historiography generally avoids for linguistic reasons, as far as such reasons can be accepted. Nobody doubts the compatibility of the texts of V. Dangel with works at least in the Central European framework. In spite of this, his own modesty and researcher’s humility towards historical processes remain proverbial. In military history these processes are full of victims and consideration of their meaning.

The reviewed work is devoted in theme and period to a key area in the academic interests of the author. The relationship between the army and society in the period of Dualism became the dominant theme. It goes beyond the classic understanding of military history and penetrates significantly not only into the political contexts, from which military history cannot be separated, but also into the social context. The social dimension is one of the decisive contributions of the work, which only apparently shapes the older texts of the author. They are very logically and cleverly connected to each other, but the author has reworked them and enriched them with the latest findings from his own research and the academic discipline in general. This led to the production of an integrated monograph. As a result of the dominant position of the author in the field, this monograph provides important academic findings and points out the gaps in our knowledge still awaiting historical research. I would also like to point to some research impulses, which this work addresses to every interested reader.

The first chapter is concerned with the mechanisms of the functioning of the army, its individual components, forms of military service, the system of recruiting and conscription. An interesting phenomenon characteristic of attitudes to the army is that the number of those, who did not present themselves to the conscription commissions, was extraordinarily high in the territory of Slovakia, where it varied in the range of 30 – 60 %. However, this incontrovertible fact is in sharp contrast to the traditional loyalty and fighting ability of Slovak soldiers in the military conflicts of the Monarchy. The low proportion of about 30 % from all the conscripts, actually called up for basic military service is equally interesting. A whole series of causes from the fields of diet, hygiene, standard of living and so on, is hidden behind their “physical immaturity”. It would certainly be useful to do exact research on this area, like that done for the 18th century in the notable book by John Komlos (*Komlos, J.: Nutrition and Economic Development in the Eighteenth Century Habsburg Monarchy. An Anthropometric History. Princeton / New Jersey 1989*).

The second chapter considers the extraordinarily interesting phenomenon of assimilation in the army, from the points of view of both Hungarian conceptions and Slovak reactions. Starting from the latest foreign research, the author states that the nationality problem in the functioning of the army should not be over-estimated, and was far from being as decisive as has been supposed. On the other hand, in view of the limited success of Magyarization of the whole state, the Hungarian

side placed considerable hope in the assimilative function of the army. However, the Slovak positions were equally ambiguous, with part of the political elite willing to accept strengthening of the role of the Hungarian language and its recognition as the language of command, in the framework of political agreements.

The position and prestige of the officer corps form the subject of the very attractive third chapter, which can be entirely unambiguously assigned to social history. It is mainly concerned with the mentality, attitudes, life style and forms of behaviour of the officers as a very specific social group in the Monarchy – for example, loyalty and close connection with the monarch and dynasty, officer's honour, duels, use of familiar language, criminal responsibility. Perhaps the methods and categories of social history could have been applied more fully here, but if the author did not want this chapter to depart from the overall concept of the book, he decided to remain on the level of various very interesting statements. Perhaps it would be in harmony with the character of the chapter to use the very rewarding and characteristic sources in the form of contemporary literary works such as the novels of Joseph Roth: *Radetzky marsch* and *Die Kapuzinergruft*, Robert Musil: *Der Mann ohne Eigenschaften*, Franz Werfel: *Nicht der Mörder, der Ermordete ist schuldig*, Kálmán Mikszáth: *A Noszty fiú esete Tóth Marival* (*The Case of Young Noszty with Marika Tóth*). Their value as evidence is extraordinary, although still unused for the problem of the army. The parallels between the worlds of the bourgeoisie and the officers are very interesting. In connection with the military doctors and their peculiarities (p. 70-71), the author could have emphasized that the great majority of them were Jews. In connection with the number of members of parliament with careers as officers, which V. Dangl takes from Tibor Hajdu (p. 75), I want to point to the entirely different results produced by a group of sociologists in the work *Képviselők Magyarországon I.* (*The Members of Parliament in Hungary*). Szerk. Ilonszki G., Budapest 2005. According to them only 6.1 % of the members of parliament in 1884 had officer backgrounds, and in 1910 only 3 % (p. 213). The difference will certainly lie in the method of evaluating the evidence. Here, I only want to point out how uncertain some data can be.

The fourth chapter speaks of the towns, barracks and garrisons in Slovakia, and so about the relationship between urban communities and the army. Here, the author also penetrates into economic history and accurately points out the limited and fragmentary character of Slovak research. He has himself substantially advanced our knowledge of the historical period preceding that covered by the already classic study of Ľubomír Lipták. The presence of a permanent garrison was very important to the economic and cultural life of a town in the period of Dualism, and towns made great efforts to secure such garrisons. On the other hand, it is also necessary to see the contradictory nature of the historical phenomena, when V. Dangl points to the differences in perceptions of the common army and Honvéd, the strained relations and difficulties of coexistence. The nationality question in the army is closely connected with this. In this context, the author again deals with the problem of assimilation, considering various themes such as statistical Magyarization and Germanization. The minimal proportion of Slovaks in the officer corps was largely a result of the absence of a tradition of this profession and certainly also an expression of the relationship to it.

The following chapters describe the growth of state militarism in the period of the Balkan wars and expressions of anti-militarism from the side of the Slovak population and Slovak political elites, also accompanied by growing popularity of the ideas of Slavism and Slavonic community. V. Dangl's contribution is deepest here. He goes into individual regions and both chapters are mainly based on original research.

The last chapter deals with the military plans of Austria-Hungary in the summer of 1914 and their modifications in connection with the diplomatic and military developments in the first weeks of the war. The Monarchy did not expect the failure of its attack on Serbia, or that Russia would launch an offensive before the completion of its mobilization. The first months of the war also

clearly revealed the backward state of technology, deficiencies in building up the modern parts of the army, in its organizational structure and in the military tactics of its commanders. The failure of the lightning war against Serbia and the senseless attacks by cavalry on Russian machinegun positions on the Galician front proved significant in this area. From the point of view of the relationship between society and the army, it would certainly be interesting to mention the historical myth embodied and still popular in Hungarian historiography, denying the responsibility of Hungary for the outbreak of war, on the basis of the negative attitude of Prime Minister István Tisza to its declaration. In this area, the work of I. Bertényi junior: *Tisza István és az I. világháború (Tisza István and the First World War)*. In: *Mitoszok, legendák, tévhitek a 20. századi magyar történelemről (The Legends, Myths, Fantasies about Hungarian's History in the 20th Century)*. Szerk. I. Romsics. Budapest 2005, appears to be most objective. This aspect is also undoubtedly connected with the position of V. Dangel, who states in the conclusion of the book that the relationship between the army and society during the war is an urgent task awaiting Slovak historiography. The present publication is undoubtedly the best impulse for an academic study of this theme.

In the conclusion of the publication, it is possible to positively evaluate the high quality German summary. However, the extraordinarily interesting illustrations could have been presented more generously.

It is a pity that the text was not more thoroughly corrected, since a significant number of stylistic and factual errors hinder more observant reading. There are some variations in terms, for example "rakúsko-uhorské" and "rakúsko-madžarské" (Austro-Hungarian and Austro-Magyar), "arcvojvoda" and "arciknieža" (forms of the term "Archduke"), "snem" and "parlament" (forms of the term "parliament"), and inconsistent writing of the numbers of acts of parliament in Roman and Arabic numerals, as well as surprising mistakes in foreign language names, but especially in the main Slovak text (for example: *Slovenský hlásnik* instead of the correct *Národný hlásnik* on p. 20; *Nyugatmagyarországi Hírlap* instead of the correct *Nyugatmagyarországi Híradó* on p. 80; an inaccurate date 9 June instead of 9 July on p. 146). The author could have avoided the terms "bourgeois opposition" and "bourgeois political parties", which do not correspond to Hungarian realities. Further inconsistencies concern historical Fiume (today Rijeka, p. 25) and "former Transylvania in Rumania" (p. 26). A table would be useful on page 31. Mistakes and simplifications can be found in the parts about the ennoblement of officers in connection with orders and decorations (p. 75).

In spite of some critical comments, the work of Vojtech Dangel is undoubtedly a contribution and to some degree a conclusion to the researched problem, also in terms of generation, at least in terms of the fact that it defines our present level of knowledge and the possibilities of extracting as much as possible from the works of foreign authors. However, in various places, the author himself points to inadequacies in research, which nobody else will correct for Slovak historiography. This is why the questions he poses and the answers he seeks should evoke increased interest in the problem of the relationship between society and the army. In this way, the present monograph should undoubtedly fulfil its aim and satisfy the most secret wishes of Vojtech Dangel, who has ploughed the deepest furrow in this field.

Roman Holec

KRAJČOVIČOVÁ, Natália. *EMIL STODOLA. The Gentleman of Slovak Politics*. Bratislava : Kalligram, 2007, 232 pages.

Emil Stodola was one of the important figures in Slovak politics in the first half of the 20th century. He started his political career in the Kingdom of Hungary, as an unsuccessful Slovak National Party candidate for a seat in the Budapest parliament, he actively participated in the declaration assembly at Martin in October 1918 and briefly held the position of chairman of the Slovak National Party after the formation of the republic. Although he supported Slovak autonomy, he placed it firmly in the context of the Czechoslovak Republic and understood its achievement as a strengthening of the ties between the Czechs and Slovaks. He also applied his life-long creed of "*humanity and justice*" in politics. He was tolerant towards the views of his political opponents. He always based his ideas on consistently prepared and justified arguments, and in contrast to many other Slovak politicians, demagoguery was entirely foreign to him. These characteristics brought him the justified description of "the gentleman of Slovak politics". Precisely this aspect of Stodola could, or rather should be, an example and inspiration for the present-day Slovak political scene.

As the author acknowledges in the introduction, Stodola's modern views, erudition and tolerance, which clearly distinguished him from his political contemporaries, already interested her at the beginning of her academic career. Although various studies were published in the past concerning his views, political career and destiny, she decided to summarize the findings and research, and present Emil Stodola to the wider reading public. The result is the work reviewed here.

After the monograph devoted to Karol Sidor, the publisher Kalligram offers the reader a second publication about an important Slovak politician of the inter-war period. The not very large book is divided into nine chapters, which are supplemented by a few pages of illustrations and a family tree of the Stodola family. Apart from the political career of E. Stodola, the author is concerned with his life as a whole and devotes considerable attention to Stodola's works on language, minority and autonomy problems, not only in Slovakia but also in various states of Western Europe.

The brief introduction is followed by a chapter dealing with the history of the Stodola family of Liptovský Mikuláš, including the ups and downs for their family factory processing leather until its final closure in 1912. The author presents the individual members of the family of Ondrej Stodola – his four sons. She devotes special attention to the noted technician Aurel, who spent his professional life at Zürich University, where he gained global recognition and became a friend of the most influential scientist of the 20th century Albert Einstein. She also gives space to the youngest brother, Kornel, who was very close to Emil as is shown by the fact that the two brothers married two Polóniova sisters.

Their relationship was not spoiled by the fact that their paths diverged after the revolution. While Emil led the autonomist Slovak National Party, Kornel became a member of parliament for the centralist Agrarian Party. The chapter also includes Emil's study at the Evangelical Lyceum in Bratislava, during which his father told him to be careful about expressing his Slovak feelings. Later he studied in the Faculties of Law in Vienna, Prague and Budapest. During his study in Prague, he came under the influence of the thought of T.G. Masaryk, as his above-mentioned creed for life shows. After gaining the title of Doctor of Law, he opened an advocates office in his native town.

The next chapter is devoted to the political career of Emil Stodola. It is chronologically divided into two parts with the titles: *In the Kingdom of Hungary* and *In Czechoslovakia*. When conceiving this part, the author started from contemporary documents, especially Stodola's correspondence and his memoirs written in the 1930s. At the end of the 19th century he had similar reservations towards the leadership of the Slovak National Party as other representatives of the younger gene-

ration of Slovak patriots, especially the Hlasists. He accused the leadership of not including in the party programme enough proposals for improving the economic position of the Slovak population. He demanded that more tradesmen and manufacturers should be drawn into politics. He criticized Vajanský's reliance on help from Russia and demanded the creation of district organizations of the party. He was convinced that the Slovaks would only be helped by the consistent democratization of political life in Hungary, and especially of the electoral system. In spite of these reservations, he attempted to gain a seat in the Hungarian parliament in 1905, but with the Hungarian electoral practices of the time, which included bribery and votes from dead people, he did not have a chance against the government candidate Lányi, who won by 33 votes. The same result awaited him in later elections. However, he still moved to Budapest, where he opened an advocates office in 1912.

The role of Emil Stodola in the adoption of the Martin Declaration of October 1918 is an essential part of Slovak history, although the proposal of the Evangelical pastor of Modra, Samuel Zoch was finally adopted instead of Stodola's version. However, on the second day he initiated a session of the declarants, at which they discussed the form of constitutional incorporation of Slovakia into the new state. This later formed the basis for Tuka's theory about the adoption of a secret clause of the declaration, but Stodola never admitted its existence in the form presented by the Ľudáks. However, at this time, he regarded a provincial administration according to the example of Moravia as the minimum for Slovakia. His refusal to accept the position of head of the emerging Slovak judiciary, offered to him by the first minister for the administration of Slovakia Vavro Šrobár, is contradictory in this context. The accurate account of Stodola's role during the Martin meeting of the Slovak politicians and his role and views on the position of Slovakia in the emerging state are a great contribution of the publication reviewed here. The author has shown that she is one of our leading experts in this field.

The next chapter is devoted to Stodola's activity in the function of chairman of the Slovak National party. After the transitional period, when the Slovak National Party joined the Slovak agrarians to form the Slovak National and Small Farmers' Party in the interest of achieving better results in the 1920 elections, the independence of the Slovak National Party was renewed at the beginning of 1921 because of disagreement over closer relations with Czech partners and differences of view on Slovak autonomy. E. Stodola was elected to lead it and he also created its new autonomist programme. In April 1921 he already published an article *On Autonomy*, in which he emphasized the need for its gradual introduction. In his eyes, autonomy had to serve the maintenance of Slovak identity.

The differences between the two parts of the republic would be gradually overcome precisely by respecting Slovak specifics. Although he did not reject cooperation with the People's Party in pursuit of Slovak autonomy, its Czechophobia troubled him very much. The author goes on to a consideration of Stodola's attitude to the county reform of 1923, towards which he had serious reservations. She also examines his concept of the two in one Czechoslovak nation, by which Stodola declared the possibility of creating a Czechoslovak political nation. However, he did not stop talking at public assemblies, about the need to recognize the Slovaks as a separate ethnic nation within the republic. He resigned from the position of chairman of the party at the end of 1922. Although he justified this with health problems, according to the author, it was also partly because he had not succeeded in uniting the party, and Viliam Paulíny and Milan Ivanka left it at this time. However, he remained a member of the Slovak National Party after his departure from the function of chairman.

The next chapter contains a detailed examination of the views of E. Stodola on the nationality question. He was especially dissatisfied with the activity of Czech teachers at the Bratislava university, in particular with A. Pražák and V. Chalopecký, who systematically denied the existence of the Slovaks as a separate nation. His views on the counter-productive nature of their activity

in Slovakia, agreed with those of the representative of the centralist political camp in Slovakia A. Štefánek. However, beyond this, their views diverged. While the agrarians often said that Slovakia only represented an administrative problem for the republic and it would be solved by the introduction of the provincial organization in 1928, Stodola always emphasized that it was also a cultural and political phenomenon. In the course of the 1920s, he often emphasized that extensive autonomy was often possessed by territorial units in countries otherwise understood as states inhabited by single nations. The author also stresses his criticism of the corruption of the time, which he regarded as a sad achievement of Czechoslovak democracy.

The following four chapters are concerned with analysis of the most important works of E. Stodola. The author devotes detailed attention to the ideas in the works: *O samospráve Slovenska* (*On the Autonomy of Slovakia*) (1921), *O úprave užívania reči v Švajčiarsku* (*On Regulation of the Use of Languages in Switzerland*) (1921), *O jazykovom zákone a menšinových otázkach* (*On the Language Act and Minority Questions*) and *O menšinách a samospráve* (*On Minorities and Autonomy*) (1938). Especially the last two reacted to the threat from Germany, which did not hesitate to use the dissatisfaction of a large part of the German minority in Czechoslovakia in pursuit of its aggressive plans against Czechoslovakia. In these works, he always supported his views with consistent arguments, often appealing to the example of other countries where various ethnic groups lived together and several languages were in official use. He referred to Switzerland especially frequently as an example for the regulation of the official use of minority languages.

The author evaluates as a further important contribution of his works, the fact that thanks to his linguistic abilities, he made examples from the administrative practice of other states accessible to the wider Slovak public. Stodola supported widening of the powers of the provincial administration and its president. Thus he regarded autonomy as a higher level of the administration of public affairs, which involved the participation of wide groups in the population and so strengthened their links with the state. All his comments were always an appeal for the democratic solution of the Slovak and minority question in the First Czechoslovak Republic. He criticized especially the existing practice of the appointment of one third of officials by the government. In 1938, he again participated in the preparation of Slovak National Party autonomy proposals, but, in the end, they were less radical than his suggestions.

Emil Stodola was a very important theorist, but he lagged behind many other politicians of the time in his ability to put his views into practice. However, part of the reason was that he remained a member of the Slovak National Party, which had only minimal influence at this time. As the author comments, he always avoided the politicization of the problems to which his works were devoted. Therefore, he hardly ever gave concrete evaluations of the political steps of the president, government or parliament. However, in spite of this, the work lacks his position on important events in Slovak politics after his departure from the leadership of the Slovak National Party in 1922. A personality of his calibre must have reflected on them, at least in private correspondence. For example, it would certainly be interesting to know Stodola's views on the joint effort of the Slovak National Party and Hlinka's Slovak People's Party to achieve the autonomy of Slovakia after the adoption of the Zvolen manifesto of 1932 and the subsequent joint approach of the two parties. Greater attention to his relationship with his brother Kornel and how their membership of different political camps affected the everyday lives of their families, would be a contribution to this area. Stodola's attitude to events during the Slovak state of 1939 – 1945 also certainly deserves analysis. The author only states that the totalitarian regime of the time was in absolute conflict with Stodola's democratic convictions and respect for civil principles.

However, in spite of these reservations, the book as a whole is a great contribution to knowledge of the life, views, political career and works of one of the few "gentlemen of Slovak politics". His principles, including respect for human rights, defence of the rights of nationalities, tolerance and

sincere democratic convictions, are also topical today. We can only hope that we can await further similar monographs about important personalities from 20th century Slovak politics.

Matej Hanula

HOLEC, Roman – HALLON, Ľudovít. *THE TATRA BANKA IN THE MIRROR OF HISTORY*. Bratislava : AEPRESS, 2007, 326 pages.

The view was heard at various discussion fora in recent times, that after 1989 economic history has shown definite torpor in Slovakia, and has fallen ever further behind the general international level in quantitative and especially in qualitative and theoretical-methodological terms. In spite of this not very happy statement, it is necessary to say that works satisfying international criteria are also appearing in Slovakia. The book by Roman Holec and Ľudovít Hallon – *Tatra banka v zrkadle dejín* (*The Tatra banka in the Mirror of History*) can certainly be included among them. However, the history of banks is not one of the favourite projects among historians or one of the most attractive themes for readers. It is an extremely complex and demanding theme for researchers, because the history of banks overlaps with the history of the state economy, economic policy, industrial companies, trade, the agrarian sector and other areas. In the countries of Central Europe, the importance of the joint stock company banks of universal type lay in the fact that they were the most important and largest mediators of financial resources for companies, for the state and for local government. They were the backbone of the credit system.

The publication of a monograph about the Tatra banka can rightly be described as a milestone in Slovak historiography, because up to now Slovak historians could use only use the monographs of Austrian and especially Hungarian and Czech historians, which were also directly concerned with the territory of Slovakia. These included particularly the Czech synthesis – *Dějiny bankovníctví v českých zemích* (*History of Banking in the Czech lands*), the monograph about the Agrárna banka by J. Novotný and J. Šouša, the Hungarian works on the Pesti Magyar Kereskedelmi Bank by Gy. Kövér, on the Magyar Általános Hitelbank by Gy. Tallós and the collective work about the Magyar Nemzeti Bank.

It is no accident that the first modern synthetic work on banking history in Slovakia has come from the pens of the two most experienced historians of the economic history of 19th and 20th century Slovakia: Roman Holec and Ľudovít Hallon. Their long-term research and preliminary studies are finalized in this work. The publication is noteworthy both for the extent of the picture and for the well-thought out methodology of the explanation. It maps the historical development of the flagship of Slovak finance. The work can also understood “*as the possibility to capture the complex historical and economic connections of the development of Slovakia and the Slovaks from the second half of the 19th century practically until the present using the example of one banking institution.*” The explanation in the book makes a consistent effort to connect the political with the economic and to see the financial institution in a concrete historical situation with a concrete political context.

The Tatra banka has an exceptional position in the history of banking in Slovakia. When it was founded, it was already expected to become the decisive economic institution, assisting the national emancipation struggle and political activities of the Slovaks. Its name became a national symbol and was frequently part of the “greater history”. For example, the declaration assembly of the Slovak National Council was held in its premises on 30 October 1918. The chosen conception enables the authors to present the history of the Tatra banka as a showcase of Slovak banking with

all its successes, but also numerous mistakes and human failings. Thus, it is not only the history of one institution, but especially the history of many human destinies, the history of the economic effort of our ancestors, who found space in the market and the banking sphere in spite of the mistakes and failings. The conception chosen for the work pushes the analysis of economic parameters into the background – “to a large extent deliberately” according to the authors. This is a significant difference from the above mentioned monograph by J. Novotný and J. Šouša about the Agrárna banka, which is characterized by minute analyses of individual deals between the bank and various firms and companies. However, the conception chosen by the authors of this work enables a comprehensive, synthetic view of the Tatra banka in specific historical situations, especially in the framework of the whole state and in the international context.

Apart from the inspiring introductory part on the Tatra banka and Slovak history, the monograph is divided into nine chapters. As I already mentioned, a well thought out method of explanation is characteristic of the whole work. The first chapter is devoted to the position of Slovakia in the economy of the Kingdom of Hungary. The main new feature of this account is that it presents the economy of the territory of Slovakia in its social and political context, in relation to the whole state and the whole of Europe. This part accurately records the political and economic context in which the first national economic activities of the Slovaks emerged in the fields of cooperatives, finance and light, mostly wood-processing and paper industries.

The second chapter traces the specific history of the Tatra banka from the complex period of its origin in the mid 1880s up to the formation of the Czechoslovak Republic in 1918. In a convincing and balanced way, it gives a comprehensive picture of all the basic events and developmental wanderings of the Tatra banka. In spite of the fact that it originated in the complex period of the struggle against the assimilation efforts of the Hungarian state authorities, it relatively quickly established itself as the most important Slovak financial institution. Great attention is also devoted to analysis of the mistakes, credit voluntarism and subjective failures of its leading representatives. Apart from its high expert level, the monograph certainly makes fascinating reading, because the actual account is appropriately enriched with quotations from correspondence by personalities interested in the destiny of the Tatra banka, whether it is crushing criticism of the situation in the Tatra banka expressed by the poet Pavol Országh Hviezdoslav in 1903, or correspondence between the director of the Tatra banka I. Daxner and P. V. Rovnianek from 1907 – 1910 concerning the “American adventure”. It is also necessary to draw attention to the methodologically very valuable analysis and review of the basic economic indicators of the bank, in which the author also examines the views in the discourse of the time about the optimal values of individual items in the balance.

In the third chapter, under the title *Slovakia in the Economy of Czechoslovakia (1918 – 1938)*, the author gives a brief but realistic and well-integrated account of the basic problems and wanderings of the incorporation of Slovakia into the new state in confrontation with the substantially more mature Czech economy and the stronger Czech capital. As in his monograph about the industrialization of Slovakia in the inter-war period and other studies on this problem, Ľ. Hallon shows his ability to give an expert analysis of the causes, course and results of the structural changes in the economy of inter-war Slovakia.

In the fourth chapter, the author devotes attention to the activity of the Tatra banka in the inter-war period. The origin of the Czechoslovak Republic opened new possibilities and perspectives for the Tatra banka, as for other Slovak financial institutions. The Tatra banka extended its network of branches, participated in the concentration process by taking over a large number of smaller financial institutions, built up its business holdings and gained a place among the strongest banks in Slovakia, alongside the Slovenská banka and Slovenská všeobecná úverová banka (Slovak General Credit Bank). However, its field of activity was limited to the territory of Slovakia, and from the point of view of the whole state it was only a middle sized bank. Like other banks in



Slovakia, it succumbed to the post-war founding euphoria, over-estimating the strength of its own potential and the experience of its management. The post-war economic and deflationary crisis affected the financial sphere in 1922 – 1924. However, apart from objective causes, the losses of the leading Slovak banks were also the result of their efforts to extend their influence as quickly as possible by taking over other financial institutions without adequate assessment of their overall financial situation. Their position was also worsened by badly considered and mistaken investments, which resulted from inadequate experience and lack of caution among the functionaries of the banks when financing industrial and commercial enterprises. However, as the author tellingly commented, such realities as dilettantism, irresponsibility and deliberate fraud also appear in the world. Consolidation of the position of the largest banks, including especially the Tatra banka and Slovenská banka, was considerably assisted by the financial rehabilitation on the basis of the banking legislation of 1924 from the resources of the state budget. The years 1926 – 1929 brought gradual stabilization and development of the investment activity of the individual banks. However, the economic crisis of 1930 – 1933 interrupted the hopeful development and paralysed commercial banking in Slovakia. Its results were so destructive that the inertia in banking also continued during the boom of the second half of the 1930s. The state undertook another financial rehabilitation of the banks in 1932. As a result of the intervention of Milan Hodža, the Tatra banka and Slovenská banka were the only Slovak banks included in this process, and in the end only the Tatra banka used the financial rehabilitation assistance. The author points to the fact that the financial rehabilitations of 1924 and 1932 deepened the phenomenon of political orientation, especially the increased influence of the agrarian party and its leading Slovak representative M. Hodža at the Tatra banka. M. Hodža repeatedly strove to promote the conception of the merging of the largest Slovak banks – the Slovenská banka and Tatra banka to form a strong centre. According to his plans from the 1930s, the merged bank would also fulfill the role of centre for the banking operations of people's finance. However, his plan collapsed because of the unwillingness of the Slovenská banka in conditions of boom and renewed economic balance. The author devotes relatively large space to the planned merging of these institutions as is appropriate to the importance of this problem. The merging of the Tatra banka and Slovenská banka was intended to be part of extensive organizational and structural changes in the credit system of Slovakia. It is only possible to agree with the statement that the methods used by the representatives of the government and agrarian party towards the Slovenská banka were distant from the principles of Czechoslovak democracy, but the fact that the government did not implement the empowering act also shows that the authoritarian tendencies had their limits in the Czechoslovak Republic.

I think that the parts of this and the preceding chapter devoted to the mutual relations between the commercial banks and people's finance in the inter-war period are very inspiring and stimulate various considerations. The author presents people's finance as a reliable pillar of the credit system and the whole economic development of Slovakia. In comparison with commercial banking, it was more viable because it developed according to a well thought out conception with effective state assistance. At the same time, people's finance, especially the small farmers' mutual savings banks (roľnícke vzájomné pokladnice), were protected by the agrarian party as part of its systematically constructed economic background. It is possible to agree with the view of the author that the project of the agrarian movement for the capital combination of banking with people's finance and their subsequent joint penetration into the food industry, represented a progressive step, which would have renewed the progress of Slovak national capital and led to a revival of the industrialization of Slovakia.

In the fifth chapter, the author offers a brief review of the basic characteristics of the economic development of Slovakia in the period 1939 – 1945. It is necessary to appreciate its balanced and objective approach, since precisely this period of our national history is the most frequent object of

variously positioned comparisons, with simplified and extreme evaluations. Under the patronage of Nazi Germany, Slovakia experienced considerable economic development in this period, especially in the quantitative indicators. In the new conditions, the industrialization of Slovakia already made progress in the years immediately before Munich and the wartime boom. On the other hand, however, the economic overexploitation of Slovakia by Germany and the direct contact with war from the second half of 1944 caused a gradual reversal of the Slovak economy. The author also devotes attention to various special measures of the ruling economic circles. He does not avoid the Aryanization programme, which represented in an extreme form the character of the political measures in the economy, namely the expropriation of the property of the Jewish community. In this part, the author gives an accurate description of the concentration process of banking in Slovakia. In contrast to the preceding period, the government carried out this concentration by means of direct political dictat on a legislative basis. According to the ideas of the ruling regime, the strengthened Slovak national banks would lead the expansion of Slovak capital into the business sphere, until then mainly in the hands of Czech and Jewish capital.

The sixth chapter of the book acquaints us with the activity of the Tatra banka during the war years, 1939 – 1945. It is interesting to trace how the Tatra banka changed from an institution destined for liquidation to become one of the main epicentres of the concentration process in Slovakia. It showed its viability and in various ways succeeded in convincing the ruling regime that it was much better prepared in economic and personnel terms for the tasks entrusted to it, than, for example, the provincial Ľudová banka (People's Bank) of Ružomberok. A close connection to the radical wing of the ruling Hlinka's Slovak People's Party brought the Tatra banka renewed economic stability. It gradually gained the leading position and played a key role in the concentration of banking, increased the volume of its credit deals for businesses in the fields of industry and foreign trade, provided loans for clearing deals, and widened its business holdings. The author also accurately perceives the negative aspects of development. In spite of expansion, the Tatra banka found itself in a provisional position as a result of incomplete financial rehabilitation. Shortage of liquid resources gradually became another serious problem. The bank tied up a large part of its investment in state securities and clearing deals with Germany. Apart from this, immense credit investments were frozen by the approach of the front to the territory of Slovakia and as a result of the so-called revolutionary forms of Aryanization.

The seventh chapter of the publication gives an account of the position of Slovakia in the economy of post-war Czechoslovakia in the period 1945 – 1950. As a result of the struggle between the democratic camp and the communist forces over the character of the economy in the transitional period of 1945 – 1948 was a mixed economic model including elements of the free market and of central planning. The concentration of power in the hands of the Communist Party in February 1948 finally led to a total transformation of the Czechoslovak economy into a command system of the Soviet type. In the second part of this chapter, the author describes the development of finance in Slovakia in the period 1945 – 1950. In spite of the transitional period of 1945 – 1947, the development was irreversibly heading towards complete centralization and transformation. This part also provides unhappy reading about the pushing of the commercial banks out of the economy and their gradual liquidation.

The eighth chapter of the monograph is devoted to the activity of the Tatra banka in the period 1945 – 1950, when the direction of its further development, as tellingly described by the author, was fatally influenced by presidential decree no. 102/1945 Zb. on the nationalization of joint stock company banks. The Tatra banka became a national enterprise and property of the state, with its shareholders definitively losing their rights. In the transitional period of 1945 – 1948, the Tatra banka played a key role in providing credit for nationalized industries, while also continuing to finance the private sector. However, after the government of K. Gottwald came to power in July 1946, the

position of the commercial banks changed. In the nationalized sector, their function had to narrow to only providing operational credits. The representatives of commercial banking had to submit to the government proposal about concentration of finance, with the Tatra banka and Slovenská banka becoming the concentration points in Slovakia at the beginning of 1948. The February coup of 1948 enabled the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia to accelerate the application of its ideas about the organization of banking. A government decree from 25 March 1948 decreed the merging of the Slovenská banka with the Tatra banka to form the Slovenská Tatra banka, the only bank operating in the territory of Slovakia. The Slovenská Tatra banka only continued its activity until 1 July 1950, when, as a result of the deepening of the centralist bureaucratic character of economic management, the leading representatives of the state decided to create in Czechoslovakia a single centrally directed state financial institution with the functions of a currency issuing, credit and clearing bank, according to the Soviet model. Thus, the Štátna banka československá (State Bank of Czechoslovakia) with its headquarters in Prague and its Slovak branch the Oblastný ústav (Regional Institute) began to operate from 1 July 1950. It took over the Poštová spořitelňa (Post Office Savings Bank), Oblastný ústav Národnej banky Československá (Regional Institute of the National Bank of Czechoslovakia) and Slovenská Tatra banka. The Štátna banka gradually took over all the rights of obligations of the liquidated companies and institutions.

The final, ninth chapter gives the story of the new Tatra banka in the revived market in the new state. Its origin dates from 1990, when it was established as the first private bank in Slovakia. It quickly became one of the most important banks.

In conclusion, I will repeat that the monograph about the Tatra banka is noteworthy both for the extent of its subject and for the well thought out methodology of its explanation. Not least of its contributions are the sections of individual chapters devoted to the position of bank officials, who became a new professional group in Slovak society around 1900. Shopkeepers, bank officials and to a lesser extent businessmen formed new elites in the framework of Slovak society. The authors present hitherto unknown views on the life of this professional group, they provide evidence of what the bank officials lived by, how they perceived social and national problems, their own affairs and the surroundings in which they lived. The position of this professional group changed in the course of time in connection with the political milestones or new economic conditions. These sections will certainly be inspiring for research into the history of business elites in Slovakia, social history and everyday history. In this context, I appreciate the brief biographical portraits of individual bank functionaries.

In a work of this extent it is impossible to avoid some inaccuracies, although in inessential matters. The Constitution of the Czechoslovak Republic was adopted in 1920 (p. 11), the text on page 90 refers to Vlastislav and not Vladimír Ondrůšek. The Slovenská banka did not take over the Bratislavská všeobecná banka in 1940. It was liquidated from the end of 1941 by the Sedliacka banka. For reasons mentioned by the author, the Slovenská banka was not assigned to the concentration process in the end (p. 227). Before his appointment as general director of the Tatra banka, Ľ. Kováčik was employed in the Regional Institute of the National Bank of Czechoslovakia in Bratislava as an auditor of the second class in the function of deputy head of the secretariat (p. 279), although he spent most of his time at the secretariat of the Communist Party of Slovakia. Part of the text under table 39 on page 294 is missing.

In spite of these minor errors, the authors have convincingly demonstrated in the monograph on the Tatra banka the noteworthy phenomenon of how the history of Slovakia with all its hopes and disappointments was reflected in the functioning of one financial institution. Let us hope that this monograph will stimulate the writing of other similar works, although the quality of its content has set a standard that will be difficult to surpass in the coming years.

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