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The study is devoted to the Chronicle of the Council of Konstanz by Ulrich Richental, in which he described the events of the Church council of 1414 – 1418. The chronicle is also known from the point of view of Slovak history in relation to its mentions of the territory of Slovakia, which prove that in the 15th century, the territory of Slovakia was perceived as special and ethnically different in the framework of the Kingdom of Hungary. In several places, Richental mentions noblemen, whose property was located in the territory of present-day Slovakia as lords “in Windschen länden”. A closer geographical location, such as on the river Váh, is sometimes given. In Richental’s Chronicle, apart from the name “Hungary”, also called in one place “Ungerland”, we also find Slovakia designated as “Windenland”. Richental’s mentions of Slovakia are very valuable, but so far more or less unknown in expert literature.

Perhaps the most important or at least the most famous church council of the Middle Ages – the Council of Konstanz – gained its name from the previously quiet and little-known, although relatively important and rich cathedral city on the shore of Lake Konstanz in Germany. The council brought the city permanent fame. From 1414 to 1418, Konstanz literally became the centre of Europe. On the initiative of the king and later Emperor Sigismund of Luxembourg, the political and religious elite of Europe gathered here to solve the Papal schism, which had continued since 1378. Sigismund played an important role in organizing the council and bringing it to a successful conclusion. Ending the schism and getting a new Pope elected were a great political victory for him. On the other hand, the burning of Jan Hus, which he could not prevent, in spite of the letter guaranteeing the safety of Hus, became a great personal defeat for the monarch. 1

1 This is not changed at all by the fact that Sigismund attempted to help Hus. The Czech reformer was arrested on 28 November 1414, before Sigismund came to Konstanz. He was imprisoned in a dark cell in the Dominican monastery. As soon as he arrived in Konstanz at Christmas 1414, Sigismund showed good
brought him almost two decades of struggle for the Czech crown, which he gained only a short time before his death in 1437.

Works concerned with the Council of Konstanz can now be counted in hundreds. Contemporary eye witnesses of the council left historians rich and comprehensive information in documents, letters and chronicles. One of the most interesting testimonies is the work of a burgher of Konstanz Ulrich Richental, who gave a straightforward account of everyday life in the city during the council, of things he saw, heard or learnt directly from participants in the council. His account was based on his own notes and on sources available to him thanks to his personal contacts.

He wrote the chronicle after some time, perhaps in the 1420s or at the beginning of the 1430s, which can explain many inaccuracies. The chronicle is composed of two parts. The first is a diary of the council, and the second is a sort of heraldic book, in which the author presents all the important participants in the council and their coats of arms, although these are often his own invention.

The original text of Richental’s Chronicle has not survived. We know it only from later manuscript copies, divided into the established, so-called Kautzsch scheme. The so-called Konstanz manuscript (K) will be the most important for our study. It originated in the mid 1460s. A Slovak publication of a critical edition has appeared.

The Chronicle of Ulrich Richental is also an important source for the history of Slovakia. Although it apparently tells of events far away and only indirectly connected with our history, this is not so. It is not only that the chronicle by the Konstanz burgher is full of interesting information bringing many aspects of the everyday life of the time close to us, especially in the religious sphere, or that it provides practical examples of the economic thinking and economic life of a medieval city, including the development of prices and what was available in the market, as well as information useful for the now popular research into rituals and festivals or about the position of the monarch and hierarchy of medieval society. It is also important for its numerous very valuable mentions of participants from the Kingdom of Hungary. Before we devote attention to them, we will look

will by urging the release of Hus, when he first met the cardinals. Some of the cardinals threatened to leave the city, which would have seriously threatened Sigismund’s whole effort to call the council. In this situation, the king retreated on the matter of Hus, but insisted that he be given an airy cell by the refectory of the monastery, where Hus could receive visitors, and that he would be heard in public. For more details see: ŠMAHEL, František. *Husitská revoluce. I.-IV.* (The Husite Revolution). Prague : Historický ústav AV ČR, 1993, II., p. 274. On 21 June 1415, less than two weeks before his death, Jan Hus wrote a letter thanking King Sigismund for everything good he had done for him: “Regratior etiam regi Sigismundo de omni bono, quod mihi exhibuit.” PALACKÝ, František. *Documenta magistri Joannis Hus.* Prague 1869, p. 123. However, in spite of this, the burden of guilt for the martyrdom of Master Jan Hus remains on the shoulders of Sigismund of Luxembourg in the historical consciousness.


at the influence of the Council of Konstanz on the intellectual life of Europe, including the Kingdom of Hungary.

The participants in the council included representatives of all the European kings, princes, and cardinals, more than 300 bishops and high ecclesiastical dignitaries, hundreds of scholars from various universities. Writers, poets, important scholars and humanists of the time met there, and some of them went to Hungary at the end of the council with King Sigismund to continue their activity at his court. Thus, the council influenced many areas of culture, life style and education in the Kingdom of Hungary. For example, the golden age of Hungarian heraldry began with the Council of Konstanz. It is also possible to mention Sigismund’s magnificent reconstruction of his palace in Budapest, which was allegedly inspired by his travels around Western Europe at the time of the council. Apart from intellectuals and artists, he brought many craftsmen, builders, masons, goldsmiths and so on to his court.

However, not only new people came to Hungary, there were also people who returned after several months or years away. Hundreds of noblemen from the Kingdom of Hungary went to Konstanz with King Sigismund. Members of almost all the magnates families with their “familiares” and servants were represented in his retinue. They returned home full of experiences, new impressions and knowledge.

Noblemen from Hungary not only accompanied their king to Konstanz, but also on his travels around Europe. Many of them had the possibility to see Lausanne, Narbonne, Perpignan, Paris, Avignon, Lyon, London and many other famous cities. Sigismund already left Konstanz in August 1415. He had two aims: to force the abdication of the resisting Pope Benedict XIII and to mediate peace in the century old war between England and France. Sigismund’s itinerary in this period reveals the incredible activity of the king. First he headed for Perpignan in southern France. He requested a salus conductus, a sort of medieval entry visa and letter of protection for noble travellers, from the King of Aragon, for 400 and later 1500 horsemen.4

In Perpignan Sigismund met King Ferdinand I of Aragon and Pope Benedict XIII, but the 77 year old Pope was so intransigent, that the exasperated King of the Romans and of Hungary left the city after two weeks and went to Narbonne. The talks continued there, but ended with the flight of Benedict XIII. Sigismund concluded an agreement with the kings of Aragon, Castile and Navarre in Narbonne, and continued his journey to Paris. He stopped in Avignon and Lyon on the way.

According to the chroniclers, King Sigismund arrived in Paris with a retinue of about a thousand people at the beginning of March 1416. He stayed in the city for more than a month.5 From Paris he went to England. On 1 May 1416, the king and his retinue arri-

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ved in Dover on 300 ships. Sigismund remained on the island until the end of October. He visited Canterbury, London, Westminster, Windsor and other places. For the sake of completeness, it is necessary to add that his mission of mediating peace between England and France did not succeed. Therefore, he returned to Konstanz, where he arrived at the end of January 1417.6

Who formed the thousand member retinue of the king mentioned by the chroniclers? Which Hungarian aristocrats could afford to travel around Europe with the king? Which Hungarian noblemen left their property and families for months or years, and did not mind spending considerable financial resources on accompanying their king? Which of them stayed in Konstanz to await the return of their monarch?

These questions can only partly be answered. Any attempt to exactly reconstruct the Hungarian members of the royal retinue strikes against some limitations. First of all, the group was constantly changing. Only a few remained by the side of the monarch without interruption from his departure from Hungary in autumn 1412 until his return to the country in February 1419.7

Therefore, the information is very fragmentary and approximate. We often have definite knowledge of who was with the king in Konstanz or elsewhere, but we do not know when or for how long. Apart from the reports of Ulrich Richental’s chronicle about Hungarians in Sigismund’s retinue, which we will consider later, the main source of information is the documentary material. The sources of primary importance are especially documents or letters issued by noblemen in Konstanz or other places of residence of the king during his travels. There are also the documents issued by the monarch, in which a particular person appears as the “relator”.

The contemporary registers of participants in the Council of Konstanz are also a valuable source. They had great popularity and were produced directly on the orders of King Sigismund. They were obtained, for example, by many German towns, but there was also interest in these registers in Hungary. One of these contemporary registers was preserved in the archives of the Zichy family.8 It is difficult to say for whom it was originally created or how it came to the Zichy archive.9 The actual register of participants is not complete and gives the impression of a torso, but as in Richental’s chronicle, the persons are arranged hierarchically, with special attention to archbishops, bishops, abbots, priors and clerics, deans, representatives of chapters and so on. The ambassadors (ambasatores) of in-

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6 Richental gave a detailed description of Sigismund’s return to Konstanz. See: FEGER, ref. 3, p. 218 (chap. 201).
7 This is stated in Richental’s chronicle itself in the conclusion of the Aulendorf manuscript: “However, it is necessary to realize that they were not all in Konstanz at the same time. Lords who did not belong to the council and were not needed here, stayed in Konstanz for half a year or longer, until they had settled their affairs, and then they left. Others came to replace them, and so they came and went for four years and two months.” FEGER, ref. 3, p. 278, (translation into Slovak by M. Papsonová).
8 The original is found in the Hungarian National Archives (Magyarországos Levéltár) in Budapest under signature DL 82 956.
9 The register is published in the edition of documents from this family archive: Codex diplomaticus domus senioris comitum Zichy de Zich et Vásonkeő. A zichi és vásonkeői gróf Zichy-család idősb-ágáinak okná-nytára. I-XII. Budapest 1871-1931, XII., p. 99-108. The editor thought that the register had been bought in Konstanz by a member of the Töttős family from Bátmonostor, who was in the king’s retinue.
dividual monarchs, princes and others come next, mostly without giving concrete names. They are followed by the names of secular personalities: kings, princes, counts, knights and other participants, including some members of Sigismund’s retinue, such as the Counts of Cilly (Celje). The last item is the “names of Hungarians and Bohemians” (*Item secuntur nomina Ungaricorum et Bohemorum*). This part gives 38 names of persons, who are jointly described as “counts” (*comites*). The text ends with the comment that there were knights and other participants at the council, but it was not possible to write out all their names. As in Richental’s Chronicle, the names of Hungarian noblemen are rather garbled, which shows that the author of the register did not come from the Royal Chancellery of Hungary.

Documents issued by the king at Konstanz or elsewhere in favour of particular people are an important source for reconstructing the royal retinue. They include donations, grants of arms, ennoblement, judgement of disputes and other matters. However, in this case it is necessary to treat the sources very cautiously, because a document could be issued on the basis of a request by another person, and the beneficiary may not have been close to the king at the time. The only unambiguous documents are those, which actually state that a person is being rewarded for his service to the king during travels in Germany, England, France or elsewhere. Such documents often originated only many years after the end of the Council of Konstanz. Therefore, the source material is continually providing new information, although various historians have devoted attention to reconstructing Sigismund’s retinue. Future researchers will certainly continue to supplement and make more exact the list of people from the Kingdom of Hungary, who participated in the Council of Konstanz, as they discover information in so far unpublished sources.

However, some Hungarian noblemen in Sigismund’s retinue deserve special attention. They include the Archbishop of Esztergom John of Kanizsa, who also served as Chancellor of Hungary and the Holy Roman Empire and who received considerable attention from Ulrich Richental. He first mentioned the archbishop coming to Konstanz with a retinue of 160 people at the beginning of February 1415. Bishop Andrew of Kalocsa also came to Konstanz with Archbishop John, but he looked like a poor relation with his retinue of 18 horsemen.

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11 FEGER, ref. 3, p. 178 (ch. 75).
The archbishop later returned to Hungary, because he was entrusted with governing the country as Sigismund’s representative. Another reason was his serious health problems, from which he had already suffered for a long time. At the beginning of 1416, John of Kanizsa again came to Konstanz, this time with a larger retinue of 300 horses, as Richental reports, but without clearly stating the chronology, so that the exact date cannot be determined. However, on the basis of other sources, we can date his return to Konstanz to the first half of 1416. We know from a letter of 7 January 1416 from the provost of Bratislava John Jubar, that the archbishop was at home at that time, but was preparing to travel to be with the king. The provost wrote that he welcomed the news of the journey, because he regarded it as evidence of the improvement of the archbishop’s health. At the same time, he recommended to the archbishop his messenger, also named John, a burgher of Bratislava, who wanted to travel to Germany as a member of the archbishop’s retinue. The archbishop used part of the revenue from the diocese of Győr to finance the journey to Germany.

In April 1416, Sigismund sent the arch-bishop a letter from Paris, informing him about his reception in the city, his talks and his intention to travel to England. He expressed the wish that the archbishop would consider his invitation to join him in Paris. At the end of the letter, he explained the delay of the messenger of a certain provost, who brought a letter to him, because he had recently fallen off a horse and seriously injured his back. Several months later, after returning from England in September 1416, Sigismund issued a further instruction that John of Kanizsa should not travel to join him in Paris, as he had originally ordered, because the Paris talks had ended in failure, but directly to Konstanz. 

Richental mentions the arrival of John of Kanizsa a third time, in this case on 3 February 1417, when the archbishop had to come to Konstanz with a retinue of 400 horses and eight covered wagons. The king came to meet him and led him through the whole city to the monastery of Petershausen, where the Hungarian members of his retinue were housed. The chronicler also observed that two cardinals also came to welcome the Hungarian archbishop and “such respect was not shown to any other archbishop with the exception of the Archbishop and Elector of Mainz.”

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12 In 1412, during a visit by the King of Poland, Sigismund mentioned in a document the health problems of the archbishop, saying that he was “now again weak” (“nunc iterum debilis”) and could not devote his attention to the royal guest. ZsO III, ref. 10, no. 2338.

13 FEGER, ref. 3, p.181 (ch. 85). The event is assigned to the discussions at the beginning of 1415, but after a deviation to the flight and capture of Frederick of Austria, which occurred much later. The report on the return of the archbishop with a retinue almost twice as large does not logically fall into the period at the beginning of February 1415 where Richental placed it.

14 ZsO V, ref. 10, no. 1409.

15 On this see two documents from Sigismund, by which he ordered that part of the revenue of the diocese of Győr, which he had given to the Archbishop of Esztergom, John of Kanizsa to finance his journeys to Germany, should be given to the archbishop’s relation Stephen of Kanizsa. The letter was issued by John of Kanizsa himself, using the royal seal and dated in Győr. ZsO V, ref. 10, nos. 1403 and 1404.

16 ZsO V, ref. 10, no. 1728.

17 ZsO V, ref. 10, no. 2280.

18 FEGER, ref. 3, p. 219 (ch. 203).
Archbishop John, who was not young and clearly not in good health in these years, showed admirable mobility in the period 1414-1418. However, the demanding travels were not good for the ailing John. He returned to Hungary earlier than the monarch, and soon after, in May 1418, he died.  

The imperial and Hungarian vice-chancellor, papal “referendarius” and notary, the provost of Esztergom John Újvárosi was also an important person in the retinue of King Sigismund. Since he appears in the sources as John of Esztergom and in practice headed both royal chancelleries, which were officially headed by his namesake the Archbishop of Esztergom, about whom we spoke above, it is sometimes difficult to distinguish them in the sources.  

Provost John also participated in preparing the council. In October 1413, he acted as one of Sigismund’s plenipotentiaries at talks in Italy with representatives of John XXIII about where the future council would be held. He accompanied the monarch throughout the period of the council including the journeys to Western Europe and England. The immense work load also affected his health. He died on 30 December 1417 in Konstanz, as Ulrich of Richental informs us. In connection with his funeral, to which the chronicler devoted two chapters, there is an interesting comment that the servants of the deceased mourned and lamented as is the custom in Hungary.  

When considering the most important Hungarian magnates, we cannot omit the Palatine Nicholas of Gara, the highest dignitary in the kingdom and brother in law of King Sigismund. Our chronicler also mentions him, although he does not give a separate description of his arrival, but places him in the heraldic part of his chronicles among the counts without princely titles (nit gefürst). Richental’s failure to mention the coming of the palatine separately or state the size of his retinue is connected with the fact that the palatine did not come to Konstanz independently, but in the retinue of the king and queen at Christmas 1414, after accompanying Queen Barbara from Hungary to the coronation at Aachen in November. The palatine also appears in the above mentioned list of participants in the council from the archive of the Zichy family.

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19 In March 1418, he wrote a private letter to Sigismund from Hungary, accusing the king of not sending him any news for many days. Any information about the king’s successes filled him with joy, and he asked for advice on a specific matter. See: ZsO VI, ref. 10, no. 1588. His death is mentioned in document from 30 May 1418, ZsO VI, ref. 10, no. 1968, which is verified by other sources of this period, where he appears as already deceased. ZsO VI, ref. 10, no. 2090.  
20 PALACKÝ, ref. 1, p. 515.  
21 FEGER, ref. 3, p. 249 (ch. 274). Richental or the copiers of his original text made the mistake of mentioning him under the name Sigismund. The original text was apparently “Sigismund’s chancellor” and not “the chancellor Sigismund”.  
22 FEGER, ref. 3, p. 250 (ch. 277): “Und sin diener clegten und wainten umb in mit wainen und hülen, als noch sit ist in Unger.”  
23 Sigismund’s wife Barbara and Nicholas’ wife Anna were sisters, daughters of Herman of Cilly.  
24 “Grauff Niclaus großgraff zu Ungern, der Naterspan”, FEGER, ref. 3, p.270.  
25 More information on the queen’s retinue and the movements of the palatine is given in an account of services in a donation document by Sigismund from 18 October 1418. ZsO V, ref. 10, no. 1136, DL 10 390 and DL 30 418.  
26 “dominus magnus comes in Ungaria”. A few lines below he is mentioned again as “dominus natrespeyn”. DL 82 956.
Nicholas of Gara was one of the most prominent diplomats and advisers in the circle of King Sigismund. He accompanied the monarch on almost all his journeys during the period of the council. Detailed information is given in the charter granting Devin Castle, issued by King Sigismund on 18 October 1415 in Perpignan.\(^\text{27}\) Nicholas was also with the monarch in Paris and in England. In both cases, he arrived early to organize the visit.\(^\text{28}\) In Paris, Sigismund gave Nicholas of Gara a grant of arms, adding a golden crown to his coat of arms.\(^\text{29}\) On the same day, King Charles VI of France also made a grant of arms to him, rewarding Nicholas for his diplomatic activity.\(^\text{30}\) Sigismund could not have chosen a better ambassador to the King of France, because Nicholas of Gara’s family had been very close to the French court for decades. The palatine’s father, Nicholas I had been rewarded by Charles VI many years before with membership of the king’s order.\(^\text{31}\)

Various English chroniclers also mentioned Nicholas of Gara. One of them described him as a duke and recorded that he sat immediately next to the King of England during a special service for St. George’s day in the Chapel of St. George at Windsor.\(^\text{32}\) Sigismund sent Nicholas back from England to Paris to continue the talks about a peace treaty between England and France, but the talks collapsed and Nicholas returned to Konstanz.\(^\text{33}\)

The extraordinary honour expressed in the above mentioned case of a Hungarian magnate seated next to the King of England, was also granted to another Hungarian nobleman, John of Peren, although in a different form. He was the only Hungarian nobleman to include in his coat of arms the insignia of the English Lancastrian dynasty, in the form of the so-called Collar of Esses placed around the shield, as can be seen on his gravestone, which is still preserved in the parish church at Trebišov.\(^\text{34}\) This insignia could be awarded only by the King of England himself or a member of the ruling dynasty and was a high award for its bearer. The Hungarian historian A. Bárány thought that John probably gained this honour for his diplomatic services during a visit to the King of England, because he played an important part in Sigismund’s foreign policy.\(^\text{35}\) The gravestone of John of Peren also bears the symbol of the Aragonese Order of the Jar, which we also find on the gravestone of his brother Stephen of Peren. However, it is necessary to realize that at the time of the Council of Konstanz, John was still very young, and only at the beginning of his career. He appears in the sources as a courtier (aulicus) or court

\(^{27}\) Ref. 25.
\(^{28}\) ZsO V, ref. 10, no. 408, DL 10 546. P. also BÁRÁNY, ref. 10, p.13.
\(^{29}\) ZsO V, ref. 10, no. 1692.
\(^{30}\) ZsO V, ref. 10, no. 694.
\(^{31}\) DL 7067. The father of our palatine, also called Nicholas I of Gara, supported the succession of a member of the French ruling dynasty to the throne of Hungary after the death of King Louis of Hungary, against the interests of the Luxembourg dynasty.
\(^{32}\) BÁRÁNY, ref. 10, p.13: “duke of the emperoures ..., sate on the kyng ys syde”. For references to other English chronicles see ibid. p. 12, note 48.
\(^{33}\) ZsO V, ref. 10, no. 2280.
\(^{35}\) BÁRÁNY, ref. 10, p. 18.
knight (*aulae regiae miles*). He gained his first title at the royal court only many years later, when he became royal steward in 1431. Therefore, it is impossible to suppose that he could have played an important role in the diplomatic service of the king at the time of the Council of Konstanz, and he did not hold such a position even later. It is much more probable that the Lancastrian insignia and the right to include them in the coat of arms, as well as the Aragonese order of knighthood, were acquired by his father Imrich of Peren, who served for many years as Sigismund’s private chancellor, one of the key positions in the monarch’s domestic and foreign policy. The exact circumstances of the granting of the Lancastrian chain to the of Peren family will probably remain unknown. It could have been granted to the son, who was certainly there, at the request of Sigismund during his stay in England, but as a sign of recognition of the work of his father. However, it is impossible to exclude the possibility that the son gained it himself, but certainly not as a reward for many years of diplomatic activity.

Imrich of Peren is undoubtedly a very interesting personality at the court of Sigismund, so he deserves some consideration here. He came from the Trebišov branch of the lords of Perin (de Peren), and started his career at the court of Sigismund’s first wife, Queen Mary as a page (1386 – 1388). Later he established himself in the service of Sigismund as his cupbearer (1397 – 1404) and finally as his private chancellor (1405 – 1418). It is interesting that Imrich was the first layman to hold this office. He also achieved a leading position among the secular magnates of Hungary by his education. In 1384 he studied at Prague University, at that time, a rarity. The majority of the Hungarian lords of the time were illiterate. He was also an able soldier. He fought beside Sigismund in the Battle of Nikopolis in 1396, and during the uprising against the king in Hungary in 1403, his successful military interventions helped Sigismund to achieve victory. He became one of the founder members of the Order of the Dragon and an important diplomat. In particular, Sigismund entrusted him with “exotic” missions. During one such mission, probably to Asia Minor, he fell into captivity and succeeded in escaping in dramatic circumstances. In 1407, he led a mission lasting several months to one of the son of the Turkish Sultan Bayazid.

Imrich accompanied King Sigismund to the coronation at Aachen in November 1414, and from there probably to Konstanz. Later he returned to Hungary, but on 18 March 1418 in Konstanz, he asked the Pope for permission to call a confessor and change a promise to make a personal pilgrimage to the Holy Land for another pious act. The reason for this request was evidently Imrich’s health. He knew that he did not have

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38 ZsO VI, ref. 10, no. 1657. However, it is impossible to be sure that Imrich was actually in Konstanz at this time, although it is probable.
enough strength for the journey to the Holy Land. Soon after, sometime in the period from March to July 1418, he died.\(^{39}\)

Another figure, who interested Ulrich Richental was Peter Čech of Levice (de Leva), whose arrival also received a special mention from the chronicler.\(^{40}\) He allegedly came to Konstanz with 80 horses and four wagons at the beginning of 1415, but in reality, he came already at the end of 1414. Richental mentions him under the garbled name of Stechpeter von Schora, which is the Hungarian form of his name as Richental could have heard it: Cseh Peter of Sáró, that is of Šarovce in the County of Tekov. The names of his lordships are unfortunately also garbled. Ulrich Richental mentions him as lord “ze Brísnitz” and “ze Coppelstain”. In the heraldic part of the chronicle, we find him named among the “free or banderium lords”\(^{41}\) as lord “zu Toppelschain”. We can only guess which localities the author meant by this.\(^{42}\)

Peter Čech was relatively young at the time of the council, with an age of little more than thirty, but he already had a successful career behind him. He was the king’s marshal and Sheriff of the counties of Tekov, Novohrad and Hont. Like the other above mentioned magnates, he was also a founder member of the Order of the Dragon, which is evidence that he belonged to the narrowest group of courtiers and enjoyed extraordinary favour from the king.

In 1413, Peter accompanied the king to Italy. For this journey, he borrowed money from the Archbishop of Esztergom and his brothers, as well as from his wife, to whom he gave property in the County of Tekov as security.\(^{43}\) From Italy, he did not go directly to Konstanz with the king, but he returned to Hungary to find more money for another planned journey. It is interesting in this context that he did not prepare only for the journey to Germany, but from the beginning he also intended to travel to other countries. This is shown by the documents with which Peter secured his journey. In June 1414, the palatine issued a document, by which he delayed any legal cases, because Peter was going to various kingdoms and countries for “training in the knightly arts”.\(^{44}\) On 16 December

\(^{39}\) In July 1418, he already appears in the sources as deceased, or rather his sons, the squires (iuvenes) John and Stephen appear as the sons of the late Imrich, DL, 10 705.

\(^{40}\) FEGER, ref. 3, p. 172 (ch. 55).

\(^{41}\) Banderium lords (Panerherren) were noblement, who had the right to lead soldiers into battle under their banner (Latin banderium). It was a privilege enjoyed only by the most important magnates in the kingdom.

\(^{42}\) The identification of the properties mentioned by Richental is controversial. Coppelstain and Toppelschain is probably one and the same locality. It is difficult to decide which name is closer to reality. Toppelschain resembles the castle of Topoľčany, but it was never a hereditary possession of Peter, although it is not excluded that he had it as security, as indicated by a later document from 1433, which states that Peter redeemed it from the Husites. See: DL 59 177, DL 59 178. Brísnitz could be Tekovská Breznica Castle, ruins of which still exist in the territory of the village. Since the castle is not mentioned in written sources from this period, it was considered abandoned. Therefore, Richental’s testimony is valuable from this point of view. However, all these considerations are purely hypothetical. Both names are so garbled, that they cannot be unambiguously identified. We only know with certainty that Peter Čech held the castle lordships of Levice and Revište in the territory of Slovakia at the time of the council.

\(^{43}\) ZsO III, ref. 10, no. 3100, ZsO IV, ref. 10, no. 11.

\(^{44}\) “pro exercitacione actuum militarium ad diversorum regum regna principumque dominorum terras et dominia”. ZsO IV, ref. 10, no. 2050.
1414 in Konstanz, Pope John XXIII issued a letter of safe conduct (salvus conductus) for Peter Čech, supreme marshal and advisor to King Sigismund. It was also valid for countries “beyond the sea” (tam circa, quam ultra maria). On 6 January 1414, less than two weeks after coming to Konstanz, King Sigismund issued another letter of safe conduct for Peter. It emphasized that Peter Čech of Levice, “finding that knighthood is the life of a man on earth (militia est vita hominis super terram), decided to travel to distant countries, so that he could taste the customs and languages of nations, their habits and way of life.”

A few days later, on 13 January 1415, the monarch ordered all judges in Hungary to delay any legal disputes concerning Peter Čech and his “familiares”, because he was travelling to visit foreign kings and princes for training in the knightly arts. In May 1415, King Ferdinand of Aragon issued a letter of safe conduct for him, addressed to the King and Queen of Castile and the King (Emir) of Granada. It states that Peter was travelling through different parts of the world, performing various knightly tasks, so that he would gain great glory and fame.

However, only a few of the chosen could afford travel in the style of Peter Čech. Apart from his own money, he borrowed for the journey another thousand gold ducats (florenus), and for another 4,000 ducats he gave his castle at Revište as security. His sister provided him with gold and silver objects for the journey worth another 3,000 ducats, to contribute to his “honour and dignity”.

Unfortunately, we do not have the itinerary of Peter’s journey. We only know that in September 1416, he was back in Hungary. At Pécs he reported to the barons on his talks with the Despot of Serbia on ransoming imprisoned Hungarian noblemen.

Together with Peter Čech, Ulrich Richental mentions Pipo Spano of Ozora in two places: firstly in a description of the arrival of these Hungarian noblemen, according to Richental, Pipo was accompanied by 150 horses and four wagons, and secondly, a whole chapter is devoted to Pipo in connection with his role in defending Hungary against the Turks. 160 horses are mentioned here. Pipo did not stay long in Konstanz, he had to return to Hungary because of the Turkish threat. The information of our chronicler is surprisingly exact here.

Richental concluded the group of Hungarian lords, who came to Konstanz with the Counts of Cilly: Hermann, father in law of King Sigismund and Frederick his son, who came to the council with 300 horses. He shared with the Archbishop of Esztergom, first place in size of his retinue. Frederick of Cilly is mentioned again in the chronicle as an active participant in tournaments, but we will speak of that in another place.
Ulrich Richental wrote in a separate chapter about the coming of two lords “from Poland”: the Prince of Brzeg, mentioned as a prince from Silesia, and Lord Stibor. Our chronicler could easily have placed both among the Hungarian lords. Louis, Prince of Brzeg was active at the court of Sigismund of Luxembourg.

At the time of the holding of the Council of Konstanz, he gained from the king the whole County of Trenčín with its castles including Trenčín itself. Stibor was born in Hungary and he never abandoned it. We are concerned here with the younger Stibor, son of Duke Stibor, who gained vast properties and important positions as a reward for supporting Sigismund of Luxembourg in his struggle for the Hungarian crown. Richental mentions that Stibor’s properties were situated on the river Váh and “on this river he has five towns: Trenčín, Beckov, Uherský Brod, Holič with Skalica and Hlohovec”. Here we can immediately notice several inaccuracies: that he mentions six towns and not five, that Holič and Skalica are not situated on the Váh, and that Hlohovec belonged to Stibor’s sister and her husband, and so was not part of the Stibor inheritance.

Let us add that Stibor came to Konstanz with 120 horsemen and three wagons, but he did not stay for the whole duration of the council. He returned to Hungary already at the beginning of 1416.

With him, we exhaust the list of Hungarian lords, whose coming to Konstanz was described by Richental in his chronicle. All the above mentioned magnates also appear in the concluding heraldic part of the chronicle, which also includes other participants from the Kingdom of Hungary. It is necessary to note that these lists of persons differ in different manuscripts of the chronicle. In some cases, the names are so garbled that their identification is difficult, and in some cases controversial or even impossible.

However, Ulrich Richental did not limit himself only to describing the arrival of individual Hungarian lords. He speaks of the Hungarians several times in his chronicle, so that we can see how a burgher of Konstanz perceived the visitors from this distant and slightly exotic country.

In spite of the pomposity of the Hungarian lords, our chronicler looked at the Hungarians arriving in Konstanz with a certain disdain, describing them almost as dangerous barbarians. It is necessary to say that his view is rather distorted and full of prejudice. According to Richental, the king had to move three days after coming to Konstanz, from the city to the monastery at Petershausen outside the city, because the Hungarians with their restless nature could not remain in the city “because they treated people roughly and they thought they could behave like in their own country.” They behaved no better

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53 FEGER, ref. 3, p. 172 (ch. 54).
55 DVOŘÁKOVÁ, ref. 54, p. 352-353.
56 FEGER, ref. 3, p. 171 (ch. 50): “Und Maint man, das es darumb beschach, das er sin diener, die Ungerschen, nit wol behalten mocht in der stat vor irs großes unfrids wegen. Wann sy wolten allweg mit den lüten in der hertikait leben und vermainted zů tünd als in irem land.”
in Petershausen, but the inhabitants were able to pacify them. Some dislike can also be felt in Richental’s account of how the Hungarians took wood from the forest of the Abbot of Petershausen, although the monarch had the right to ask for wood from any abbey in the country, and the abbot actually sold wood to the king and his Hungarian courtiers.

In this context, the chronicler’s fictitious information about how Sigismund granted fiefs to his Hungarian subjects is characteristic. According to Richental, anybody who received a fief from the king had to give something in return: sheep, chickens, peacocks, eggs, wax or other minor things. He mentions as a matter of interest that Hungarian only received fiefs for life or during the life of the king.

It is also difficult to trust this report, already because the feudal system in the true sense of the word did not exist in Hungary. There was official tenure of property, so called *pro honore*, which was tied to a specific office, and which lasted only while the office was held, and there was donated property, which could be held for life or as a hereditary possession, if we exclude mortgaging and sale of properties. It is difficult to say what situation Richental actually saw and recorded, but it was probably the reception of representatives of a town by King Sigismund. The representatives of towns usually honoured the monarch with similar gifts, as the surviving municipal accounts show. We know, for example, that King Sigismund was visited in Konstanz by envoys of the city of Bratislava, who asked him to solve a dispute with the provost of Bratislava. The idea that some of the Hungarian magnates, who gained donations in Konstanz, placed eggs at the feet of the monarch, is pure fantasy of the Konstanz chronicler.

Although Richental is not an entirely reliable informer, as the preceding section shows, some parts of his chronicle give really exact information and show surprising knowledge. As a point of interest, we will mention Richental’s record of 23 June 1415, when he received in his vineyard King Sigismund, Queen Barbara, the Queen of Bosnia and other members of the elite. According to Richental, the king spent the day in pleasant feasting on the grass under the trees. He dealt with many matters, which his servants submitted to him, and he rewarded his vassals with small fiefs. Richental’s words are confirmed in this case by a surviving charter, issued on this date, granting a coat of arms to a Hungarian nobleman. It is also worth mentioning that Richental recorded that the king was not pleased that noblemen had tied their horses to young, apparently fruit bearing trees. He ordered them to move their horses and tie them to willow trees.

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57 FEGER, ref. 3, p. 171 (ch. 51): “wann wenn gelöff oder geschray kam, so luffend die von Peterßhusen all zesamen und laitten sich über die Unger und schlůgend sy, sy hetten recht oder unrecht”.
58 FEGER, ref. 3, p. 253 (ch. 287).
59 FEGER, ref. 3, p. 225 (ch. 227): “Er lech ouch den Ungern, doch nit lenger dann ir leptag und ouch die wil der küng lebt, and nit füro. Und welher von im enpfieng, der mußt im geben, es wären schaff, hínr; pfawen oder ayer oder wachs, oder was soliches was. Denn kainer getorst lär komen und lehen von im empfahen.”
60 ZsO V, ref. 10, no. 766.
61 FEGER, ref. 3, p. 200 (ch. 143).
Richental also mentioned the Hungarians in connection with tournaments. We learn from him that “young” Frederick of Cilly defeated Duke Frederick of Austria in a tournament. The two opponents competed for “some jewels”, and the Austrian Duke had to participate in the tournament to increase his prestige. The tournament and hastiludium (lance game) were favourite entertainments throughout the period of the council. Richental mentions them repeatedly. He also evaluated the best competitor in tournaments: the inexactly specified knight *Schwartz Saffins*, who came to Konstanz with the Polish bishops.

The legendary Polish knight Zawisch Czarny of Garbow is undoubtedly hidden behind this garbled name. He was active at the courts of both King Vladislav Jagiello of Poland and of Sigismund of Luxembourg. During the council he actively participated in political and diplomatic activities. He was one of the noblemen, who supported the imprisoned Jan Hus, appealing to Sigismund’s letter guaranteeing his safety. During Sigismund’s stay in Paris in the spring of 1416, he acted as the ambassador of the King of Poland in talks about extending the armistice between the knights of the Teutonic Order and Poland.

Another striking participant in the tournaments was the English Earl Richard of Warwick. Richental considered it remarkable that he never took to a tournament a horse from which he had fallen in a previous contest, and he was equally interested in the superb brocade and fur covers of his tournament horses. Richental also gives in other places details of tournaments, including the occasions on which they were held, how long they lasted, the method of fighting and the number of participants. Perhaps the most interesting is his account of the Carnival tournament of 1418, in which the participants included King Sigismund and the Hungarian lord Laurence of Hédervár, mentioned by Richental as lord of Žitný Ostrov. In this case, it was not a hastiludium, but according to the chronicler’s description more a typical group tournament resembling a real battle, held on the meadow outside the city walls. Laurence joined the contest when it had already been going on for some time. Together with him, King Sigismund demonstrated his knightly ability, but anonymously with a closed helmet and no heraldic shield. He unhorsed one knight and one squire, and withdrew from the battle with his face still hidden under his helmet. If we realize that Sigismund had already celebrated his fiftieth birthday by this time, this testifies to his outstanding physical condition, and to his courage, since he fought anonymously to avoid having an advantage.

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62 FEGER, ref. 3, p. 191 (ch. 119).
63 FEGER, ref. 3, p. 177 (ch. 72).
65 On Ján Hus: ZsO V, ref. 10, no. 624, on the Paris talks: ZsO V, ref. 10, no. 1735.
66 FEGER, ref. 3, p. 178 (ch. 76).
68 FEGER, ref. 3, p. 251 (ch. 282): “do zoch ab herr Laurentz vom Hadristurn von Ungern usser der Schütten”. 
With the detailed description of the tournaments at Konstanz, we have exhausted almost all the mentions of participants in the council from the Kingdom of Hungary, although we should mention the report of the chronicler on how Sigismund’s courtiers left Konstanz without paying their debts, and how they were detained against their will at Ulm, where they had to sell their horses and armour to pay their debts. It is interesting that in places where Richental is speaking about individual Hungarian lords, he does so without the disdain and emotional colouring, we can perceive when he is talking about Hungarians in general. Thus the chronicle gives valuable testimony about the mentality of a medieval person, about his way of perceiving a different cultural environment, about his distrust or aversion towards the foreign and unknown. However, feelings of distrust, contempt or ridicule towards members of other nations could be found in the whole of Europe in this period. Various generally negative traits were attributed to nations and made their characteristic features: wild and indomitable Hungarians, arrogant and effeminate French, coarse and ill-mannered Germans and so on. The Hungarian noblemen had similar views on foreigners. However, to avoid going far in our search for examples, we will look at a letter from one of the Hungarian participants in the Council of Konstanz, who also accompanied King Sigismund on his journey around Western Europe: Stephen of Rozhanovec (Rozgon). In a letter sent from Paris in 1416 and addressed to a relation in Hungary, he expressed among other things, his unfavourable view of the French: “I never saw people with such coarse manners as in these regions.” Many French people would undoubtedly have said the same about people from Hungary.

With a little exaggeration, we could say that the Middle Ages laid the foundations of nationalism. However, it is certainly possible to state that it laid the foundations of the modern nations, including Slovakia, and the Chronicle of Ulrich Richental has extraordinary importance for Slovak history from this point of view. It proves clearly and unambiguously that the name “Slovensko” was used for the territory of present day Slovakia in the 15th century, and that this territory was seen as a distinct region in the Kingdom of Hungary.

Slovakia is directly mentioned several times in the Chronicle of Ulrich Richental. It appears most frequently in connection with the arrival of Hungarian lords, especially in the case of Stibor: “lord in the Slovak lands (in Windeschen landen) between Moravia and Poland along the river called the Váh, and on that river he has five towns: Trenčín, Beckov, Uherský Brod, Holíč with Skalica and Hlohovec.” Immediately in the following chapter, Richental mentions the arrival of Peter Čech of Šarovec, better known in literature with the predicate “of Levice”, who lived “in the Slovak lands (in Windeschen

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71 FEGER, ref. 3, p. 172 (ch. 54): “Och zoch in der groß herr, herr Strobor usser Boland und her in Windeschen landen zwischen Merhern und Bolan an dem wasser, das man nempt der Vag, und het in fünf stet an dem Wasser: Tränsch, Plunsch, Ungerschbrat, die Wisenkitchen und Galitz und die Frigenstat mit hundert und zwantzig pfläritten und dry wagen.”
landen)”, and is lord of Breznica and Koppelstein.72 Peter Čech is mentioned again in the heraldic part of the chronicle, here actually as “Peter Čech of Šarovce in Slovakia (usser Windenland), lord of Toppelschain.”73

There is a further important mention of Slovakia in connection with the diocese of Esztergom of Archbishop John of Kanizsa. According to the words of the chronicler, his bishopric and suffragan bishops are situated in the Slovak lands (in Windeschen landen).74 Since the archdiocese of Esztergom is essentially identical with the territory of Slovakia, there is no doubt that Richental had Slovakia in mind when he wrote “Windischen landen” or “Windenland”. The Konstanz chronicler mentions the “Slovak lands” again, when describing Sigismund’s journey after leaving Konstanz. The king went from Germany to Bohemia, Moravia and from there through Slovakia and Bratislava to Wrocław.75

If we would like to be exact, the expression “Windeschen landen” should be translated also as “Slavonic lands”, since the German word Winden indicated Slavs in general. For the 15th century and in the context in which Richental uses it, it is clearly more correct to use the expressions: “Slovak, Slovakia”. The reasons why this is so have been sufficiently described in the expert literature, but it will do no harm to summarize them here.76

The German name “Windischen landen” or “Windenland” and its Latin equivalent “Sclavinia” or “Slavinia” were used in the Middle Ages to designate various countries inhabited by Slavs, and always in cases where there was a Slav – non-Slav contrast; to put it simply: in regions where Slavonic territory belonged to a non-Slav state, either really or according to a one-sided claim. Thus, we know of Bavarian Slavonia meaning Carinthia and the Eastern Mark, and Saxon Slavonia meaning the territory of the Slavonic Sorbs, Lusatians and Obodrites divided between the Saxon marks. Croatian Slavonia is distinguished from Dalmatia, which belonged to the Byzantine Empire and later to Venice. It was only in the 13th century that the meaning of this name became restricted to the part belonging to the Kingdom of Hungary. Similarly, “Slovak” Slavonia, namely

72 FEGER, ref. 3, p. 172 (ch. 55): “Es zoch och in ain Ungerscher her, her Stechpeter von Schora, und ist gesessen in Windeschen landen, und ist her ze Brisnitz, zu Coppelstein mit achtzig pfäritten und so vil personen und mit zwain wegen.”
73 FEGER, ref. 3, p.274: “Stech Peter von Schara usser Windenland, her zu Toppelschain.”
74 FEGER, ref. 3, p. 219 (ch. 203): “An sant Blasius tag nach der vesper, do rait in gen Constentz der hoch-wirdig ertzbischoff von Granensis usser Ungerland, und sin bistum und suffragani ligent in Windeschen landen.”
75 FEGER, ref. 3, p. 261 (ch. 316): “Und zoch do gen Beham und gen Mernher und darnach in Windenland und darnach gen Preßburg.”
Daniela Dvořáková The Chronicle of Ulrich Richental

the territory of the former Principality of Nitra, was distinguished from Magyar Hungary. Since the Slavs called themselves Slovieni, every country named after them was Slovenia or Slavonia, but this original name has survived until today only in the cases of Slovenia (Slovenija) and Slovakia (Slovensko). 77

Why did some Slavonic nations, including the Czechs, Poles, Croats, Bulgarians, Serbs and Russians, adopt their own ethnic names already in the Middle Ages, while some retained their originally wider pan-Slavonic name? The reason is understandable: Slavs living in close contact with non-Slavs did not develop so much need to distinguish themselves from other Slavs and were sufficiently identified by their general designation. In this way, the general Slavonic designation acquired a different, narrower, purely national content. This is why it is necessary to distinguish in historical texts whether the Slavs in general are being mentioned or whether we have a designation of a specific ethnic group or its territory. In such cases, the historian must always start from the given context. In the case of Richental’s “Windischen landen” and “Windenland”, it is clearly most appropriate to translate these expressions as “Slovak lands” or “Slovakia”.

The names of inhabitants arose in a similar way to the names of countries. People from the territory of Slovakia were called “Sclavi” or “Slavi” in medieval Latin sources, “Tóth” in Hungarian, “Winden” or “Wenden” in German, “Slovenin” or “Slověnin” in Czech and Slovak. The same designations were used for the Slavs of the southern part of the Kingdom of Hungary. The designation “Slovak” (Slowak) appeared in the Czech environment only in the 15th century, and replaced the older words “Slovenin”, “Slověnin” for the meaning: “Slovak man”. 78 However, the original form is still used in the Slovak language, in the words: “Slovenka” meaning “Slovak woman”, the adjective “slovensky” – “Slovak” and the name of the country: “Slovensko” – “Slovakia”. 79

The perception of Slovakia, originally the Principality of Nitra, as an ethnically different region, existed throughout the Middle Ages, also when it became part of another – Hungarian state. Although the former frontiers disappeared, and the territory of Slovakia never formed a separate administrative unit in the framework of the medieval Kingdom of Hungary, consciousness of its difference from the ethnic Hungarian or Magyar part of the kingdom persisted, as Ulrich Richental also shows. We encounter this phenomenon in the sources throughout the Middle Ages. We will mention an example from the first half of the 15th century. The Hungarian nobleman Pangrác of Svätý Mikuláš (Szent-

77 STEINHÜBEL, ref. 76, p. 335.
78 A document from 1444 from the Archives of the town of Bardejov has been identified as the oldest evidence of the name “Slovak” from the territory of Slovakia. It mentions two commanders of the town: Mikuláš Čech and Slovák. AMB no. 429. On this see also: RATKOŠ, ref. 76, p. 55. The designation „Slovak” occurs much more frequently in documents of Czech and Moravian provenance, where there was a need to distinguish Slovaks from local inhabitants. For some examples see: ibid, p. 54-55. From our archives, we could add a document from 1439, deposited in the medieval collection of the Archives of the City of Bratislava under the number 1 637/d. Among the servants of a Count of Liechtenstein, a certain Hynko Slowack is mentioned.
79 V ARSiK, O vzniku a rozvoji slovenskej národnosti, ref. 76, p. 15; V ARSiK, Vznik názvu Slovák, ref. 76, p. 272. The word Slovak originated in the same way as the work “Pražák” from “Pražěnin” or “Polák” from “Polan – Polanin”.
miklósi) sent a letter from Strečno Castle to the Chapter of Esztergom, threatening revenge, if the collectors of tolls in the properties of the chapter asked for payments from his people, who were going “versus partes Hungariae”. 80 We could mention other similar examples, including a Slovak document from the 16th century, which mentions the journey of a yeoman from Liptovská Boca to “Hungary” (“Uhry”). 81

We also encounter the same perception of Slovakia as an ethnically distinct part of the Kingdom of Hungary in the work of the Konstanz burgher Ulrich Richental. 82 We find in his chronicle apart from Hungary, also named “Ungerland” 83 in one place, the name “Windenland” – Slovakia. Richental’s mentions of Slovakia are very valuable and so far unknown to expert literature, although they are certainly not surprising. They are only a further piece in the mosaic, which forms the picture of medieval Slovakia, which continued to be known as a distinct country in the framework of the Kingdom of Hungary from the time of the Principality of Nitra. Richental probably learnt about this from people from the Kingdom of Hungary, who participated in the Council of Konstanz.

* The study originated in the framework of the project APVV (G 28) Lexikón stredovekých miest (Lexicon of Medieval Cities).

80 Photographic collection of the Hungarian National Archive in Budapest DF 249 067.
81 For other examples from the years 1075, 1297, 1332 and the example from the 16th century cited above, see RATKOŠ, ref. 76, p. 39-40.
82 In this context, it is necessary to point to the misleading, erroneous but generally accepted claim of Hungarian historiography, presented, for example, in the academic Korai magyar történeti lexikon (9.-14. század). (Lexicon of Hungarian History (9th-14th centuries).) Főszerkesztő Kristó Gyula. Budapest : Akadémiai Kiadó, 1994, p. 653, which states that the medieval sources never mention “Slovakia” as the name of a country or territory. The name Slavonia appears for the first time only in 1512 (!), but according to the authors, it is the name of Slavonia, not of Slovakia.
83 FEGER, ref. 3, p. 219 (ch. 203).

OBČAN, SPOLOČNOSŤ, NÁROD
V POHYBE SLOVENSKÝCH DEJÍN

MILAN ZEMKO
By analysing selected texts by S.H. Vajanský from the period 1881 – 1897, the author points to his conception of history, in the context of his national ideology and conception of the policy of the Slovak National Party (Slovenská národná strana) at the end of the 19th century. Vajanský’s historical argumentation rests on two different but inter-connected interpretations of national history. The first starts from the concept of the Slovak nobility as an elite group in the society of the Kingdom of Hungary, the only group able to represent the mass of the nation. However, instead of this, it voluntarily “broke its connection with its people”, which is the cause of national poverty. Vajanský, however, did not find any cause for pessimism, but for optimism, thanks to the fact that the role of representing the mass of the nation had been taken up by the national intelligentsia. On this basis, he constructed a second interpretation of national history based on their negation. According to him, the Slovak people remembered “prehistoric times”, but remained untouched by “historic times”, which, in the interpretation of the author, meant event or political history. The negation of event history led to historical optimism – the Slovak nation still had its history in front of it.


Svetozár Hurban Vajanský

Svetozár Hurban Vajanský is mentioned in every general account of the history of the Slovak national movement and of the national ideologies around 1900, and there is

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1 Since at the end of the 19th century Svetozár Hurban also became known as Svetozár Hurban Vajanský, or only as Vajanský, I will also use this pseudonym. The author of this pseudonym was Viliam Pauliny-Toth. See: PETRUS, Pavol. Realizmus, moderna a začiatky proletárskej literatúry (Od zrušenia Matice slovenskej do vzniku Československej republiky) 1875 – 1918. (Realism, modernism and the beginnings of proletarian literature (From the dissolution of Matica slovenská to the formation of the Czechoslovak republic 1875 – 1918. In PIŠÚT, Milan (ed.). 

also a relatively large number of studies concerned especially with Vajanský’s national ideology. The historians, who have written up to now have reached a consensus in evaluating Vajanský as the leading ideologue of the conservative current in the Slovak national movement or the policy making leader of the so-called Martin centre of the Slovak National Party (SNP) (Slovenská národná strana) in the given period. In spite of this, the monographic treatment of Vajanský as the ideologue of the Martin centre of the SNP is still awaiting an author. Such a work would require a precise analytic approach to
Vajanský’s extraordinarily extensive publicist writings. However, the expert literature usually starts from historiographic concepts and only to a smaller extent from analysis of the content of Vajanský’s actual texts or his extensive correspondence. In contrast to historiography, literary science has devoted much more attention to Vajanský. Yet, Ivana Taranenková has pointed to the one-sidedness of the literary science research, which has analysed Vajanský’s wide-ranging activities in isolation. This expert on literature has the ambition to reconstruct Vajanský’s conception in the context of all aspects of his activities in Slovak literature and culture. She regards them as organically inter-connected, with the “ideology or conception of the nation closely linked with the conception of culture” as their unifying and determining platform. Therefore, when researching Vajanský’s literary position, it is necessary to consider the ideological aspect: “aesthetic conservatism is conditioned by ideological conservatism.” I find the views expressed by this author and her studies inspiring for my interpretation of Vajanský’s historical ide-base is undoubtedly one of the basic studies of Vajanský’s national ideology. (I am grateful to the author for providing his work.) M. Gniazdowski has also published a study in Slovak. See: GNIAZDOWSKI, Mateusz. Predstavy národa v publicistike S. H. Vajanský. (The idea of the nation in the publicist writing of S.H. Vajanský). In Proglas, 2001, year 12, no. 1, p. 35-40. In the area of books, it is necessary to point especially to the work by O. Nagyová on Vajanský’s journalistic activities in the period 1870 – 1880. See: NAGYOVÁ, Oľga. Mladý Vajanský ako novinár. (The young Vajanský as a journalist). Bratislava: Obzor, 1973, 198 p. and 16 pages of illustrations. For a popular book about Vajanský’s life and work see: JURÍČEK, Ján. Vajanský. Portrét odvážneho. (Vajanský. A portrait of a brave man). Bratislava: Obzor, 1988, 176 p. and 16 pages of illustrations.


6 When reading various works, it is impossible to avoid the impression that their authors already knew the conclusions of their research before they began to analyse Vajanský’s texts.


9 TARANENKOVÁ, ref. 8, p. 27.

Naturally, the character of this study does not enable sufficient consideration of these connections. My aim is to examine Vajanský’s conception of history in the context of his national ideology and conception of the policy of the SNP at the end of the 19th century, on the basis of selected texts from the period 1881 – 1897. I will try to provide a textual analysis with an emphasis on the content and meaning of Vajanský’s statements in the relevant narrative units. On this basis, I will present several general characteristics of his thinking about the nation and especially his conception of national history in the given period.

Before actually analysing Vajanský’s texts, it is necessary to make some methodological comments. The subject of this text is the history of Vajanský’s ideas. Therefore, I am not concerned with their relationship to how things were in reality. For example, when I write about Vajanský’s interpretation of the Slovak nobility I am concerned with the history of the idea of the Slovak nobility in Vajanský’s thought and not with the history of the Slovak nobility. This leads to systematic avoidance of evaluations of whether a view being considered corresponded to “historical reality”. A similar point could be made about such central terms in Vajanský’s texts as Slovak and Magyar, and the expressions Slovaks, Slovak nation or Magyars, Magyar nation. I use them exclusively in the sense of central terms in Vajanský’s thinking. Although Vajanský used them to name specific groups of people, the real existence of these groups is not the subject of my research. It is clear from this that in the context of my analysis, the content of these terms has nothing in common with the majority populations of the present day Slovak and Hungarian states. In the context of my interpretation, their semantic fields are derived exclusively from Vajanský’s texts, or in the case of other texts or conceptions from the views of their authors or supporters. In these cases, and in the cases of some other words and phrases from his texts, I use boldface.

I also want to point to one important aspect in these introductory remarks. I regard my conclusions as one of various possible interpretations. It is clear that a different se-

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12 I justify the year 1881 as a chronological milestone in my research because in that year the revived Slovenské pohľady published texts by Vajanský, which I consider to be of key importance from the point of view of their influence on the ideology of the Martin centre of the SNP. On this, see below. See ref. 16 on the year 1897 as the second chronological milestone.

13 Even the question of the existence or non-existence of the group Vajanský called the Slovak nobility is not the subject of my analysis.

14 Compare to this the principles of research into the history of historiography from the culturalological perspective as formulated by A. Radomski: RADOMSKI, Andrzej. Perspektywa kulturoznawcza a badanie dziejów historiografii. (The culturological perspective and research into the history of historiography). In MATERNICKI, Jerzy (ed.). Metodologiczne problemy syntezy historii historiografii polskiej. Rzeszów : Wydawnictwo Wyższej Szkoły Pedagogicznej, 1998, p. 75-76.

15 However, at the same time, I do not claim that the content of Vajanský’s terms have no relation to “historical reality”, only that this problem does not overlap with the subject of my research.
lection of texts and conceptions would enable different interpretations. This is connected on one side with a change in the historic ideology of the Martin centre of the SNP around 1900, especially under the influence of the spread of the historical conceptions of the supporters of the ideology of national unity of the Czechs and Slovaks, and on the more general level it is associated with the fact that Vajanský was primarily the ideologue of the Martin centre of the SNP and not an “impartial” scholar. In this sense, such a disproportion is not remarkable and can be considered characteristic. It is also necessary to point to the fact that Vajanský was considered a controversial personality by the nationally oriented elite of the time.

1. S. H. Vajanský as the creator of the ideology of the SNP in the period of political passivity

The Slovak National Party entered a new phase of its activity at the beginning of the 1880s, and this was accompanied by a new character of the national ideology. There was a change of elites, with the younger patriots (národovci) replacing the generation of Matica slovenská. This period substantially differed from the era of Daxner and Moyses. The Dualist system was already sufficiently stabilized, and apart from many other cons-

16 I deliberately do not analyse Vajanský’s texts from the beginning of the 20th century, because the differentiation of the Slovak national movement at the end of the 19th century was also expressed in the character of Vajanský’s ideological profile. Compare: ref. 106. The terminating year 1897, when Nálady a výhľady (Moods and prospects) appeared, is essential from the point of view of the consistence of my interpretation.

17 It was naturally a matter of a differentiated ideological stream, which changed over time. It involved the Czech Slovakophils, Hlasists and Prúdists, that is the circle influenced especially by Tomáš G. Masaryk, Karel Káral and to some extent also such personalities as Jaroslav Vlček. Among the personalities from the Slovak national movement at the beginning of the 20th century, who can be definitely assigned to this ideological current, we can name Meakulpínsky (Ladislav Novomestský), Vavro Šrobár and Anton Štefánek.

18 In this context the statement of M. Potemra is telling: “Perhaps nobody else in Slovak society at the time expressed views on such a wide range of historical and current internal and international political, cultural and economic problems as Vajanský. Also for this reason, his publicist work shows the influence of the philosophical, philosophical-political literature and methodology of the individual philosophical-historical orientations in Europe at the end of the 19th and beginning of the 20th centuries. This also makes it difficult to assign Vajanský’s historical publicist writings unambiguously to any one philosophical-historical orientation [emphasis by K. H.].” See: POTEMRA, Hlavní predstavitelia, ref. 3, p. 234.

19 For example, Jaroslav Vlček wrote the following noteworthy statement in 1891: “Whoever knows Hurban well, I insist, is not able to show him a pinch of respect: he is already a dear old literary pensioner and quite unpleasantly businesslike journalistic windbag, not to speak of his other moral essence.” See: letter from J. Vlček to T. G. Masaryk from 24 July 1891. In RYCHLÍK, Ján (ed.). Korespondence TGM. T. G. Masaryk – slovenští verejní činitelé [do r. 1918]. (Correspondence of TGM. T. G. Masaryk to Slovak public figures [up to 1918]). Prague : Masarykův ústav a Archiv AV ČR, v.v.i., 2008, letter no. 16, p. 36. It is necessary to add that Vlček wrote this uncompromising evaluation only a year after the publication of his Dejín literatúry slovenskej (History of Slovak literature), a work corresponding in conception to the ideology of the Martin centre of the SNP, in contrast to Vlček’s Literatúry na Slovensku (Literature in Slovakia) from 1880 (see ref. 30), and Vajanský reacted to it with a positive review in the Národné noviny. For details of the second work in this series of articles see ref. 65. Compare also: SOJKOVá, Zdenka. Spor o Ľudovita Štúra před vystoupením hlasistů. (The dispute about Ľudovit Štúr before the emergence of the Hlasists). In Slovenská literatúra, 2005, year 18, no. 6, p. 558.
titutional, foreign policy and economic aspects, it was beginning ever more clearly to have the character of a struggle of the ruling Hungarian or Magyar nationalism with the various unofficial non-Magyar nationalisms.\textsuperscript{20}

Moreover, it is necessary to note that Czecho – Slovak relations still did not play such a substantial role in the formation of national ideologies as they would later, at the turn of the century. While the leadership of the SNP was in the hands of Pavol Mudroň, Matuš Dula and Ambro Pietor at the beginning of the 1880s, the most prominent creator and promoter of the ideological orientation of the national movement was S.H. Vajanský. The basic characteristic of this phase of activity of the SNP was political passivity, which was first officially declared in 1884. This policy also influenced the national ideology. Its basis can be summarized in the words of Milan Podrimavský as “the pursuit of passive forms of preservation of the attributes of national identity”. This principle was directly connected with a strong Russophil position,\textsuperscript{21} Vajanský really believed that the Slovaks would become part of a greater Slavonic union under the leadership of Russia.\textsuperscript{22}

If we want to understand Vajanský’s emphasis on “conserving the state already achieved” or “not dissipating forces”, we must realize that Russophilism was not an imaginary vision of the distant future for Vajanský, but a real expectation, which should come sooner rather than later. Although I will not devote special attention to Russophilism, it is a factor of key importance, which must be borne in mind, when analysing the ideological basis of this current in the Slovak national movement in the period considered here.

\textsuperscript{20} This problem can be approached by means of two aspects. It was the period of the government of Kálman Tisza, which was characterized among other things by a qualitative change in the original idea of Dualism, with Magyarization, especially of non-Magyar education and culture, becoming a characteristic feature of government policy. Compare, e.g.: KONTLER, László. A History of Hungary. Millennium in Central Europe. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002, p. 288. This meant, for example, the failure to observe the Nationality Act no. 44/1868 (on equality of the nationalities), as well as act no. 38/1868 on teaching in people’s schools (on teaching in the national schools). The Slovak translation of these legal norms, of fundamental importance for the rights of non-Magyars, was published already in 1868. See: Sbierka krajinských zákonov z roku 1868. (Collection of state laws from 1868). Budapest: Uhor. kráľ. ministry pravosudia, 1868, trans. Ján Alex Gočár, p. 181-216 and 263-270. (There is an interesting note from the translator J. A. Gočár, who mentions considerable problems "with establishing a terminology that is entirely new to us" (p. VII)). A second aspect is the legal status of the SNP, which existed from the legal point of view only as an “electoral party” in accordance with the election act no.33/1874, since there was no act on political parties. Therefore meetings of the leadership of the SNP in periods away from elections had the official character of private meetings. For more details see: PODRIMAVSKÝ, Slovenská národná strana, ref. 2, p. 51-52. This aspect significantly effected the Rumanian National Party, which was dissolved in 1894. For further details see: HITCHINS, Keith. A Nation Affirmed: The Romanian National Movement in Transylvania. 1860 – 1914. Bucharest: The Encyclopedic publishing houses, 1999, p. 147-148; Supplements. In: Scotus Viator [SETON-WATSON, Robert William]: Národnostná otázka v Uhorsku. (The nationality question in Hungary). Bratislava: SKSI SLOVKIA PLUS, 1995 [first published 1908], trans. Katarína Babinská, p. 436.

\textsuperscript{21} PODRIMAVSKÝ, Slovenská národná strana, ref. 2, p. 74-76.

\textsuperscript{22} For more details on the differentiated Russian conceptions, their perception by the Slovak conservatives and the perception of the Slovaks in Russian Slavophil circles, see: PODRIMAVSKÝ, Rusofilstvo, ref. 2; ROKINA, V. Galina. Slovenská otázka v ruskej periodike tlači poslednej tretiny 19. storočia. (The Slovak question in the Russian periodical press in the last third of the 19th century). In Proglas, 2004, years 14-15, p. 27-32. The critical attitude of Vajanský towards Polish political conceptions is interesting in this context. See: GNIAZDOWSKI, Konserwatywna, ref. 4, p. 118-122.
In the following text, I will progress to actual textual analysis of a selection from Vajanský’s publicist writings. I conceived the selection from his texts so that I could interpret the pillars of the national ideology of the Martin centre of the SNP in general and consistently progress to the specific problem of interpreting Vajanský’s understanding of history or his view of the history of the Slovak nation.

The SNP before the 1881 elections

Slovenské pohľady informed about the results of the discussions within the SNP in connection with the 1881 elections.23 The text reacts to the decision to participate in them and so to apply the tactic of activity at the expense of passivity: “We think that this resolution will be received with general agreement from the Slovak voters. We must move our limbs if we do not want to be paralysed.” He continues by pointing to the unfavourable conditions under which elections were held in Hungary. Although he does not directly mention the Magyars, it is clear that the description of those responsible for electoral lies and brutal violence like nowhere else in the world concerns the Magyars. Therefore the real “will of the nation and noble intention of its leaders” is opposed by “all seven deadly sins” [emphasized in the original]. In contrast to this the Slovak demands represent the will of God: “On our banner shines God’s eternal truth [emphasized in the original], which finally decides the fate of nations.!”

A concrete expression of this divine and eternal truth is none other than the Memorandum of the Slovak Nation (hereinafter the Memorandum): “The Slovak nation recalls at this moment the historic fact [emphasized by K. H.] of the Martin assembly and its legal demands expressed in the Svätý Martin Memorandum. This historic fact cannot fade in the hearts and minds of our Slovak conscience heard under the lime trees, and its voice trembled with the electric spark of the pain of the suffering soul of our nation. This great effort was the beginning of national consciousness and will be the starting point for the further development of our national individuality.” [emphasized by K. H.] The text also speaks entirely clearly about the status of the SNP or about its relationship to the national community: “The central assembly of trusted national representatives is an expression of the uniqueness and individuality [emphasized in the original] of our nation, on which our policy is based. We are one body and we want to have institutions that can express our will. As long as our national personality [emphasized in the original] is not recognized, we must bravely struggle for freedom. The struggle for freedom is a sacred struggle!”24

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23 Active participation in elections was one of the central conceptual questions of the SNP since its origin or since the unsuccessful elections of 1872. The decision to participate in the 1881 elections was preceded by a discussion, in which Matuš Dula and others recommended continued passivity. For more details see: PODRIMAVSKÝ, Slovenská národná strana, ref. 2, p. 63-73. It is interesting that a similar conceptual question was also solved by the leadership of the Rumanian National Party. The conception of activism triumphed in 1881, when the Rumanian National Party was formed from the merging of two Rumanian political parties. It meant the implementation of the conception of Rumanian politicians from Banát and Hungary at the expense of the passivist line of the Rumanian politicians from Transylvania. For more details see: BOIA, Lucian. Relationships between Romanians, Czechs and Slovaks (1848 – 1914). Bucharest: Editura Academiei Republicii Socialiste România, 1977, p. 63-64.

24 Volebná porada národnej strany slovenskej. (Electoral meeting of the Slovak National Party). In Sloven-
Summary

This election campaign text expresses the basic ideological starting points of the SNP, which long formed the essential argumentation base of the Martin patriots. They can generally be summarized in the following points:

– A typical feature is argumentation appealing to God. The Slovak demands represent God’s intentions. The opponents of the Slovaks are depicted as being on the opposite side of the value spectrum: as representatives of evil. Naturally, this means the Magyars, who are really fighting against God.

– The Memorandum is proclaimed as a historic fact. In a certain sense, Slovak history begins with the events of June 1861. There is no emphasis here on the demand for a defined region or other specific aims. It is mainly a matter of the symbolic legitimation of the SNP as the successors of Daxner and Moyses. It is no accident that these personalities will be systematically placed on the pedestal of the national canon. The message of the Memorandum is national unity and the declared national individuality. This document contains the expression of national self-consciousness.

– By means of the cult of the Memorandum, the SNP declares that it is the exclusive representative of the nation. Later this will be expressed even more precisely, when this party declares itself to be the nation as such (pars pro toto; see below).

Vajanský developed these central points in the ideology of the conservatives in the following two texts. By means of them, I will point to further foundations of the ideology of the Martin leadership of the SNP, which were expressed especially in the programme of the SNP after the 1881 elections.

All the seven deadly sins have triumphed over God’s eternal truth – the ideological results of electoral defeat in 1881.

The elections, presented in the previous text as a struggle between good and evil, ended in the crushing failure of the SNP. In the context of the political activity declared before the elections it was an extraordinarily serious event. Its importance lay not so much on the practical, but mainly on the conceptual level. On this occasion, Vajanský wrote the crucial text: Our present position (Slovenské pohľady, 1881).

The starting point of the text is definition of the exclusive status of the SNP. However, its essence cannot be captured by means of the political category: “Slovak journalists have sometimes written that we are more than a mere political party: [emphasized in the original] This is fortunate for us. [emphasized by K. H.] Whoever looks at us only as a mere political party (as our opponents and scandalmongers do) will see a sad, unsuccessfully ploughed field. We can add to the above statement without paradox that at present

ské pohľady, 1881, year 1, no. 3, p. 287.

25 In this matter, it is necessary to add that the historic message of the Memorandum significantly differs from Vajanský’s conception analysed in this study. The Memorandum emphasizes the harmonious coexistence of Slovaks and Magyars on the principle of equality. Compare with the text of the Memorandum: Memorandum národa slovenského. (The Memorandum of the Slovak nation). In ELIAŠ, Michal (ed.). Z prameňov národa. Na pamiatku stodvadsiateho piateho výročia vzniku Memoranda slovenského národa z roku 1861. Martin : Matica slovenská, 1988, p. 257-262.

26 For more details see: PODRIMAVSKÝ, Slovenská národná strana, ref. 2, p. 71-72.

27 HURBAN, Svetozár. Náš dnešný stav (Our present position). In Slovenské pohľady, 1881, year 1, no. 6, p. 481-484.
we are less than a political party.” [emphasized in the original] Vajanský consistently outlines a further characteristic feature of his ideology, which is optimism: “The writer of these lines has never expressed in his publicist works the slightest fear that the Slovak nation will perish due to present day Magyarism. On the contrary, he was always certain of an approaching brighter future.” The justification for such a positive attitude lay in the essential, but clearly unreal, weakness of the opponent: “In his frequently expressed opinion, Magyarism is essentially too small-minded, spiritually sterile, poor in resources [!], repugnant to the human sense of beauty, discouraging for the moral person, to be able to kill the Slovak element.” The following two sentences give an excellent example of the motif of the cultural superiority of the Slovaks over the Magyars, which Vajanský concretizes as the superiority of the Slovak language over Hungarian or Magyar, and, at the same time, the dependence of Magyar as a language of scholars on Slovak: “The Slovak element never concentrated its attention on Magyar scraps, while Magyar used and still uses the surplus of the Slovak spirit. Not many examples are needed: the Magyar language without Slovak elements would not be enough even for the last swine herd, let alone for the cultured.”

Then he progresses further to the heart of the matter: interpretation of defeat in the election. Vajanský deduces from the defeat the exclusiveness of the suffering of the Slovaks, and equally, the exceptional cruelty and immorality of the Magyars: “As a political party we suffered defeat everywhere, and we live only by what is in us and our efforts beyond the party political sphere. Our defeat as a party had results, which declare, on one side the ruthlessness of the opponent, and, on the other, the extent of the national misfortune. There is no example in recent history of the winning party using its victory so relentlessly as the Magyars have done.” In this context, Vajanský entirely openly and unambiguously calls for revenge, although it would require the Slovaks to deny their nature: “It [the Magyar side] beats us to the ground knocked down by brute force and arouses in us a wish for revenge alien to our nature. It is sinful and suicidal not to think of revenge! [emphasized by K. H.] Even the worm twists under the foot of its killer, and there must be enough honour and spirit in us to at least enable us to understand the anticipation and sweetness of just revenge.”

However, Magyars are not alone in their immoral struggle. They have found important allies in the Magyarones: “The victorious Magyar side with its Sancho Panso.”

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28 HURBAN, ref. 27, p. 481.
29 Compare the extracts from the same text cited below, in which Vajanský evaluates the election defeat as a national misfortune, but also a challenge to revenge.
30 It is interesting that one of the pillars of the ideology of the national unity of the Czechs and Slovaks was the conception of Czech as the language of Slovak science, or, in other words, the conception of the superiority of Czech over Slovak. This conception was, therefore, similar in structure to the cited fragment of Vajanský’s text about the relationship between Slovak and Hungarian. Compare e.g.: VLČEK, Jaroslav. Literatúra na Slovensku, její vznik, rozvoj, význam a úspěchy. Příspěvek k dějinám písemnictva československého. (Literature in Slovakia, its origin, development, significance and successes. A contribution to the history of Czechoslovak literature). Prague : Nákladem Slavíka & Borového, 1881, [2nd volume in the series: Knihovna československá (Rudolf Pokorný)], p. 58-60.
31 HURBAN, ref. 27, p. 481.
32 A character from Cervantes’ novel Don Quijote de la Mancha, a devoted servant of his master. In this
Magyaronism, was not satisfied with deadening political and national rights promised by miragelike legislation, but progressed to the elimination of private existence, penetrating the sacred privacy of the household, taking every piece of dry bread from hungry mouths.” The idea of Magyarization lacks any value and its supporters are similarly evaluated: “Magyarism, which came to power thanks to Austrian weakness, has become the only refuge of the propertied and the spiritual nihilists.” Vajanský identifies the cause of the rise of Magyarism in the pride of members of the middle and lower nobility of Hungary, who had lost their social status: “The middle and lower nobility of Hungary are losing dozens of members and the former pillars of the kingdom are transformed into a herd of paupers with proud claims for life.”

Therefore, the above mentioned Magyarones represent the economic and spiritual decline of formerly privileged groups capable of representing the Slovak people. In accordance with the ideological function of the text, Vajanský claims that apart from these renegades, the Magyars themselves represent the worst characteristics directed against the Slovaks: “A certain Magyaromaniac stated that he was angry with God for only one reason: that he had created the Slovak. This man expressed the motto of the whole winning party. However, it would be futile to cultivate the hope that such fury is exclusively a property of renegades. We have no reasons to expect better even from true Magyars. What comes from the cat also affects the mice.” In connection with the Slovak renegades and their Asiatic models, he describes our present position, namely the situation after the election defeat of 1881: “Our renegades are imitating the savagery of the Asiatic Magyar tribe. We find ourselves in such a position, defeated as a political party.” However, as he mentioned in the introduction, the SNP is fortunately not only a political party: “Yet, we are undefeated and unbroken as an elemental force, and that which raises us above the level of a mere party, cannot be taken away from us by any political savagery [emphasized by K. H.] It may finally limit us, obstruct our growth, but...
Therefore, he optimistically notes the essential weakness and cultural immaturity of the Magyar opponent.

Then Vajanský changes the orientation of his critical tone from the Magyars and Magyarones to the Slovaks and so progresses to the formulation of a programme for the further activity of the SNP. He states that not everything bad is caused by difficult circumstances. On the contrary, many necessary things do not happen because of their difficulty and immovability. This led to a basic programme definition of the Martin centre in the period of electoral passivity of the SNP. Emphasis was placed on an orientation to language, associated with the demand for the development of literature in standard written Slovak. He clearly distinguished two sides – the creators and recipients: “In the literary field, present day Magyarism does not obstruct us directly [emphasized in the original], and we would go a long in self-deception, if we claimed that we are adequately fulfilling our responsibilities – whether of those called to creative activity or of those who consume and take care of consumption.” [emphasized by K. H.] He points to the minimal possibilities for our (Slovak) people to read their own (Slovak) popular literature. In spite of this, “our people buy tens of thousands of vain and superfluous publications imported by bookbinders and shopkeepers”.

This imported literature had a negative impact on the intellectual level of the Slovak people: “The immense quantity of Budapest rubbish spreads stupidity through our region.” Therefore, he appeals for the systematic writing of instructive and entertaining works, since the educated groups support appropriate literature to a sufficient degree. This demand flows mainly from a fundamental ideological principle: “However, we not only write and read for ourselves, we do not raise the Slovak flag only for ourselves, but for our people, the people, who preserve their own and our nationality, speech and customs.”

This was inevitably associated with the abandonment of intervention in public affairs: “Our messy villages, roads in unusable condition, industry not only does not flow through new channels, but also formerly flourishing industries dry up one after the other. The old receded, but the present Magyar current, rich in phrases and fanaticism, could not initiate new beginnings. The more sources of income disappear, the faster demands grow. The Slovak National Party cannot positively prevent these and similar problems. It is powerless against the disruptive forces, which take a diabolical pleasure in negating and only negating.”

To summarize, public affairs are extraordinarily unfavourable for the Slovaks and the SNP is not able to change this situation, but it is able to develop and maintain our present position by means of literature. The aim of this effort is to be prepared for the expected redemption: “It is necessary to admit without self-deception that our present position does not justify strong hopes of early and vigorous progress. However, what is certain and what we can rely on is that our present position guarantees that we will survive [emphasized in the original].” This is naturally proved by the existence of Slovak literature in spite of the destructive negation of our whole life. Vajanský assures the Slovaks that as long as Slovak literature continues to develop, “we need not fear

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38 HURBAN, ref. 27, p. 483.
that we will not survive with vigour and individuality until the happy hour of our final redemption!”

“The Slovak pupil must be skilful and diligent, if he wants to survive in the evil pack of Magyar and Magyarone slime.” (S. H. Vajanský in the text Slovak Youth)

As an ideologue, Vajanský knew that agitation had to be oriented towards the young. His text Slovak Youth contains various essential elements of his ideological profile. The text begins with a classic or classically expressive statement of Magyar sins against individual groups in the Slovak community. From this, he progresses to the young: “Modern Magyarism has not sinned” against any component of public life to such a degree as “against the Slovak youth”. Vajanský meant this really seriously, and emphasized it by predicting the worst fate for the Magyarizers of Slovak youth, which awaited them from the judgement of God: “When God, laying aside his patience, weighs the sins of the oppressors of the Slovak nation, the scales, weighed down by the sins committed against the Slovak youth, will fall low, even into Hades.”

In this text, Vajanský also clearly expresses his concept of the cultural superiority of the Slovaks over the Magyars. Moreover, he denies the possible interpretation of his negative attitude to the Magyars, according to which he thinks only of the ruling, publicly active Magyars. On the contrary, Magyars are essentially less valuable, they are people of lower quality. He points to this, when comparing Slovak and Magyarone pupils, the latter being comparable to Magyars: “The young Slovak is pure as a mountain spring in the Tatras. Whoever has the spirit to say today, ‘I am a Slovak’, must be pure and blameless. The Slovak pupil must be skilful and diligent, if he wants to survive in the evil pack of Magyar and Magyarone slime.” In this context, he formulates a further ideological principle – the linguistic definition of the Slovak nation. Language or speech is not only a means of communication, its significance must be sought in the sacred sphere: “A person for whom speech is nothing other than a means for expressing his everyday thoughts, will not join the quiet, sad circle of Slovaks. For them, language is something higher, more sacred, more precious. Threatened property acquires value.”

Vajanský’s educational programme is unambiguously composed of Slavonic languages and the building of Slavonic patriotism. Slovak youth does not need the official

39 HURBAN, ref. 27, p. 483-484.
40 HURBAN, Slovenská mládež. (Slovak Youth). In Slovenské pohľady, 1882, year 2, no. 2, p. 97-99.
41 It is characteristic that Vajanský declares on one side that: “We do not press charges. In the eyes of today’s cynicism, an accusation would be both pointless and would only entertain our tormentors.” At the same time, however, he enumerates the specific expressions of Magyar policy: “In recent times they have sinned against the Slovak nation so relentlessly, as never before. The history of this Slavonic tribe below the Carpathians is a mere martyrology. All regulations, laws, decrees and measures only have validity here, if their aim is the destruction and complete eradication of the Slovak nation.” See: HURBAN, ref. 40, p. 97.
42 On the other hand, he presents the much scorned Magyaronism as an understandable, even inevitable phenomenon: “Slovak youth must breathe in such an atmosphere. It is not surprising that the majority of sons of Slovaks succumb, are denationalized and become killers of their own blood. It is a wonder and a miracle that it is still possible to speak of Slovak youth, that the last son of a Slovak mother has not fallen in the terrible, unequal struggle.” See: HURBAN, ref. 40, p. 98.
43 Hurban, ref. 40, p. 98.
teaching. They must acquire the necessary knowledge in the private sphere: "If our youth is to remain true to their ideals, their fathers, their nation, if they are to fortify themselves with diligence and constancy, and not be satisfied with the shabby wisdom of the professors, they must prepare themselves for life privately. Study of their language and of Slavonic languages in general strengthens love of the nation in young breasts. Happy the Slavonic person! A Slavonic movement in the whole world. In all directions it bangs, disturbs and prepares for change and new life. New electricity circulates in the veins of humanity. How great, how beautiful it is to be a participant in great events, even if you are small and unknown. The Slavs are facing towards light, action and day!" 

Summary
The SNP as the exclusive representative of the whole nation reaches beyond its importance in the political sphere. Politics is dominated by the savagery of the Magyars.

– Use of absolute opposites was typical of Vajanský as an ideologue: the Slovaks suffer most among all the nations in the world, while the Magyars show the greatest cruelty.

– In spite of this, Vajanský is basically optimistic. He argues that the leadership of the SNP is able to maintain the existing state until the expected redemption arrives. The idea of Russophilia is naturally hidden behind this.

– The electoral failure of 1881 led to the SNP deciding to give up trying to participate in public affairs, and to direct its activity towards the private sphere. This activity was primarily defined by the cultivation of standard written Slovak and specifically by the development of Slovak popular literature. There was also a clear emphasis on the teaching of Slavonic languages, under which it is necessary to understand especially Russian.

2. Historical elements in the national ideology of S. H. Vajanský
Slovakia and its literary life

In this important programme setting article, which formed the introduction to the first issue of the revived periodical Slovenské pohľady, Vajanský followed the example of his father’s article in the first issue of the periodical Slovenskje pohľadi na vedi, umeňja

44 Similar arguments, were given, for example, by Elena Maróthy-Šoltésová. See: SOLTÉSZOVÁ, Elena. Dozvuky ku poslednému valnému shromaždeniu Živeny. (Reverberations from the last general meeting of Živena). In Slovenské pohľady, 1882, year 2, no. 5, p. 433-437. In the context of research into the history of the Slovak women’s movement, this text gives a good illustration of the prioritizing of national demands over the demand for the emancipation of women. The valuable thing was not the education of women as such, but Slovak education, although limited to the private sphere. Compare, e.g.: “Let us cultivate in our homes the pure flame of love, let us not make our hearths dirty with expensively bought slaves, which bring the poison of treason to us for our money! What they drive out of the council chambers, the universities and the whole of public life, should find a sanctuary in the pure female breast, in the quiet refuge of Slovak homes!” See: SOLTÉSZOVÁ, ref. 44, p. 437.

45 HURBAN, ref. 40, p. 99.

a literatúra (Slovak views of science, art and literature) from 1846. It had become, in Vajanský’s words, “the symbol of the resurrection of Slovak consciousness”. Vajanský set himself the aim of critically assessing the optimism of Jozef Miloslav Hurban after 35 years. He asks the question, whether the Slovak nation “has the right to reality, development and life before the judgement seat of the spirit, thought and ideas”. The fundamental problem of the existence of the Slovaks as a fully developed national entity is solved primarily using historical argumentation.

According to Vajanský, the Slovak nation has inhabited its territory since time immemorial, and survived without injury the raids of temporary occupiers such as the Heruli, Rugii and Langobardi. The Slovaks also survived the invasion of the Magyars, who “did not cut the roots, but, at most, cut off some of the branches”, which is a clear allusion to the Slovak yeomen (zemiansťo) (see below). He dates the first period of Magyar rule to the brief period 894 – 955. He does not exactly date the second period, but he expresses doubt about whether it is possible to speak of Magyar rule from the year 1031, when, according to Vajanský, the Slovaks were incorporated into the Kingdom of Hungary. In reality, the rule of a foreign nationality over the Slovaks can be spoken of only in the most recent period of triumphant Magyarization. The history of the Slovaks is divided between two states or kingdoms: Great Moravia and Hungary. However, our poverty – the poverty of the Slovak nation does not result from this division, but from the internal division into the Latinized nobility and the mass of the nation or the people. Thus, Vajanský identifies with the aristocratic definition of the Slovak nation. According to him, the basic differentiation between the people and the nobility was also usual in other nations, but in contrast to the Slovaks, “the Polish, Spanish and Russian nobilities remained on the same national soil as their peoples...” On the other hand, the mass of the nation “can be the preserver of nationality, but never the bearer of great national achievement”.

Therefore, the feudal social differentiation was not the true cause of our poverty. This state derived from the estrangement of the nobility from their national essence, when they lost their connection with the mass of the nation: “A strange fate developed among us, with not only a feudal division between the people and the yeomen, but a difference of essence, so that our Slovak aristocracy lost the Carpathian granite under their feet, took off into the air and remain there until today!” This estrangement of essence, this loss of the ground under their feet, has its roots in the distant past: “Losing and forgetting the national truth dates from the earliest times.” He saw a deviation from this development in Matúš Čák, “who began to connect what the ages had divided”. Later, the Martin centre did not build up the image of Matúš Čák as a Slovak hero. At the beginning of the 1880s, the ideologues of the SNP did not have this element worked

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48 Vajanský did not define the territory, but it is interesting that he dates it from 894, the year of Svätopluk’s death.

49 HURBAN, ref. 46, p. 1.
out. However, in this case, it testifies to Vajanský’s emphasis on the independence or autonomy of Slovakia.

The Magyars did not play any role in this process of estrangement: “After the Battle of Mohács, the Magyars lost the little influence they had on Slovak life, and for 145 years they were nullified.” 50 The Slovaks preserved the independence and name of the Hungarian state in relation to the outside powers – the Turks and the Habsburgs. In spite of this “they lost themselves, their clear understanding and consciousness of their own existence!” He saw the cause of this situation unambiguously in the Slovak yeomen, because in his view, neither the burghers, to a large extent composed of German emigrants, nor the peasant farmers, could represent the nation. Only the yeomen could do that, but they did not use this potential. Vajanský found the cause of this inability in Latinism, which tore this group away from the national truth. 51 This “free and property class threw itself into a dead language”. This was connected with the psychological phenomenon of estrangement, which appeared at the time of the coming of Magyarization, which was connected with the struggle against the Germanization of Joseph II. The Slovak nobility, accustomed to foreignness, had no problem replacing one foreignness with another. In contrast to the Magyar nobility, the representatives of the Slovak nation in the period of the decline of Latin did not return to their original language, but, instead, began to accept the Magyar language. 52

The intelligentsia returned to national consciousness or to the embrace of the Slovak mother. Vajanský calls these leading representatives of the national movement great spirits and Slovak apostles: Ján Kollár, Pavol Jozef Šafárik, Ľudovít Štúr, Ján Holly, Andrej Sládkovič, Samo Chalupka, Jonáš Záborský, Ján Botto, Ľudovít Žello, Viliam Pauliny, Karol Kuzmány. He considered their appearance in the given conditions as a historical miracle and their work as evidence of the right of the Slovaks to exist. He could positively answer the question stated in the introduction to the text: Does this community “maintain its life before the judgement seat of the spirit, thought and ideas”. The basic message of the article also flows from this. The orientation of the programme of the Slovak national movement has to pursue the development of literature and intellectual abilities. The programme so-defined is strictly political. 53 The concluding idea points to this: “Make Slovakia into Slovakia by actions and its literary life will prepare a broad highway to the glorious political life, which awaits us in the near future.” 54

The Slovak yeomen 55

The main idea of this article – the estrangement of the Slovak yeomen from the mass of the nation – is continued in the text The Slovak yeomen published in the next

50 Vajanský had already defined Magyar culture as actually a “non-culture”. See: TARANENKOVÁ, Potvrďovanie, ref. 10, p. 118.
51 HURBAN, ref. 46, p. 2.
52 HURBAN, ref. 46, p. 3.
53 Taranenková already pointed to this. See: TARANENKOVÁ, ref. 8, p. 42.
54 HURBAN, ref. 46, p. 4.
issue of *Slovenské pohľady*. Vajanský explains that he is not writing about the yeomen again in an attempt to win them back to the national community: “We are not returning to this theme for the purpose of agitation, our words are not addressed to the yeomen, the Slovak spirit has found other vessels apart from them, and its temple may be built on their final demolition.” Interest in the yeomen derives from their Slovak origin. The group needs to be studied only because of interest in history. “We have to talk about them only as an archaeologist talks about mummies or the researcher into Culm-flora about long extinct plants.”

Vajanský repeats the view already stated in the previous article, that: “The misfortune of the Slovak nation is closely connected with the misfortune of the Slovak nobility.” He starts from the conviction that the “yeomen were the flower of our nation”, which means nothing other than the high position of the Slovak yeomen in the Hungarian social structure: “our purely Slovak yeomen did not hang about in the anti-chambers of the powerful, but had free access to the highest dignities. It is a well-known and exhausted matter.”

Vajanský updates his historical axiom to the period of Dualism: “Our yeomen, organized in the Slovak National Party in parliament and outside it, would not have to be content with sinecures granted by charity... The weight of this party would be much greater than the weight of the present Croatian delegation in the Hungarian Parliament.”

The yeomen of the time actually occupy a much lower place on the social ladder. They are lackeys of the aristocracy or candidates for the poorer sinecures. He emphasizes that the Slovak yeomen are to blame for this: “Renegadism threw them from the throne of independent existence...” Magyarization excludes the eventual influence of the yeomen (“it is equal to zero”).

On the other hand, the Slovak renegades form a substantial element of the Magyars: “‘No Turk without a Turkified renegade’ say the Serbs, and among us no Magyar without a Magyarized renegade. ... In this lies the certain ruin of the Slovak yeoman class.”

Vajanský summarizes his considerations with the statement that the Slovaks have to do without the yeomen, they had to develop, if not for themselves, then, at least, because of their membership of a larger body – the Slavonic world. In this sense, the yeomen are not necessary. In the name of the Slovaks, Vajanský concludes: “We are very content about our future life, but our hearts are in pain over the loss of so much strength, which we will still lack, and those who joined up with the strength we lost bear the seeds of certain dissolution.”

Summary

In Vajanský’s interpretation, the Slovaks in Hungary were not only autochthonous, but also a nation with extraordinary qualities. The Slovak nobility belonged to the elite.
In spite of this, it was Latinized and denationalized. Therefore, the Slovak nation was responsible for its own bad position.

– In his national conception, the people did not play the primary role. He divided the nation into the mass and its representatives. The mass can only fulfill the function of preserving the nationality it can never represent the nation.

– In these texts, Vajanský did not incline to classic event history, but worked with a rather generally conceived chronology.

– The classic motif of Great Moravia as the “golden age” is absent. The dissolution of Great Moravia and the formation of the Kingdom of Hungary was not fatal for the Slovak nation. Vajanský perceived Hungary as a feudal state, in which the representatives of the individual nations communicated in a dead language, rather negatively, but he did not regard these factors as the essential problem. He defined the basic problem as the long term loss of connection between the Slovak nobility and the ordinary people, as a result of which the Slovak privileged classes did not take up the role of representing their nation. By accepting Latin and later Magyar, they gave priority to the foreign over their own. It is necessary to observe that Vajanský did not consider that foreign nations had an influence on this process, and certainly not the Magyars, who remained on the margins of social activity until the end of the 18th century.

– In the context of the historical thinking of the time, it is necessary to observe Vajanský’s tendency to see in Matúš Čák a connection between the nobility and the mass of the nation. However, it was not a central argument. Matúš Čák as a Slovak ruler later entirely faded from the historical ideology of the Martin centre of the SNP.61

– The national intelligentsia took over the role of representative of the nation from the estranged nobility.

– Slovak national life is, therefore, defined by means of the national literature.

– The Slovak nation is not an independent entity, but a member of the Slavonic whole. It is not responsible only for itself, but must also take into account the Slavonic body. The obligation of the intelligentsia as the representatives of the nation to develop literary life derives from this.

The negation of event history and rejection in principle of research into historic times “I cannot imagine the connection between the present Slovak nation and the nation of Svätopluk.” (S. H. Vajanský in the text Živá starina)

In the article Slovak culture (1885) Vajanský expressed ideas that arouse the impression of a critical historian, inveighing against etymologizing62 and the romantic search for a glorious past: “In fact, our ‘ancient Slavonic’ fantasies, well intended curiosity, invented without firm foundations, games with words and their sounds and so on, theories without value, poetry in science, prose in poetry, all remained unnoticed and did not bring us any benefit, at most they blew up a straw fire, arousing loudmouthed tastes in

61 However, Matúš Čák was an integral part of the historical ideology of the supporters of the national unity of the Czechs and Slovaks, in connection with the concept of an independent Slovakia. See: ref. 108.

62 Compare e.g.: OTČENÁŠ, Michal. František Víťazoslav Sasinek (Príspevok k jeho životu a dielu). (František Víťazoslav Sasinek (A contribution to his life and work)). Košice : Slovo, 1995, p. 53.
uncritical people. We must progress to a pragmatic, real method. As far as possible, it is necessary to collect and preserve materials, to encourage and inspire people to undertake work in this direction." It is clear from the quotation that Vajanský was aware of the change of discourse in comparison with the periods of Štúr and Matica slovenská. In the 1880s, uncritical appeals to a glorious history were ever more counter productive from the point of view of national agitation.

However, even in later texts, Vajanský had no problem appealing to entirely undocumented autochthonicity. Therefore, the main sense of these ideas must be sought elsewhere. I think that with the challenge to the real or pragmatic method, Vajanský showed a tendency to the complete negation of event history as a research programme, in favour of the cultivation of ethnography. This is fully expressed in the texts Living antiquity and Moods and views. In them, he presents his specific view of Slovak history. He considers that the standard content of historical narrative, for example, political history, was unnecessary.65

Living antiquity66

I regard this text as the basic source for Vajanský’s historical ideology. Apart from the theoretical level, it is necessary to see in it a connection with the formulation of a programme and conception for the museum being established at the “House”. A further dimension of this text is the definite rejection of the idea of a scientific society as pro-

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63 HURBAN V AJANSKÝ, Svetozár. Slovenská kultúra. (Slovak Culture). In HURBAN V AJANSKÝ, Štate, ref. 5 [originally in the Národných novinách, 1885, nos. 68-71], p. 23-24.

64 He already expressed himself entirely clearly on this matter in 1883: “It is not necessary to prove the need for ethnographic studies. In our age, the best minds are taking great interest in ethnography. It is not only important as an individual discipline, but extends strongly into other sciences, even into the fine arts. Believe me, ethnology and ethnography, not historical junk, preserve and liberate nations. History is only a mummy, but ethnography is a living body. If we preserve the living body, we will live.” [emphasized by K. H.] Cited according to: PROFANTOVÁ, Zuzana. Tendencie v slovenskej folkloristike na prelome storočí. (Tendencies in Slovak folklore studies at the turn of the century). In PODRIMAVSKÝ, Milan – KOVÁČ, Dušan (eds.). Slovensko na začiatku 20. storočia (Spoločnosť, štát a národ v súradníctiach doby). Zborník štúdií. Bratislava : Historický ústav SA V; Polygrafia SA V , 1999 [originally in the Národné noviny 1883, no. 32], p. 252; see also: PROFANTOVÁ, ref. 3, p. 69.

65 He also expressed this tendency in the review of Vlček’s Dejín literatúry slovenskej (History of Slovak literature). He stated his view on the formal requirements of a historical text: “We do not want to see oddments or the behind the scenes view, but a complete picture, a complete perspective! We want a history of ideas and not a list of names, the spirit and not a mass of letters. It is necessary to have material together, to embrace the whole, to know at the beginning how the end will look. It is necessary to prove the need for literature, the categorical imperative of its existence, which is a fact just as the heat and light of the Sun, the firmness of the Earth or the gravity between bodies are facts!” See: HURBAN V AJANSKÝ, Svetozár. Živá starina (Living antiquity) i. In Národnie noviny, 6 Sept 1890, year 21, no. 104, p. 2.

66 HURBAN VAJANSKÝ, Svetozár. Živá starina (Living antiquity) I. In Národnie noviny, 27 Nov 1890, year 21, no. 139, p. 1; HURBAN VAJANSKÝ, Svetozár. Živá starina II. In Národnie noviny, 29 Nov 1890, year 21, no. 140, p. 1.

67 See the latest study of this institution in the volume: KUNOVSKÁ, Vlasta (ed.). Načo je národu Dom... Význam Národného domu v kulturno-spoločenských dejinách Slovenska. (Why a House for the nation... The importance of the National House in the cultural and social history of Slovakia). (Expert seminar on the occasion of the 110th anniversary of the opening of the National House). Martin : Divadlo Slovenského národného povstania, 2002, 126 p.
posed by Andrej Kmet. Soon after this publication, the Národnie noviny published the text: Proposal to collect ethnographic data for the museum in the “House” (according to the programme of the Geographical Society in St. Petersburg). The two texts need to be seen in connection with each other. The programme of the St. Petersburg ethnographers formulated purely ethnographic requirements, by which they defined the essential subjects of research. Four areas were specified: “I. Physical characteristics, exteriority; II. Mental and moral development; III. Language, national traditions and monuments; IV. Domestic life.” According to Vajanský, such research would enable the creation of a true image of our people. This important aim would be achievable with appropriate organization. If there was interest from our community “we [Slovaks] could easily collect a substantial part of our living antiquity”.

Every part of the programme is described in detail in the text. The collection of material documenting national history is clearly limited. The research tasks were dominated by obtaining information such as “the form of nose, ... whether arms and legs are long or short”, or “whether [the researched people] easily accept ideas and in what cases” and so on. I found only two tasks relating to history. The first appears in the context of the first area: “Whether the inhabitants are autochthonous or came to the region. In the second case, are there written records or oral traditions of when, from where and in what circumstances they came?” Vajanský added to this task in brackets, that it would be important for the Slovaks of the Low Lands and Germans in Turiec and Nitra. In this way, he expressed his conviction on the autochthonicity of the Slovaks.

The second task relating to history is found in the third area of the programme: “Description of national monuments: hillforts, barrows, old abandoned settlements, cemeteries, caves about which there are stories. Whether such places have been excavated, what was found, and where are the finds?” However, even here it is not directly about


69 V[janský]: Návrh plánu pri sbieraní ethnografických dát pre Muzeum “Domu” (dľa programu geografického spolku v Petrohrade). (Proposal to collect ethnographic data for the museum in the “House” (according to the programme of the Geographical Society in St. Petersburg)). In Národnie noviny, 6 Dec 1890, year 21, no. 143, p. 1-2.

70 V[janský]: ref. 69, p. 2.

71 V[janský]: ref. 69, p. 1.
collecting archaeological material. It is enough to record the state of these monuments and their reflection in folk tales.

Thus, Vajanský wrote two introductions to this specific programme in the Národnie noviny. In them, he stated the importance of the key term living antiquity for Slovak society. It was an application of the idea of Vladimir I. Lamanskij (1833–1914), contained in an introductory article to the periodical of the above mentioned St. Petersburg institution: Živaja starina (Living Antiquity). The fact that Lamanskij wrote for the Russians did not weaken but rather strengthened the importance of his text for the Slovaks: “He blew a fresh breeze into the political emptiness of our age, and if Lamanskij spoke first of all about the needs of his own nation, he can be understood as also speaking about us. Already from the very title of his publication, it is as if he grew up a Slovak in spirit.”

Living antiquity is the foundation on which “we must build our national temple”. Vajanský begins his explanation with a negation of the traces of the past: “Among us there is hardly any dead antiquity.” He develops this idea into the complete negation of the importance of studying history. He regards the researchers into the Slovak past with respect, but he does not find the importance of their work for the nation: “I cannot imagine the connection between today’s Slovak nation and the nation of Svätopluk.” An abyss separates these two nations, and no research into dead antiquity, that is into historical times has overcome it up to now. The Slovak people were untouched by history: [our people] “have retained nothing from historical times in their souls and memories. Dead antiquity was nothing to them. It happened, it passed above them like clouds, but did not affect them.” The Slovak people remember nothing from the historical times about which the chroniclers write, they remember only prehistoric times. Therefore, the Slovak people have access to exclusive knowledge about times on which the chroniclers are silent. “They made a wild leap from the primeval ages to our own days. What lies between the prehistoric and present eras has no internal connection with the nation and its life up to now.” From the point of view of Vajanský’s historical ideology, these ideas had serious consequences: “In the end, our present state, the thinking of our people, their memories, the way they remember, do not entitle us to draw consequences from old times for today [emphasized by K. H.]”

In the framework of this philosophy of history, the Slovak nation is without a past, which naturally means that it is not necessary to research “dead antiquity” or historical periods. Such research cannot give the Slovaks anything. This absolute rejection of the past derives from a further element in his philosophy of history. He divides the traces of the past into the absolutely unnecessary, or even dangerous for the Slovaks (“it only kills our nationality”) namely unfantastic, real traces such as names and dates, and their opposite, namely poetry. However, the Slovaks jumped over the historical period, and

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V. I. Lamanskij was an important representative of the St. Petersburg Slavophils. His many-sided activity was also oriented towards cooperation with the representatives of the Slovak national movement. He was also the secretary and later the chairman of the ethnographic section of the Russian Geographical Society. See: MATULA, Vladimír. V. I. Lamanskij a Slovensko. (V. I. Lamanskij and Slovakia.). in Slovanské štúdie IX, Bratislava : Vydavateľstvo Slovenskej akadémie vied, 1967, p. 138 and 142. For more details on Lamanskij’s activities see p. 138-147.
even “poetry could not revive in us our dead antiquity, even when such great spirits as Hollý threw themselves into it”.

However, the absence of history did not mean the least cause for pessimism.\textsuperscript{73} The Slovaks are not historical relics, which “trail with trembling limbs towards the grave or the archaeological museum”. Next he expresses satisfaction with the fact that such a fate does not threaten the Slovaks. The absence of history is much more advantageous: “We see much more in the fact that we have still not experienced our age.” The state of forgetting among the Slovaks is “a natural characteristic of a very young age”. This leads to a basic practical consequence: “We are not destined for a museum, but for life. Our history is in front of us, like the biography of a young person.” In the interest of the best possible form for this biography, it is necessary to study Slovak living antiquity.\textsuperscript{74}

Vajanský is more specific in the second part of his programme essay. In his appeals for the establishment of a scientific society and a natural science periodical, A. Kmet\' usually received the reply from the Martin patriots: “It is not time for it”. In the following quotation, Vajanský developed and made more specific this general reply: ‘There were calls for ‘science’, for a ‘scientific periodical’! They were sincere calls, but it was putting the son before the father. What place is there for science, when we still do not have the material collected, what house, when we have not gathered the stones? No, what we want is the study of living antiquity, but still not science. What is done among us is not decorated with this word. Speaking sincerely, we, as a group threatened with dying out, do not need science in the strict sense of the word. ... Science is a ripe fruit and we still have not dug the hole to plant the tree.” He did not think the scientist in the role of a classifier of collected material was necessary at the time, and he did not expect that a scientist could produce any satisfactory results in the given situation. The urgent task of collecting the living antiquity excluded scientific effort: “Action costs something, not longing for some scientific utopia.” In accordance with the view he had expressed, he demanded a non-scientific person: “What we want can be done by a non-scientific person, somebody intellectually energetic, with the right feeling, diligent and accurate.”\textsuperscript{75}

Summary
– Vajanský is working here with his typical basic opposition between our own and the foreign. From the point of view of history, the foreign comprises preserved traces of the past, that is – dead antiquity. The history that can be read in historical texts is foreign in character for the Slovaks and investigation of it is unnecessary or even undesirable.

– The mass of the nation or the people is described as in the preceding texts. However, in Living antiquity, its function of preserver of the nationality is made definite by means of the memory of national qualities from the most ancient past.

– Vajanský presents here a specific form of the discontinuous conception of Slovak history, in which the mass of the Slovak nation experienced an initially ideal situation but then fell asleep. It will awake in the modern age unaffected by history and with full

\textsuperscript{73} Vajanský analysed this idea in another introduction. See: HURBAN VAJANSKÝ, Svetozár. Prečo my nie sme pessimisti. (Why we are not pessimists). In Národnie noviny, 4 March 1890, year 21, no. 26, p. 1.

\textsuperscript{74} HURBAN VAJANSKÝ, Živá starina I., ref. 66.

\textsuperscript{75} HURBAN VAJANSKÝ, Živá starina II., ref. 66.
potential for further life. In this way, Vajanský indirectly expressed the superiority of the Slovaks over other nations whose peoples did not preserve such original qualities and were literally marked by history.

– The mention of Svätopluk’s nation is important. In this conception, Great Moravia is just as foreign for the Slovak nation as any other period. Referring to it is only a vain search for dead antiquity.

– The people have preserved their original Slovak identity and so they represent the only necessary direction for Slovak research activities. Vajanský clearly declares that this research does not have to go beyond the limits of pure ethnography, and so he rejects in principle scientific research or classification. The only aim is to collect and conserve rare material concerning the original Slovak identity.

Moods and views

In this series of articles from the Národnie noviny from 1897, also published in a separate brochure, Vajanský presented his ideology of the national movement in its most compact form. With regard for his position as the leading ideologue, it was also an ideological manifesto of the whole Martin centre. From the point of view of research into historical ideology, it is important that the conception of history from Living antiquity is developed and made more precise here.

Vajanský set himself the aim of introducing his period. He considered it a national duty that our older representatives had not fulfilled. “They published in folio format the War of the Divine Titus against the Jews, written in Greek by the Jew Josephus Flavius (37 AD), wrote tomes about America and Palestine, stories about Krakúses, leviathans and mermaids, but they left almost nothing about themselves and their times. In particular, they did not leave their views and feelings, so that we unfortunate descendants stand before a dark space, in which we know that our nation breathed, worked, suffered, bled, sinned, performed good deeds quarrelled and united in harmony, loved and hated.” This leads to a basic evaluation of Slovak history as essentially more valuable in comparison with world history: “if the suffering of the Jerusalemites besieged
by Titus was terrible, as the folio volumes teach us in our language and the Germans in their language, and if it is interesting to know how Columbus discovered America and Cortez destroyed the tame nation of the Aztecs,\textsuperscript{81} then the \textit{chronicle of the suffering of our nation} [emphasized by K. H.] is closer to us,\textsuperscript{82} and it is more interesting to know how Slovak thinking heads perceived the world and what was happening around them. As a result of the orientation towards non-Slovak problems “our antiquity is covered in impenetrable darkness”. Researching the past has no sense precisely because of the neglect of recording Slovak moods in the past: “It is already lost and we suffer for that loss, therefore, we scrape so hard from the pit of historical nothingness, dug by a harsh oppressor: ... We have nothing in our hands, the unfortunate descendants of lazy fathers!”\textsuperscript{83}

Thus, Vajanský wanted to pass on the \textit{mood of our nation}. He wanted to limit the description of the past to the essential minimum: “what is really necessary for understanding things and for those who read our journal but are not versed in our poorly recorded history of past years”.\textsuperscript{84} He deliberately directed his attention to the more recent history, because early history is “deformed by later lies, it is not scientifically worked out and full of fantasies”. Before the actual core of the text, Vajanský did not forget to comment that his account does not have a scientific character. The aim of the text is to interpret the \textit{spirit and character of our age}, as well as “of the ages before ours, which are ascertained and supported by dates”.\textsuperscript{85}

Vajanský started the central part of the text with a definition of the Slovak nation: “The Slovak nation is age-old, going back to a prehistoric ethnographic individuality [emphasized in the original] with a sharply defined territory, but with its ethnographic colour in frontier regions approaching that of neighbouring Slavonic ethnographic indivi-

\textsuperscript{81} The contemporary significance of this example in the sense of the conquering Magyar nation and the tame Slovaks is clear.


\textsuperscript{83} [HURBAN VAJANSKÝ], ref. 76, p. 6.

\textsuperscript{84} [HURBAN VAJANSKÝ], ref. 76, p. 7

\textsuperscript{85} [HURBAN VAJANSKÝ], ref. 76, p. 8. It is necessary to add here that Vajanský already admitted at the beginning that he would give a subjective account. He was resigned to subjectivity because: “entirely measured objectivity will not be and never was”. Starting from this assumption, he proposes an alternative definition of the objectivity of the writer, which lies in avoiding partiality: “Objectivity will lie only in the effort of the writer to tell the truth according to his view, as he sees it, and avoid partiality [emphasized in the original], that is an aim set in advance to support or oppose one thing with another. Partiality has short breath.” See: [HURBAN VAJANSKÝ], ref. 76, p. 3.
Thus, the argument of antiquity, a classic feature of the historical thinking of the time, is also present here. However, Vajanský’s specific feature lies on emphasis on Slavonic ethnographic individuality. The motif of the Slavs developed into the form that any merging of the Slovaks inhabiting marginal parts of their territory with other Slavonic nations can be welcomed in the most extreme case because “they undeniably remain our brothers in one family.”

As in Living antiquity, he is convinced that the Slovak nation preserved its language, stories, songs, customs and finally also memories from prehistoric existence. All this testifies to its tenacity. However, it was also “forgetful and indifferent where building historical monuments to its existence was concerned”. In other words, it preserved the essence or substance of nationality, but it did not give these qualities “artistic or visible form”. Just as in Living antiquity, he regards traces of art as the only value in national history. The absence of art equals the absence of history. However, it does not mean non-historicness: “Thus, not non-historicness, as we thought (indeed things happened, people bled, worked and created things), but absence of artistic feeling or creativity, which would fix the past in stone, pillars, castles, literature, poetry, statues, houses, temples and towns.”

The absence of history does not result from the weak intelligence of the Slovaks in the past: “Our nation was not any more primitive than the Bavarians or the Saxons, our highland regions were the most educated, the most developed in the Kingdom of Hungary.” Neither was their legal status lower: “They were not more enslaved than other nations. Even the reverse – hills and mountains are always defences allowing greater freedom than flat plains.” He saw the cause of the absence of art and so also of history precisely in this freedom, resulting from the character of the natural environment: “Among us, art was replaced by nature.” Vajanský then developed the relationship between nature and the nation, formulating one of his best descriptions of our own: “But it [nature] with all its beauty, cannot be an ethnographic monument, it serves everybody nevertheless. It supports a certain degree of lack of care for future days!”

In any case “our nation did not work out a conscious nationality for itself, but preserving all the elements for it, waited for nationality to come to it from outside, to be inserted by teaching, word or deed from without”. This is a key feature of his philosophy of national history. This unconscious nation “produced people from itself, who placed

86 [HURBAN VAJANSKÝ], ref. 76, p. 8.
87 Vajanský had in mind the Czecho-Moravian tribe. The situation was significantly changing in connection with the origin of Hlas and the development of the ideology of the national unity of the Czechs and Slovaks. Vajanský excluded the Czechs from his cited lack of concern over the possible merging of the Slovaks with other Slavs. He more clearly oriented himself to the east. He stated, for example, that “if I could no longer be a Slovak, I would rather merge into the Russian sea than into the Czech puddle”. See: GNIAZDOWSKI, Predstavy, ref. 4, p. 35. On the other hand, Vajanský supported the alternative variant of Czecho-Slovak or rather Moravo-Slovak cooperation, and also in the context of national ideology. See his speech from the seventh congress of Slavonic journalists (1906) in the Národnie noviny from September 1906, nos. 108-115.
88 [HURBAN VAJANSKÝ], ref. 76, p. 9.
89 [HURBAN VAJANSKÝ], ref. 76, p. 10.
90 [HURBAN VAJANSKÝ], ref. 76, p. 10-11.
themselves against it in the sense that they divided themselves from its masses...” This is clearly a reference to the familiar motif of the estrangement of the **nobility from the mass of the nation**. Then Vajanský defines the actually noble ancestry of leading figures in the **national** awakening. This flows from the continuation of the cited idea: “[... but they returned to it, to pour on it the oil of consciousness, so that they could say what he is, and give form and expression to the national being].”  

A change from third person to first and from past to present tense shows that Vajanský regarded the Martin patriots under his ideological leadership as the direct successors of these awakeners: “We are votaries of the spirit. It would be crazy to put into the masses properties they do not already have, but to awaken or develop properties the masses already have in latent form is an essential duty. Yes essential! Even if we wanted to, we could not join the immovable conglomerate of people and continue to sleep with them.”  

The conclusion of this part of the text goes further and identifies the Martin centre of the Slovak National Party (it is clear that in Vajanský’s conception no other centre exists) with the Slovak nation as such: “We are a new formation in our nation, but we emerged from it. We are not a political party, we are the nation, part for the whole, like the head in relation to a whole person.”  

The basic aim of these exclusive representatives of the nation was not primarily defined by awakening activity, but by conservation or only improvement of the existing work. The greater part of this work is concerned with the most recent history of the Slovak nation since the time of the first real awakeners. It shows a clearly visible selection of traditions and actually their canonization. The figure, who undoubtedly stands at the head of the list of patriots is Ján Hollý. Štúr and his associates are emphasized as his successors, but not Bernolák and his associates. Vajanský also places a clear emphasis on Štefan Moyses, to whom he also devoted a whole monograph (1897). Carefully, but still entirely clearly, Vajanský also selected “negative classics”:

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91 [HURBAN VAJANSKÝ], ref. 76, p. 11.  
92 [HURBAN VAJANSKÝ], ref. 76, p. 12.  
93 “But preservation is something we need to demand, we must demand. We have already done the main, hard, rough and most difficult work, to wave the hand and stop working, cease improving, refining and beautifying work already done would be a terrible mistake, it would be ‘moral insanity’. It would be a terrible mistake to abandon the great national work and leave to unconscious descendants the terrible task of starting everything from the beginning, to achieve again what was already achieved by us and our fathers! Honourable nations do not work or live like that. Only Indians from the Sioux tribe, or Hindus degraded by ancient fate live like that, but not a noble branch of the Aryan-European race: ‘gordij vnuk Slavian’!” See: [HURBAN VAJANSKÝ], ref. 76, p. 57.  
94 The creation of a national canon by means of “selection of the classics”, that is by means of creating a common memory and common “forgetting” is a characteristic feature of nationalist ideologies. For more details see: HUTCHEON, Linda. Nový pohľad na národný model. (A new look at the national model). In Slovenská literatúra, 2004, year 51, no. 2, p. 143.  
96 “The Prešporok (Bratislava) school already really approached the nation. ... The tone was different, but the continuity unbroken. The example of Hollý, not followed by Bernolák’s school, found its disciples here.” See: [HURBAN VAJANSKÝ], ref. 76, p. 20-21.  
97 HURBAN VAJANSKÝ, Svetozár. Život Štefana Moysesa. (The life of Štefan Moyses). In Storočná pamiatka narodnia Štefana Moysesa, biskupa baňsko-bystrického, Jeho veličenstva skutočného tajného...
“The Slovak language was ‘thrown out of the window’ by strong hands. The history of this throwing out by Kollár, Šafárik, Lichard, Palárik, dr. Radlinský and even Kuzmány, that is by almost the whole literary staff, had political causes and Vienna-political. Beautiful promises were conditioned by the suppression of literary Slovak.” By pointing to the principled position of his father and the associates of Štúr grouped around him, this throwing out of the window gains the clear character of moral weakness: “Only Dr. Hurban and a small group of modest people remained around the banner.”

Ján Hollý served Vajanský as the best example of his views on the latent talents of the Slovak people. He pointed to this by means of the contrast between his plebeian origin and his central function in national life: “Hollý did not come from the elite of a cultured age. He was the son of illiterate, sleeping, ignorant, primitive people, but he was the source from which the river of culture and national life was to come.”

Hollý’s value is directly connected with the fact that he was an artist and poet. He was the first to really break the basic problem present in the whole history of the Slovak nation – the absence of art: “He was the first to consciously begin to artistically depict the Slovaks [emphasized in the original] in himself and in his works: the Slovak home, Slovak nationality, Slovak history, Slovak people and Slovak fantasy.” Hollý’s work essentially continues “ordinariness” or earthliness. Hollý is a representative of God’s intention: “He grasped what past ages had missed. This was not the act of a politician, a diplomat or even a poet or philosopher, but of intuition derived from the grace of God.”

Vajanský’s contemporaries could scorn Hollý, but nothing changed the fact that they were influenced by him: “The members of the present generation do not read his [Hollý’s] writings, but without knowing it, they live from them. Without his works, their intellectual lives would be different. The first sources of rivers are always hidden in the mountains, but rivers still begin with them.”

98 [HURBAN VAJANSKÝ], ref. 76, p. 39.
99 The motif of essentially but only latently gifted people, primitive, but able to beget a cultural giant of the type of Hollý, already had a longer tradition in Vajanský’s thought. In 1890 he expressed essentially the same idea through the example of the success of Slovaks in America, in spite of the fact that they came from culturally backward and nationally unconscious regions: “Immigrants to America are recruited from the darkest, most beaten to death, most stultified regions of Slovakia: from Šariš, Zemplín, Spiš and neighbouring regions. The light of Hollý, Štúr, and Moyses did not penetrate there. They speak a declining dialect and have hardly heard of standard written Slovak. But their Slovak nature, as soon as it received free air, proved capable of development and advancement.” See: HURBAN VAJANSKÝ, ref. 97, p. 5.
100 [HURBAN VAJANSKÝ], ref. 76, p. 14
101 [HURBAN VAJANSKÝ], ref. 76, p. 13
Vajanský’s historical ideology: summary

From Vajanský’s views given here, it is possible to summarize his general philosophy of the history of the Slovak nation, and to describe the historical argumentation in his national ideology during the given period. The central motif of Vajanský’s ideology is his concept of identity (svojstvo), which he defined as Slovakness and at the same time as Slavonicness. Everything that was non-Slavonic opposed this concept. He also worked with the concept of the nation as the people and their representatives, and not as a mere collection of individuals. Vajanský’s historical argumentation derives from two different, but connected interpretations of national history. The first starts from the concept of the Slovak nobility as an elite group in the society of the Kingdom of Hungary, and the only group able to represent the mass of the nation. The nobility, however, voluntarily “broke its links with the people”, which is the cause of national poverty.102 The history of the estranged Slovak nobility does not correspond to his conception of identity. They simply are not part of national history. Vajanský does not find any reason for pessimism in this fact. On the contrary, thanks to the fact that the national intelligentsia, represented by Ján Hollý and later by the Martin leadership of the SNP, took up the role of representing the mass of the nation, he is in principle an optimist. On this basis, he builds a second interpretation of national history based on its negation. Thus Vajanský presented a conception according to which the Slovak people remembers “prehistoric times”, but remained untouched by “historic times”, that is, by event or political history (“that which is recorded in the chronicles”). He also distinguishes between the nation of Svätopluk and the present Slovak nation in the sense that he did not find any connection between them. The negation of event history leads him to historical optimism – the Slovak nation still has its history in front of it. This is connected with the principle of preference for ethnographic research rather than investigation of the past, or to use Vajanský’s words, preference for research into living antiquity over the useless search for dead antiquity.

In conclusion, I want to briefly point to the ideological results of the substantial changes in the Slovak national movement at the end of the 19th and especially at the beginning of the 20th century. Part of the Hungarian-Magyar pro-government intelligentsia reacted to the spread of the ideology of the national unity of the Czechs and Slovaks by means of new conceptions of the Slovak question. Since the official circles of the Hungarian state

102 In a sense, a similar concept can be seen in the conception of the representative of the Krakow school W. Kalinka. In his work: The last years of the reign of Stanisław August, he saw the main cause of the partition of the Kingdom of Poland in the Poles themselves and not in the great powers, which divided this noble republic. The views of Kalinka and the Krakow school were seen as historical pessimism, in contrast to the views of representatives of the Warsaw school. It is interesting that in this argument, Kalinka was criticized not from the point of view of the truth or untruth of his view, but because of fears of the possible negative political consequences of publication of his work. See: WIERZBICKI, Andrzej. Argument z polityki w historii (Argument from politics in history). In CHŁOPECKA, Wiesława (ed.). Metodologiczne problemy badań nad dziejami myśli historycznej. Warsaw : Uniwersytet Warszawski. Zakład historii historiografii i dydaktyki historii, 1990, p. 87-94. However, there is a substantial difference between Kalinka and Vajanský. Like Kalinka, Vajanský sees the basic cause of national poverty in the nation itself, but he does not derive pessimism from this. In contrast, Vajanský presents an optimistic vision of a “young nation” represented by a self-sacrificing and talented intelligentsia and protected by the powerful Russian nation.
considered the activities of the ideologues of the national unity of the Czechs and Slovaks to be extraordinarily dangerous to the territorial integrity of Hungary. Some of the Hungarian-Magyar ideologues chose the tactic of opposing them by means of support for the conceptions of the Martin centre of the SNP as the natural opponent of the supporters of the ideology of the national unity of the Czechs and Slovaks. They emphasized Slovak as a language substantially different from Czech. These Hungarian-Magyar conceptions accepted the existence of a separate Slovak nation, or in harmony with the Hungarian-Magyar discourse of the time, a separate Slovak nationality, in the framework of the Kingdom of Hungary. The central figures here were Samuel Czambel and Lajos Steier. Here, it is enough to comment that in his work *The Slovak question I. History of the development of the Slovak nationality movement*, L. Steier identified with Vajanský’s interpretation expressed in *Moods and views* in connection with interpretation of Ján Hollý. On the other hand, in this period, Vajanský showed a tendency to declare patriotism towards the historic Kingdom of Hungary.

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106 For example, in 1911, on the occasion of the fiftieth anniversary of the *Memorandum*, he expressed himself entirely openly as a patriotic citizen of Hungary, when he expressed hope for the solution of the Slovak question by the leader of the former Independence Party Ferenc Kossuth: "Also in the present Parliament, we have heard words from the mouth of Fraňo Kossuth, leader of the Independents, that Hungary should become an eastern Switzerland. In Switzerland, three nations: German, Italian and French live in concord and exemplary harmony. With complete national equality, they form one indivisible Swiss state. This is how it should be among us, and then Hungary would be powerful and capable of resisting any outside attack. It is true that they attacked Fraňo Kossuth in the present parliament, for wanting to make Hungary into an eastern Switzerland, but this is a sign of the time. Equality between the nations in Hungary will gradually begin to melt the ice between the opposing groups. Therefore, let us firmly believe that the demands of our Memorandum will sooner or later be fulfilled. Long live equality between the nations of Hungary!" See: Hurbán, Svetozár. *50-ročná pamiatka (50th Anniversary)* [adapted version of Vajanský’s article in the *Národnie noviny* 3 June 1911 entitled Vôľa k celku. Polvekové jubileum Memoranda. (A wish for the whole. The half-century jubilee of the Memorandum.)]. In Skultéty, Józef. *Slovenské Memorandum roku 1861. Na 50-ú ročník rozpomienku. S prílohou memoranda.* Turčiansky Sv. Martin : Knihltlačarsky účastinársky spolok, 1911, p. 37. This public declaration by Vajanský could have been motivated by political pragmatism and not by ideological consistence, but its content is so weighty that it simply cannot be ignored by historiography. In this place, I will limit myself to citing a study by Michal Potemra about the character of Vajanský’s publicist writing at the beginning of the Great War. I regard it as an appropriate supplement to the text above: “[Vajanský] published enough articles at this time in support of the military measures of the government of Hungary and the authorities in Slovakia. He demanded the understanding of his readers for these measures and the understanding of the authorities for the difficult position of the Slovak population. Slovak historiography has still not clearly explained his
that of Vajanský, needs to be understood primarily as a pragmatic response to the current political situation and the arguments of their ideological opponents. In their historical conceptions, the ideologues of the national unity of the Čechs and Slovaks emphasized political history, especially the search for periods of political independence of Slovakia, and they depicted the Magyars in a similar style to that found in Vajanský’s works from the beginning of the 1880s. The fact that Vajanský dealt with these conceptions by modifying his national ideology or historical ideology flowed simply from the logic of the ideological struggle on the political scene of the time. However, this is part of a complex problem, which requires a separate study.

Translator’s note on “Hungarian” and “Magyar”
The Hungarians always use the word “Magyar” for themselves, their state and their language. Most foreigners use derivatives of Latin “Hungaria”. English has “Hungary – Hungarian”. “Magyar” is sometimes used in some contexts and is generally assumed to mean the same as “Hungarian”.

However, Slovak clearly distinguishes between “maďarský” and “uhorský”. The Hungarian or Magyar ethnic group, their language and their state since 1918 are described as “maďarský”. The historic Kingdom of Hungary from before 1918, which included Slovakia and parts of Austria, Croatia, Serbia, Rumania and Ukraine as well as present day Hungary, is described as “uhorský”, a word etymologically related to “Hungaria”. This is not only a difference of words, but also of interpretation. The Slovak usage emphasizes the difference between the historic Kingdom of Hungary and the Hungarian or Magyar ethnic group, while the usage in other languages emphasizes the connection between them. This is always a problem when translating texts about the history of Slovakia and Hungary from Slovak into English. This applies especially in the present case, which involves detailed analysis of the views of a 19th century Slovak intellectual on the relationship of the Slovaks with the Hungarians or Magyars. Therefore, when quoting Vajanský’s writings and considering his views, the Slovak word “uhorský” has been translated “Hungarian” and the Slovak word “maďarský” has been translated “Magyar”. The reader should bear in mind that Vajanský and other Slovaks clearly distinguish between these words.

declaration from 17 July 1915 against the Czechoslovak struggle in exile. ” See: POTEMRA, Vajanský ako novinár, ref. 3, p. 72.

107 It is not especially necessary to emphasize that dealing with ideological opponents and with the current political situation were also key factors when the texts analysed in this study were written.

NEGATION DER EREIGNISHISTORIE UND HISTORISCHER OPTIMISMUS: HISTORISCHE IDEOLOGIE VON S. H. VAJANSKÝ (1881 – 1897)

KAROL HOLLÝ


The revolutionary governments in Hungary and their conceptions for solving the “Slovak question”

The long maintained and presented loyalty of the population to the Monarchy was seriously affected by the conditions of war. Towards the end of the war, the worsening military, internal political and economic situation strengthened the current among the Slovak elite, which supported the creation of a common Czecho-Slovak state. The famous Fourteen Points of the American President Wilson announced on 8 January 1918, declared the freest possible autonomous development of all the nations of the Monarchy. This introduced a new and important principle into international law. However, a real change in the situation came only in spring 1918. After betrayal of the secret talks of the young Emperor of Austria-Hungary Karl with the Entente, the Monarchy was forced to declare its loyalty to Germany and the hopes for a separate peace disappeared. However, at that time, the Czecho-Slovak struggle in exile already had an important trump card in its hands, namely the legions fighting on the fronts of the First World War. On 29 June 1918, France recognized the Czechoslovak National Council as the political body representing the future Czechoslovakia. The representatives of France promised the new state independence within its “historic frontiers”. On 9 August 1918, Great Britain did the same and on 2 September 1918 so did the USA. Thus, the new state was recognized before it was actually created. The effort of the Vienna Court to save the situation with

1 KLIMEK, Antonín – KUBŮ, Eduard. Československá zahraniční politika 1918-1938. Kapitoly z dějin mezinárodních vztahů. (Czechoslovak Foreign Policy 1918-1938 Chapters from the history of international relations). Prague : Institut pro středoevropskou kulturu a politiku, 1995, p. 15-17; HRONSKÝ,
federalization came too late. The Hungarian government did not accept this proposal and federalization only applied to the Austrian part of the Monarchy. The Slovak member of the Hungarian Parliament Ferdinand Juriga referred to this in his speech to Parliament on 19 October 1918: “We demand our rights on a natural and historical basis, so that we can form our own state community in the territory where we live, as King Karl also wants.” At this time, the political calculations of the elites associated in the Slovak National Council already anticipated change. They agreed on a reserved approach with the main aim of avoiding direct negotiations with the Hungarian side as far as possible. This was also characteristic of the later position of Czechoslovak diplomacy towards Hungary.

On 28 October 1918, the foreign minister of Austria-Hungary Gyula Andrássy accepted Wilson’s conditions and asked for peace. On the same day, the origin of the Czechoslovak Republic was declared in Prague. Two days later, the representatives of the Slovaks, organized in the Slovak National Council, declared their allegiance to the Czecho-Slovak state by the Martin Declaration. They perceived the offer of cooperation from the new prime minister in Budapest Count Mihály Károlyi as only a belated attempt to preserve the integrity of the historic Kingdom of Hungary. The representatives of the Slovak National Council did not have much confidence in a real change of course by the ruling elite in Budapest. They constantly pointed to the former intolerant policy of Hungarian governments towards minorities. From their point of view, the important thing was to really implement the declared political change in Slovakia.

The result of the First World War changed the existing balance of power in the region. It was significantly disturbed by the dissolution or weakening of the two great powers of European rank: Austria-Hungary and Germany. Apart from this, Russia experienced the installation of an entirely new regime of Bolshevik type. Several smaller states arose on the ruins of the former Monarchy. This strengthened the diversity of the region, and complicated the possibility of foreseeing its future development and securing its stability. The new Hungarian government of Count Mihály Károlyi, formed on 31 October 1918, declared a republic and separation from Cis-Leithania – the Austrian part of the Dual

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3 Slovenská národná knižnica, Archív literatúry a umenia (SNK ALU), (Slovak National Library, Archive of Literature and Art), sign. 94 J 27.

4 DČZP – Československo na parižské mirové konferencii 1918-1920 (Czechoslovakia at the Paris Peace Conference 1918-1920); Archiv Ministerstva zahraničních věcí Praha (AMZV) (Archive of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Prague), řPZ Budapest 1919, doc. 81.

5 DČZP-1918, doc. 181-183.
Monarchy. As a former opposition politician, Károlyi hoped for a better starting position in the coming talks with the victorious powers, and he strove to reverse the process of disintegration of the historic Hungarian state. For this reason, he also sent a telegram to the assembly of the Slovak elite in Turčianský Svätý Martin. However, the Slovak representatives assembled there were no longer considering preservation of the integrity of the historic Kingdom of Hungary, even under new conditions. Károlyi and his associates regarded historic Hungary as a perfect state unit from the geographical and economic points of view, with its individual parts mutually dependent on each other. They started from the assumption that with their negative attitude to the former regime, democratization, at least partial support for the national emancipation efforts of the non-Magyars and moderation of the social tension in the country, they would be able to maintain its integrity. They assumed that the Entente would appreciate their policy and declared intention to submit to the decisions of the peace conference. These extensive political changes were described by the Budapest, pro-government Slovenské noviny (Slovak News), which was edited by Adolf Pechány, as the “rebirth of Hungary”.

However, the first complications came already in connection with interpretation of the armistice signed in Belgrade on 13 November 1918. Czechoslovakia, Rumania and even the great powers did not accept this armistice because it violated the sovereignty of the successor states, since Czechoslovakia and Rumania did not participate in signing this convention as affected parties. The representatives of Hungary argued for the validity of the Belgrade armistice with the aim of maintaining control over the whole territory of historic Hungary, which could significantly influence the decision about the future of the given territories. However, the other successor states were not willing to identify with such a state of affairs, because they perceived it as a serious intervention in their spheres of interest.

To strengthen its position at home and abroad, Károlyi’s regime also placed increased emphasis on propaganda. Apart from a specially created ministry, it was spread by various patriotic societies and organizations, which arose spontaneously in the territory of the former Kingdom of Hungary with the aim of struggling to preserve the integrity of the country. The great tasks facing the propagandists are confirmed by the words included in Károlyi’s Manifesto to the Nationalities. He expressed in it the expectation that the reply of the minorities to the Rumanians, Czechs, Ukrainians and South Slavs would be: “Do not harm Hungary, it is no longer the Hungary that harmed us...”. However,
this propaganda did not cover the growing fears of part of the Hungarian elite, who declared that the activities or the passivity of Károlyi and his associates was only assisting the disintegration of Hungary. This criticism, mostly from the side of the former ruling circles, was constantly strengthening. In the following years, they promoted the view in Hungary that Károlyi was one of the people most responsible for the break up of the historic Kingdom of Hungary.

In November 1918, a conception for solution of the minority question known as Keleti Svájc (Eastern Switzerland) was worked out at the Budapest Ministry for National Minorities, which was headed by the well-known liberal intellectual Oszkár Jász. His appointment already reflected the key idea of a cantonal organization, which would also include autonomy for smaller regions. Among the assumed 14 cantons, Slovak population would predominate in three: in the north-western, northern and eastern-Slovak. This conception, presented as a provisional arrangement, would officially last until the decision of the peace conference in Paris, for which the Hungarian side prepared already from October 1918. However, as the historian László Szarka observes, the fact that this conception was indefinitely postponed already on 2 December 1918, indicates that it did not correspond to the demands of the time.11 Talks from 25 to 30 November 1918 on the temporary administration of Slovakia with Milan Hodža, the Budapest representative of the Czechoslovak government for the question of delimitation, also failed to solve the complex situation. Although Hodža had talks with the minister of war Albert Bartha on a temporary demarcation line, which to some extent corresponded to the ethnic situation in Slovakia, these talks were interrupted under pressure from Czechoslovak diplomacy. In January 1919, Hodža already left his place of activity in Budapest.12

The representatives of Czechoslovakia did not trust the changes in Hungarian policy, and they sensitively perceived the continual propaganda campaign against the republic.13 By the end of November 1918, French diplomacy made clear that the Hungarian interpretation of Paragraph 17 of the Belgrade armistice, from which Károlyi and his associates derived the right to control the territory of Slovakia, was inaccurate. The right of Czechoslovakia to annex Slovakia was confirmed. The Hungarian side still interpreted these efforts as illegitimate and it appealed to the definitive decision, which would come...
from the peace conference in Paris. Apart from efforts to talk to representatives of the national movements, the Hungarian government also supported various partial minority movements with the aim of proving that the non-Magyar population was not interested in the break up of the historic Kingdom of Hungary. The Union of Fraternal Nations of Hungary was already formed in November. It was joined by the Eastern Slovak National Council (Keleti Tótok Tanácsa) and other similarly oriented organizations. The Eastern Slovak National Council actually functioned as a counter-pole to the Slovak National Council. It was headed by a former Prešov county official, archivist and journalist Viktor Dvortsák (Dvorčák, Dvorecsák). Apart from actively engaging in publication of Hungarian language periodicals, he edited the Šariš dialect periodical Naša zastava (Our flag), which proclaimed the so-called Slovjak conception. Naša zastava was written in a pro-Hungarian spirit and it propagated the difference between eastern and western Slovaks. On 11 December 1918, Dvortsák and other supporters proclaimed the Eastern Slovak Republic in Košice. The other supporters included the advocate Karol Bulissa and the Evangelical pastor Lajos Liptay (Liptái). However, the advance of the Czechoslovak army, at that time gradually occupying the territory of the emerging republic, prevented the longer existence of this unit. Another unsuccessful attempt to reverse the situation in Slovakia was a planned uprising the Žitný Ostrov region organized by the last sheriff of the County of Bratislava György Szmrecsányi. It was thwarted by lack of support and the fact that the Hungarian regular army had already retreated, which gave it little chance of success.

After the events of the end of 1918, Jáš, who did not have sufficient political support, gave up his position as a minister on 19 January 1919. This ended the period of division of responsibility for foreign affairs between Károlyi and Jáš. In this period, Károlyi’s views on foreign policy underwent some changes. After unsuccessful attempts to orient himself towards France and then towards Italy, his sight turned east towards Russia. His inability to stop the disintegration of the country was also reflected in radicalization of his statements on the peace conference. He declared that he was waiting for its decision, but he was already aware of the fact that the fate of Central Europe would not be decided by negotiations in Paris. For this reason, he began to support reconstruction of the army.


15 For details: TAJTÁK, Ladislav. Dvortšákovo separatistické hnutie a maďarská iredenta. (Dvortšák’s separatist movement and Hungarian irredentism). In Príspevky k dejínám východného Slovenska. Bratislava 1964, p. 218-269; ŠVORC, Peter. Prouhorské integračné snahy na území Slovenska na konci r. 1918. (Pro-Hungarian integration efforts in the territory of Slovakia at the end of 1918). In Historický časopis, 1999, year 17, no. 1, p. 44-54. Dvortsák also attempted to establish contact with the representatives of the Czechoslovak Republic in Budapest at this time, but they rejected his offer. AMZV, PZ Budapest 1921, no. 310.


17 HORNÝÁK, ref. 8, p. 32.
One of the many foreign policy options considered by the Hungarian elite was closer relations with Poland. Károlyi several times talked to Polish representatives about the possibility of mutual cooperation against a common enemy – the Czechs. From the Polish side, fear of a Czechoslovak – Russian corridor and disputes on the drawing of the Czechoslovak – Polish frontier, especially in the Těšín area, spoke in favour of this cooperation. At the time, they considered the Slovaks to be pro-Polish. The Hungarian government brought the Slovak question to the attention of Polish circles by organizing a visit to Warsaw by a Slovak delegation, sometime around 17 March 1919. The mission was undertaken by Karol Bulissa in the name of the “Slovak Republic”. He presented to the Polish government a memorandum, which stated among other things that the Slovaks wanted to live in a common state with the Hungarians, and their mutual relations would be regulated by Act no. XXX on the Slovak Region, declared on 12 March.\(^\text{18}\) At the end of March 1919, the Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs recommended that Polish agents in Slovakia should support all forms of Slovak separatism, whether under the slogan of independence, of union with Hungary or with Poland.\(^\text{19}\)

From the point of view of solution of the Slovak question, it is important to mention the memorandum of Jászi’s associate Miksa Stróbl \textit{About the Slovaks who do not want to break away from Hungary}, still written in the spirit of the conception of Keleti Svájc. His proposal included twelve non-Magyar, eight Magyar and six large city cantons. The brochure on the Slovaks was published on the occasion of the visit to Hungary of an American professor, at that time leading the American diplomatic mission in Vienna, Archibald C. Coolidge. Stróbl stated that the ideal solution to the Slovak question would be the creation of an autonomous Slovak region, formed on the basis of the right to self-determination, but still within Hungary. He emphasized the historic and economic determinants, as well as pointing to the lack of interest of the Slovaks in coexistence with the Czechs, and to the linguistic differences between the Slovaks themselves. The powers of the Slovak autonomous institutions would be similar to those gained by Croatia after the Austro-Hungarian Ausgleich: own territory, parliament and so on. Slovakia would be divided into three cantons. This had to be preceded by an agreement according to which the demarcation line would be moved to the west. The eastern and central cantons, where most Slovaks lived according to Stróbl, would be placed under the authority of the Slovak administration. The definitive decision would be taken by the peace conference, but the meaning of his proposal was that Hungarian administration would be maintained in as much as possible of the territory of Slovakia. This is confirmed by the proposed demarcation line, which began on the frontier with Galicia at the peak of Volovec, went to Ždumbier, then along the ridge of the Nizke Tatry to the border of the County of Turiec and along the border of the County of Nitra. From there it would go south-west through Vtáčnik and Tribeč to Nitra and then to the western boundary of Bratislava, through Pezinok and south of the Malé Karpaty. In the end, these steps were intended to help minimize the loss of territory. According to this proposal, the Czechs would only gain

\(^{18}\) Archiwum Akt Nowych Warszawa (hereinafter: AAN), Archiwum I. Jana Paderewskiego, Komitet Narodowy Polski w Paryżu 1917-1919, mikr. 20 824.

the Malé Karpaty and the territory along the river Morava as far as Devin. This memorandum did not acquire much significance in foreign policy, but it offers a relatively detailed view of the ideas and arguments, which the propagandists of the time considered it advantageous to place before the “world public”.

Károlyi’s radical rhetoric was accompanied at the beginning of March 1919 by the planning of military action in Slovakia. Representatives of the government discussed the plans with the Upper Hungarian League (Hornozemská liga, Felvidéki liga) and with Viktor Dvortsák. Unfortunately, we do not have much concrete information about these plans. Act no. XXX Tótország – Act on declaring the autonomy of the Slovak region from 12 March 1919 also has an important place. Dvortsák also emphasized the need for it after the dissolution of the Eastern Slovak Republic. This belated legal norm actually copied the text of act no. X on the autonomy of Sub-Carpathian Ruthenia, already adopted at Christmas 1918. On the basis of this act, Slovakia was divided into three parts and apart from territorial autonomy, it would receive its own government, which would have the right to intervene in internal, judicial, religious and educational matters. The act speaks of a Slovak parliament, proportional representation of members in the Budapest parliament and one Slovak minister in the central government. The declaration of this legislation at a time when the country was in continual crisis, the Czechoslovak authorities were already operating in the whole territory of Slovakia and the frontiers were being decided at the talks in Paris, appears rather anachronistic. From the point of view of the Budapest government, it was mainly a political gesture directed towards allied forces. It could be used, especially in propaganda, with the aim of strengthening loyalty to Hungary. The act offered a new alternative for the discussions in Paris, although Hungary was not even participating at the time. The Slovenské noviny emphasized that the act had arisen on the basis of the complaints of the Hungarian government against the behaviour of the Czechs in Slovakia, and that the government was pursuing the same aim as with preceding autonomy arrangements. At this time, information was really coming from all sides about the situation in the “occupied territories”, and it pointed to dissatisfaction of the inhabitants with the Czechoslovak regime. On 19 March, talks were held between premier Dénes Berinkey, Dvortsák’s close associate Štefan Margorin and the leader of the Upper Hungary League Pavol Oberschall about appointing a minister for the Slovak region. Viktor Dvortsák was suggested as a possible candidate. Margorin and Oberschall appealed to the government to begin actions to liberate Slovakia / Upper Hungary, and Berinkey expressed a positive view. Criticizing the policy of the great powers, he declared that he was willing to defend the integrity of the country by force. After the subse-

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21 SZVIEZSÉNYI, Zoltán. Hogyan veszett el a Felvidék. (How Upper Hungary was lost). Budapest : Franklin Társulat, 1921, p. 93.
quent hand over of government power to the socialists, the general argument was that the struggle for integrity would continue, only with the pretext that the question of integrity could also be seen as a social matter.24

The decision of the peace conference on 26 February 1919 on the demarcation line, which was delivered to Károlyi by the head of the French military mission in Budapest Colonel Ferdinand Vix in a note on 20 March 1919, provoked radical changes in Hungarian politics. This note set the future frontier between Hungary and Rumania. Károlyi already stated in advance that such decisions were unacceptable from his point of view, and he decided to hand over the government to the socialists. He kept the post of president for himself. However, the socialists then joined with the communists and on 21 March 1919 they took over the government. Béla Kun, the commissioner for foreign affairs in the new revolutionary government council, came to power. In spite of the fact that Kun recognized the steps of the previous government and expressed willingness to talk about territorial concessions on the basis of the right to self-determination, the political situation in the region acquired a whole new dimension.25

The origin of the Hungarian Soviet Republic was justified by its representatives with reference to the imperialism of the Entente states, which wanted to rob Hungary of its economic resources by taking territories. According to Kun, a far-reaching vision of the future organization of the region comprised the federal organization of national autonomous regions, which would have the widest national and cultural rights. Apart from ideological affinity, they would form an economic unit. Kun assumed that a socialist “world revolution” would soon arise and triumph in the region. For this reason, he played for time in talks with the Entente and calmed the international community by emphasizing his peaceful intentions. He declared that Hungary did not insist on the condition of indivisible territorial integrity. However, at the same time, he did not forget to emphasize the right to self-determination. The establishment of a Bolshevik government only nine days after the declaration of the act on the autonomy of Slovakia, essentially meant the end of the previous nationality policy, in spite of the fact that Dvortsák’s group quickly oriented themselves in the new situation. On 23 March, under the name of the Slovak Government Committee, they emphasized the need to implement act no. XXX. However, the new representatives of Hungary did not support this demand, although they did not agree with the new situation.26

At a time, when the whole territory of Slovakia was already under the sovereignty of the Czechoslovak government, they did not regard Slovak autonomy as a topical issue. They temporarily solved the minority question by proportional placing of their representatives in various state institutions. Dvortsák participated in looting the Office of the Czechoslovak Delegate in Budapest and gained finance, which was used to produce propaganda against the republic. His flirtation with the Bolsheviks did not last long. He left Hungary and began to cooperate with the emerging counter-revolutionary forces.27

24 On these talks see: SZVIEZSÉNYI, ref. 21; Slovenské noviny, 20 march 1919, p. 1.
25 See various French documents on this problem: FDI I, doc. 113.
27 AMZV, PZ Budapest 1921, no. 310.
The significant political change in Hungary represented by the establishment of Béla Kun’s regime strengthened Western fears of post-war radicalization of society, which, in the spirit of the idea of the foreign policy of class war, was perceived as the route to the spread of Bolshevik revolution across the whole of Europe. The successor states also perceived it as a serious situation. Instead of the expected intervention of the great powers, delaying tactics were adopted at the beginning of April. On 4 April 1919, the mission of the South African General Jan Ch. Smuts travelled to Budapest. Kun and his associates perceived this fact as a strengthening of their international position and a guarantee that the Entente had given up the idea of intervention. The fact that no representative of France was included in the mission was perceived especially positively. In spite of the fact that General Smuts offered some concessions, which representatives of the great powers would probably never have offered to Károlyi, no actual agreement was reached. The Hungarian side insisted on the validity of the Belgrade armistice, which confirmed that it did not recognize the territorial gains of Rumania and Czechoslovakia. It did not accept Vix’s note as a starting point for negotiations, and demanded negotiations between the successor states, without the participation of the great powers, about the final frontiers, promising that Hungary would not insist on preserving the integrity of the historic Kingdom of Hungary.

However, few believed such promises. They were regarded more as tactical declarations standing in sharp contrast to the strongly nationalistic atmosphere in the country. However, Kun’s expectations connected with Smuts’ mission proved to be exaggerated, and it was the same with attempts at a rapprochement with the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes, which did not show such a negative attitude towards Hungary as Czechoslovakia and Rumania.

After the failure of these talks, the Rumanian army began military operations against Hungary on the night of 15-16 April 1919. Their declared aim was to occupy the territory defined by Vix’s note. From 27 April 1919, the Czechoslovak army also participated in this action. Exploiting the retreat of the Hungarian forces, it occupied Sub-Carpathian Ruthenia and Slovenské Nové Mesto. At the same time, however, tension arose between Czechoslovakia and Rumania over parts of Sub-Carpathian Ruthenia. This was resolved only by French intervention. After a successful campaign against the Hungarian Soviet Republic, the Rumanian army stopped on the river Tisa. Using this fact, Kun’s Red Army undertook a strong counter-offensive in the north on 30 May. Its success can be attributed to chaos, the bad fighting morale of the Czechoslovak army and partly also to support for the Red Army from the local population. Part of the population welcomed

30 Politikatörténet és Szakszervezeti Levéltár Budapest (PIL), f. 508, 6/1.
the coming of the Red army because they saw it mainly as a Hungarian army. It included many people, even in the highest positions, who were much more motivated by patriotic aims than by Kun’s socialist rhetoric.

The successes of the Bolsheviks in Slovakia provoked an acute need for intervention by the great powers. However, the Entente powers did not have enough forces in the region. Therefore, they also re-evaluated use of the Hungarian counter-revolutionary forces active in Vienna and Szeged. On 7 June 1919, the chairman of the peace conference and French premier Georges Benjamin Clemenceau appealed to Hungary to end the war against Czechoslovakia and the successor states, so that the Entente could also end military operations.\(^{32}\) It did not happen. The fighting continued and on 7 June the Czechoslovak army launched a counter-offensive.

On 13 June, Clemenceau announced the definitive frontiers to the representatives of Hungary, Rumania, the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes and the Czechoslovak Republic. After the departure of the Red Army from Czechoslovak territory, the Rumanian army, which had penetrated deeply into Hungary, was also supposed to begin its withdrawal. In spite of the fact that Kun promised to stop fighting in a secret letter to Clemenceau, he stated that the frontiers were unjust and he wanted to pursue their revision at the peace conference in Paris or in negotiations between the successor states.\(^{33}\) On the same day that Kun stated his non-aggressive intentions in a letter, he distanced himself from the idea of integrity, pushed the ethnic principle into the background, and supported the declaration of the Slovak Soviet Republic.\(^{34}\)

Its leaders appealed to the Belgrade armistice, and declared that Slovakia belonged only to the Slovaks and that they wanted to live in a union with the Czech proletariat. Antonín Janoušek, a revolutionary of Czech origin, became the leader of this republic. His government included names such as Viliam Baján and Jozef Varecha, who were already active in Dvortsák’s Eastern Slovak government. In this context, communist historiography stated that the aim of the representatives of the Soviet Republic was the Bolshevization of Czechoslovakia.

The occupation of Slovakia was to be the first step in this direction. In contrast to this, contemporary Slovak historiography has taken the view that it was only a form of Hungarian revisionist movement, which derived especially from the fact that a very important mobilizing element, also during the period of Bolshevik rule, was precisely the idea of renewal of integrity.\(^{35}\) However, neither the Hungarian Soviet Republic nor its Slovak “clone” existed for long enough, to give us a clearer answer to this question. In contrast to this, as Tomáš Garigue Masaryk stated, Hungarian Bolshevism strengthened the position of Czecho-Slovak statehood, both from the international and internal points of view.\(^{36}\)

\(^{32}\) FDI I, doc. 145, 146.

\(^{33}\) FDI I, doc. 151, 152.

\(^{34}\) The problem of the Slovak Soviet Republic is considered in various texts in the volume: DEÁK, ref. 22, p. 56-147.


\(^{36}\) ŠOLLE, Zdeněk (ed.). *Masaryk a Beneš ve svých dopisech z doby Paříských mírových jednání v roce*
A few days after an armistice was signed with representatives of the Soviet Republic on 24 June 1919, the Red Army left the territory of Slovakia. At this time, the system installed by Kun and his associates in Hungary was internally disintegrating, and the counter-revolutionary forces were strengthening, after being forced onto the defensive during the period of Bolshevik rule.\textsuperscript{37}

\textbf{The policies of the national – Christian course}

After the fall of Béla Kun, there was a brief period of chaotic alternation of governments in Hungary. The first, so-called trade unionist government, headed by Gyula Peidl, came to power on 1 August 1919. It was composed of people, who were not too seriously compromised by the period of dictatorship of the proletariat. Six days later, after a counter-revolutionary coup, they were replaced by the government of István Friedrich, appointed by Archduke Joseph von Habsburg. The fact that the position of the Habsburgs was again strengthening in the country was perceived by the neighbouring states as a serious threat. For this reason, Edvard Beneš sent a protest note to Paris already on 12 August. Joseph resigned from his position under the influence of the decision of the great powers.\textsuperscript{38}

On 19 August 1919, the parallel counter-revolutionary government in Szeged resigned in favour of Friedrich, and the outlines of a new political situation in the country began to emerge. However, at this time, a large part of Hungary was not under the control of the new government. The territories east of the river Tisa were controlled by the Romanian army. Elsewhere, various para-military units purged the country of Bolsheviks. These actions were called the \textit{white terror}.\textsuperscript{39} However, the great powers did not recognize Friedrich’s government. The mission of the British diplomat Sir George R. Clerk was sent in October 1919 to resolve the situation. His task was to solve the question of the withdrawal of Romanian forces and discuss the creation of an acceptable government, which would represent Hungary at the peace conference in Paris. The result of Clerk’s mission was that on 24 November 1919, the cabinet of Károly Huszár was formed, and it was later recognized by the Entente powers.\textsuperscript{40}

The course introduced by Friedrich and confirmed by Huszár’s government clearly indicated that the previous unsuccessful attempts to defend the integrity of the country would be replaced by new efforts. The old-new elite, which came to power after the fall


\textsuperscript{40} RÁNKI, György. A Clerk-misszió történetéhez. (The history of Clerk’s mission). In \textit{Történeti Szemle}, 1967, no. 2, p. 156-187; MÉSZÁROS, ref. 38, p. 69-82.
Historický časopis, 58, Supplement, 2010

of Kun, defined its policy as national-Christian. It considered renewal of the integrity of the historic Kingdom of Hungary to be the best solution. Propaganda would be used to improve the reputation of Hungary before the negotiations in Paris, but in spite of the clear aim, it was rather chaotically produced in this period. For this reason, its old and new co-ordinator strove to make it more unified and effective, immediately after the success of the counter-revolution. A meeting chaired by Count István Bethlen was held at Dísz tér (Hungarian Ministry of Foreign Affairs) already on 21 October 1919. The participating representatives of ministries and important social organizations agreed to establish a central office at the foreign ministry to oversee this work. However, it turned out that this attempt did not bring the expected results because there was not enough co-ordination of the requirements of the government and the activities of some of the social organizations. The constant political and ideological competition in Hungarian politics was also an important catalyst of this disorder. Bethlen described the obviously untrue information produced by various patriotic societies and institutions, as harmful to the propaganda effort. Such information strengthened foreign distrust of Hungary and assisted the propaganda efforts of the successor states. In December 1919, the press department of the foreign ministry instructed the press not to publish unobjective attacks on the neighbouring countries, and instead of seditious articles to defend the integrity of the state with scientific argumentation. The main idea had to be that whoever wanted to break up Hungary was promoting war, but whoever defended its unity was working for the peaceful development of the region and the whole world. Where the nationality question was concerned, it was necessary to emphasize the need to hold plebiscites under the observation of neutral observers, which should stress the self-confidence of Hungary on this question.

The most active of the organizations devoted to irredentist propaganda in this period was the League for the Defence of Territory (Területvédő Liga). It did not devote its attention only to propaganda abroad, but also to activity within Hungary. It strove to influence public opinion concerning the problems of territorial integrity, minorities and so on. The league was formed on 2 December 1918 and began to actively campaign for the maintenance of the integrity of the country. Its propagandist activities were especially visible in the first half of 1920 – the period of the negotiation of the peace treaty with Hungary.

In spite of the fact that the counter-revolutionary elite was ideologically and personally connected with the old regime in the Kingdom of Hungary, in an effort to renew or preserve the integrity of the country, they came to the conclusion that without some

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42 Archiv ústavu T. G. Masaryka Praha (AÚTGM) (Archive of the Institute of T.G. Masaryk in Prague), f. E. Beneš I, c. 175, Fascicle 314/2 Maďarsko 1919.
43 The League for the Defence of Territory was an influential irredentist social organization with about 18 thousand registered members in 1920. It developed propagandist activities both in Hungary and abroad. By means of specialized leagues, such as the Upper Hungarian League, it distributed materials in the languages of the minorities. In 1920 alone, it published almost 300,000 pieces of propagandist materials in foreign languages. It also participated in distributing the materials of other organizations. It distributed about 400 thousand books. These materials reached important foreign politicians, journalists and organizations. MOL. ME. K 26 1921-XXXVIII-3.
changes, it was not possible to achieve this aim. Consideration of nationality policy, which had to a large extent caused the existing situation, played an important role. The Hungarian elite accepted the need to deal with the problem of the relationship with the former minorities on the way to renewal of integrity. They began to say in official places that the liberal Hungarian nationality act no. XLIV from 1868 had not been put into practice sufficiently, that the non-Magyars had been treated unjustly in the past. The basic theses of nationality policy were revised. The Ministry for National Minorities, headed by Jacob Bleyer, a politician of German origin, played an important role in this. The creation of the ministry was already announced by Peidl’s short-lived government, and Bleyer was already included in Friedrich’s government from 15 August 1919. The main aim of this institution was defence of the rights of the non-Magyar minorities, associated with the ambition of renewing the integrity of the country. By means of recognition and support for some cultural and linguistic rights for the non-Magyars, it strove to support the loyalty of the population to the idea of the unity of the historic Hungarian state. Its positive position was intended to guarantee that integrity would be renewed on a reformed basis, which would prevent “anti-Hungarian minority irredentism” in future. The definition of the basic tasks and aims of this ministry already show that its sphere of activity also reached into the territories of the neighbouring states.

The first attempt to “fill in the holes” in the old nationality policy is represented by government decree no. 4044/1919 from August of that year. However, it was officially declared only on 19 November 1919 after the departure of the Rumanian intervention forces from Budapest. It included basic obligations concerning minority administrative and language rights. The Hungarian government officially declared its ambition to reach agreement with the non-Magyar minorities, and willingness to give up the former nationality policy. This orientation, presented especially by minister Bleyer forms the so-called Christian-national course in Hungarian nationality policy, expressed in the spirit of the thesis: “We welcome the reawakening of national feeling and its growth, if this reawakening of the cultural and national interests of a given minority is not directed in a harmful direction.” In the period 1918 – 1919, Bleyer was not a supporter of territorial autonomy. After a change of view, he requested fulfillment of the given promises, but did not succeed in this. From its origin, the ministry was faced with constant denunciation, which was most noticeable at lower levels in the official hierarchy, in schools, but also in church institutions. Activities in favour of securing the rights of minorities were seen as anti-Hungarian, treacherous activities, or even as efforts to violate the unity of the country. The results of Hungarian nationality policies were also criticized. The great degree of responsibility of the representatives of the former minorities for the break up of Hungary was emphasized, and this was supported with the argument that the non-Magyars had

45 For further details see: ref. 44, p. 38-50.
46 MOL. Miniszterelnökség. (ME). Minisztertanácsi jegyzőkönyvek (K 27). 20 Sept 1919 – 7; MOL. ME. Miniszterelnökség levéltára (K 26) 1920 xLIII a-d t. One of the subjects emphasized here is the need for information from the “occupied territories”, so that they would know how to behave in future, after the departure of the Czechs.
been given enough space for self-expression in the past, as was proved by the survival of their traditions and languages. However, they had rewarded the ethnic Hungarians or Magyars for this policy, by misusing the trust given to them and betraying the thousand year old Hungarian state. This was the stab in the back myth. The conclusion from considerations in this spirit was that further concessions in favour of increased minority rights only increased the possibility of fragmentation of the country, and so threatened it.  

The efforts of the Hungarian elite to solve the nationality question also had a significant foreign policy dimension under the influence of the approaching peace talks. The Budapest governments did not perceive minority policy exclusively as an internal matter of “mutilated Hungary”, as a problem of the national minorities living in post-war Hungary. They perceived it in the wider context of the question of the individual ethnic groups living in the whole territory of the historic Kingdom of Hungary. For this reason, expressions of loyalty from the Slovaks still living in the reduced territory of Hungary not only had the role of speaking for themselves, but also for their “brothers” in the “occupied territories”. After the fall of Béla Kun’s regime, various centres of “Slovak action” were formed or activated with the aim of spreading propaganda in Slovakia. The minutes of the meeting of the Council of Ministers on 20 September 1919 state that the individual nationalities, or, to be more precise, some of their representatives, had expressed the wish to send their representatives to the peace conference, where they would express the idea of the right of nations to self-determination. They requested finance for this activity and for their organizations within Hungary. The Council of Ministers had agreed.

A pre-condition for the successful fulfillment of all the revisionist conceptions that appeared in Hungary was internal instability of the successor states. Hungary strove to promote it with direct actions and propagandist agitation. Apart from purely nationalistic separatism, Budapest also supported some forms of Bolshevik agitation with an emphasis on communist, nationalist and revisionist slogans. According to Czechoslovak sources, the Hungarian Ministry of War sent resources to these agitators. They were promised that if they went to agitate in Slovakia, their previous “offences”, such as their engagement in the Bolshevik movement, would be forgiven. These fantastic or extremely conspiratorial claims basically contradict the ideological principles on which the counter-revolutionary regime in Hungary was based. However, their reality is suggested by various archive sources and by the doubtful past of many persons, mainly political agitators and soldiers, who were involved with both Bolshevism and with the counter-revolution.  

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48 The Ruthenians had already received 1 million crowns. The Germans and Slovaks got 500 thousand crowns each. The government gave the Croats, Serbs and Slovenes a total of 500 thousand crowns.

49 For example: SNA, f. V . Šrobár, c. 11, inv. no. 644, 296/15/3; AÚTGM, f. E. Beneš I, c. 175, fascicle 314/3 Hungary 1920. A report from 8 Jan 1920 states that at first the Czechoslovak officials did not want to believe what they were hearing from imprisoned agitators, “But recently we have received irrefutable evidence that the statements of the Bolshevik agitators are true.” The plan for the “liberation of Upper
was a matter of using any available means to internally and externally weaken Czecho-
slovakia, which was seen as the most appropriate target for future revisionist actions.

The effort to use Slovak separatism in favour of renewal of the integrity of the historic 
Hungarian state was an important part of the plans of the Hungarian elite. Ideas about the 
“traditional” loyalty of the Slovaks persisted in Hungarian society partly on the basis of 
amultitude of encouraging reports from Slovakia. The Slovaks were expected to become 
disillusioned with the new situation following their union with the Czechs. The aim of 
the pro-Hungarian propaganda was to support the dissatisfaction among the population 
of Slovakia, while also presenting itself as an appropriate platform for fulfillment of the 
demands of the former minority. Various emigrants from the territory of Slovakia and 
pro-Hungarian oriented Slovaks, who cooperated with state institutions in plans to renew 
the historic Hungary, played an important role. In August 1919, there was a substantial 
revival of the campaign to separate Slovakia from the Czech Lands. Reports about an 
offer of autonomy from Hungary appeared and were spread by Viktor Dvortsák. 50

In June, Dvortsák already had discussions in Vienna with representatives of the counter-revolutionary Anti-Bolshevik Committee, which was inspired by Count István Bethlen. He also met the Polish diplomat Count Jan Szembek. Declaring that he represented 
the Slovaks, Dvortsák stated that their political ideal was independence, especially in the 
fields of culture and administration. However, in economic, foreign policy and military 
questions, they would have to maintain a union with Hungary. He supported interest in 
good relations with Poland, in which the Slovaks would play the role of mediators, with 
the statement that one of the leading personalities in the counter-revolutionary forces, 
Count István Bethlen, had expressed understanding for the Polish claims in the regions 
of Spiš and Orava. At the same time, Szembek reported that the Slovaks wanted to send 
a delegation to Warsaw, which would then travel to Paris with Polish help.

At the peace conference, they would declare an antagonistic attitude to the “Czechs”, 
and present their demands. It is interesting that the name of Andrej Hlinka appears 
in the planned delegation alongside names such as Zoltán Szviezsényi (Sviežen) and Lipták (probably Lajos Liptay). 51 The important Hungarian legitimist politician 
Baron Aladár Boroviczény also mentioned in his memoirs that the Slovak leaders Viktor 
Dvortsák, František Jehlička (Jehlicska) and Andrej Hlinka talked to the Hungarian side 
in the time of the Hungarian Soviet Republic, first in Vienna, and later after its fall, also 
with the government in Budapest. According to his information, the aim of these people 
was separation from the Czechs. 52

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50 AMZV, PZ Warsaw 1919, no. 177, 209.
51 AAN, f. KNP, microfilm 2 084, Report of Szembek from Vienna, 7 June 1919.
52 BOROVICZÉNY, Aladár. A király és kormányzója. (The king and his regent). Budapest : Európa 
Soon after this, Hlinka’s adventurous journey to Paris in August – October 1919, really made the Slovak question visible in the Central European context. The famous memorandum: *For peace in Central Europe – Memorandum of the Slovaks to the peace conference*, which Hlinka and his associates distributed in Paris, contained sharp reservations towards the “Czech policy”. It emphasized complete fulfillment of the Pittsburgh agreement, the content of which became known to Hlinka in spring 1919, and demanded a plebiscite. The style of this document is strikingly similar in its argumentation, to that coming from Hungary at this time. It is also known that this undertaking was supported by some leading Polish politicians, including Józef Piłsudski. However, Hlinka’s journey to Paris did not bring any more substantial success, as a result of the prompt intervention of Czechoslovak diplomacy. On 12 October 1919, Hlinka was deprived of his seat in parliament and imprisoned. His associates decided to emigrate.53 The university professor František Jehlička played a significant but very controversial role in this action.54

Jehlička was not one of the new faces in Slovak politics. In 1906, he was already elected as member of the Hungarian parliament for the constituency of Pezinok. He belonged to the Slovak People’s Party and many of his ideological associates saw him as the young hope of Slovak politics. However, Jehlička gave up his seat in parliament, and was much criticized by the Slovak patriotic community as a result. He was accused of betraying the national interest for the sake of a university career. Jehlička again began to engage in politics in the autumn of 1918. He publicly supported and expressed loyalty to the common state of the Czechs and Slovaks. By the side of Andrej Hlinka, he began to build up the Slovak People’s Party, which had been founded in the time of the Monarchy. He became a member of the provisional Czechoslovak Parliament and government commissioner for the Elizabeth University in Bratislava. Jehlička politically engaged especially in questions connected with the Catholic Church and political Catholicism. Like Hlinka and other representatives of the People’s Party, he openly criticized the situation in the republic. However, their basically confessional criticism was also connected with personal dissatisfaction with the steps of the Czechoslovak government or of the minister for the administration of Slovakia Vavro Šrobár, and the non-fulfillment of the personal ambitions of these influential Slovak politicians.

The highly educated and ambitious priest Jehlička, is thought to have inspired Hlinka’s journey. He was an intermediary, who aimed to radicalize the Ľudáks and direct them towards a pro-Hungarian platform. However, it is still not clear when Jehlička made his political reversal. It is possible that he decided to return to the pro-Hungarian platform already before the journey to Paris. One of the important figures in the Slovak community in Hungary, the professor at Budapest University Michal Kmoško (Kmoskó) stated that precisely Jehlička urged him to persuade the Hungarian government that the Slovaks had

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an interest in returning to Hungary if they were promised autonomy. Jehlička’s critical view of the situation in Czechoslovakia was shared by Hlinka. According to the memoirs of Colonel Stephen Bonsal, interpreter to the American President Woodrow Wilson, the Slovak politician expressed a very negative view of the brief period of co-existence with the Czechs. He emphasized the importance of economic and religious or moral ties with the Hungarians compared to Czech “free thinking” and “godlessness”. Obviously, this did not necessarily mean that Hlinka was seeking a way back to union with Hungary. He probably only wanted to secure foreign support for the idea of Slovak autonomy. The Hungarian counter-revolutionary elite regarded the autonomist platform as one of the important political currents that could be advantageously used to undermine the foundations of the idea of Czecho-Slovak cooperation, and so the republic as a whole.

The importance of this conception grew especially when Jehlička began to openly support a pro-Hungarian policy. The movement of an important Slovak politician and close associate of Hlinka to a pro-Hungarian position was perceived as important by Budapest. It is known that Jehlička had the support of the Primate of Hungary János Csernoch (Černoch), with whom he shared a Slovak origin and home town of Skalica as well as his views. In November 1919, Jehlička publicly declared that he had authorization from Hlinka, to seek support for Slovak autonomy abroad. He argued that the new, Christian regime in Budapest would provide more space for the emancipation of the Slovaks than Czechoslovakia, which he described as a country in which Czech atheism and Bolshevism would dominate. Later, as a result of negative reactions from Slovakia, several corrected versions of Jehlička’s journey to Budapest appeared. These emphasized Hlinka’s agreement with his activities. As the statements of the participants in the journey to Paris show, the interpretations were influenced by circumstances such as Jehlička’s pro-Hungarian platform and Hlinka’s pro-Czechoslovak platform, and further adapted to specific political needs. Apart from this, a further participant in the journey, Štefan Mnoheľ used similar argumentation in Poland, where he began to publish the Slovák and to propagate a pro-Polish conception of the solution to the Slovak question. This led to the interesting situation that in the given period, three periodicals were published with the title Slovák: in Zakopane, Ružomberok and Budapest, and they all declared that they represented the views of Slovak Catholics and autonomists.

Hlinka was very well informed about the efforts of the Hungarian government, which wanted to agree with him on autonomy. However, it remains an open question, to what degree he was accessible to such an agreement in the given situation. The question is also complicated by the fact that Hlinka was imprisoned in Mírov until 18 April. In spite of the fact that he publicly rejected later claims that he cooperated with Hungarian


irredentists, the representatives of the pro-Hungarian Slovak exiles continued to proclaim that they coordinated their activities with the Ľudáks, and that they represented the interests of the Slovaks abroad. Later, there was still a sort of “hot line” connecting the representatives of the People’s Party in Slovakia with Jehlička and František Unger. However, the Ľudáks could not openly admit it, because the exiles were regarded as traitors in Czechoslovakia. However, in spite of the different conceptions for solving the Slovak question in the inter-war period, these two platforms did not obstruct each other. To a certain degree, it is possible to say that in various political games, they sometimes benefited from each other.

**The Slovak organizations working in favour of the renewal of integrity**

Various specialized organizations and leagues worked on the “Slovak action” in the territories of Hungary and Slovakia. Some arose spontaneously to defend the interests of particular groups, others on orders from government circles. At the same time, the governments of Hungary made a continual effort to achieve complete control over the activities of irredentist organizations with ideas, aims and methods that were not always identical to the conceptions of the individual governments. It is well-known that the majority of Hungarian politicians and members of the elite engaged in irredentist social organizations because they considered it their patriotic duty. This already meant that it was not a homogeneous and entirely united movement. Mutual rivalry had an important role in the activity of these groups. One person was sometimes involved in various organizations, and in some cases, probably for financial reasons, the same group established parallel organizations, as in the case of the Party of Spiš Germans in Hungary. What was the motivation to become active in these movements? Apart from traditional loyalty, patriotism and faith in an early renewal of the “historic frontiers”, personal experiences and profit seeking played an important role. These factors included exile, loss of employment, property or security on one side, and visions of profit or improved social status on the other. In the context of Czechoslovak – Hungarian relations, it is necessary to point out that the Czechoslovak authorities saw a large proportion of the former officials and employees of the Hungarian state as disloyal, and there was an effort to exclude them from state service. However, this was not possible for practical reasons. According to reports from October 1920, the majority of the officials still in state service in the Czechoslovak – Hungarian frontier region, were considered part of the Hungarian irredentist movement.

According to summary reports by Vojtech Tuka and the Upper Hungarian League, the following irredentist organizations developed intensive activities in the territory of Slovakia in the period 1919 – 1921: the Pro-Hungarian Slovak People’s Party, Slovak Independence Party, Slovak Central Office, Hungarian-Ruthenian Political Party, Spiš Union, Union of Germans in Upper Hungary, Upper Hungarian League, Organization of

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58 In the context of the “Slovak action”, see, for example, the reports on past actions and their functioning: MOL. Külgíminisztériumi levéltár. Politikai Osztály rezervált iratai (Küm. K 64) 1920-7-34.
59 MOL. ME. K 26. 1921-XXXVIII-8848. The prime minister’s office rejected this application.
60 However, another summary report from April 1921 already denies these claims. SNA, f. Ministerstvo s plnou mocou pre správu Slovenska (MPS), c. 321, no. 154.
Iván Héjjas, Kürthy’s Organization, Refugee Office, Upper Hungary Committee. Apart from these specialized organizations, other groups participated in propagandist activity, but not enough information has survived about their activities, and it appears that they did not have such great importance in the context considered here.61 Two important political platforms with a wide range of activities, from espionage to propaganda, directed towards uniting Slovakia with Hungary, participated in the “Slovak action” in the period 1919 – 1921.62 The first was the Slovak Central Office (Tót Központi Iroda) headed by the former Prešov advocate Karol Bulissa. The roots of this organization need to be sought somewhere in the time of the declaration of the Eastern Slovak Republic in 1918. The historian and expert on the Slovak question Lajos Steier played an important role in the background of this movement. The Slovak Central Office was supported especially by military circles. Its activities involved active officers, who smuggled leaflets from the regional military commands into Slovak territory. The office received generous grants from the foreign ministry. From 1 October 1919 to 12 April 1920, it received 5.8 million crowns for its activities, especially for preparing an uprising in Slovakia.63

Such a well financed institution could maintain a numerous apparatus of staff and contributors. According to the surviving records, Bulissa’s conspiratorial work found a response especially in eastern Slovakia, where 800 paid agitators and many reliable supporters were active. They produced not only propagandist leaflets, but also the Slovenský národ newspaper, printed in numbers of 50 thousand. The organization relied especially on former functionaries of the Hungarian regime, officers and members of the intelligentsia. By means of them and of paid agitators, the representatives of the office strengthened and drew attention to anti-Czech feelings in Slovakia. At first, they deliberately avoided revealing their main aim. The basis of their propaganda was attacking the Czechs, with an emphasis on economic, linguistic and religious “injustices against the Slovaks”. They criticized the idea of a united Czechoslovak nation and the spread of Bolshevism in the republic. For tactical reasons, they emphasized the demand for a plebiscite and the slogan: “Slovakia for the Slovaks!” However, from the beginning, their propaganda materials also included pro-Hungarian declarations. For example: “Before the World War, the Slovak people lived quietly and in good friendship with the Hungarians, and only a small group incited by the Czechs and by paid agitators was discontented, and this also arose only from the immediate mood.”64 Such claims usually ended with sentences appealing to “divine providence” and the need for irreversible changes. The declarations also

63 For more details on the question of financial flows from Hungary see: ANGYAL, Béla: A csehszlovákiai magyarság anyaországi támogatása a két világháború között. (Financial support from the motherland for the Hungarians in inter-war Czechoslovakia) In Régió, 2000, no. 3, p. 131-177.
64 Slovenský národ, 14 Dec 1919, p. 3.
sometimes included threats of a revolutionary solution, if the situation was not rapidly corrected. They found a starting point in cooperation with the Hungarians, who had provided the Slovaks with the conditions necessary for their national development.

Karol Bulissa made himself visible as the leading personality in the pro-Hungarian Slovak movement by submitting a memorandum to the British diplomat George R. Clerk. In an anti-Czech spirit, it emphasized “political and economic oppression”, “the falseness of Czechoslovak nationalism”, “Czechization”, and it compared the situation in the republic to that in the former Monarchy. The Slovak Independence Party (Tót Függetlenségi Párt) aimed to represent this ideological platform on the Hungarian political scene. Under the chairmanship of the journalist Ľudovít Janovec (Janovetz), its programme was summarized in 30 points and approved on 8 January 1920 in Budapest. It demanded a clearly defined Slovak territory and within it a plebiscite and autonomy. Until then, Slovakia should be controlled by international forces and a Slovak armed force would be formed to maintain order.

Democratic elections, the right to free assembly, legal protection for minority nationalities, freedom of religion, protection and development of Slovak agriculture, a progressive property policy, Slovak education to the highest level, teaching in a Slovak spirit and support for Slovak culture were also demanded. They wanted to address the poorer classes with support for health care and legal protection for workers according to the example of Western countries. Application of the democratic, Christian and national spirit was described as the basis for the healthy functioning of society. After the Hungarian Ministry of the Interior had approved the statutes of the party, a general assembly was held on 9 May 1920. Several hundred people, mostly exiles from Slovakia participated in it. Apart from the obligatory criticism of the existing situation and demands for a plebiscite, they approved a memorandum condemning the decision of the powers about the conditions for the peace treaty with Hungary. The chairman Janovec declared that: “the Slovak nation cannot be suppressed and would rather choose a cruel struggle or even death than Czech imperialism!” However, in the end, the activities of this party did not have much importance, apart from a momentary, short-term propagandist effect. It was relatively quickly compromised by Bulissa himself. He was considered too pro-Hungarian, and this largely disqualified him in the eyes of Slovaks.

In parallel with Bulissa’s group, another important group of pro-Hungarian Slovaks emerged in Budapest. It was associated with the Slovak Main Department (Tót főosztály), which was established at the Ministry for National Minorities on 22 September 1919. On the same day, the government also decided on the quick establishment of a Department of Slovak Language and Literature at Budapest University. Zoltán Szviezsényi was appointed head of the Slovak Main Office. His institution, as an information office of

65 Slovenský národ, 8 Dec 1919, p. 2. Part of the memorandum were also published in the press in Hungary (Pesti Napló, Szózat, Magyarország). Jehlička and Kmoško also met Clerk on 30 Oct 1919. AMZV, PZ Budapest 1919, no. 77. Clerk promised that he would inform the British premier David Lloyd George about the problems of the Slovaks.


the Hungarian government, was supposed to work in favour of the renewal of integrity, like other parts of the ministry. Its role was to harmonize the demands of the Slovaks with the interests of the government. Szviezsényi emphasized “the creation of the necessary moral preconditions for the renewed attachment of Slovakia”, since according to him: “The question of Upper Hungary is mainly a Slovak question”. Like Bulissa’s group, this platform also maintained its own network of agitators and informers throughout the territory of Slovakia. They also strove to establish contacts with political parties in Slovakia. The important people active on this platform included: Viktor Dvortsák, who was later delegated to the Hungarian Parliament with the help of this department, university Professor Michal Kmoško, and František Jehlička. They presented their views by means of leaflets and the magazine Slovák Zahraničný, which was published by Szvieszényi’s department. Jehlička declared in the pages of Slovák Zahraničný, that the wishes of the Slovak nation for a separate identity were not being fulfilled. He pointed to the “unsustainably bad situation” in Slovakia. He considered the Czechs and a “handful of Lutheran traitors” responsible for this. He also regularly intensified the negative image of the Czechoslovak Republic with abusive vocabulary such as “pepíci”, “Czech swine”, “thieves”, “Husites”, “čechúni” and so on. His anti-Czech argumentation had a strongly confessional background. He constantly pointed to the conflict of the “Lutheranism” and “Husitism of the Czechs” with Slovak Catholicism. He also argued in favour of a plebiscite with the view that in Turčiansky Svätý Martin not all the representatives of the national forces were heard. Against the negative image of Slovak reality, he propagated the image of a new, tolerant, Christian Budapest. The Pro-Hungarian Slovak People’s Party (Magyarbarát Tót Néppárt) was formed in Budapest under his leadership. This political group, officially established on 10 December 1919, had the main aim of securing rights for the Slovaks in a common state with the Hungarians. In contrast to Bulissa’s group, which relied mainly on a military solution, the Main Department supported the view that a realistic solution would come from some form of agreement with the representatives of the Slovaks. At the same time, however, they did not exclude military action, and actively participated in preparations for it. Apart from great similarities in propagandist argumentation, there were also differences between the conceptions of Bulissa’s and Szviezsényi’s groups. Bulissa and his associates perceived the minority problem only as a means for the renewal of integrity, a matter of correctly conceived propaganda. In contrast to this, the associates of Bleyer’s ministry, who had mostly declared their non-Magyar origin for a long time, had an entirely different starting point in this area. They expected real changes. However, the Hungarian government did not give much support to Szviezsényi’s group. The department had only one official employee – its head. Its other members were officials borrowed from other ministries, mostly refugees from Slovakia. The competitive struggle between these two important groups, both striving to

69 MOL. Küm. K 64 1920-7-34.
72 MOL. Küm. K 64 1920-7-505.
gain the absolute confidence and support of the Hungarian government, did not bring victory for either. They were reorganized in spring 1920 on instructions from above.

Apart from the two above mentioned groups, the Upper Hungarian League (Felvidéki liga) was active in the territory of Slovakia. As in the other organizations of this type, it was composed of volunteers, drawn from the former state employees and officers, that is from people, who had to leave their former places of activity because of their convictions and had an obvious interest in changing the situation. The league was formed at the beginning of 1919. However, it was not a typical “Slovak organization”. Its activists were mostly people of ethnic Hungarian or Magyar nationality. Its activities were especially connected with the Christian Social Party in Slovakia. Like other organizations of a similar type, the Upper Hungarian League set itself the aim of restoring the integrity of historic Hungary. We have already pointed to its activity in March 1919. From the beginning, its activity lay in caring for refugees from Slovakia and providing information about moods in the republic. At this time, it mostly used propaganda materials produced by other organizations. Later, the league succeeded in establishing in the territory of Slovakia a secret underground network, which was intended to engage in planning military actions against the republic. Its agents carried out intelligence activities, and the league gave the Hungarian state authorities regular reports on the situation in Slovakia, spread propaganda and so on. The importance and activities of the league grew after the counter-revolution, when its task of organizing actions of a military character was also renewed. In the period from October 1919 to October of the following year, it distributed more than 2.3 million pieces of propaganda materials, mostly its own products, and the number of its active spies reached 250. From January to June 1920, the league received regular financial support from the Hungarian government. The political situation after the ratification of Trianon, economic measures of the government including reduction of spending on the state apparatus and irredentism, as well as difficulties with the Hungarian currency, caused its gradual dissolution.

A special department of the Ministry of Propaganda in Győr, headed by former lawyer Ede Ernyey, was concerned with the distribution of propagandist materials in Slovakia in the period 1919 – 1920. Ernyey made Captain Ágoszton Nusser his deputy for military questions, although he was suspected of Bolshevik inclinations because of his active participation in the Hungarian Red Army. After the abolition of the Ministry of Propaganda on 23 December 1919, the department was not dissolved. It continued under the control of the second department of the Prime Minister’s Office (Miniszterelnökség). It developed close cooperation with the important irredentist organizations in Hungary and maintained active contacts with inhabitants of Slovakia, such as the Hungarian Christian Social politician János Tobler. In the period from January to May 1920, it distributed in Slovakia 100 thousand propagandist brochures and 200 thousand leaflets. It

73 MOL. Küm. Elnöki osztály (K 59) 1919-3; SNA, f. Policajné riaditeľstvo (Police Directorate) Bratislava, c. 771, 475/43.
75 MOL. ME. K 26 1922-IVbiz-2154.
76 MOL. ME. K 26 1922-IVbiz-96.
transported into the territory of Slovakia 25 thousand copies of Slovák Zahraničný, 10 thousand copies of the leaflet Radostná novina (Joyful News) and 25 thousand copies of Jehlička’s proclamations. These materials were distributed to the whole territory of Slovakia, partly by post, partly by couriers, and especially to western Slovakia. Apart from the already mentioned numbers “Jehlička propaganda”, five thousand Hungarian language leaflets were also transported to Slovakia in the period from January to May 1920. The propagandist materials were smuggled in smaller parcels and in letters. The newspapers got into circulation in Slovakia also by means of Slovak soldiers, who were often rewarded for their services with tobacco.77 Especially in the area around the river Danube, the employees of the department engaged in general public education, as well as distributing printed materials. They also spread propaganda in Hungary, emphasizing especially “love of the homeland”, the “thousand years of unity” and the “economic interconnection” of Hungary and Slovakia. The associates of the department supported cross-frontier contacts, which naturally flowed from its tasks. They had to organize meetings, at least once a week, distribute the leaflets they received, explain their meaning, struggle against the activities of socialists and Jews, organize journeys across the frontier to smuggle leaflets into Slovakia, secure contacts with Slovakia and with their colleagues.78 From 9 May 1920, the department came under the control of the Upper Hungarian League, which also gained its property. Imre Hávó became head of the department. After this step, the former department depended on the fate of the Upper Hungarian League, which was officially dissolved a year later.79

The project of autonomy for Slovakia

The idea of Slovak autonomy began to resound in Hungarian politics immediately from the fall of the Monarchy. The plans of Károlyi and Járási were not fulfilled, but in spite of various fundamental political changes in 1919, the idea of some form of Slovak autonomy in the framework of the future Hungarian state never entirely went away. The differences lay only in its real form and the legal environment in which it would exist. After the fall of the Bolshevist regime in August 1919, the Slovak exiles renewed talks with the leading representatives of the counter-revolutionary regime – Horthy, Friedrich, Archduke Joseph – about the form of Slovak – Hungarian coexistence. Their activity in this direction proved to be successful. They gained a promise that the Hungarian government would leave them “free hands” on the question of autonomy. From October 1919, the whole movement was headed by Karol Bulissa, who received substantial financial resources from the Hungarian government to organize the “Slovak action”. The result of these activities was a proposal of autonomy, which was discussed at the Budapest seat of the Archbishop of Esztergom before being submitted to the government. Jehlička, Kmoško, Pechány, Szviezsényi, Kutkafalvy and Bleyer also participated in this meeting. Preliminary demands were worked out and summarized in 18 points, which Bleyer, as

77 MOL. ME. K 26 1920-XLII-2684; MOL. ME. K 26 1921-XXXVIII-Hlášenie Dr. Ede Ernyeiho (Declaration of Dr. Ede Ernyey).
78 MOL. ME. K 26 1920-XLII-229.
79 MOL. ME. K 26 1920-XLII-List pre Perényi (Letter for Perényi) from 20 Jan 1921.
the minister authorized by the government, had to submit for discussion.\textsuperscript{80} Disagreements between the two significant currents among the pro-Hungarian Slovak exiles already existed in this period. In spite of this, the articles supporting Jehlička, who had a very strong position in the given situation, were also published in Bulissa’s \textit{Slovenský národ}. It is interesting that the information that the Slovaks have to gain autonomy from the Hungarian government, but could not expect it from the Czechs, was presented to the public long before the problem was secretly discussed by the Council of Ministers.

The fact that the politicians in Budapest intensively concerned themselves with the minority question was also to a large extent connected with the international position of Hungary, which was faced with talks about the peace treaty. The activity of the representatives of the non-Magyar minorities loyal to Hungary also intensified in this period. Their declarations were mainly intended to support the arguments of the representatives of Hungary in Paris.

Soon after the formation of Jehlička’s Pro-Hungarian Slovak People’s Party, the Union of Representatives of the Non-Magyar Nationalities of Hungary was also established. It included representatives of the Slovaks, Rumanians, Ruthenians, Germans, Croats and Slovenes. On 30 December 1919, a great demonstration of loyalty to Hungary and its government was organized in Budapest under the umbrella of this organization. The participants, with the chairman of the union Jehlička and Kmoško representing the Slovaks, declared their political aim: to assist the building of Hungary within its historic frontiers and to secure all the rights of the non-Magyars to national development. In the resolution sent to prime minister Károly Huszár, they demanded solidarity in the matter of integrity of the country based on the principles of democracy in the national and Christian spirit, and guarantees for the rights of non-Magyar nationalities.\textsuperscript{81} Soon after this, when Apponyi submitted his preliminary memorandum in Paris, an assembly of the Pro-Hungarian Slovak People’s Party was held in Budapest on 15 January 1920. The participants demanded the separation of Slovakia from the Czech Lands with the slogan: “Czechoslovakia was not and will not be, but Hungaria was and will be.” There were speeches by Jehlička, Dvortsák, Kmoško, Szviezsényi, Gašpar Baluška-Mészáros and Mária Sliacka. They adopted a programme of the party based on the ideas of integrity and Slovak autonomy. The assembled activists also agreed on a memorandum addressed to the peace conference.\textsuperscript{82}

In Hungary they did not believe in the long-term existence of Czechoslovakia, which they labelled an “artificial state formation” comparable to the Habsburg Monarchy, because of its high percentage of ethnic minorities. They regarded the Slovaks in the Czechoslovak Republic as an oppressed minority rather than as a state forming element. Precisely in this context, the offer of Slovak autonomy had to be an important act, which would send a signal to the international community that Hungary had an interest in sol-


\textsuperscript{81} MOL. ME. K 27. Mtj. 3 Jan 1920 – 35; \textit{Slovák Zahraničný}, 3 Jan 1920, p. 1.

\textsuperscript{82} \textit{Slovák Zahraničný}, 25 Jan 1920, p. 1.
ving the nationality question in the region. Minister Bleyer proposed the adoption of a preliminary plan for autonomy for discussion by the Council of Ministers on 7 January 1920. He started from the assumption that the Slovak question could no longer be solved only on the basis of minority declarations of the government. In his view, enactment of autonomy would also influence the other minorities. The proposal of Slovak autonomy had relatively strong political support at this time. It was supported by such influential personalities as Count Albert Apponyi, Baron Gyula Wlassics and Miklós Horthy. There was another significant discussion at the next meeting of the Council of Ministers, on 9 January 1920. A preliminary autonomy plan was approved, in spite of opposition from the finance minister Frigyes Korányi, who categorically declared that the adoption of such a plan would undermine the foundations of the thousand year old Hungarian state. However, in spite of this, he admitted that in relation to the talks in Paris, he was willing to make this concession.\textsuperscript{83}

The proposed autonomy was based on two fundamental principles: the ambition to offer the minorities all the rights necessary for comprehensive development, and an effort to maintain the unified character of the Hungarian state. The demand of the Slovak politicians for the creation of territorial autonomy had to be combined with the idea that no form of corpus separatum could be accepted in the country. This led to a proposal to create autonomous county units, with minority self-government and cultural rights. The counties where the majority of the population was of Slovak nationality would form a minority region named “Slovakia”. They planned to define the Slovak ethnic territory on the basis of the last Hungarian census statistics obtained in 1910. This territory would gain autonomy in the majority of fields of administration, education, culture, religion and the judiciary. It would have a parliament with the right to issue decrees valid in the autonomous territory, a government with its head elected by the parliament, and the right to use its own national colours. The rights of the Slovaks in the central government would be secured by their own minister, they would have representatives in the central parliament, and special Slovak units would be formed in the army.\textsuperscript{84} The plan for Slovak autonomy meant a substantial widening of the minority rights previously held by the Slovaks in Hungary, which was justified by the strengthened national consciousness of the Slovak population. However, this proposal could hardly compete with the real political gains of the Slovaks in the Czechoslovak Republic. As developments under the pressure of events showed, this proposal was not regarded as a fixed promise by the Hungarian government, but as a forced maximum, achievement of which depended on ability to implement it in the real conditions of the country. In contrast to this, for example, Jehlička regarded it as the forced minimum and criticized the fact that Hungarian circles demanded that these preliminary agreements be kept secret.

A success for Bleyer’s minority policy was that after the elections to the Hungarian Parliament, held on 25-26 January 1920, Germans gained four seats as members of the Union of Representatives of the Non-Magyar Nationalities of Hungary. In summer, after

\textsuperscript{83} TILKOVSZKY, ref. 79, p. 584-585.
\textsuperscript{84} TILKOVSZKY, ref. 79, p. 589-594.
the departure of the Rumanian intervention forces, Kuttakfalvy and Dvortsák joined this group.

When the peace treaty with Hungary was signed, the minority question was continually in the foreground of political discussion. However, when the declared position of the government or of the representatives of the minorities ceased to topical in relation to the international situation, this theme was gradually marginalized. At the same time, the lower representatives of state power generally did not respect the activities of the Ministry for National Minorities. There was passive resistance from officials, government commissioners, school inspectors, chief sheriffs, notaries, and representatives of the army and the churches.

On 15 March 1920, the day of appointment of the new Hungarian government of Count Sándor Simonyi-Semadam, minister Bleyer appealed to his colleagues to express their view on the question of the Slovak autonomy proposal. In this way, he probably wanted to refute the sceptical views of some of the minority politicians. He was planning to prepare a similar declaration for the territory of Burgenland, which was still under Hungarian control. He also urged the nomination of two Slovak representatives in the Budapest parliament. He recommended Jehlička and Dvortsák as well known personalities. On 25 March, the Hungarian ministers adopted a solemn declaration stating that the autonomy plan approved in January would be incorporated into legislation and the autonomy of the Slovak people would become part of the constitution. However, this could not be published because objections were expressed against the use of national colours and the Slovak language in the army.

Bleyer again intervened at the end of April 1920, this time in favour of the observance of decree no. 4044/1919. He criticized the government for not taking even one step to secure the rights of the minority nationalities, in spite of declarations that the nationality question could only be solved by mutual understanding. He described the approved autonomy plan as the maximum the Hungarian state could offer the Slovaks, since without such an offer the idea of integrity was threatened in his view. He also observed that such an agreement did not pre-judge possible future changes and adjustments in mutual relations. The foreign minister Count Teleki observed in this context, that they could not speak about it as the maximum for the Slovaks, because the other side could interpret such concessions as the minimum. He emphasized that Slovak autonomy could not be regarded as some sort of template, because there were different demands in each territory. He emphasized the old territorial divisions of Hungary and considered it disadvantageous to change them. Subsequently, with some reservations, the Council of Ministers expressed its confidence in Bleyer’s minorities policy.

On the basis of the declarations of the responsible Hungarian politicians, it is possible to state that the question of fulfillment of the approved autonomy plan already had further political limitations. The idea of possible concessions was narrowed to basic cultural and administrative, especially linguistic rights in counties where the Slovaks

86 MOL. ME. K 27. Mtj. 25 March 1920 – 44.
87 MOL. ME. K 27. Mtj. 30 April 1920 – 3.
clearly predominated according to the 1910 census. At the same time, the quality of participation in the declared rights would largely depend on the ability of individual members of minorities to assert their demands. By this time, the Slovak community in the new smaller Hungary was already at a relatively advanced stage of assimilation, it did not inhabit more extensive homogeneous territories, and more importantly, it did not possess a well established and influential institutional base. Such starting points did not approach the possibilities, which the gradually emerging Czechoslovak Republic offered to the Slovaks. František Jehlička also considered that the promised autonomy was inadequate, and in spring 1920, during his visit to Poland, he began to orient himself towards cooperation with the Poles. He criticized the frequent attacks from representatives of influential irredentist societies, headed by the chairman of the League for the Protection of Territory Árpád Galócsy, who perceived activities supporting the rights of minorities as further attacks on the “thousand year integrity”. Their permanent attacks on the “minority mafia” as they abusively called the non-Magyar politicians, were part of the above mentioned competition of views on the character of the minorities policy of Hungary.

In the summer of 1920, the policy of the Hungarian government deviated from the existing official course associated with Bleyer. It began to increasingly emphasize the liberal and progressive character of the old Hungarian Nationality Act from 1868. The ideas and plans to change or correct the inadequacies of the past minorities policy were limited only to some linguistic and cultural concessions, although the main aim of these changes was still supposed to be an effort to maintain the viability of the idea of the integrity of the historic Hungarian state.

In the second half of 1920 attacks on the Ministry for National Minorities strengthened further. Its existence was also described as disadvantageous from the foreign policy point of view in the new situation after the ratification of the Peace Treaty of Trianon. The planned uprising in Slovakia, which the ministry had participated in preparing, was indefinitely postponed. For internal political reasons, its position was undermined by accusations that its activity threatened the integrity of the country and evoked discontent among the minorities by mobilizing them against the ethnic Hungarians or Magyars, or by needlessly strengthening their national consciousness and so disrupting the process of their natural assimilation.

The highest representatives of the individual counties of Hungary also had long-term objections to the activity of the ministry. They pointed out that only minimal minorities remained in the new smaller Hungary, and they were not willing to tolerate them developing separate cultures, because they saw it as a threat to the existence of the Hungarian state. This current was cemented especially by the influential social organizations: the Hungarian National Union and the League for the Defence of Territory. The radicalism that became dominant in Hungary at this time, was also connected with the disappointment of wide groups in the population with the situation that had arisen. In politics, the view became dominant that the break up of the historic Kingdom of Hungary was con-

89 These memoranda are found in MOL. ME. K 26 1920-XLIII.
nected much more with an excessively liberal minorities policy and with the irredentist propaganda activity of the neighbours, rather than with the disillusionment of the non-Magyar representatives with the Hungarian minorities policy. Bleyer defended himself against these accusations by emphasizing the importance of his activities in the field of propaganda.

At the end of October 1920, he formulated a memorandum for the Council of Ministers in favour of a fair policy towards the minorities. He emphasized the importance and topicality of such a policy especially with reference to the unsolved question of Burgenland. Hungary had still not given up this territory, which the great powers had awarded to Austria. He connected the promises with the specific conditions, such as the level of development of the given nation, its aspirations and its interest in returning to the old homeland. He also observed that promises had to be kept. He mentioned Slovak autonomy as an appropriate example, pointing out that they had made no definite commitments and all the promises were still on a general level. He demanded for the minorities at least a minimum of language rights, on the basis of which it would be much easier to build their positive relationship to the homeland.90

However, the responsible representatives of the country, such as the prime minister and his advisors, did not think this proposal was justified. They pointed to its incompatibility with Hungarian legislation and administration. Their view clearly indicated that Budapest was no longer interested in continuing the sort of minorities policy propagated by Bleyer. A practical or legislative solution to the minorities question was postponed until a more appropriate moment.91 Bleyer’s efforts, which had encountered indifference and suspicion for a long time, did not receive support even from his colleagues in the government. On the basis of this situation and of the fact that not even Premier Teleki supported him, he decided to offer his resignation at the end of November. In the end, he did not give up his position, but his name did not appear in Teleki’s new government formed on 16 December 1920. Decree no. 4 044/1919 was also subjected to fundamental criticism. After the ratification of the Peace Treaty of Trianon by the Hungarian Parliament, the decree was said to “threaten the idea of the Hungarian nation state and its unity”. The new minorities policy had to be based on the still valid act from 1868, but its exact form was left open. Especially the great foreign policy significance of this question played an important role in this. From the point of view of internal policy, it was considered necessary to promote especially the use of the Hungarian language.92 This trend was also supported by the next prime minister Count István Bethlen, who came to power on 14 April 1921. He declared the application of the so-called Hungarian national policy. Consolidation of the economy and the internal affairs of the country was regar-

90 MOL. ME. K 26 1920-XLIII-8634.
91 Ibid.
92 As a reason for revising decree no. 4 044/1919, it was said that its origin was influenced by the given situation, but the nationalities did not demand some of the concessions and the peace treaty did not commit Hungary to granting them. The decree was incompatible with the existing legal order and caused problems from an administrative point of view. However, as this memorandum clearly shows, the nationalities had still not clearly defined their attitude to the renewal of integrity, and for this reason they could not commit themselves to a more liberal conception of this question, which would not, however, mean a commitment for the future. MOL. ME. K 26 1920-XLIII-8634.
ded as an important pre-condition for an active foreign policy. Bethlen defended the old Hungarian minorities policy and expressed very cautious views on any concessions to the minorities. Everything would be solved according to the specific time and situation. He saw a sort of “optimal minorities policy” in strengthening of rights in the fields of culture and state administration, while maintaining the principle of the inviolability of the “unity of the country”. On 22 April 1921, the Slovak and Ruthenian main departments at the Ministry for National Minorities were dissolved. Their tasks were taken over by the political departments of the foreign ministry and the Prime Minister’s Office, which continued to work on actions directed towards renewing the integrity of the country. The personnel and activities did not change substantially, but proposals for the position of “Slovakia” in a renewed greater Hungary had no real political relevance in the existing conditions. They became significant again only in 1938, when the future organization of the region was again being decided.

* The study originated in the framework of the project APVV no. 51-017 105 Slovakia in the 20th century.

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Miroslav Michela  *Plans for Slovak autonomy*

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Chronologisch konzentriert er sich vor allem auf die Epoche seit Antritt der Károly Regierung nach Unterzeichnung des Trianon Friedensvertrages (4. Juni 1920). Gerade in dieser Zeit waren

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93 BELLÉR, ref. 44, p. 151-152.
die Aktivitäten der prowungarischen Kräfte am intensivsten und die Frage der Wiedervereinigung der Slowakei mit Ungarn zeigte sich als sehr aktuell. Im Jahr 1920 kam es allerdings langsam zu Abweichung vom bislang sgn. nationalchristlichen Kurz der Minderheitspolitik, was sich auch in der institutionellen Reorganisation widerspiegelte, die sich auch in Wendung der Beziehungen im Rahmen der provungarischen irrendentistischen Bewegung widerspiegelte. Im Hinsicht der Vorstellungen über eventuelle Gestaltung der slowakisch-ungarischen Beziehungen ist es von Gebietsautonomie und später vor allem kulturellen Autonomie zum Gedanke des einheitlichen Staates gekommen. Innerhalb dessen hielt man für notwendig nur die Litera des alten nationalen Gesetzes aus dem Jahr 1868 zu erfüllen und bei Bedarf (sollte es zu Gebietsrevision kommen) könnte es zu Erweiterung dieser Konzessionen kommen.

Ungarn verfügte in der gegebenen Situation nicht über den notwendigen Militär-, Wirtschafts- weder Bündnispotential, ohne das sich alle revisionistischen Pläne als höchstens gefährlich zeigten. Aus diesen Gründen stellten alle Pläne der Autonomie nur als bestimmte Möglichkeit, die sich aber in den gegebenen Bedingungen der politischen Realität in der Region entzieht.
THE UNIVERSALITY OF ANTI-SEMITISM AND THE UNIQUENESS OF THE HOLOCAUST

HANA KLAMKOVÁ


While anti-Semitism is usually perceived as a universal phenomena, the Holocaust is often viewed as a unique and unprecedented event. However, when it comes to explaining the Holocaust, reference to anti-Semitism seems to be the only answer, the sole factor that led to the tragedy. But if – in one or another form – anti-Semitism is a constant feature, what makes the Holocaust an unparalleled experience? The aim of this study is not to investigate the uniqueness or “historicization” of the Holocaust, but rather to analyse the relation between anti-Semitism as a phenomena and the Holocaust as an event. The concerned relation is studied on the example of Slovakia, in the period between the formation of Slovak national consciousness and the end of the Second World War.


“Anti-Semitism – religious, economic, cultural or racial, virulent or mild – has been for millenia an almost ecumenical phenomenon. And yet the Holocaust has been an event without precedents.”

Zygmunt Bauman

With the expression ecumenical anti-Semitism, the sociologist Zygmunt Bauman points to the long-term anti-Jewish prejudices and simultaneously to their great variety. If we content ourselves for now with the rather inexact definition of anti-Semitism as meaning hatred of Jews, then in one or another form this phenomenon has been part of history for almost two millennia. According to Bauman, anti-Semitism is a more or less permanent phenomenon, which has various forms but remains unchanged in essence. However, in contrast to anti-Semitism, the Holocaust – the Nazi attempt to exterminate the Jews of Europe – is an unprecedented event. The Holocaust cannot be compared with anything else.

Without entering into a discussion of the uniqueness or the “historicization” of the Holocaust, which is also not the subject of this study, I will jump to the words of the historian Shulamit Volkov, who wrote: “[t]he historiography dealing with the Holocaust has long been a sphere of contesting and competing views. One thing, however, seems to have remained constant in all its ups and downs – the reliance upon anti-Semitism as rationale for the National Socialists’ ‘Final Solution’. Various protestations notwithstanding...”

standing, almost all historians finally make use of anti-Semitism as the single most important element in analysing the road to Auschwitz – twisted or direct.”

This study asks two questions: Is there a connecting line between anti-Semitism and the Holocaust? Was the Holocaust the logical result of anti-Semitism? I investigate the question of the relationship between anti-Semitism and the Holocaust on two levels: the theoretical level and on the case study of Slovakia between the emergence of Slovak national consciousness and the end of the Second World War. When analysing the Holocaust and the routes that led to it, the terms “anti-Judaism”, “anti-Semitism” or anti-Jewish feeling are often used without explanation. What feelings or expressions are described by the term “anti-Semitism”? Can all the anti-Jewish attitudes be covered by the term “anti-Semitism”? Does “anti-Semitism” have one definite form or several variants? Reliable and exact definition of anti-Semitism is hindered by the fact that anti-Jewish attitudes were and still are often complex and contradictory in content. However, I will attempt, at least, to outline the situation, while being aware of giving a rather simplified picture.

Judeophobia and the Making of a Stereotypical Jew

Anti-Semitism, a word intended to designate the “longest hatred” is not an entirely fortunate expression. Authorship of the term “anti-Semitism” is most frequently attributed to the German publicist Wilhelm Marr, who used it for the first time at the end of the 1870s. The new expression, which still awaited more precise content at the end of the 19th century, was intended to symbolize overcoming of the traditional, mostly religiously motivated anti-Jewish feeling (Judenhass). The historian Yehuda Bauer thinks that Marr’s need to use a new designation for hatred of Jews was also partly connected with his negative view of Christianity, which was “a Jewish invention. The new term sounded scientific, did not mention Jews, but everyone knew who and what was meant; it described a newly developed phenomenon, of a nationalistic and racial biological approach.” In the course of history, the term anti-Semitism has been used so much, that, for example,

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3 VOLKOV, Shulamit. Anti-Semitism as Explanation: For and Against. In POSTONE, Moise – SANTNER, Eric (eds.). Catastrophe and Meaning: The Holocaust and the Twentieth Century. Chicago : The University of Chicago Press, 2003, p. 34. Volkov refers to the so-called intentionalists and functionalists, meaning two basic orientations in interpretation of national socialism and the so-called final solution of the Jewish question. To put it simply, the intentionalists explain the development of Nazi Germany with an emphasis on Hitler’s aims and ideology, while the functionalists point to the chaotic to anarchic character of the Third Reich, which led to radicalization of Nazi policy. For further details see: BROWNING, Christopher R. The Path to Genocide: Essays on Launching the Final Solution. Cambridge : Cambridge University Press, 1992, p. 86-121; NIŽŇANSKÝ, Eduard. Interpretácie fašizmu historiografiou SRN (1945 – 1990). (The interpretation of fascism in West German historiography (1945 – 1990)). Nitra : Vysoká škola pedagogická, 1995.


6 BAUER, Yehuda. Problems of Contemporary Antisemitism. A contribution to the conference: Rethinking Antisemitism: The Holocaust and the Contemporary World, 3-5 May 2003, Stevenson College, University of California, Santa Cruz, copy of the paper in the possession of the author.
today it is often used without people realizing that etymologically it “is inane nonsense, because there is no Semitism that you can be anti to”.7 It is also clear from history that the feelings and expressions designated as anti-Semitism were almost exclusively directed against Jews, and usually did not concern the other Semitic nations or nations that speak Semitic languages.

Why did the original Judenhass cease to be topical? In pre-modern society, the Christian Church determined a large part of public opinion, including the relations between Christians and Jews. Joshua Trachtenberg a Reform rabbi and author of books about medieval views of Jews, thinks there was a qualitative worsening of relations between Christians and Jews in the High Middle Ages because of an effort by the Christian Church to ensure its dominant position and prove the superiority of its teaching over Judaism.8 In an effort to overcome Judaism, the medieval Church “resorted to the common trick of disputants – mud slinging”.9 Apart from attacks on the Jewish faith as such, this slander included the construction of the theological Jew, a figure presented by the Church as “a ‘monster’, a theological abstraction, of superhuman malice and cunning, and more than superhuman blindness”.10

Bauman comes to a similar conclusion, when he considers the connection between the hatred of Jews stimulated by the Church and the effort to define and strengthen the position of Christianity. Definition against the Jews became part of the medieval Christian identity. Bauman observes in this context that medieval hatred of Jews strengthened their position as a group, which belonged “neither with the not-yet-converted heathens, nor with the fallen-from-grace heretics, who marked the two zealously defended, and defensible, frontiers of Christendom. [...] Their presence constituted a permanent challenge to the certainty of Christian evidence. The challenge could be repelled, or at least rendered less dangerous, only by explaining Jewish obstinacy by a malice aforethought, ill intentions and moral corruption.”11 The specific nature of the relationship of Christianity to Judaism had the result that the Jews became the subject of a “powerful and sinister fascination they would otherwise hardly possess”. Like Trachtenberg before him, Bauman came to the conclusion that “Christianity could not reproduce itself, and certainly could not reproduce its ecumenical domination” without the stereotypical Jew, who “visualized the horrifying consequences of boundary-transgression, of not remaining fully in the fold, of any conduct short of unconditional loyalty and unambiguous choice; he was the prototype and arch-pattern of all nonconformity, heterodoxy, anomaly and aberration”. Trachtenberg’s theological Jew and Bauman’s stereotypical Jew have something in common. Both are invented entities, which have no more in common with

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7 Ibid.
9 TRACHTENBERG, The Devil and the Jews, ref. 8, p. 162.
11 BAUMAN, ref. 1, p. 37.
really existing Jews than with real Christians. In other words, the theological or stereotypical Jew does not exist outside the imaginations of those who believe in his existence. The reality that the constructed Jew does not exist in the real world, does not weaken his effect, on the contrary, it enriches him with two important properties: immortality and lack of logic. The fact that the theological or stereotypical Jew is invented is practically impossible to prove – his unrecognizability may be a result of perfect pretence by the Jews. According to Zygmunt Bauman, the illogical nature of the constructed image of the Jew “marked the mythical entity deemed to reconcile them as a demonic, potent force; a force simultaneously intensely fascinating and repulsive, and above all frightening”.

This hatred of Jews can be described more as anti-Judaism or Judeophobia than as anti-Semitism, although these designations cannot adequately capture the whole complexity of the phenomenon. The roots of medieval anti-Judaism need to be sought in the effort of the Christian Church to secure the dominant position of its teaching, and to overcome Judaism, the religion from which Christianity derived. It is clear that although we also encounter the illogical character of hatred of Jews in the modern period, traditional anti-Judaism could function especially in an environment, in which Jews, as a religious minority, were physically isolated from Christians by the gates of Jewish ghettos, as well as by customs and rituals. In the pre-emancipation period, Christians and Jews met, but always for particular purposes, usually agreed in advance. As Jacob Katz notes, whether the representatives of the two communities met for trade or came into contact at school or at the doctors, their meetings always had practical purposes. In other words, Jews and non-Jews only met when one needed something from the other, not because they simply wanted to meet. The physical and social separation of Jews from non-Jews is also an important pre-condition for religiously motivated hatred, and already because it clearly and undoubtedly defined who was who, that is, who was Jewish and who was Christian.

**Modern Forms of Anti-Semitism**

The enlightened philosophy, which progressed through Europe from the end of the 17th century, changed the social relations of the old continent from the foundations. Approximately until the time of the French Revolution, national identity and religion were inseparably connected, but the Enlightenment with its emphasis on reason undermined the hitherto unquestionable position of faith and made religious convictions a more or less private matter. Since the Enlightenment proclaimed especially rationalism, humanism and universalism, but not because of any great sympathy towards the Jewish minority, the enlightened philosophers proclaimed the idea that the Jews must also be fully incorporated into the states and societies in which they lived. The attitude of the enlightened was accurately described by Walter Laqueur, who wrote: “In spite of the

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12 BAUMAN, ref. 1, p. 38-39.
fact that the leading Enlightenment thinkers fought for tolerance, their attitude to the Jews was at least restrained. Voltaire had only contempt for the Jews. He considered them intolerant and fanatical. [...] Other important personalities were willing to make an exception for educated Jews, but not for the moustached ones."¹⁵ Disregarding the mostly reserved relationship of the enlightened philosophers to the Jews (Gotthold Ephraim Lessing was a well-known exception in this respect), the Enlightenment, with its belief in the equality of every person, significantly contributed to the creation of an environment in which Jews and non-Jews began to encounter one another in situations not determined by immediate commercial interest.¹⁶

Without wishing to deny the Enlightenment philosophy its role in creating a new more equal view of European Jews, I consider it important to emphasize that the emancipation of the Jews could not have happened without deep transformation of the formerly medieval society. In the background of this transformation was the effort of the absolutist ruler “to concentrate power in his own hands with the aid of a bureaucratic apparatus. Under this new form of government, all the estates were gradually shorn of their autonomy, and the absolute ruler converted the members of the various estates into citizens”.¹⁷ If they had to be Jews, who were useful to the ruler as a third estate, with their duties and rights, they also had to be included in the monarch’s plan.¹⁸

The view that – stated with some exaggeration – the emancipation of the Jews was a miraculous liberation from the horrors of the medieval ghetto, prevails in historiography. The historian Salo Baron, accurately described as an “iconic figure among historians of the Jews”,¹⁹ is often mentioned in connection with his criticism of the “lachrymose conception of Jewish history”, according to which the Middle Ages was an exclusively dark period for Jews. In line with this criticism, one of Baron’s most frequently cited essays rejects the view that emancipation was “the dawn of a new day after a nightmare of the deepest horror”.²⁰ In the same essay, Baron reconstructed the life of the medieval Jews, casting doubt on the terrible nature of their life, so that emancipation lost some of its magic.

Emancipation is usually spoken of as a moment of break through in connection with the development of relations between Jews and non-Jews, a moment that created the conditions for qualitatively better coexistence between the two communities. Equal praise is also addressed to the accompanying Enlightenment philosophy. To a considerable extent this view is correct. In the age of reason, the emphasis on a secular society had key importance for the Jewish minority. If religion was not what determined the value of a person, then the ghettos, whether physical or social, were superfluous. Laqueur offers a rather less one-sided view. According to him: “from the historical perspective, the ideas

¹⁵ LAQUEUR, ref. 5, p. 70.
¹⁶ KATZ, ref. 13, p. 42.
¹⁷ KATZ, Tradition and Crisis, ref. 14, p. 216.
²⁰ BARON, ref. 18, p. 50.
of the Enlightenment led to the emancipation of the Jews, but they also contributed to the origin of modern anti-Semitism”.21

The term “emancipation of the Jews” is a relatively new designation for something described at the end of the 18th century as the “amelioration of the civil status of the Jews”. This designation comes from the title of an essay by the Prussian diplomat Christian Wilhelm von Dohm, written in 1781 at the request of his friend and representative of the Jewish Enlightenment Moses Mendelssohn. In the essay, which is mainly an appeal for the granting of civil rights to French and German Jews, Dohm argued that “[e]verything the Jews are blamed for is caused by the political conditions under which they now live, and any other group of men, under such conditions, would be guilty of identical errors”.22 Dohm was convinced that since a Jew is first of all a human being and only then a Jew, equalization of his position would make him just as good a citizen as any other. But was this really true? Not only theological arguments were used against the emancipation of the Jews. Many of Dohm’s and Mendelssohn’s contemporaries were convinced that Jews had such faulty characteristics, that no civil rights would correct them. In the background of these arguments was the idea that it was not Judaism that made the Jews incapable of improvement, it was simply the way they were born.

At the time Marr sought a new designation for hatred of Jews, he no longer opposed the Jews as a Christian, but as a German. Marr articulated his ideology of racial hatred in two successive pamphlets bearing the symptomatic titles: Der Sieg des Judenthums über das Germanenthum: Vom nicht confessionellen Standpunkt aus betrachtet and Wählet keinen Juden! Der Weg zum Siege des Germanenthums über das Judenthum: Ein Mahnwort an die Wähler nichtjüdischen Stammes alles Confessionen. Marr presented emancipation as a definite step towards Jewish domination, as a measure giving political security to Jewish economic exploitation. It is clear from the formal and content aspects of the pamphlets that Marr was using anti-Semitic feelings for his own political ends. In 1879, the same year as he wrote the pamphlets, Marr founded the Anti-Semitic League (Antisemiten-Liga). This was not only the first German organization bearing an anti-Semitic designation, but also the first organization in which anti-Semitism served a political aim. Politicization and institutionalization are important features that distinguish racial anti-Semitism from traditional, mostly religiously motivated hatred of Jews. Marr was convinced that emancipation had made the German Jews stronger and more powerful than ever before. Since, according to Marr, the essence of the conflict between Germans and Jews was not religious, but national and racial, the integration or assimilation of Jews could not change anything. In other words, conversion could help Jews to become Christians, but they could never become Germans. It was already clear from the titles of the two pamphlets that according to Marr, the Jews and Germans were engaged in a merciless conflict. However, if the Germans were going to triumph over the emancipated Jews, they needed more effective and more precise instruments. According to Marr, institutionalized political effort was necessary in the framework of political parties and of

21 LAQUEUR, ref. 5, p. 71.
organizations and associations created for the purpose of political agitation. Anti-Jewish political argument in the newspapers was obviously also necessary.\textsuperscript{23}

In comparison with the reserved position of the Enlightenment intellectuals towards the Jews, the more radical position of Wilhelm Marr, who did not believe in humanism and the principles of individualism, is not so surprising. Marr represented those, who did not believe in the existence of the German of Jewish origin and excluded the possibility that a Jew could be a good and honourable citizens. For Marr, the separation of the Jews from German society represented a certainty that emancipation undermined. In the words of Zygmunt Bauman: \textit{“In France, Germany, in the German-dominated part of Austro-Hungary, the likelihood that all Jews would sooner or later be ‘socialized’, or would ‘self-socialize’, into non-Jews, and hence would become culturally indistinguishable and socially invisible, was quite real.”}\textsuperscript{24} The anti-Semites believed that the barriers between Jews and Germans needed to be rebuilt. \textit{“Man is before he acts; nothing he does may change what he is. This is, roughly, the philosophical essence of racism.”}\textsuperscript{25}

The preceding text shows that traditional anti-Jewish feelings and modern variants of anti-Semitism have much in common, but also some different features. The most important connecting link is probably the above mentioned lack of logic in anti-Jewish views, as we observed in the case of Trachtenberg’s theological Jew and Bauman’s stereotypical Jew Traditional Judenhass had its roots in the effort of the Christian Church to secure its dominant position, and so it was directly aimed against Judaism. Modern anti-Semitism considered that it had overcome traditional and imperfect anti-Judaism. Racial anti-Semitism did not react to the differences between Jews and non-Jews or Christians, but to the threat that the two formerly separated groups might merge into one group. In other words, for Marr and the modern anti-Semites, the Jewish religion was a secondary problem. The main problem was the threat of integration and assimilation of the Jewish minority.

\textbf{Anti-Semitism in the Slovak Historical Context}

The aim of the preceding part was to theoretically define the term and phenomenon of anti-Semitism. The modern racially based theory of hatred of Jews is most frequently mentioned as the cause of the tragedy of the Holocaust. However, to avoid the retrospective interpretation of history, I will examine the problem of anti-Semitism in a wider historical context. Is it possible, using the example of Slovakia, to prove continuity in anti-Jewish feeling?

However, before I attempt to answer this question, I will return to the definition of anti-Semitism. In the following parts, I will regard as anti-Semitism, those expressions that are directed against Jews, not on the basis of what they have done or might do, but simply because they are Jews. At the same time, I build on the classic definition by the American psychologist Gordon Allport, who defines negative prejudice as \textit{“an avertive


\textsuperscript{24} BAUMAN, ref. 1, p. 59.

\textsuperscript{25} BAUMAN, ref. 1, p. 60.
or hostile attitude toward a person who belongs to a group, simply because he belongs to that group, and its therefore presumed to have the questionable qualities ascribed to the group”.

I understand the Slovak national revival as “the process of deliberate change of status of a group with insufficient consciousness of belonging together by means of re-identification.” This process began in Slovakia in the course of the 1780s, when Anton Bernolák produced the first proposal for standard written Slovak. However, more than half a century passed before intellectuals in Upper Hungary began to proclaim the existence of a Slovak national unit.

Why is the Slovak national revival important for understanding anti-Semitism or Slovak – Jewish relations? Tibor Pichler pointed out that the aim of the revivalist efforts was to promote the existence of a particular old but also new nation. The patriots presented the nation as something natural, especially in contrast to the state, but they also strove for the revival of the ethnic community. At the same time, the renewal process most frequently proceeds by means of the national story, retelling of the national history and myth, or with the help of a newly created standard written language. Pichler says that ethnic nationalism expresses itself in romantic thinking, which he describes as zealous or enthusiastic. It also states the position in which the given linguistically and culturally defined community is found, and for the revivalists, this position is a source of dissatisfaction. Pichler perceives the connection between ethnic enthusiasm and the emotion of indignation, which “arises in the tension between our own us and the foreign them. The factor of the hostile foreign to some degree has a constitutive function, which stimulates comparison and leads to crystallization of the consciousness of the group, which finds itself under pressure, and reacts by means of intellectuals able to present a new interpretation of the group or nation.”

The conception of the collective “us” and “them”, or more exactly “us” versus “them” used in national co-ordinates assists the (re-)identification of the community already by saying who we are not. To put it simply, according to this conception, we are “us”, at least because we are not “them”. An example of the pressure about which Pichler writes, is the phenomenon of Magyarization, discussed below, which was the catalyst for the Slovak revivalist efforts. The Hungarian or Magyar elite generalized into the Hungarian nation was the external enemy in the eyes of the Slovak intellectuals. The internal enemies were the “renegades’, who turned away from the nation to which they belonged ‘by origin’”.

It is clear that for the Slovak patriots, the Hungarian nobility was the primary enemy to which they reacted and which they defined themselves against. As I will show in the next part, in the process of constructing Slovak national identity or forming the collective “us”, they did not consider the Jewish minority and the Jews were more or less automatically placed among “those others”. In a further part, I will examine the influence of the

28 PICHLER, ref. 27, p. 572.
29 PICHLER, ref. 27, p. 572.
formation of the Slovak national consciousness on the relationship of the Slovak ethnic majority to the Jewish minority. Two connected factors – language and pro-Hungarian orientation – hindered Jewish participation in the formation of the Slovak nation. However, anti-Jewish, Judeophobic stereotypes also played their part in the relationship to the Jewish minority of the Slovak majority, who did not always understand the “learned speeches” of the national intellectuals.

Bernolák, Kollár and Štúr: The Formation of National Consciousness

The basic instrument of the Slovak revivalist efforts was language. The proposal for a standard Slovak written language was published in 1787 by Anton Bernolák, one of the students at General Seminary for Priests established in Bratislava Castle by Joseph II. Bernolák’s language reforms were not connected only with the ethnic feeling of this Roman Catholic priest and linguist, but especially with an effort to translate the Bible into the spoken language of Upper Hungary. The Protestants, who formed a substantial majority in the Slovak population up to the 17th century, used the Czech Kralice Bible. The use of Biblical Czech, the language of the Kralice Bible by Slovak Protestants also derived from the close relationship between the Czech and Slovak Evangelicals. The Catholic clergy, who regained the majority position after the Thirty Years War, celebrated Mass in Latin, but they preached in the spoken languages – Hungarian or German in the larger towns, and Slovak dialects in the smaller towns. Bernolák was loyal to the multi-ethnic Kingdom of Hungary, and he regarded acceptance of the official language as a necessary part of the functioning of linguistically divided state. He did not promote the idea of a separate Slovak nation, but he supported the principle of “equality and respect for the various languages of the kingdom. All his activity was devoted to raising the level of his mother tongue and interest in the past of his ethnic group.”

The process of moving beyond Bernolák’s ethnic feeling and the origin of national identity was closely connected with the German cultural-linguistic nationalism of the 18th century. The impact of German thought on Slovakia is shown by the fact that the first proclaimers of the concept of a nation on a linguistic basis were graduates of Jena University: the teacher at the Evangelical Lyceum in Bratislava Castle by Juraj Palkovič and his pupil, the Evangelical pastor and linguist Ján Kollár. The nation was seen as a grouping of people on a linguistic basis, as a sort of natural cultural and linguistic entity. However, Kollár never considered a separate Slovak nation. He admitted the existence of a Czechoslovak tribe, which belonged to a common Slavonic nation together with the Russian, Polish and Serbocroat tribes. As an Evangelical pastor, Kollár was very close to Czech Protestantism and the language of the Kralice Bible. He supported linguistic and literary unity of the Czechs and Slovaks. He thought that the Slovak people would accept the Czech language, which would be enriched with Slovak linguistic elements. However, a shift in the development of Slovak nationalism was influenced less by the efforts of Kollár and Šafárik to compromise with the Czech intellectuals on the question of the “Czechoslovak language”, than by the separation “of natio from the concept of patria.”

In contrast to the Slovak intellectuals of the preceding period, he felt no need for loyalty to the natio hungarica, which was composed only of the ruling elite of the Kingdom of Hungary. J. Kollár’s nation was the community of people, who spoke the same language as he did. This community had nothing in common with the state in the political sense and was not territorially defined. It was not protected by laws and historical documents, but by the right of every person to be loyal to the group with which he was connected by ties of the heart. The state was an artificial creation. Man created it to serve practical purposes. A nation arose organically. It was a work of nature, which God created for people as part of his plan.31

Pichler observes that Kollár’s Slavonic solidarity is an expression of apolitical Slavonic cultural nationalism, which defends the language and culture of the Slovak ethnic group in the framework of the multi-national Kingdom of Hungary. At the same time, however, Slavonic cultural nationalism proclaims the existence of a Slavonic nation.32 Kollár’s understanding of the nation in the linguistic-cultural and not political context is of key importance for the shift from Slovak ethnic feeling to national identification, which I have sought. A nation that starts from a linguistic and cultural basis reaches beyond the frontiers of states. Kollár’s concept of the nation was actually independent of the Kingdom of Hungary.

The coming young generation of the associates of Štúr accepted Kollár’s concept of the nation, the frontiers of which could but did not have to coincide with the political frontiers of states. However, on the question of Slavonic community, Štúr went beyond Kollár, when, in the sense of “unity in diversity” he proved in one of his texts “the independence of Slovak as a Slavonic language, and he explained the need to codify the Slovak written language as an attribute of the emerging Slovak nation”.33 The preparedness of Štúr to abandon Kollár’s Czechoslovak linguistic framework did not derive from the idea of the difference between the Slovak and Czech languages, but from the conviction of the separate identity of the Slovak nation. I see the codification of the Slovak language at a meeting in the Bratislava Lyceum in February 1843 precisely in the context of the shift from ethnic to national feeling, strengthened by fears of growing Magyarization and the feeling that they had been abandoned by Vienna. The accepted standard written Slovak was not an exact replica of the Central Slovak dialect, just as Bernolák’s version was not a precise copy of the Western Slovak dialect. It started from the dialects of the counties of Liptov and Zvolen, but contained many Western Slovak and Czech linguistic elements.

The outlined development of Slovak ethnic and national feeling points to the connection between Slovak group identification and the language question. From the point of view of the formation of Slovak national consciousness, language became an important factor, which determined who actually formed the “reawakening” nation. The effort of

31 BROCK, ref. 30, p. 50-51
Budapest to change multi-lingual Hungary into a state with one language played a sort of accelerating role in national identification. The effort of the monarch to centralize the Monarchy with German as the official language stimulated the *natio hungarica* to establish Hungarian as the official language of the Hungarian part of the Empire. The effort to make multi-lingual Hungary into a state with one language stimulated some of the Slovak intellectuals to strive for the linguistic and cultural revival of the Slovak ethnic group.

**The Slovak Jews: Emancipation and Magyarization**

How did this effect the Jews of Upper Hungary? By the Toleration Patent of January 1782, originally intended for Lower Austria, Joseph II confirmed religious freedom for the Jews, just as he already had for Protestant and Orthodox Christians. With this reform, Joseph II endeavored to restructure the economic life of the Jews and re-orient Jewish culture. He expressed this as follows: “it is our goal to make the Jewish nation useful and serviceable to the State, mainly through better education and enlightenment of its youth as well as by directing them towards science, the arts and the crafts”.

Joseph’s reform policy enabled Jews to establish their own elementary and secondary schools, which taught the German language, mathematics, geography and ethics. For the first time, Jews could also have their children educated in Christian elementary and secondary schools and state institutions of higher education. The Toleration Patent also guaranteed the Jews the right to freely undertake all types of employment, including agricultural work. In harmony with Joseph’s effort to centralize the Empire by means of German as the official language, the Jews were required to keep their account books only in the German language. As a result of the Toleration Patent, which obliged Jews to educate their children and keep their accounts in the German language, and with the help of associated reform legislation, the majority of the Jews in the Habsburg Monarchy gradually accepted the German language.

With the death of Joseph II in 1790, the emancipation policy of the Habsburg Monarchy towards the Jews was interrupted for a time, up to 1848. The remaining measures discriminating against Jews were removed during the 18 years after 1848. In 1849, the Jews under Habsburg rule were granted freedom of movement (*Freizügigkeit*), they could get married freely, and gain employment in public offices. Jewish ghettos and the discriminatory toleration tax were abolished. Final emancipation in 1867 finally enabled Jews to own and rent land and made them formally equal citizens of the Monarchy with the same political, economic and civil rights as Christians.

The majority of the Hungarian political elite supported emancipation of the Jews, and this tolerance, although not entirely unselfish, encouraged the Jews of the Kingdom of Hungary to accept the Hungarian language. It was not only the legendary Lajos Kossuth,
but also József Eötvös or Ferenc Deák, who recognized in the Jews useful Magyarizers and economic modernizers.\(^{37}\) Thus, at the end of the 18th century, the Jews under Habsburg rule were invited to accept the German language, and at the end of the 19th century the majority of Jews in Hungary also accepted the Hungarian language. The attitude of the Hungarian elite to the Jews is also shown by the rapid increased of the Jewish population of the Kingdom of Hungary. At the beginning of the 19th century, 127,000 Jews lived in Hungary, forty years later there were 241,000 of them, and in 1890 the number of Jews in Hungary reached 713,000.\(^{38}\)

This growth would not have been possible without some openness of Hungarian representatives towards the Jews, whether already settled in Hungary, or immigrants from the Czech Lands and especially from Poland and Russia. However, this openness of the Hungarian elites towards the Jews did not arise from love of the Jews, but from the assumed usefulness of the Jews to Hungary. For the Jews of Hungary, Magyarization was a rational matter. The majority of Hungarian political leaders offered some degree of protection against anti-Jewish feelings and politicians, in return for assimilation into the Hungarian or Magyar nation. The importance of the “assimilation contract”, as it has been called by historians, is clear with regard to Vienna, which was paralysed by the anti-Semitic mayor Karl Lueger at the end of the 19th century.\(^{39}\)

The centralizing policy of Joseph II provoked a sort of “chain reaction” on the side of the Hungarian and Slovak intellectuals. On one side it stimulated the natio hungarica to establish the Hungarian language as the official language of the Kingdom of Hungary. On the other side, the growing linguistic and cultural Magyarization encouraged the Slovak intellectuals to consider their own standard written Slovak language. In the course of the 19th century, the Jews of Upper Hungary inclined to the side of the Hungarian or Magyar nation. This was a result of several inter-connected factors. The first of these was the attractiveness of Budapest as the political, economic and cultural centre of the Hungarian part of the Dual Monarchy. Secondly, there was the tolerance of the Hungarian elite, who saw the Jews as useful Magyarizers and modernizers in ethnically divided Hungary.

Thirdly, there was the character of the national revival in Slovakia. Slovak national consciousness developed more against something than for something. In other words, the establishment of standard written Slovak was intended to divide the Slovak community from the Hungarian or Magyar nation. From the point of view of the revivalists, the Jews stood unambiguously on the side of Budapest, but they did not realize the causes of the pro-Hungarian orientation of the Jews of Hungary. They succeeded in maintaining the “Hungarian card” in the consciousness of the majority population also thanks to the fact that in the Slovak villages, it was easier to point to the local Jew, than to the more distant


Hungarian nobleman. Here, however, we must take note of an important factor, namely, that in this period, the inhabitants of Upper Hungary, whether educated or uneducated, were under strong Magyarizing pressure. In other words, the emerging Slovak nation was in real danger of being assimilated itself. It did not have enough strength to assimilate other groups.

The Archetypal Jew: The Role of Judeophobia

Anti-Jewish stereotypes were an important factor influencing the relationship of the Slovak majority to the Jewish minority in the period of the formation of Slovak national consciousness. The importance of anti-Jewish stereotypes lay above all in the fact that they evoked a reaction from the parts of society for whom the national conceptions of Anton Bernolák, Ján Kollár and Ľudovít Štúr were extremely distant. Therefore, in this part I will examine society’s ideas about Jews with the help of Slovak literature from the period between the end of the 18th and the end of the 19th centuries.

The first work of literature to be written in the Slovak language was the two volume novel René mládenca príhody a skúsenosti (René Young Fellow Events and Experiences) by the priest Jozef Ignác Bajza from 1783. At the beginning of his literary work, Bajza was an adherent of Josephinism, and in his travel writing and moralizing novel he wanted “to offer not so much an invented, but more a truthful picture of the prevailing morals” in Slovak villages.40

However, his heavy style, “complex sentences and German influenced word order with the predicate usually at the end of the sentence” did not enable to Bajza to write an attractive and interesting novel.41 However, in the context of general social criticism, the author succeeded in creating something he may not have considered in advance – a stereotyped image of the Jew. The figure of the Jewish innkeeper Mojžiš is avaricious, greedy and cunning. Henrich Jakubík, one of the few authors, who has studied the problem of Jewish characters in Slovak literature, perceives Bajza’s character of the Jew Mojžiš as a bet on a certainty. According to Jakubík, Bajza “actually only collected the age-old accumulation of popular myths, pseudo-Christian views and half-truths taken out of context. He emphasized the allegedly typical features of the Jewish nature: miserliness, cunning, lack of principles and a hostile attitude to the ordinary Slovak people, motivated by socio-religious considerations. If we add to this elements of physiognomy, evoking feelings of aversion and uncleanness, we get the basic skeleton of a figure to which further character-forming details, such as form of speech, can be added according to the taste of the author. Partly because of lack of competition, Bajza succeeded in creating a sort of archetype or template, which his literary heirs used for decades with larger or smaller variations.”42

41 PIŠÚT, ref. 40, p. 179.
The use of this template was interrupted at the beginning of the 19th century and the dominant Classicism of the time, which placed the social novel, along with artistic prose and comedy, among the lower genres, and preferred poetry, especially the ode, epic and tragedy. Bajza’s template of the Jew returned to the pages of Slovak prose works only with the coming of Romanticism. In the Matica slovenská period, especially in the 1860s and 1870s, the popular genre of the public information novella assisted the spread of the stereotyped image of the Jew. The description “public information” is more than characteristic. These literary works had the aim of educating the ordinary people, or in other words, defining the problems of Slovak society, pointing to the guilty and showing the means of correction.

The nature of public information prose meant that the national concepts of the Slovak intellectuals fulfilled the function of didactic instructions for the authors of this genre. I will approach this by again looking at Štúr, his views on the problems of the Slovak people and the responsibility of the Jews for them. In his speech to the Hungarian Parliament at the end of 1847, Štúr described material and moral poverty as the greatest problem of the Slovaks. The cause of both types of poverty was the Estates system. Abolition of serfdom represented the only way to “ease and improve their lot”. Štúr complained that the Slovak people had obligations but no rights. Moreover, the feudal lordships were grateful to the Slovaks for the fact that “terrible distilleries and inns proliferate, so that in one village with 10 joint owners (composessores), there were ten inns, to which vermin of Jewish scum came, and without any conscience they rob and wear down the people, so that they have to pay high rents, and especially in the mountainous parts of our homeland, where the land is infertile and the Jews and composessores numerous, in many villages people are entirely bankrupted. There are empty villages everywhere, the Jews take control on the basis of judicial enforcement against the poor people, who are driven from their homes, families and friends. They must go away into the wider world to die or vanish there.”

Ján Omris, who wrote notes for the 1954 publication of Štúr’s political essays and speeches, stated that “it is quite clear from this long sentence that Štúr was not against Jews as such without distinction, but only against the Jewish exploiters, tenants of other exploiters – the landlords. They strove to extract from the people not only all the rent that had to be paid to the lords, but further amounts to enrich themselves.” We could argue with Omris that Štúr’s declaration against the Jews as innkeepers was really more connected with his campaign against alcohol and alcoholism, than with antipathy towards the Jews. However, Štúr’s connection of the Jews with the lords is very im-

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46 Compare: JAKUBÍK, ref. 42, p. 205-206.
important from the point of view of Slovak – Jewish relations. They represented the feudal establishment, which Štúr hated and blamed for the poverty of Slovak society. If on one side stood the impoverished Slovak people, who had to be gradually awakened to defend their linguistic and cultural rights under the influence of the active patriots, and on the other stood the arrogant nobility, who deprived the Slovak people of their property and identity, then in Štúr’s view, the Jews stood on the “other” side.

Jozef Miroslav Hurban, one of Štúr’s close associates, also presents a contradictory picture of the Jews. On one side, in the novel Prítomnosť a obrazy zo života tatranského (The Present and Pictures from Tatran Life) from 1844, he perceived the “existence of remarkable parallels between the historical fate of the Jews and the position of the Slovaks”, but on the other, in the novel Slovenskí žiaci (Slovak pupils) written nine years later, he depicts the Jews as victims of pogroms, however, in the end, they are themselves responsible for these.47

Jakubík’s analysis of the Jewish characters in public information novels starts from the work of Jonáš Záborský Dva dni v Chujave (Two Days in Chujava), the prose of Mikuláš Štefan Ferienčík Jedlovska učitel (The teacher of Jedlová) and Bohdanice a jej učitel (Bohdanice and Its Teacher) by Andrej Seberíny. Jakubík noticed some striking similarities in these works: The action usually occurs in a Slovak village and the story is dominated by conflict between the village “us” and the outside “them”, namely the hostile aristocratic authorities. The figure of the Jewish innkeeper or the nouveau riche Jew has a limited but key role in these works. This figure is always mean and insincere towards the Slovak people. Moreover, the unpleasant character traits of the Jew are supplemented by their physical repulsiveness and uncleanness. The opposite of the stereotype Jew is the modern national hero, usually a priest or teacher, who is endowed with all the virtues: goodness, wisdom, industriousness, experience, piety and obviously patriotism. In spite of the fact that the Jewish characters, serving the outside power, impoverish the Slovak village people both materially and morally, there is never a real conflict. In this context, Jakubík perceives the minority position of the hostile Jewish characters and their hopeless resistance.48

The first important deviation in the stereotyped depiction of Jewish characters is found in the Listy Židom (Letters to the Jews) published by the Slovak politician and publicist Viliam Pauliny-Tóth in the Národné noviny between October and mid December 1871. In the letters, Pauliny-Tóth strove to persuade the Jews to ally themselves with the Slovaks in the conflict between nationalities. František Viťazoslav Sasinek, an equally important figure in Slovak literature, also expressed similar ideas. In spite of these initial attempts to win over the Jewish inhabitants, there was no significant shift in the perception of the Jews by Slovak writers and politicians. On the contrary, at the end of the 19th century, Svetozár Vajanský in his novels Letiace tieňe (Flying Shadows) and Pustokvet, sharpened the characterization of Jewish figures, when he attributed demonic traits to the Jews and blamed them for the deteriorating position of the Slovak population.

47 JAKUBÍK, ref. 42, p. 206-207.
According to Jakubík’s analysis, the image of the Jew in Slovak literature falls into
the above mentioned conceptions of the theological or stereotype Jew. The stereotyped
character of the Jew was most frequently unprincipled, avaricious, lazy and hostile to
Christians. Contradictory characteristics attributed to the Jews did not contradict, but
rather strengthened the hostile image of the Jew. It appears that these stereotyped images
are a direct continuation of the traditional Judeophobic view of the Jewish community.
As Jakubík mentioned, the template of the Jewish character already created by Bajza
was a bet on a certainty, because it relied on the socially fixed Judeophobic prejudices
against Jews.

Anti-Semitism in the Czechoslovak Republic

During the roughly twenty years of existence of the First Czechoslovak Republic “all
the standard features of a democratic state were applied”, including protection of human
rights and freedoms, equality of citizens before the law, the principle of plurality and di-
vision of powers, and the market economy. The democratic form of government made
Czechoslovakia “the great exception in inter-war Central and Eastern Europe” and
provided a secure position for the Jewish population of more than 350,000. However,
like Czechoslovakia itself, the “Czechoslovak Jews” were to some degree a construct
without historical forerunners. The creation of a real Czechoslovak Jewish community
was hindered by the excessively brief existence of the first common state of the Czechs
and Slovaks, and by the internal heterogeneity of the Jewish communities living within
the frontiers of the new republic.

The territories of the Czech Lands, historically part of the Austrian section of the Mo-
narchy, and Slovakia and Sub-Carpathian Ruthenia, formerly under the rule of Budapest,
contained three different Jewish communities, none of them internally homogeneous. To
put it simply, while the Jews of the Czech Lands, with their high degree of acculturation,
urbanization and secularization belonged to the Western European type of Jewry, the
Sub-Carpathian Jews were a typical example of the Eastern European type of Jewry.
They had a low level of acculturation into the surrounding community, spoke Yiddish
and observed strict religious orthodoxy. The Slovak Jews were not only geographically
situated between these two groups. On one side, they were considerably more religious
than the Czech Jews, but in contrast to the Sub-Carpathian Jews, few spoke Yiddish.
Many more had adopted German or later Hungarian.

However, the problem of inter-war Slovak Jewry was not primarily the fact that this
community contained elements of the Western and Eastern European types of Jewry,
which divided it and made it more vulnerable to attack from outside. From the point
of view of the majority Slovak society, a much more serious problem was the already
outlined question of Jewish identity. It was naive to think that the Jews of Slovakia, in
the 19th century most frequently presented as bearers of Hungarian oppression, would
be accepted in the new state as equal Slovaks. As the anti-Jewish propaganda of the time

49 BALÍK, Stanislav et al. Politický systém českých zemí 1848 – 1989. (The political system of the Czech
50 MENDELSSOHN, ref. 38, p. 131.
proclaimed: “The Jews may be good taxpaying citizens of Czechoslovakia, they may be inhabitants of Slovakia, but because of the high percentage of Orthodox Jews, they cannot be good Slovaks.” The census data from 1921 and 1930 indicate that the Jews themselves had doubts about Slovak national identity.

The first Czechoslovak census was done in 1921, and for the Jews it was notable that for the first time they could declare themselves members of the Jewish nationality. If we trust the official data, 354,342 believers in the Jewish religion lived in the territory of Czechoslovakia in 1921, representing about 2.3% of the total population of the republic. From this total number, about 38%, numbering 135,918, lived in the territory of Slovakia. More than half (54.3%) of them used the possibility to declare Jewish nationality, with a further 22.3% declaring Czechoslovak nationality, 16.5% Hungarian and 6.7% German. Since the majority of Slovak Jews spoke Hungarian among themselves, it clear that “they chose their nationality with regard for their religious (orthodox) and cultural orientation but without regard for their mother tongue”.

If I compare these data with the 1930 census, I find no great differences. The total number of Jews in 1930 was estimated at 356,830 with about 136,736 of them in Slovakia. In the nine years since the previous census, the number of Jews in Slovakia declaring Czechoslovak nationality had increased by ten percent to 32.2%, while the numbers declaring Jewish or German nationality remained about the same. However, the fact that more than half the Jews living in the territory of Slovakia declared Jewish nationality cannot be automatically associated with the ideas of Zionism. The Israeli historian Ezra Mendelssohn thinks that in general the Czechoslovak Jews of the inter-war period “were not only too acculturated or too orthodox for Zionism to become a great factor, but also on the whole too secure”.

For example, the electoral success of the Jewish Party, which started from Zionist ideas, but in the course of its functioning developed as a non-partisan organization and gained about half of all the Jewish votes in the 1921 elections, shows that the inclination to Jewish identity was the result of a sort of “spiritual dilemma” in Czechoslovakia. In other words, while Masaryk’s Czechoslovakia gave Jews an adequate feeling of security, so that the idea of emigration to Palestine was less attractive than, for example, to Polish Jews, “many acculturated and Orthodox Jews, probably none too friendly to secular Jewish nationalism, voted for the Jewish Party because they believed in the need for a strong Jewish political organization devoted to protecting general Jewish interests in the new state, and because they believed that the delicate situation of Czechoslovak Jewry dictated following an independent political line rather than siding with one nationality against another, or with one non-Jewish party against another.”

52 HRADSKÁ, ref. 51, p. 131.
53 MENDELSSOHN, ref. 37, p. 158.
54 MENDELSSOHN, ref. 37, p. 156.
However, the feeling of relative safety did not mean that expressions of anti-Jewish feelings, anti-Semitism or occasional pogroms against the Jewish minority disappeared. The sociologist Anton Štefánek, after the Second World War rector of the Slovak University (the present Comenius University) in Bratislava, saw the roots of the so-called Jewish question in Slovakia in the development of Jewish and non-Jewish society in Hungary. Štefánek thought that the enormous growth in the number of Jews in Hungary during the 18th and 19th centuries, was caused by the favourable but calculating policy of the Hungarian nobility towards the Jews. In the words of Štefánek: “The nobility scorned the Jews, but used them as economic and political factors where they could. On the other side, the Jews were able to adapt to the needs of the economically, nationally and socially dominant lords to such a degree that not even a solid magnate and even less the poorer gentry could live without the Jews.”

According to Štefánek, the willingness of the Hungarian nobility to use Jewish potential and the preparedness of the Jews to accept this opportunity led to Jewish dominance in trade and industry as well as in the free professions. The statistics show that Štefánek was partly right. In 1930, 60% of all Slovak Jews were employed precisely in trade and industry. According to Mendelssohn, the economic profile of the Slovak Jews approximately corresponded to that of the Czech and Moravian Jews. However, the problem of the Slovak and partly also of the Sub-Carpathian Jews was that in their case “the Jewish middle and lower middle classes played a much more conspicuous role in the nonagricultural economy, both in the towns and in the villages. [...] Thus, even if backward eastern regions possessed a much larger Jewish working class than did the more prosperous west, the Jewish storekeeper, merchant, and industrialist in these regions was more likely to be regarded as ‘dominating’ the local economy.”

The sigh of Anton Štefánek that practically until the origin of the Slovak state, trade, industry and part of the free professions were in Jewish hands is based on real figures. For example, at the end of the 1930s, 40% of doctors in Slovakia were of Jewish origin. However, Štefánek did not realize that the high representation of Jews in certain professions was connected with the fact that the ethnic Slovaks did not have a numerous middle class. Precisely this fact partially caused the “visibility” of the Jews or their dominance in particular professions. Apart from the unbalanced economic profile, Štefánek devoted more attention to another matter, the already frequently mentioned connection between Jews and inns. Štefánek saw in this a means by which the Jew influenced life in his surroundings: “He carefully observed what was happening in the village and always quickly and thoroughly informed the gendarmerie, official and notary. As a result, the officials liked to give licences to operate inns to Jews. Formerly, the inn determined public opinion in the village.” When comparing Jewish and non-Jewish innkeepers, he came to an amusing conclusion: “It is clear that Christian innkeepers are not better than Jewish. The only difference is that Christian innkeepers regularly drink with their customers, but Jewish innkeepers never do.” In the conclusion of this part, I will give a

56 MENDELSSOHN, ref. 37, p. 145.
57 MENDELSSOHN, ref. 37, p. 145.
further eloquent quotation from Anton Štefánik regarding the Jews in Slovakia: “They are strictly religious, endogamous and insular. The Christian inhabitants do not like them and even suspect them of ritual murder, but the material dependence of people on the Jews limited every sharper explosion of anti-Jewish xenophobia. Non-Jews come into contact with Jews in shops, in the offices of advocates and doctors’ surgeries […] but they do not cultivate neighbourly relations with the peasant farmers, they do not participate in Slovak national and cultural activities. In the past, they were among the most ardent Magyarizers.”

Anti-Semitism as the Official Policy, 1938 – 1945

While the Czechoslovak Republic was a democracy, the regime of the wartime Slovak Republic is variously described as fascist, clerofascist, totalitarian, authoritarian, authoritarian-totalitarian or totalitarian-authoritarian. The political scientist Lubomír Kopeček sees the main cause of the lack of terminological clarity in the fact that the wartime regime “did not achieve a more permanent and stable form at any time during its existence”. With the help of two typologies of totalitarian and authoritarian regimes, one worked out by Carl J. Friedrich and Zbigniew Brzezinski and the second by Juan J. Linz, he concluded that the regime of the wartime state developed from the building of an organic-etatist authoritarian regime in the period from the end of 1938 to the summer of 1940, similar to those of Dollfuss and Schuschnigg in Austria or Salazar in Portugal, to a “defective” totalitarian regime in the period from the Salzburg talks to the second half of 1942. However, from 1942 there was a rapid disintegration of the regime, which prevents precise classification of the system that remained in power until the outbreak of the Slovak National Uprising. Kopeček did not consider the final stage from September 1944 to spring 1945 because the state did not have sufficient sovereignty.

Regardless of the fact that the Slovak state never succeeded in establishing a stable regime, mainly because of its brief duration, but also because of the unstable internal political and international situation, the character of its government was always undemocratic. In addition, throughout the period of its existence, the government of the Slovak state relied on one important pillar, namely its anti-Jewish policy.

A significant change in the approach of the state authorities to the Jewish minority did not occur only on the origin of the Slovak state, but already a few months earlier. Hlinka’s Slovak People’s Party already used anti-Jewish agitation for its political aims during the period of autonomy of the Slovak region. As Nižňanský convincingly showed, after the declaration of autonomy, anti-Semitism was expressed on various levels and in various ways, whether already at the celebrations of the gaining of autonomy, by means of sharp anti-Jewish propaganda, at anti-Jewish demonstrations, and obviously by means of the “first extensive anti-Jewish act of state violence” – the deportations of November

58 ŠTEFÁNEK, ref. 55, p. 94.
1938. In addition, although no anti-Jewish legislation was adopted in this period, the government began to prepare for it. In this context, Nižňanský correctly observes that although the anti-Jewish policy of the autonomous government might appear “unplanned and so chaotic”, “when a state and its legislative bodies, government and other components of the executive begin to prepare laws to regulate any of its minorities or part of their activities, certain mechanisms immediately begin to function. They are released by the acceptance of systematic or only partially systematic measures”.

The government of the Slovak Republic continued the so-called solution of the Jewish problem. The officially highest document of the wartime republic was the constitution from July 1939. Immediately in the preamble, it defined the relationship between the nation and the new state as follows: “The Slovak nation under the protection of God Almighty, has retained the living space assigned to it since past ages. Now, with His help, from which all power and law derive, it has established its own free Slovak state.”

The emerging Slovak national identity of the 19th century was based on linguistic and anti-Hungarian demarcation, which, in the context of the multi-national Kingdom of Hungary, logically meant the separation of natio from patria. This condition no longer applied in the Slovak state. On the contrary, in his work on the nation and national character from 1943, the psychologist Anton Jurovský placed a common living space among the four basic attributes of the nation. Its own language, common blood or family relationship and common spirit are the other three key features of a nation. According to Jurkovský, the Slovaks fulfilled all these conditions and so they formed a separate nation.

According to the constitution, but less in reality, the declaration of the Slovak state was an expression of the national will and of divine favour. The constitution also recognized nationalities living alongside the Slovak nation in the territory of Slovakia. It declared their “right to cultural and political organization under their own leaders”, to maintain cultural contacts with their own nations and to use their mother tongues in official business and education. However, the essential limitation here was that these rights applied only to the extent that “the same rights are enjoyed by the Slovak minority in the mother state of the minority nationality”. But what did this mean for the Jewish minority of about ninety thousand people? Were the Jews a separate nationality? If they

60 Nižňanský, Eduard. Židovská komunita na Slovensku medzi československou parlamentnou demokraciou a slovenským štátom v stredoeurópskom kontexte. (The Jewish community in Slovakia between Czechoslovak parliamentary democracy and the Slovak state in the Central European context). Prešov : Univerzum, 1999, p. 34.


62 Slovenský zákonník, (Slovak Statute Book), 1939, ústavný zákon (Constitutional Act) 185/1939 Sl.z.


64 Slovenský zákonník, 1939, ústavný zákon 185/1939 Sl.z.
were, as a nationality without a mother state, they could not have any constitutionally
guaranteed rights as a minority nationality. Were they, from the point of view of the state,
Slovaks of Jewish religion or ethnic origin? Then what about their allegedly different
family relationship?

In April 1939, the first codification of the term “Jew” started from the religious prin-
ciple. To put it simply, a Jew was a member of the Jewish religion. However, the Slovak
state significantly limited the significance of baptism. A Jew baptized after 30 October
1918 was not considered a Christian or non-Jew. Those baptized “late” remained Jews
according to the state.

The same applied to people without religion, who had at least one parent of the Je-
wish religion, and people who married Jews or lived in partnership with Jews after this
government decree became valid. The first Jewish codification still did not recognize
the concept of the part Jew, and so children of mixed unions of Jews and non-Jews were
designated as Jews.65 This first definition of the term “Jew” already shows that soon after
the origin of the wartime state, the original linguistic identification of the Slovak national
unit was widened to include a biological concept. In addition, the right to freely declare
“a nationality” was to a large extent false, because nationality was not determined by
individuals, but by the state.

The codification of the term “Jew”, from September 1941, attempted to divide Slovak
society along racial lines. According to the government decree “On the legal position of
Jews”, better known as the so-called “Jewish Code”, a Jew was a person, “who comes
from at least three racially Jewish grandparents”. A part Jew was a person, who “comes
from two racially Jewish grandparents”. The attempt to redefine the concept of the na-
tion on racial lines was completed by limitation of mixed marriage and sexual relations
between Jews and non-Jews. Under threat of three years in prison and loss of the right
to vote and hold office, the Jewish Code banned marriage between Jews and non-Jews
and between Jews and half Jews. A higher, five year prison sentence threatened those,
who had extra-marital sex with a person known to be Jewish.66 However, I consider it
important to mention here that the so-called Jewish Code, which defined the “Jewish
question” as a racial problem, was essentially a summary of already issued and valid
anti-Jewish measures.

The decree on definition of the term Jew from April 1939 and the decree on the legal
position of the Jews from September 1941 pointed to the importance of the confessional
and biological principle in the national identification of the inhabitants of the Slovak
state. In comparison with the period of the Slovak national revival, the linguistic aspect
raced into the background in the new state, but it did not disappear completely. The
appeal to Slovakize Hungarian sounding names of official figures is one of the examples
of the mother tongue remaining an important attribute of nationality. For example, in
November 1941, the district notary’s office in Topoľčany explained the Hungarian soun-
ding surname of the Topoľčany government commissioner Ľudovít Csáp in the sense
that “there are great Slovak personalities and politicians, such as Pavel Országh and ot-

65 Slovenský zákonník, 1939, nariadenie (decree) 63/1939 Sl.z.
66 Slovenský zákonník, 1939, nariadenie 198/1941, Sl.z.
hers, who wrote their surnames in such forms, and it could be a family tradition”. The stigmatization of the Jews as members of a biologically different race, not correctable by assimilation or conversion, accelerated the exclusion of the Jews from Slovak society.

The marginalization of the Jews began in the period of Slovak autonomy. In November 1938, in reaction to the results of the Vienna Arbitration, for which the Jews were entirely illogically supposed to be responsible, the government of the Slovak region had poor Jews and Jews without Czechoslovak citizenship deported to the territory ceded to Hungary. Regardless of the later orders that “only” Jews without Czechoslovak citizenship and the homeless could be deported, the November action “clearly indicated to the Jewish citizens that the territory of autonomous Slovakia was no longer a safe place for them”.

Thus, in the course of its existence, the wartime republic issued dozens of laws and decrees, which gradually deprived the Jews of all their economic, religious, civil and human rights. Even before the issuing of the so-called Jewish code, the number of Jews in the free professions, including medicine, was limited. The Jews were gradually excluded from the public services and Jewish soldiers were sent to labour camps. Later the Jews were assigned labour duties, deprived of their passports and their businesses were liquidated or Aryanized.

Just as in the 19th century, the Jews were labelled as innkeepers, Magyarizers and those responsible for impoverishing the Slovak people. The confiscation of Jewish property was explained as a process by which property stolen by the Jews was returned to the original Slovak Aryan hands. The attempt to stigmatize the Jews as members of a sinister race facilitated the forcible exclusion of the Jews from all spheres of social life. The deportations of the Jewish population, which occurred from March to October 1942 and later after the occupation of Slovakia by the German army, were a paradoxical “solution” to the anti-Jewish policy of the autonomous Slovak region and the Slovak Republic. But was the holocaust really the logical result of anti-Semitism? Was anti-Semitism the only cause of the holocaust?

The Holocaust and Anti-Semitism

Explaining the tragedy of European Jewry with reference to modern anti-Semitism has several difficulties. Zygmunt Bauman pointed out that “antisemitism offers no explanation of the Holocaust (more generally, we would argue, resentment is not in itself a satisfactory explanation of any genocide)”. According to Bauman, clear causality between anti-Semitism and the Holocaust contradicts history, since before the rise of Nazism to power, relations between Jews and non-Jews were on a new level, at least in Germany.

67 State Archive of Nitra, Topoľčany branch, collection of the Topoľčany district office (Okresný úrad), carton 114, 1941/41 prez.
69 Slovenský zákonník 1939, vládne nariadenie 63/1939 Sl.z., 150/1939 Sl.z., 184/1939 Sl.z. and 230/1939 Sl.z.; Slovenský zákonník 1940, nariadenie 215/1940 Sl.z., 256/1940 Sl.z.; Slovenský zákonník 1941, nariadenie 153/1941 Sl.z.
70 BAUMAN, ref. 1, p. 60-63.
Some historians even say that around 1900 “the possibility of German – Jewish symbiosis was outlined”.  

The German historian Helmut Berding has also posed the question of continuity and change in the anti-Semitism in German society. On the basis of comparison of early anti-Semitism, which he placed up to the first half of the 19th century, modern anti-Semitism approximately in the period of existence of the German Empire of 1871 – 1918, and the period of the world wars of 1914 – 1945, he came to the conclusion that “in the history of intolerance of Jews in Germany, turning points in the structure of prejudices need to be evaluated as more important than the aspect of continuity. These turning points distinguish modern anti-Semitism from earlier versions.” According to Berding, the modern anti-Semitism of Imperial Germany cannot be seen simply as a stage in the development towards Auschwitz. The Nazi slaughter of nations, as Berding describes the Holocaust, was facilitated by some factors that went back to the reign of Wilhelm II, but only “war and defeat, revolution and inflation” changed the political culture of the country, and so also the character of anti-Jewish feelings and attitudes.

It is clear from the previous two sections that the question of the relationship between anti-Semitism and the Holocaust will not be easy to answer. Was the Holocaust really the answer to modern anti-Semitism, based on racial theories? Or was anti-Semitism only one of various factors, which led to the tragedy of the Holocaust? The above-mentioned historian Shulamit Volkov and her colleague Saul Friedländer offer two, essentially supplementary answers to these questions.

Friedländer thinks that the decision to exterminate the Jews of Europe was taken between mid October and mid December 1941, and that it was closely connected with the situation on the Russian front. According to Friedländer, “redemptive anti-Semitism” played a key role in Hitler’s campaign against the Jews. He defines it as the “convergence of racial anti-Semitism on one hand and of a religious or pseudoreligious ideology of redemption (or perdition) on the other.”

To put it simply, the salvation of the “German race” depended on the extermination of the “Jewish race”. At the same time, Friedländer distinguishes between this radical anti-Semitism of Hitler and the top leadership of the NSDAP, and more traditional and widespread anti-Jewish feelings. The latter was an important condition for the Holocaust, but in the words of Friedländer: “initiating the total extermination of millions of people and transporting them to killing sites from the furthest corners of the continent

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72 BERDING, ref. 71, p. 81-82.
in the midst of an increasingly desperate general war, demanded the fanatical drive of a pitiless ideological faith”.74

Like Friedländer, Volkov distinguishes between various “anti-Semitism”, but he also emphasizes the interconnection between ideology and practice, when he says that “it is apparently all too easy to forget that long-established historical lesson, namely that ideologies are never simply realized; that they are never just put into practice”.75 According to Volkov: “Anti-Semitism – both as a general sentiment and as a vague but powerful ideology already had been there before, but its effectiveness came from the chances of implementation, and these became evident only with the onset of the military campaign in the east.”76

Let us try to apply Shulamit Volkov’s argument to the situation in Slovakia. It is clear, and we had the possibility to verify this in the present chapter, that prejudices against Jews did not begin in the period of the wartime state. We saw that already in course of the 19th century, Slovak national identity was largely formulated against something, most frequently against the Kingdom of Hungary. For reasons stated above, the Jews of Slovakia adopted the Hungarian language or were assimilated into the Hungarian or Magyar nation. In the eyes of “ordinary” people, the Jews were the “Magyars” they most frequently encountered. The Slovak intellectuals did not realize the reasons for the pro-Hungarian orientation of the Jews of Slovakia, and they had the possibility to rely on the anti-Jewish stereotypes rooted in society. These persisted, were dusted and enriched with racial elements until the period of the wartime Slovak state.

In the wider historical context, the Holocaust of the Jews of Slovakia appears to have been the result of at least three factors. Firstly, the deeply rooted anti-Jewish prejudices, which facilitated the transition between theory and practice. Secondly, there was the opportunity for implementation, if we borrow the combination used by Shulamit Volkov, in the form of cooperation with Nazi Germany. The most important, but far from the only evidence of such “seizing of an opportunity” was the agreement of premier Vojtech Tuka with the German ambassador to Slovakia Hans Ludin from 2 December 1941, on the basis of which the government of the wartime state paid Nazi Germany 500 Reichmarks each, among other things, for a guarantee that the deported Jews would never return to Slovakia. However, we cannot forget that the deportations were discussed already several months earlier, in October 1941, when the representatives of the Slovak state made a “historic journey” to Hitler’s headquarters.77

At the same time, the deportation of Jews from Slovakia was a cynical solution to a serious social problem, which arose as a result of the so-called solution of the Jewish problem in Slovakia. The Jewish question became a social problem after “22 thousand from the total of 27 thousand Jewish households lost their regular income. In other words, the Aryanization process had deprived 65 thousand from the total of 90 thousand

74 FRIEDLÄNDER, Ideology and Extermination, ref. 73, p. 31-32.
75 VOLKOV, ref. 3, p. 40.
76 VOLKOV, ref. 3, p. 42.
77 For more details see: HRADSKÁ, Katerina. Jozef Tiso v Hitlerovom havnom stane a na Ukrajine roku 1941 vo svetle nemeckých dokumentov (Jozef Tiso at Hitler’s headquarters and in Ukraine in 1941 in the light of German documents). In Historický časopis, 2003, vol. 51, no. 4, p. 685-694.
Jews of their livelihood.

Thirdly, as is clear from the last point, the Holocaust in Slovakia did not begin in the trains to Auschwitz, but already when anti-Semitism became the state ideology and official policy, the beginnings of which can already be seen in the period of the autonomy of Slovakia.

DIE ALLGEMEINHEIT DES ANTISEMITISMUS UND DIE EINMAHLIGKEIT DES HOLOCAUST: BEISPIEL DER SLOWAKEI

HANA K Lamková


KÔŇ
a ČLOVEK
STREDOVEKU

* k spolujítiu
človeka a koňa
v Uhorskom
kráľovstve

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*

DUŠAN KOVÁČ


The study is devoted to the transformation of the Slovak Academy of Sciences as a result of the social changes after November 1989. The transformation is traced in three stages. The first stage, which lasted from November 1989 to the election of a new Presidium of the Academy in January 1990, was very dynamic. Strike committees were formed and there were changes in the leadership of the Academy and its institutes. The changes culminated in the election of a new democratically elected body: the Council of Scientists of the Slovak Academy of Sciences. The second stage occurred during the term of office of the new democratically elected Presidium of the Slovak Academy of Sciences (Predsedníctvo SAV) (1990 – May 1992). The coarsest deformations and injustices caused by the totalitarian regime were corrected, and the Academy developed a new character as a non-university academic institution. During the second Presidium of the Academy (May 1992 – 1993), the transformation continued especially in the field of making scientific research more effective. The number of employees of the Academy was reduced by almost half, while scientific research was maintained on a good level. Apart from structural changes, the introduction of a grant system contributed to this. The transformation was largely completed in the period 1989 – 1993, and the Slovak Academy of Sciences was transformed into a democratically run, effective scientific institution, which carried out basic research and in some areas also targeted applied research.


1 Apart from documents in the Central Archive of the SAS (Ústredný archív SAV – ÚA SAV) and documents published in the Správy SAV (Reports of the SAS), the author has relied on material analysed by Branislav Lichardus, Ladislav Mach and Silvester Takács: LICHARDUS, Branislav. Transformácia SAV v rokoch 1989 – 2002 (The transformation of the SAS in the years 1989 – 2002); MACHO, Ladislav. Prvé predsedníctvo SAV (The first Presidium of the SAS); TAKÁCS, Silvester. Von November 1989 bis zur Wahl des neuen Präsidentiums. Materials processed by the staff of the Central Archive of the SAS were also used in study of the theme: KAMENCOVÁ, Lýdia. Stav SAV na konci 80. rokov, počet pracovníkov legislatívne zakotvenie, financovanie, ústavy, vedné odbory. (The state of the SAS at the end of the 1980s, number of employees, legislation, finance, institutes, branches of science); KLAČKA, Jozef. Od novembra 89 do zvolenia P SAV (From November 1989 to the election of the Presidium of the SAS); MARČEKOVÁ, Alexandra. Rada vedeov, prvé revolučné zmeny. (The council of scientists, the first revolutionary changes); NEMESKÜRTHOVÁ, Ľudmila. Prvé P SAV 1990 – 92. (The first Presidium of the SAS 1990 – 92). The author wishes to thank all the above mentioned witnesses and researchers for providing material. All these materials are available in the library of the Institute of History of the SAS. A summary of these materials is also accessible on the website of the Academic Society of the SAS (Učená spoločnosť SAV): http://www.us.sav.sk/index.php?lang=SK&dv=historia The author wishes to thank Fedor Gömöry, František Šebej and Milan Štutovec for valuable information.
Thanks to the social movement of autumn 1989, known as the “Velvet Revolution”, fundamental political and social changes were gradually introduced in Czechoslovakia. The totalitarian system also collapsed in a short time in all the countries of the former Soviet Bloc. Society in Slovakia went through a period of fundamental transformation. This also affected the Slovak Academy of Sciences (SAS). The transformation of the SAS flowed naturally from the fact that it was part of society and so the transformation process inevitably influenced it, but also from the fact that the need for fundamental reform was felt in the SAS itself.2

In the years of communist totalitarianism, the Communist Party strove in every possible way to subordinate to itself the scientific and academic research in the SAS. Apart from its institutes, the SAS also formally had an academic society composed of a body of academics and correspondent members. Its members had to be elected from the most important scientists in the institutes of the SAS, universities and other scientific institutions. In reality, the Communist Party, especially the ideological department of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Slovakia, decided about the academics and about scientific policy, although this process was formally carried out on the basis of elections held according to law. However, the Constitution of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic contained a paragraph about the leading role of the Communist Party, and all the interventions of party bodies in the running of science, the composition of the members of the academy and the Presidium of the SAS, were based on it. This caused serious deformation, because it was difficult for important scientists, who were not members of the Communist Party to become part of the leadership of the SAS. The SAS was an independent organization, but on the international level it was represented by the Czechoslovak Academy of Sciences (CSAS), which caused some difficulties with establishing and maintaining contacts with foreign countries. However, the greatest problem was the totalitarian system as such, because in this system, everything, including science and research, was directed from one centre. Therefore, any autonomy of a scientific institution or community of academics was an illusion. In this way, the SAS was a mirror of the whole society, although people with higher education were concentrated here. The SAS obviously had functionaries and staff to whom the communist system was suited or who gained from it, but there was always a strong reformist potential here. Above all, there were people, and they formed the majority, who were interested in doing scientific research, and tried to do it even in complicated social conditions.

Especially researchers in the humanities and social sciences felt the isolation from world science. In these fields, international cooperation was narrowed to the countries of the Soviet Bloc. Sporadic and exceptional journeys by individuals to countries beyond the Iron Curtain could not really change anything. Unsuccessful economic reforms stimulated the ruling Communist Party to seek a way forward also in the field of science, although this was expressed more in the perverse form of defining science as a “productive force”, and as a result supporting mainly applied research.

2 A comprehensive study of major turning points and continuity in the SAS has been prepared for publication in a collective monograph from the Austrian Academy of Sciences: HUDEK, Adam – KOVAČ, Dušan. Brüche und Kontinuitäten in der Geschichte der Slowakischen Akademie der Wissenschaften. A manuscript of the study is available in the library of the Institute of History of the SAS.
All the attempts at reform of society, which was in permanent economic and especially moral crisis, also touched the SAS in some way. In the second half of the 1980s, the principle of reconstructing the economic mechanism was applied in Czechoslovakia and this process also affected the SAS. Although the leading cadres of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia (CPC) and Communist Party of Slovakia (CPS) were not enthusiastic about Gorbachov’s “Perestroyka”, they could not entirely ignore this reform effort. An analysis of work and results was produced in the SAS at the end of 1987, and further reform steps were supposed to develop from it. On the basis of resolution of the government of the Slovak Socialist Republic (SSR) no. 47 from 23 March 1988, a document was worked out in the SAS with the title: Basic aims of the further development of the SAS in conditions of the reconstruction of the economic mechanism and the overall life of society.\(^3\) It was directed towards some degree of democratization and liberalization, but involving only cosmetic and more or less formal adjustments, which would not lead to fundamental change. All basic questions would still be decided at the highest levels of the party and not in the academic community.

At the end of the 1980s, the SAS had almost 6,000 employees in 47 research institutes. From these, 37% were in the first section concerned with inorganic nature, 36.5% were in the second section, concerned with organic nature and medicine, and 14.8% in the third section concerned with the humanities and social sciences.\(^4\) The others worked in joint and service departments. The scientific staff included many competent scientists, also recognized abroad. The interventions of the Communist Party deformed especially the managing structures – the Presidium and the composition of the general assembly – a body of academic and correspondent members.

As a result of this situation many scientists from the SAS joined the protest actions of the students and artists during the revolutionary days of November 1989. They supported democratization and fundamental change in society, including the SAS. Some of the most active participated in the television discussions, which attracted much attention. Various employees of the SAS became members of the leadership of the new political force: Public Against Violence (PAV) and members of the staff of almost all the institutes formed strike committees. Thus, change in the SAS came in parallel to the changes in society.

**Correction of the deformations caused by the totalitarian regime**

In the first phase, it was mainly a matter of amendment of the greatest deformations caused by the totalitarian regime: abolition of the influence of the Communist Party and removal of the leading bodies of the SAS, which were created and installed by the totalitarian regime.

The scientific staff and institutes already sent messages of support to the protest actions of students and artists in Prague on 20 November 1989. A public assembly of about 2000 employees of the SAS was held in the area of the SAS on 27 November in support of the demands of the students, the Czech Civic Forum and Slovak PAV. Abolition of

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\(^3\) KAMENCOVÁ, ref. 1, p. 1.

\(^4\) KAMENCOVÁ, ref. 1, p. 1.
the article in the constitution about the leading role of the CPC, and holding of free and secret elections to all representative bodies was demanded.⁵

The broad social movement provoked by the events of 17 November culminated on the day of the general strike. The representatives of the SAS participated in the demonstrative general strike. The employees of the academy held meetings at their workplaces and passed resolutions on the basic democratization of society and the management of scientific activity in the SAS. Practically the whole SAS participated in the strike, as is shown by telexes sent to the Office of the Presidium of the SAS (OP SAS). An assembly in the SAS main campus at Patrónka created the Strike Committee of the SAS.⁶ The strike committee invited all the institutes to declare their readiness to strike and demanded the immediate exclusion of political parties from the institutes. In its declaration from 30 November 1989, the Strike Committee of the SAS formulated its demands in five points. Apart from the already mentioned exclusion of political parties, it demanded the resignation of discredited members from the Presidium of the SAS (P SAS), opening of dialogue between the representatives of the managing structures of the SAS and representatives of the civil initiative, participation of elected representatives of the institutes of the SAS in assemblies of the SAS and the Czechoslovak Academy of Sciences (CSAS), and the immediate removal of ideology from science.⁷ The representatives of the Strike Committee met the representatives of the P SAS Vladimír Hájko, Viliam Plevza, Štefan Luby and the head of the secretariat of the P SAS Jaroslav Červinka to present their demands.⁸ Strike committees were formed at the different institutes, partly as a result of appeals from the Strike Committee of the SAS and partly on their own initiative. On 5 December their representatives again met to discuss the situation in the SAS.

Under pressure from these events, the chairman of the SAS Vladimír Hajko cancelled the General Assembly of the SAS which would have discussed the problem of protection of the environment, planned for 23 December 1989, and proposed the holding of an extraordinary general assembly on 18 December.

However, events progressed faster. On 24 November, at a session of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia (CC CPCS) in Prague, some members proposed to use force to solve the situation, over which they were losing control. However, it turned out that such a solution was not possible, because the isolated leadership of the CPCS could no longer rely on the armed forces. This was the turning point in the development of the situation. The CC CPCS accepted the resignation of the whole presidium and secretariat. The massive general strike in all the larger towns and cities showed the strength of the revolutionary forces. The totalitarian system ceased functioning. On 29 November, the Federal Assembly removed the article in the constitution about the leading role of the Communist Party in society. This was followed by a period of talks

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⁵ KLAČKA, ref. 1, p. 1.
⁶ The speakers of the Strike Committee were Pavel Obložinský, Pavel Horváth, Fedor Gömöry, Martin Mašek, Jozef Prokeš, Ján Šeffer and Ondrej Sýkora. Správy Slovenskej akadémie vied (Reports of the Slovak Academy of Sciences – Správy SAV), 1990, year 26, no. 1, p. 5; KLAČKA, ref. 1, p. 1.
⁸ KLAČKA, ref. 1, p. 1; Správy SAV, 1990, year 26, no. 1, p. 6.
between the new civil initiatives – Civic Forum in the Czech Lands and PAV in Slovakia – and representatives of the government, in which the initiative was clearly on the side of the revolutionary forces.

These events also influenced the developments in the SAS. On 5 December 1989, the whole Presidium of the SAS resigned, which opened the way to the election of a new leadership of the SAS. It was assumed that the General Assembly of the SAS, planned for 18 December, would approve the resignation. On 6 December, after the second meeting of the representatives of the Strike Committee of the SAS with the P SAS, they learnt about its resignation and about the prepared extraordinary general assembly, which was expected to elect the new leadership of the SAS. It would be headed by a president, whose election by the Academics would be confirmed by the Slovak National Council. The deputy chairmen and scientific secretary would also be elected. The government of the Slovak Socialist Republic would appoint the whole new Presidium of the SAS. The representatives of the Strike Committee of the SAS proposed that sixty elected representatives of the institutes of the SAS should participate in the election. The leadership of the SAS agreed, but the development in society had already moved further than the thinking of the old Presidium of the SAS, according to which, the discredited General Assembly established by the totalitarian regime was going to continue its activity. It was characteristic that at the first meeting of the members of the Strike Committee with the representatives of the P SAS, the demand that political parties should be excluded from the institute evoked the objection from the existing leadership of the SAS that all the employees of the SAS should express their view on this demand. At the second meeting with the P SAS, the Strike Committee submitted documentation showing that the overwhelming majority of the employees of the SAS supported the demand. On this basis, a joint resolution was adopted with the following almost comical text: “Those present came to the unanimous conclusion, that in the interest of intensification of scientific work, the organizations of political parties should not operate in the institutes of the SAS.”

In this situation, it could be expected that the General Assembly, under pressure from the public would accept at least a compromise solution, which would mean some corrections, but not fundamental change in the running of the SAS.

The Forum of Scientists and Research Workers (FSRW) met in the Trade Union House in Bratislava on 7 December 1989. Almost 1000 scientific and research workers adopted a resolution stating that the Presidium of the SAS elected by the General Assembly
assembly of its members is not a body capable of managing and representing science in Slovakia, and demanding that the government and the Slovak National Council repeal the Act on the SAS and the legal norms on the management of science. The invitation of representatives of the institutes to the elections of the new Presidium of the SAS at the planned General Assembly was rejected with the argumentation that it did not respect the interests of scientific institutions outside the SAS and gave the invited representatives hardly any legal powers.\footnote{KLAČKA, ref. 1, p. 1; Resolution in: \textit{Správy SAV}, 1990, year 26, no. 1, p. 27.} It turned out that precisely this session of the forum of researchers\footnote{The Forum of Scientists and Research Workers (FSRW, in Slovak: Fórum vedcov a výskumných pracovníkov – FVVP) represented the whole science and research community in Slovakia. After the creation of new bodies in the SAS and universities, the FSRW became the representative of research in industrial branches, which evoked dissatisfaction from the rest of the academic community.} was decisive for the further transformation of the SAS. The resolution of this assembly stated: \textit{“We do not regard the General Assembly of members of the Academy, the Presidium of the SAS elected by it, the bodies directing science in the universities and science in industrial branches as bodies capable of representing and managing science in Slovakia.”}\footnote{\textit{Správy SAV}, 1990, year 26, no. 1, p. 27.} The resolution also expressed a general view on the management of science: \textit{“The legislation on science must start from the principle of the self-regulation of science, scientific ethics and expert responsibility.”}\footnote{\textit{Správy SAV}, 1990, year 26, no. 1, p. 27.} A new informal committee of employees of the SAS, formed at this meeting of the FSRW, seized the initiative under the name Forum of Scientists of the SAS. From the Strike Committee of the SAS, only Fedor Gömöry became a member of the Forum of Scientists of the SAS. As a result of the more radical atmosphere at the meeting, this group was more radical in its demands for reform of the SAS. The unambiguous rejection of election of the new Presidium by the General Assembly of the SAS according to the proposal of the old Presidium opened the way to a search for a new more promising alternative. Under the influence of the discussions of the FSRW, a new group of SAS researchers was formed in the premises of the sociology section of the Institute of Philosophy and Sociology of the SAS at Patrónka. This group developed in the context of the SAS formulated the radical ideas at the meeting of the FSRW. On 12 December 1989, the Coordinating Committee of the civil initiative Forum of Scientists and Research Workers took a further step. It proposed a new way of solving the situation in the SAS, according to which a Council of Scientists would be formed from elected representatives of the institutes of the SAS, as a democratic self-governing body, which would then elect a twenty-member Action Committee, which would take over the role of the P SAS.\footnote{\textit{Správy SAV}, 1990, year 26, no. 1, p. 9.} On the following day, 13 December, a meeting was held in the campus of the SAS at Patrónka with the participation of representatives of the institutes of the SAS, the strike committees in institutes, the Strike Committee of the SAS and the FSRW. This meeting unambiguously supported the proposal from the Coordinating Committee of the FSRW.\footnote{\textit{Správy SAV}, 1990, year 26, no. 1, p. 28. The announcement of the holding of the meeting was signed by the representatives of the Strike Committee of the Whole SAS without giving names.} The second meeting of the FSRW was held
in the Bratislava Park of Culture and Amusement on 15 December. It unambiguously supported all the democratization measures in the SAS and adopted a resolution calling on all the institutes of the SAS to elect by secret ballot representatives in a democratic body named the Council of Scientists.\textsuperscript{21} The era of the activity of the Strike Committee of the SAS ended here, and the initiative in submitting further revolutionary demands passed to the Forum of Scientists of the SAS and the committee formed by it. The radicalization of democratic demands was connected with the processes in society. From 22 November, demonstrations were held in Bratislava, at first every day and later for every topical reason. They filled Slovak National Uprising Square, the main square of the city centre. Society was in motion, and the “old structures” in society and in the SAS were on the defensive.

At the session of the P SAS on 14 December 1989, the president of the SAS Vladimír Hajko informed the participants about the resolution from the meeting held on 13 December, which expressed lack of confidence in the General Assembly of members of the SAS and the existing P SAV. He proposed cancellation of the General Assembly of the SAS planned for 18 December. The Presidium passed a resolution dissolving some great research centres which were very unpopular in the academic community. Vladimír Hajko also requested release from his function and proposed that the P SAS should appoint to the function the president of the SAS Ivan Hrivňák.\textsuperscript{22} It was an attempt by the old leadership to create a new body – a “Presidium of reconciliation” to some extent resembling the events in the political sphere, where a transitional government of “reconciliation” was also formed. However, the problem was that appointment of the chairman of the SAS by this method was not in harmony with the legislation on the SAS. Appointment without election could not be legal according to the existing legislation, and the representatives of the Forum of Scientists of the SAS did not intend to accept it. This caused a situation of deadlock, which the Presidium of the SAS wanted to solve by calling a meeting of members of the SAS, representatives of the civil initiatives (FSRW), elected representatives of the Council of Scientists, directors of institutes and representatives of the Office of the P SAS on 22 December 1989. The election of a new Presidium was already expected. Ivan Hrivňák proposed a compromise solution at this assembly: The new Presidium of the SAS would have half its members elected by the General Assembly from among academic and correspondent members, while important employees of the SAS would elect the other half.\textsuperscript{23} It was proposed that during the transitional period, the SAS would be directed by an operational group composed of Ivan Hrivňák, the scientific secretary of the old Presidium, the director of the Office of the P SAS and the head of the secretariat of the functionaries of the SAS.\textsuperscript{24} Since the appointment of Ivan Hrivňák as president of the SAS was considered undemocratic, he was challenged

\textsuperscript{21} Správy SAV, 1990, year 26, no. 1, p. 35.
\textsuperscript{22} ÚA SAV, RO SAV II. Minutes of the 20th session of the P SAS on 14 Dec 1989. The outgoing president then officially informed the government of the SSR about his resignation. Until the election of the new P SAS, various bodies operated parallel to each other, as is described in the next section.
\textsuperscript{23} Správy SAV, 1990, year 26, no. 1, p. 13-14.
\textsuperscript{24} After 5 January 1990, the operational group was supplemented with a representative of the Council of Scientists. KLAČKA, ref. 1, p. 2. Shorthand record in ÚA SAV, RO I 249/16.
to submit to election and he agreed. Among the more important acts of this leadership of the SAS it is necessary to mention the public apology to the people, who had to leave the institutes of the SAS during the period of “Normalization”, and the offer of the possibility of compensation and return to the SAS, and respect for expressions of no-confidence in directors of institutes.25

The operational group began to prepare for new elections to the Presidium of the SAS, which required an amendment to the Act on the SAS. It was not easy to get the amendment passed, because forces opposed to these “revolutionary” changes were still active in the political sphere, just as in the SAS.26 Ivan Hrivňák seized the initiative, and soon after Christmas, he turned to the academic public with a letter in which he agitated for the creation of the “Presidium of comity” he had proposed.27 On the same day, Ivan Hrivňák called a meeting of the “operational group” he had created, composed of himself as chairman, Štefan Luby as scientific secretary, Ján Jezný as director of the Office of the Presidium of the SAS, his deputy Milan Ružek and Jaroslav Červinka, head of the secretariat of the Presidium of the SAS.28

According to the statement of Silvester Takács: “There was still a group of people close to the communist nomenclatura, who wanted to hinder the democratization process, especially under the mantle of the possibility of reforming the body of Academicians and Corresponding Members of the SAS. This also appeared in the struggle for the amendment to the Act on the SAS, in which we only succeeded at the last minute in ensuring that the version, which enabled the Council of Scientists of the SAS to elect the new Presidium would reach the Slovak National Council.”29 The Operational Group met regularly. Ivan Hrivňák, who acted as the designated president of the SAS also had discussions with the new minister of education Ladislav Kováč, with whom he agreed that the proposals for the dissolution of the SAS, put forward in public by some representatives of the universities, were extreme, and that the proposals to transform the SAS into a university were also distant from reality.30 At its sessions on 5 and 8 January 1990, the Operational Group again concerned itself with calling a General Assembly of the SAS, which would be concerned with protection of the environment according to the old plan, as well as with adopting a programme for the activity of the SAS until the passing of the new Act on the SAS and electing the new Presidium of the SAS.31

However, by this time, a new structure, called the Council of Scientists of the SAS was already actively working at the SAS. It was composed of elected representatives

25 KLAČKA, ref. 1, p. 2.
26 TAKÁCS, ref. 1, p. 1.
27 ÚA SAV, RO SAV II. Letter from Ivan Hrivňák to the employees of the SAS from 29 Dec 1989.
28 ÚA SAV, RO SAV II. Record of the meeting of the leading functionaries of the SAS and staff of the Office of the P SAS on 29 Dec 1989.
29 TAKÁCS, Stanislav. Dodatok k oslavám výročia SAV. (A supplement to the celebrations of the anniversary of the SAS). In Správy SAV, 2003, year 39, no. 12, p. 15. The Christian name of the author is given incorrectly here. It should be Silvester.
30 ÚA SAV, RO SAV II. Record of I. Hrivňák’s meeting with Ladislav Kováč on 28 Dec 1989.
31 ÚA SAV, RO SAV II, 2, 1990. Record of the second session of the Operational Group on 5 and 8 Jan 1990 (the discussions were interrupted and continued on 8 Jan 1990).
of the institutes of the SAS. On 5 January 1990, the Council of Scientists held its first session and elected a nine member organizational committee. The coordinating committee of the Forum of Scientists of the SAS ended its activity with the constituting of this body.

The organizational committee of the Council of Scientists met Ivan Hrivňák, who informed the Operational Group about the meeting. According to Ivan Hrivňák, the Council of Scientists refused to vote on confidence in a designated president, but insisted that elections of the Presidium and president of the SAS had to be held according to the decision of the meeting on 22 December, which meant election by the Council of Scientists. At the same time, Ivan Hrivňák was criticized for submitting to the government a proposed amendment to the Act on the SAS different to that demanded at the meeting.

A further meeting with the Organizational Committee of the of the Council of Scientists was held on 10 January on the initiative of Ivan Hrivňák, who presented a document according to which he had submitted to the government a proposed amendment to the Act on the SAS as agreed at the meeting on 22 December. As a result, the representatives of the Organizational Committee apologized for their preceding criticism.

The representatives of the Organizational Committee agreed to the solution that the Council of Scientists would function as a second chamber alongside the General Assembly, but as a result of the proposed changes to the act, the Council of Scientists would elect the new members of the Presidium. They planned to postpone the General Assembly until February 1990, that is after the election of the new Presidium of the SAS, which would be held on 22-23 January. It was clear that the initiative was unambiguously in the hands of the Council of Scientists, representatives of which also had discussions about the situation with the deputy prime minister Jozef Markuš and found government support for their proposed solutions. Thus, the activity of the Council of Scientists, the new self-governing body created in the course of the revolutionary changes, was decisive for the further changes in the SAS. The proposed amendment to the act was passed by the Slovak National Council on 12 January, and the way to the election of the new leadership of the SAS was open.

**The Council of Scientists – the new self-governing body**

Around the turn of 1989 and 1990, society in Slovakia and in the whole state experienced extraordinarily dynamic development. There were changes in the highest political bodies. Alexander Dubček was elected president of the Federal Assembly and Václav Havel became President of the Republic. A Federal Assembly composed of old communist functionaries elected them to these highest constitutional positions. This fact

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32 For its composition see note 37.
34 Ref. 33.
35 The General Assembly, that is the body of Academicians and Corresponding Members of the SAS remained in the act, but it was deprived of any powers, so that it is possible to speak not of the dissolution of this body, but of the dumping of its activity. Since it was not summoned in the following years, this body did not meet and it ceased to exist after the passing of the Act on the SAS in 2002. Use of the titles “Academician” and “Corresponding Member” also ceased.
expressed the paradoxical character of the period, but also the fact that developments could not be stopped. A new federal government headed by Marián Čalfa was formed, and then a new government of the Slovak Socialist Republic under the leadership of Milan Čič. Rudolf Schuster was elected to the position of the Slovak National Council president. Society was preparing for the first free elections since 1946.

The situation within the SAS was also dynamically developing, with changes corresponding to those in society as a whole. Employees of the SAS, alongside artists and students were actually some of the most active participants in the social changes. Fedor Gál, Peter Zajac, Milan Šútovec, František Šebej and František Mikloško were among the most active members of the civil movement Public Against Violence. Mikuláš Huba was active in the environmental movement, which developed into the Green Party, while Jozef Šimúth was active in the revived Democratic Party. The prime minister Milan Čič and deputy prime minister Jozef Markuš also came from the SAS. The president of parliament Rudolf Schuster had worked briefly in the SAS. Many other people from the SAS were also involved in social and political activities. In the SAS itself, strike committees were formed and other employees participated in applying democratic principles to the management of science. People who had to leave the SAS for political reasons came back to the institutes on the basis of rehabilitation. The largest wave of rehabilitated people came from the reformist period of 1968-1969, but many others affected by purges already in the 1950s also returned.

As a result of the activity of the strike committees and individual employees of the SAS, self-governing structures began to arise in the institutes of the SAS. This was a substantial change, because the initiative in constituting the managing bodies for the whole academy passed to the democratically elected representatives of the institutes of the SAS.

The new central self-governing body of the SAS, the Council of Scientists was actually the democratically elected parliament of the SAS. Every institute elected its representatives to the Council of Scientists. The principle was one representative for every 50 university educated employees of an institute. This body was already elected and present at the meeting of scientific workers and members of the whole SAS on 22 December 1989, but its first independent session was held on 5 January 1990. The Council of Scientists consisted of 102 members elected by the institutes of the SAS. A nine member Organizational Committee headed by Silvester Takács was elected at the session.

The Organizational Committee was entrusted with quickly submitting to the Slovak National Council a proposed amendment to the act. The most important point in the amendment was incorporation of the Council of Scientists into the Act on the SAS as a self-governing body, which would have the highest responsibility for policy, supervision and issuing internal norms in the SAS, and for electing the new Presidium of the SAS, instead of the General Assembly of the SAS. Thus the most important self-governing body of the SAS was created as a result of the revolutionary changes. It took the real

36 MARČEKOVÁ, ref. 1, p. 1.
37 The other members were: Karol Babor, Ján Bakiča, Baltazár Frankovič, Otilia Gašpariková, Milan Šútovec, Viera Trmovcová, Tatiana Weissová and Ján Závada.
initiative in running the SAS into its own hands. In practice although not officially, the Organizational Committee of the Council of Scientists also fulfilled some of the roles of the still not existing Presidium of the SAS, for example, in the fields of transforming the numerous commissions of the SAS and communicating with the media.38

This also concerned the basic problems of cooperation with the Czechoslovak Academy of Sciences, the leadership of which recognized the Council of Scientists as the only representative body of the SAS. At the session of the Council of Scientists on 5 January 1990, held without the presence of the president of the SAS designated by parliament, the council expressed no confidence in the president, which meant that Ivan Hrivňák was practically deprived of his mandate and the “Operational Group” lost its reason to exist. Initiative passed to the Council of Scientists. The most important tasks facing the council and its Organizational Committee were legalization of the Council of Scientists by means of an amendment to the Act on the SAS and election of a new Presidium at a plenary session of the Council of Scientists in accordance with the amendment to the act.

The amendment to the Act on the SAS, passed by the Slovak National Council on 12 January 1990, fundamentally changed the position of the SAS in the framework of the scientific community. In the previous system, the General Assembly of the SAS, composed of Academicians and Corresponding Members of the SAS, was formally the representative body of the whole Slovak scientific and scholarly community, but the Council of Scientists was the representative only of the research institutes of the SAS. Thus, the SAS actually became a research institution. The statement that the SAS was the central Slovak scientific institution was removed from the act. The SAS was prepared to enter into free competition with other scientific institutions in the field of science and research.

The elections to the Presidium of the SAS were held on 22-23 January 1990. The activity of the Organizational Committee ended at the session of the Council of Scientists on 14 March 1990, when the Statute of the Council of Scientists was adopted and the Committee of the Council of Scientists was elected in accordance with it. A nine member committee headed by Viera Trnovcová was elected.39

Thus, apart from the new Presidium of the SAS, a body that significantly contributed to the democratic character of the whole institution and to strengthening its self-governing functions, also began to operate in the SAS. In connection with this new Presidium, the annual report of the academy stated that 1989 was a true turning point in the development of science in Slovakia, which “meant the beginning of a new era associated with true democracy and freedom in science”.40 In reality, this statement shows the hopeful atmosphere of the time. Not all of these hopes were entirely fulfilled in the following years.

38 TAKÁCS, ref. 1, p. 1.
39 The other members of the committee were: Tomáš Bleha, Klára Buzzássyová, Ivan Gašparík, Štefan Malgocký, Svorad Štolc, Vilam VaškoVIč, Klaudius Viceník, Tatiana Weissová. Správy SAV, 1990, year 26, no. 5; MARČEKOVÁ, ref. 1, p. 2.
The first democratically elected Presidium of the SAS

One of the basic questions connected with the election of the new Presidium of the SAS was whether to elect to the Presidium representatives of the universities and research institutes of industrial branches. They had previously been included in the decision-making bodies of the SAS, but were often resented by the employees of the SAS. In the end, the Council of Scientists decided to include representatives from outside the academy in the ratio 2 : 5, mainly for the purpose of improving cooperation with the universities. However, this did not save the SAS from future, often scathing attacks from some of the representatives of the universities.

The two academies in Czechoslovakia: the Czechoslovak Academy of Sciences and the Slovak Academy of Sciences, had been officially responsible for scientific research in the whole republic. However, it was unfair to blame them for the miserable financing of university research. Members of the SAS staff were often in the minority in the relevant committees of the SAS. Apart from this, the erroneous idea prevailed at the time that financial resources not granted to the SAS could be awarded to the universities. The naivety of these ideas was proved, when the resources for research at the SAS were reduced without significantly helping the universities in this area.

The Council of Scientists as the democratically elected body representing the community of scientific researchers, decided at its first session that the temporary Presidium of the SAS would have 21 members.

The Presidium would be composed of seven members from each division of science. The first division of science comprised institutes concerned with inorganic and technical sciences. The second division institutes concerned with living nature, chemistry and medicine, and the third included the social and human sciences. Each division would have two representatives of the universities or industrial branches research. Only internal employees of the SAS became members of the college of the president. Members of the Council of Scientists, scientific societies, scientific, educational and research institutions and civil initiatives proposed the candidates for membership of the Presidium.

Eighty seven candidates participated in the election. A candidate had to submit a written declaration with a brief curriculum vitae and summary of publication activity to indicate his contribution to science. During the election, every candidate had to stand before the Council of Scientists for five minutes to answer ten questions concerning the role and position of science in society, relations between basic research in the SAS, industrial branches and universities, ideas about the internal structure of the SAS, the method of financing basic research, the relationship of the SAS to CSAS, education of young scientific research workers and awarding of scientific titles, priorities in solution of problems in basic research, the possibilities for development of their own scientific field, and ideas for new legislation on science. On 23 January 1990, the Council of Scientists elected a Presidium of the SAS, defined as temporary and intended to serve until the passing of a new Act on the SAS or act on science, and at most until the end of

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41 Návrh principov a postupe pri voľbe dočasného Predsedníctva SAV. (Proposed principles and procedure for the election of the temporary Presidium of the SAS.). Archive of Milan Šútovec.

42 NEMESKÜRTHYOVÁ, ref. 1, p. 1.
1992. Ladislav Macho became the president of the SAS.\textsuperscript{43} After this act, on 26 January 1990, the Operational Group met for the last time. Ivan Hrivňák explained to the meeting why he had not participated in the election of the new Presidium of the SAS, and he formally protested against the exclusion of the General Assembly from the election of the members of the new Presidium.\textsuperscript{44}

At its session on 2 February 1990, the Presidium passed a resolution declaring its support for the revolutionary processes occurring in the country and for the democratization of life. At the first regular session on 29 January 1990, the Presidium stated that the SAS was directed by democratically elected bodies – the Council of Scientists and Presidium of the SAS. It set out the tasks for the next two years:

– return all scientific research in the SAS to its real mission, namely free service of the search for truth, independently of any ideology or political intervention;
– to raise the cultural level of the nation by development of thought, and contribute to the solution of the basic problems of society by means of deep scientific analysis;
– to transform the SAS, applying progressive democratic elements in the organization of scientific research and management of institutes, to simplify the management structures and remove intermediate levels between the institutes and the Presidium of the SAS;
– to restructure the institutes, increase the independence of institutes, reduce the administrative apparatus at the Office of the P SAS and at the institutes;
– to ensure that functions on all levels of the management of science are held by people with natural scientific authority, a high level of professional competence and clean moral profile, without intervention from political parties;
– to correct the political deformation in the composition of the membership of the Academy, to correct injustices with political causes against members and employees of the Academy and whole groups and institutes in the SAS, especially as a result of “Normalization” after 1968-1969;
– the aim of the P SAS was also to construct a new system of management of science in the SAS, which would respect the need for self-organization and personal responsibility of the most qualified scientists and research teams, by abolishing the so-called scientific plan and establishing a grant system of organization and awarding of resources for scientific projects;
– establish consistent links between research in the SAS and world science, introduce international criteria for the evaluation of results, support the improvement of the ethical consciousness of scientists;
– struggle to preserve the SAS as an important base for non-university research.\textsuperscript{45}

\textsuperscript{43} The other members of the P SAS were Ján Bakoš, Pavol Brunovský, Libor Ebringer, Oskar Elschek, Vladimir Ferák, Baltazár Frankovič, Fedor Gál, Anton Hajduk, František Hanic, Richard Kittler, Július Krempaský, Jozef Markuš, Štefan Markuš, Oľga Ovečková, František Šebej, Silvester Takács, Igor Tvaroška, Viliam Ujházy, Jozef Výrost and Ján Závada.

\textsuperscript{44} ÚA SAV, RO SAV II. Record of the session of the Operational Group on 26 Jan 1990.

A further aim of the programme of the P SAS was cooperation with the universities in the scientific and educational process, continuation of scientific education in the institutes of the SAS and improvement of the level of preparation of young scientists especially by means of study abroad and achievement of world standards in scientific education. Initiating the establishment of a Czecho-Slovak foundation for exchange of researchers between Czechoslovak and foreign basic research institutions was also considered. The P SAS set itself the aim of preparing new legislation on the structure and activity of the SAS corresponding to the new socio-political conditions. In the first half of 1990, the new Presidium of the SAS in cooperation with the Council of Scientists of the SAS introduced a whole series of democratizing measures, mainly directed towards strengthening the autonomy of the institutes and legal powers of their elected representatives. New scientific councils of institutes were elected as democratic elements of management. Personnel proceedings in the institutes included expression of confidence in directors. If the director did not win a vote of confidence, a new selection process started. Criteria were prepared for evaluation of the activity and results of institutes of the SAS with the aim of removing interventions of the political regime in research work, especially in the social sciences, and working out expert criteria acceptable on the international level. These were not simple changes. They often struck against inertia in the thinking of people in the institutes, as a new member of the Presidium Štefan Markuš stated, when he wrote, that the transformation process was striking against the residue of the preceding period of administrative authoritarian management of science: “The need for such management still persists in us. The idea that we are no longer in the service of an institution of pyramidal type is confusing for many. It is as if they cannot live without orders from the centre. Some even refuse to constitute the scientific council of their institute, as long as its purpose and legal powers are not defined from the top of the pyramid.”

Fulfillment of these aims happened in conditions of increased economic pressure. In the course of the term of office of the temporary Presidium, the annual budget of the SAS was reduced. One of the means of defence was to reduce the number of employees of the SAS, especially in the fields of services and administration and middle level expert staff. Rationalization of management in practice meant the break up of centres of science or conglomerates of scientific disciplines in large forcibly concentrated units such as the Institute of Technical Cyberetics, Institute of Artistic Science, Institute of Literary Science and several others. The creation of large research centres was considered by the academic community as a directive one. Measures introduced without discussion with the scientific researchers often did not lead to more effective research as proclaimed, but more to the opposite result. Expression of confidence or no confidence in the directors of institutes and the resulting competitive appointments to these position was an expression

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46 MACHO, ref. 1, p. 1-2.
47 No confidence was expressed in the case of 24 directors. NEMESKÚRTHYOVÁ, ref. 1, p. 2.
48 MARČEKOVÁ, ref. 1, p. 2.
49 Správy SAV, 1990, year 26, no. 3.
50 NEMESKÚRTHYOVÁ, ref. 1, p. 2.
of the depoliticization of scientific life. The criteria were expert qualification, moral integrity and age up to 65 years. The newly established scientific councils in the institutes, dissolution of several auxiliary bodies of the Presidium and appointment of replacements with new members were further expressions of the depoliticization and democratization of management. Rehabilitation commissions were established in the institutes with the aim of correcting the injustices and deformations caused especially by the period of "Normalization". A central Commission for Correcting Injustices headed by the first deputy chairman of the SAS Silvester Takács operated within the Presidium.  

Apart from these policy aims, the Presidium solved questions of the premises of some institutes in connection with demands for the restitution of the property of Church institutions, prepared the principles of a new Act on the SAS, constituted the grant system for solving and financing research by establishing a grant agency, worked out proposed principles for content and organizational changes in the SAS to ensure more effective functioning of science, and especially it continually struggled with attacks and tendencies to dissolve the SAS.  

It was equally necessary to confront efforts by the decision making sphere to centralize the management of science according to the old familiar model and entrust this task to the Ministry of Education, which would be called in full: the Ministry of Education, Science, Youth and Sport. The Presidium of the SAS protested against this tendency on various levels. It also sent a protest letter to the president of the Slovak National Council, stating among other things that: “the management of science by one ministry opposes the essence, nature and overall social importance of scientific work”. In spite of this, the tendency reappeared after two years in connection with the preparation of an act on the organization and support of science and technology. The proposed act again concentrated the legal power to manage science in the hands of one ministry, which would abolish the already created and reliably functioning self-regulating mechanisms in the SAS. The SAS again protested on various levels against the passing of an act in this form. The protests included a great meeting of the employees of the SAS on 13 March 1992. The idea that society needs to be directed, and preferably from one centre as experienced under the totalitarian system, still persisted, in spite of the changes of system in political and social life. The SAS continued to strike against this problem in the following years, and naturally, these tendencies, experienced by whole generations of scientists, did not disappear from the internal life of the SAS in an instant.

A persistent problem was the idea that science means only the production of new technologies and patents. It was a heritage from the past, as was stated in the report prepared by the Presidium of the SAS at the suggestion of the CSAS, which wanted to map the most important results of Czechoslovak science during the previous five years: “Central direction in the preceding period led to the idea that science is a service of ap-
plied research." In spite of the democratization process, this idea persisted and it still persists, not only in the managing bodies, but also in parts of the academic community.

The election of the first Presidium of the SAS essentially marked the end of the first stage of the struggle for a new democratic form of the SAS and to eliminate the results of the management of science by the totalitarian system. The newly elected Presidium was faced with demanding tasks: to analyse and diagnose the current state of the SAS, to attempt critical self-examination and so to start the transformation of the SAS with the aim of giving this scientific institution a new character and new orientation, which would be shaped not on the basis of the resolutions of political institutions, in particular the Central Committee of the Communist Party as in the totalitarian period, but on the basis of the internal needs of individual scientific disciplines, science as a whole, its role in society and not least in relation to the development of science in the world.

The SAS and its Presidium did not limit themselves only to internal changes and transformation of the Academy. They were also intensively concerned with developments in society. When nationalist passions connected with the enactment of Slovak as the official language disturbed society at the end of October 1990, and expressions of intolerance against national minorities came to the surface, the Presidium of the SAS turned to the public with an appeal for tolerance. The appeal also criticized the position of Jozef Markuš, a member of the Presidium of the SAS, who joined the nationalist actions as chairman of the Matica Slovenská cultural organization. The declaration of the Presidium stated: "We do not regard the social consequences that threaten from this source as a service to the nation, but as a serious threat to its political and cultural future."

System changes in the SAS

In harmony with its programme declaration and with the demands of the Council of Scientists of the SAS, the Presidium directed its attention to making changes in the structure of the management structures and institutes of the SAS. After dissolving the research centres: the centres for Geo-science Research, Chemical Research, Electro-Physical Research, Physiological Sciences and Biological-Veterinary Sciences, the institutes previously included in them became independent units. In February 1990, the P SAS dissolved the Institute of Scientific Atheism as a superfluous relic of the old regime. The Institute of Political Science was established and the Institute of Artistic Science was divided into the Institute of Musical Science, Institute of Art History and Institute of Theatre and Film. From the 32 advisory and auxiliary bodies, which also intervened in the activities of the institutes, only 9 were left, including the Publishing Committee, Committee for Scientific Education, Attestation Commission, Commission for Assessment of Scientific Qualifications, and the Commission for the Environment. Four new commissions were established. They included the Commission of the P SAS for Correcting Injustices, which assessed the injustices against scientific researchers up to

54 ÚA SAV, RO SAV, vol. C1/5, c. 233, inv. no. 834. Reports on the activity of the SAS. A special report on the results of the SAS during the last 4-5 years, April 1990.
1990, especially the causes of loss of employment, prohibition of scientific activity and so on, as a result of the decisions by political bodies. The P SAS advised institutes to accept the return of former employees, who were expelled from institutes. In the case of seven people, it granted more funds to enable their return. The P SAS approved the return of membership of the Academy to one living member, and proposed membership of the SAS for one new member, whose appointment as a member had been rejected for political reasons before 1989.56 The Commission of the P SAS for Questions of Membership assessed the depth of political intervention in the granting and removal of membership of the SAS. In cooperation with the similar commission of the CSAS, it also considered the granting and removal of membership of the CSAS, especially in the period of so-called “Normalization”.

The Commission for Preparation of the Act on the SAS worked out two proposed texts for the relevant legislation. However, their further legislative progress was repeatedly stopped at the level of the ministries and government of the Slovak Republic, because it was connected with the working out of an act on the organization of and support for science. This was also expected to solve the problem of the position of the SAS or its dissolution, on the basis of proposals from organizations concerned with the field of research and development. As a result, the legislative initiative of the SAS was unsuccessful. This caused considerable disenchantment and uncertainty in the scientific community, as the deputy chairman of the SAS Silvester Takács stated in an article in *Kultúrny život*: “In my view, the main obstacle to the legislative initiative is insufficient authority granted to the preparatory commissions selected by the scientific community. The frequent declarations that the central body of the state administration for science and research should form part of the Ministry of Education, also contribute to the low level of respect for its work [...] The legal uncertainty of the individual institutes and of the whole SAS do not contribute to creating a favourable climate for scientific work.”57

The Commission of the P SAS for Science and Research worked out a proposal for the establishment of a grant system in the SAS and a proposal for an act to support science and research in the Slovak Republic. The P SAS participated in working out the state policy in the field of science and research, prepared by the Ministry for Economic Strategy. It also supported proposals for the establishment of a State Fund for Science and research and a National Slovak Grant Agency. 58

In the course of 1990, personnel changes were made in leading positions at institutes of the SAS. On the basis of competitive proceedings, expert qualifications and fulfillment of moral criteria, without intervention from political parties, more than half the scientific institutes appointed new directors. The other directors gained the confidence of the scientific communities and of the P SAS. The composition of the Scientific Colleges (Boards of elected scientists for individual scientific branches) was reformed.

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56 Membership was returned to the linguist Ľudovít Novák, former Secretary General of Slovak Academy of Sciences and Arts and membership *in memoriam* was granted to the art scientist Marián Váross.


58 MACHO, ref. 1, p. 2-3.
members were proposed by the scientific councils of institutes and the individual faculties of universities. The changes in the organizational structure of the SAS and pressure for a reduction in the number of its employees led to the closure of the so-called development and production workshops of various institutes. The products of these usually replaced instruments and chemicals available from abroad, but inaccessible because of limited foreign currency and barriers to imports. Opening of the market and greater access to imports after 1989 deprived these workshops of most of their purpose. Demands for reduction of the scientific research base of the SAS led to significant reduction in the number of the administrative staff, dissolution of screening and special units, but also to the departure of many scientific staff to the universities, political and state institutions or to the newly forming economic and business organizations. In spite of the reduction in the number of employees from more than 6000 in 1990 to 4572 at the end of 1992,\footnote{In the following years, the decline in the number of staff got slower, and stabilized at about 3000 in the second half of the 1990s, which is practically the present state.} scientific output not only did not decline, it actually improved in quality, since sending of works abroad was no longer subject to monitoring and approval from so-called special units.\footnote{MACHO, ref. 1, p. 3.}

For the first time in the framework of the whole SAS, scientists from the institutes were individually evaluated according to internationally recognized criteria from the point of view of production of scientific research results and international response. The scientific output of the institutes of the SAS was also evaluated on the basis of the quality of their publications and success in international cooperation. The conclusions of the Attestation Commission formed the basis for differentiated distribution of financial resources to the institutes according to their results.\footnote{MACHO, ref. 1, p. 3-4.}

The P SAS strove to achieve the widest possible connection between the universities and the institutes of the SAS in the fields of research and education. It supported the creation of joint institutes, and by the end of 1991 there were 15 of them. The number of employees of the SAS, who also lectured in universities substantially increased.\footnote{MACHO, ref. 1, p. 4} In spite of these realities, the SAS constantly had to defend itself against attacks from some of the representatives of the universities, who openly strove for the liquidation of the SAS, apparently motivated by the naive idea that it would lead to better financing of research in the universities.\footnote{TAKÁCS, ref. 1, p. 2-3.}

The most important activity was the introduction of a grant system instead of the state plan for basic research. In July 1990, the Office of the P SAS sent the institutes of the Academy methodological instructions for the preparation of scientific research activities and scientific projects, and for the awarding of grants. The proposed grant system of the SAS was submitted to the scientific councils of the institutes and the central authorities of the SAS for discussion. It was amended on the basis of comments and approved by the Presidium of the SAS. It proposed that 30-40% of the payment fund and 25% of the
resources for investment and non-investment for 1991 would be distributed by the mechanism of internal grants of the SAS. The Committee for the Co-ordination of Science and Education of the Office of the P SAS worked out a proposed Statute of the Grant Agency of the SAS to regulate the legal and organizational functioning of the grants agenda. The Presidium of the SAS approved it on 11 October 1990. A total of 733 projects were proposed for 1991.\(^{64}\)

The Presidium of the SAS established the Grant Agency of the SAS (GA SAS) at the end of 1990 as the first organization in Slovakia responsible for the competitive allocation of funds for basic and applied scientific research on the basis of the peer review of research projects. The first elected chairman and deputy chairman of the GA SAS were Branislav Lichardus and Jozef Tiňo, who completed the statute and organizational structure of the agency. In 1991 a similar grant agency was created at the Ministry of Education of Slovakia for the universities. At the end of year, the two grant agencies were merged to form a joint grant agency for the SAS and the universities (GAS). The Council of the Government of the Slovak Republic for Science and Research became the overall controlling institution of the GAS. Establishment of the GAS was the first systematic measure to deepen cooperation between the SAS and the universities. The Presidium of the GA SAS played an important organizing role in this process in cooperation with the Ministry of Education and the Presidium of the SAS. However, it is necessary to comment critically that the technical and organizational running of the GAS (later renamed and reorganized as the present VEGA) at the Ministry of Education were not given priority and remained below the level at the SAS, where from May 1991 the GA SAS and later the GAS was an autonomous body subject to the Presidium of the SAS, with the exception of its secretariat, which remained part of the Office of the P SAS.\(^{65}\)

In May 1991 the GA SAS took the initiative in organizing a conference of all the grant agencies active in the Czecho-Slovak Federal Republic at the CSAS, SAS and the ministries of education of the Slovak and Czech republics. The conference attempted to unite the structures of the agencies, the criteria for assessing and evaluating projects and the effectiveness of scientific work, as well as the application forms for research projects. After the change in the leadership of the Ministry of Education after the parliamentary elections of autumn 1994, the habits from the totalitarian period strengthened in this central office of the state administration. This first appeared in corrections to the decision of the GAS in the area of accepting research projects and granting them finance. In 1995, the GAS was actually abolished. “Government scientific projects” were quickly organized in the universities and SAS, untransparently, but with much more generous financial support than the GAS projects. However, this attempt to liquidate democratization in the organization of science in Slovakia was corrected to some degree in 1996. The joint grant agency of the SAS and Ministry of Education was revived by transformation of the GAS without more significant organizational changes into the Scientific Grant Agency – SGA (Vedlecká grantová agentúra – VEGA), which still operates.\(^{66}\) However, the establishment

\(^{64}\) LICHARDUS, ref. 1, p. 2.

\(^{65}\) LICHARDUS, ref. 1, p. 2.

\(^{66}\) LICHARDUS, ref. 1, p. 3.
and functioning of the grant system was one thing, and the actual financial resources for
grants were another. The complex competitive system was a clearly positive element in
the development of scientific research, but it is impossible to ignore the fact that the actu-
al grants were very modest, as the chairman of the SAS Ladislav Macho pointed out in an
interview for the Správy SAV (SAS News): “The existing state is catastrophic, because
the proportion is such that one research grant in the USA or Germany amounts to the
same number of dollars or marks as our scientists receive in crowns. The proportion in
financing is about 1 : 15 or 1 : 20.”

The measures introduced during the two-year term of office of the first Presidium of
the SAS brought significant changes in the functioning of the SAS and its position in the
scientific research community in Slovakia. The number of employees of the SAS was
already substantially reduced in these years. Scientific research became more concen-
trated and there was an effort to improve its quality by introducing a system of competitive
financing, changing from extensive financing of often ineffective programmes, to inten-
sive and regularly evaluated research in all branches of science. Although international
contacts were carried on mainly through the Czechoslovak Academy of Sciences with its
centre in Prague, the SAS also intensified its research contacts with scientific institu-
tions abroad, often already on the basis of joint projects.

It was important that the SAS established itself in the new conditions and remained
the dominant scientific institution in Slovakia, both in the domestic context and in rela-
tion to Europe and the world. The SAS very quickly integrated itself into the European
research space, especially by means of project cooperation. It also played a key role in
working out proposals for state scientific policy. The chairman of the grant agency for
the SAS and universities Branislav Lichardus was appointed by the minister of education
to head of the commission to prepare such a proposal. Other representatives of the SAS,
universities and ministries also actively participated. In 1993, during the second Presi-
dium of the SAS, the Academy submitted a list of 50 topical problems in the fields of
science and research at the request of the prime minister of Slovakia. These were thought
to require priority in the interest of building the state and society. The scientists of the
SAS were prepared to work out expert reports within a short time.

The decision making sphere regularly used this material during the 1990s. The “spi-
rit of change” prevailed in the SAS during this period. Almost everybody realized that
change was not only unavoidable, but also a pre-condition for the further development of
science. Štefan Markuš summarized this in his new year interview in January 1991:
“My wish for the future is that we should be capable of change. Not change for the sake of
change, but change for the sake of more complete awareness of our responsibilities.”

In the course of the year, the conception of the SAS crystallized. It was to become a
collection of independent scientific institutes, accredited on the basis of proposals from

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68 LICHARDUS, ref. 1, p. 2-3.
Although the first democratically elected Presidium was supposed to function until the passing of the Act on the SAS or, at longest, until the end of 1992, its members decided to ask to be allowed to resign sooner. This was mainly because various members of the Presidium had meanwhile become directors of institutes and some held important positions in political institutions. Some had given up membership of the Presidium and had been replaced by newly elected members, while others participated very little in the work of the Presidium. Differences of view also appeared between the Presidium and the Council of Scientists of the SAS, which, in contrast to the P SAS, represented only the institutes of the SAS. The division of responsibilities in the P SAS was rather uneven, and the members did not always entirely succeed in fulfilling them because of their other duties. The 18th session of the Council of Scientists on 18 February 1992 considered the situation with the participation of the chairman of the SAS Ladislav Mach, the scientific secretary of the SAS Anton Hajduk and some other members of the P SAS. The Council of Scientists considered that the questions of the scientific activity, political allegiance and political engagement of the members of the P SAS during their term of office were open and unsolved. The problems of members of the P SAS from outside the Academy, the unequal workload of different members of the Presidium and the question of the decentralization of responsibilities to individual branches of science and finally to the institutes were also raised. After agreement with the Council of Scientists of the SAS, they decided on the election of the new P SAS, in which there would be only 15 members, all of them employees of the SAS. On 30 April 1992, the Council of Scientists of the SAS approved new election regulations, on the basis of which elections to the second Presidium of the SAS were held on 15 May.

Continuation of the changes in the time of the second Presidium of the SAS

On 22 May 1992, the Presidium of the Slovak National Council appointed Branislav Lichardus to the function of president of the SAS and the new Presidium began its period of office. It was the time when society was experiencing its first great disillusionment from the hopes aroused by 1989. The first free elections in 1990 had brought new politi-

71 The first expressions of dissatisfaction were expressed in the Council of Scientists already in September 1991 and defined as the “dissatisfaction of the scientific community with the work of the members of the P SAS”. In Správy SAV, 1991, year 27, no. 18, p. 2. The same consideration appeared at the session of the P SAS on 26 September 1991, where the willingness to collectively resign was expressed, but also a demand that the Council of Scientists should be reconstituted.
72 TAKÁCS, ref. 1, p. 3. Ladislav Macho gave the same arguments in an interview for the Správy SAV, ref. 50, p. 3.
73 Information from the chairman of the Committee of the Council of Scientists Vladimír Štrbák about the 18th session of the Council of Scientists of the SAS. In Správy SAV, 1992, year 28, p. 4-5.
74 The other members of the P SAS were: Vladimír Bakoš, Tomáš Bleha, Dušan Berek, Valerián Bystrický, Dušan Čaplovič, Baltázár Frankovič, František Hindák, Egon Hlavatý, Ján Kazár, Štefan Luby, František Smolen, Ján Štohl, Viliam Vaškovič, Anton Zentko.
cal groups to power, but it was proved that elections by themselves are not the essential content of democracy, only its initial stage. Society still lacked a democratic political culture and the associated social communication. The old structures and the associated political practices were already shaken from the first shock, and through various new political groups, they strove to strengthen their position in politics and the economy. Continuing attacks on the so-called Screening Act, which aimed to eliminate former agents of the State Security Service from important positions in the state-sector, also contributed to this. The economic crisis caused by the disintegration of the former so-called Eastern market led to rapid growth of unemployment, and the inability of various industrial companies, especially in the fields of heavy industry and armaments to achieve necessary changes in their products, also significantly contributed to this. The main political force of the revolutionary changes of 1989 experienced a crisis, when it broke up into two groups. The Movement for a Democratic Slovakia (Hnutie za demokratické Slovensko) led by Vladimír Mečiar broke away from Public Against Violence, which, in the end, meant the dissolution of the civil movement formed in November 1989.

The Christian Democratic Movement also split. Great changes in the economy and society resulted from privatization on the basis of inadequately prepared legislation, which created a new rich group in society, but did not lead to the expected increased production. The unsolved question of the relations between the two parts of the state was also a serious problem, expressed in a dispute over the new name of the state. This led to a compromise and as all wished, a temporary solution. The name Czech and Slovak Federal Republic (CSFR) was adopted. The new Presidium of the SAS began its work at a time when a campaign for parliamentary elections in the whole state was beginning. The elections were held on 5-6 June 1992 and led not only to the break up of the Czecho-Slovak federation, but also to a problematic orientation of Slovakia, which was criticized for inadequate democracy and a tendency towards authoritarian methods of government, especially after 1994.

Many employees and functionaries, who were involved in public and political life no longer continued as functionaries of the SAS, because it proved difficult to deal with a double burden of work. Consistent application of the Screening Act in the conditions of the SAS meant that former collaborators with the State Security Service could not hold positions such as head of department in an institute. In these conditions, the new Presidium directed its attention mainly to internal reform of the SAS and strengthening the position of the Academy in the system of science and education.

The programme declaration of the new Presidium of the SAS from 15 July 1992 stated that the main aim of the activity of the Presidium of the SAS from the long-term point of view was “to strengthen the position of the Slovak Academy of Sciences in the pluralist environment of the scientific research base of the Slovak Republic” and in the framework of external interactions “to push for the passing of an act of the Slovak National Council on organization of and support for science and technology, an act of the SNC on the Slovak Academy of Sciences and an amendment to the act on universities”. The Presidium also intended to improve “the systematic measures to secure cooperation between the Slovak Academy of Sciences, the universities and other research institutions.”
Since the break up of the Czecho-Slovak federation had already been announced, the new Presidium also expected the task of organizing the transition to the new conditions resulting from the dissolution of the Czechoslovak Academy of Sciences. In the framework of so-called internal interactions, the key task was considered to be "the decentralization of legal authority in the field of co-ordination and integration of science and research with a shift in the centre of gravity to the branches of science and heads of the individual institutes" as the Council of Scientists had already demanded. According to the programme declaration and the statement of the new chairman of the SAS Branislav Lichardus, the creation of a new academic society was planned: "It should be constituted on the basis of international criteria of merit in science and technology. It would fully participate in our scientific and cultural life and would certainly be an effective partner for state and government institutions in the creation and implementation of state scientific policy." It is necessary to say that such an academic society with such a programme has still not been successfully established in Slovakia.

Introduction of a continual process of evaluation and accreditation of the scientific institutes was one of the priorities of this Presidium of the SAS in 1992. It established the internal Accreditation Commission (AC) of the SAS from the ranks of the internationally recognized scientists and delegated representatives of the Council of Scientists and Union of Employees of the SAS. Its head was the first deputy chairman of the SAS Ján Štohl. Subcommissions of the AC were established for the division of the SAS. The supervisory committee was composed of independent experts from the university sector, including the Ministry of Education.

On the basis of a transparent process of evaluation according to internationally recognized criteria for scientific research with all the supporting documents publicly accessible, the institutes of the SAS were assigned to accreditation groups A-D according to their quality. In 1993, the results of accreditation were applied to the financing of the institutes and eight institutes assigned to group D were closed. Application of international criteria for the quality of scientific research, methodological consistence, transparency and implementation of the results of evaluation made this measure of the SAS unprecedented in Slovakia. The short period in which it was carried out was also a success in the European context.

The adequacy of the criteria for evaluation is proved by the fact that the reduction in the number of employees of the SAS did not have a negative impact on the quality of its scientific research, and the SAS succeeded in limiting the chaotic outflow of able scientists to foreign countries or to the commercial sector, as happened in other parts of the scientific research base. It is clear that accreditation continually raised the overall activity of the institutes and the qualitative and quantitative effectiveness of research. The evalu-

76 Na troskách by sa stavalo ťažko. (It may be difficult to build on ruins.). An interview with the chairman of the SAS correspondent member Branislav Lichardus. In Šprávy SAV, 1992, year 28, no. 19, p. 2. Taken from the weekly Trend, 1992, no. 33 from 12 Aug.
77 LICHARDUS, ref. 1, p. 4-5.
ation process brought innovative stimuli for the scientific orientation of institutes and for the scientific policy of the whole SAS. It was important that the scientific community in the SAS accepted the continual process of accreditation.  

Financial difficulties led to a drastic reduction of up to 70% of the budget of the SAS compared to 1989, and the number of employees was reduced by about 40% on the basis of the results of evaluation. There was a very critical situation after publication of the first proposed budget for 1993, because it represented a reduction of 40% compared to 1992. A meeting of directors and chairman of scientific councils was held on 27 October 1992 at a critical moment. Apart from protesting, they also sought a positive starting point especially in selective granting of financial resources, which again emphasized the importance of high quality accreditation. At the same time, the bad economic situation in the country was the government’s main argument for such restrictions.

The Committee of the Council of Scientists also concerned itself with this situation and passed a resolution stating: “Although we realize that present policy on the financing of science is conditioned by the bad internal economic situation, we consider it necessary for the existence and prospects of basic research to be solved with sufficient foresight and understanding. [...] It is urgently necessary to responsibly resolve the dilemma between the immediate gain from restrictive measures in the field of science and the long-term loss for Slovakia in terms of its place among the cultured nations of the world.” The SAS succeeded in getting the restriction of its budget moderated to some extent, but not entirely stopped. The decline in the number of employees ended in the following years at about half the level of 1989, that is with a decline from 6,000 to 3,000, but it is necessary to say that the quality and effectiveness of research increased at the same time.

In spite of the positive system measures in the SAS and its comparability with similar non-university institutions in more developed foreign countries, an effort to achieve the liquidation of the SAS as a relic of the totalitarian period developed among some of the representatives of the universities, industrial branches research and some politicians during the first years of the transformation process.

A similar attempt did not succeed in the neighbouring countries – the Czech Republic, Poland, Hungary and many other post-communist countries. Efforts to bring about the liquidation of the SAS began to appear immediately after November 1989. The first serious action in this direction was the prepared Act on the organization of support for science and technology, which was submitted by the Ministry of Education during the term of office of the temporary Presidium of the SAS.

With the help of the Committee of the National Council of the Slovak Republic for Education and Science, the passing of this act, which created the pre-conditions for the dissolution of the SAS, was prevented. The Council of Scientists of the SAS, Presidium of the SAS, directors and chairmen of the scientific councils of the institutes of the SAS protested against the passing of the act in a letter to the government and the National

78 LICHARDUS, ref. 1, p. 5.
80 LICHARDUS, ref. 1, p. 5.
Council, and they organized a demonstration in front of the building of the National Council. An international conference of the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) in House of Scientists of the SAS at Smolenice on 11-12 June 1992 formed the third and final state of a joint project of Czecho-Slovakia and the OECD Review of the state of the policy of the CSFR in science and technology. Delegations from Czecho-Slovakia, France, the USA, Belgium, Holland, Finland, Austria, Germany, Great Britain, Hungary and Poland, representing more than a third of the member states of the OECD, participated in the conference. The subject of the discussions was a General Report on the development and state of science, research and technological development in Czecho-Slovakia.

After extensive discussion, in the framework of which the representatives of the SAS and CSAS compared their institutions with other non-university scientific-research institutions abroad, and considered their importance for the level of science and research in the given countries, the arguments for the importance of developing non-university research in the transforming countries of Central Europe and for the preservation of its representatives in Czecho-Slovakia, namely the SAS and CSAS, gained acceptance. In spite of intensive counter-arguments from the representatives of the universities and the Ministry of Education, the OECD experts did not insist on implementation of their original recommendations of locating basic research exclusively in the universities, where the institutes of both academies would be placed, leaving them only as academic societies.81

Discussions between representatives of Central European academic institutions and the OECD at Leeds Castle in June 1993 also decided in favour of preserving non-university research. The president of the SAS Branislav Lichardus participated in the conference. The Slovak minister of education Matúš Kučera proposed the assignment of the scientific research institutes of the SAS to the faculties of the universities.

Continuation of non-university research and development in the academies of the post-communist countries was successfully defended by the representatives of the Hungarian and Polish academies of sciences as well as by the SAS.82 Therefore, the report on the activity of the SAS in 1992 justifiably stated that the activity of the new Presidium "was dominated by continual search for ways to confront the threat to the existence of the SAS" and that "the effectiveness of the activity of the SAS is still on a much higher level than can be explained by its material possibilities".83

The report on the activities of the SAS in 1992 also stated that the SAS was re-evaluating its publishing activity, which was becoming materially rather demanding. The report states: "publishing of periodicals in 1993 will require the adoption of several measures, closer cooperation with universities as joint publishers, assessment of the periodicity of individual journals, gaining of sponsors and so on".84

81 Branislav Lichardus, Ladislav Macho, František Hanic, Baltazár Frankovič and Egon Hlavatý represented the SAS at the conference. LICHARDUS, ref. 1, p. 5.
82 The Hungarian delegation was led by the later President of Hungary Ferenc Mádl. LICHARDUS, ref. 1.
84 Ref. 83, p. 19.
In a sense, lack of finance threatened internal splits, because of the question of priorities. Institutes that did not have publishing as their priority or that mainly published in foreign periodicals, began to support the reduction of financial resources for publication activities. The Editorial Board headed by Valerián Bystrický repeatedly considered the situation. This continued until 1993, when the principles of publishing policy were accepted. Thanks to the decisive position of the Editorial Board of the SAS and finally also to the balanced position of the Presidium of the SAS, it was possible to continue production of periodical and non-periodical publications on a relatively high level.\(^85\)

A further possibility for liquidation of the SAS came after the dissolution of the Czecho – Slovak Federation and the origin of the independent Slovak Republic. The Czechoslovak Academy of Sciences was also dissolved and the Academy of Sciences of the Czech republic was formed. The dissolution of the CSAS carried with it the risk that the SAS would also be dissolved, since Act of the Slovak National Council no. 74/1963 Col. defined it as an “organic part of the CSAS”.

After consultations by the chairman of the SAS with the federal government of Czecho-Slovakia and the National Council of the Slovak Republic, an amendment to the Act on the SAS was passed at the last minute on 17 December 1992 with the help of the chairman of the National Council of the SR. The amendment stated that “The Slovak Academy of Sciences is a separate legal entity supported by the state budget with its headquarters in Bratislava”. This prevented the dissolution of the SAS by the law dissolving the CSAS.\(^86\)

Therefore, the division of Czechoslovakia also meant a new position for the SAS, especially in the field of international cooperation. The SAS became a national member of the International Council for Science\(^87\) and a whole series of other international organizations. It had to reconstruct its international contacts.

Not only the transformation of the SAS, but also the conceptual management of scientific research in the whole state, led to the view that the country lacked a national body, which could deal with the overall organization of science and research. The urgency of creating such a body was further increased after the winners of the parliamentary elections decided to divide the Czecho-Slovak Federation. The SAS realized the urgency of the need to create such a body and was active in promoting idea, especially in parliament. The president of the SAS Branislav Lichardus stated as the main argument from the side of the SAS: that “a national body [...] would guarantee a higher level of objectivity when assessing the tasks that society requires from science, as well as a higher level of objectivity in evaluating the results achieved”.\(^88\)

\(^{85}\) ÚSAV, RO SAV II. 8A 1993, 8. Publishing activity. See: Proposed principles for publishing activity of the SAS; Minutes from the Editorial Board meeting on 3 March 1993; Minutes from the Editorial Board meeting on 22 April 1993 and Record of the meeting of the authors of publications and publishers of periodicals of the SAS with members of the P SAS, Editorial Board of the SAS and director of VEDA, the publisher of the SAS on 23 Feb 1993.

\(^{86}\) LICHARDUS, ref. 1, p. 5.

\(^{87}\) ICSU, originally the International Council of Science Unions.

\(^{88}\) We asked the chairman of the SAS, correspondent member Branislav Lichardus. In Správy SAV', 1992, year 28, no. 21, p. 3.
A change in the method of managing financial resources was also an important part of the transformation of the SAS. In the course of 1992, the SAS discussed the question of the transition of the institutes to a grant form of financing, by which each institute would receive a basic institutional grant from the state budget, but would also have the possibility to obtain additional financial resources outside the budget. The reason for this reform was mainly that, while in the first months after November 1989 the system of managing the budget resources was relatively liberal, the gradual introduction of various limitations and regulations began to be perceived as an obstacle. The institutes sought the possibility of moving more freely in the economic environment based on the principle of competition. At first, introduction of the grant form of financing was considered for the SAS as a whole, as was done in the case of the Academy of Sciences of the Czech Republic. However, the institutes of the SAS did not have a unified view of the effectiveness of such a reform. The transition to grants was supported mainly by the institutes with objectively better conditions for participation in a competitive economic environment, and the ability to show their results on application.

On the other hand, institutes mainly concerned with basic research were afraid that the principle of the so-called profitability of science, applied several times before, was returning, and branches of science that could not be assessed in terms of the economic results of their research would face discrimination and threats to their existence. This especially concerned institutes from the third division of sciences, composed of the social sciences and humanities.

The directors and chairmen of the scientific councils of these institutes met on 18 October 1992, and passed a resolution opposing the transition to the grant form of management, stating that: “The space for free scientific research, created in the new political conditions after November 1989, in which the social sciences are no longer restricted by the artificial barriers of the state ideology and party bureaucracy, should not be limited again on the basis of arguments about the need for financial restriction of science and technology for narrowly pragmatic reasons. Efforts to mechanically transfer the scientific institutes of the SAS from a budgetary to a grant system will not create the pre-conditions for the favourable development of their scientific research activities.”

However, not only the institutes from the third section of the SAS, but also various natural science institutes rejected the transition to a grant form of financing and expressed fear that such a transition would force them to supplement their budget and limit basic research. The SAS finally accepted a compromise solution. Institutes were transferred to grant financing only on a voluntary basis. This complicated the administration of the budget on the central level, because two methods of managing resources from the state budget were applied in one organization, but the situation in the institutes was calmed.

In essence, it is possible to say that the process of transformation in the SAS was completed in the years 1992 – 1993. This was also stated at the celebrations of the fiftieth
anniversary of the SAS in 1993, when the SAS received appreciations from important personalities in scientific life in Slovakia and abroad.

Changes actually continued and really they have continued until today. Struggles over its position in research and in social life also continued. In 1994, the SAS had to confront an attempt by the nationalist forces in the Matica Slovenská cultural organization to annex the institutes of the SAS in the fields of the humanities and social sciences, which would have meant in practice the liquidation of independent non-university research in these scientific disciplines. However, the most basic reform and transformation steps were taken in the first years. The transformation process was formally completed with the passing of the new Act on the SAS in 2002, which codified all the basic reforms carried out in the SAS since November 1989.

After its transformation, the SAS became a scientific research institution concerned with basic and to a smaller extent applied research. Its independence was confirmed by the preservation of a separate section in the budget and especially by the autonomy and democratic character of all its managing bodies, above all the Presidium and Assembly (snem), which replaced the Council of Scientists. The Slovak Academy of Scientists established itself not only in the scientific community of Slovakia, but also as the most successful and effective Slovak scientific institution in international cooperation, especially in the European research space.

TRANSFORMATION DER SLOWAKISCHEN AKADEMIE DER WISSENSCHAFTEN IN DEN JAHREN 1989 – 1993

DUŠAN KOVÁČ


Unter dem Druck der Geschehnisse traten der Vorsitzende und das ganze Präsidium der SAW zurück. Anschließend entstand ein neues Revolutionsorgan, Wissenschaftlerforum der SAW.


Mit der Wahl des SAW-Präsidiums begann die zweite Etappe der Transformation. Zum Hauptziel wurde die Befreiung der Wissenschaft von jeglichen Ideologien, Durchsetzung des Prinzips der freien wissenschaftlichen Forschung, Wiedergutmachung des Unrechts, was mehreren Mitarbeiter der SAW in der Zeit der kommunistischen Totalität geschah. Gleichzeitig musste das neue Präsidium auf die neuen wirtschaftlichen Bedingungen reagieren, vor allem auf die Kürzung des Staatsbudgets. Mit dem Antritt des zweiten SAW-Präsidiums im Mai 1992 begann die dritte Etappe der Transformation. Die SAW musste sich mit der Senkung der Zahl der wissenschaftlichen Mitarbeiter um die Hälfte abfinden, sie musste den häufigen Angriffen standhalten, die gegen die Existenz der Forschung außerhalb des Hochschulgebiets gerichtet wurden. Gleichzeitig war es dringend notwendig die Forschung effizienter zu machen, wozu auch die Einführung des Subventionssystems diente.


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Politické
a kultúrne transfery
medzi Francúzskom,
Nemeckom
a strednou Európou
(1840 – 1945):
prípad Slovenska

Political
and cultural transfers
between France,
Germany
and Central Europe
(1840 – 1945):
the case of Slovakia

HOMMAGE
A DOMINIQUE
LASSAIGNE
REVIEWS


This book by the leading Slovak military historian is composed of an integrated series of chapters on the problem of the development of the army in the relevant period. Precisely V. Dangl has played an important part in making the period before the First World War a subject of systematic historical research from the point of view of military history. He has added to historical literature a series of expert scientific publications of fundamental importance. The first part of his work with the title: Na ceste k svetovej vojne (On the road to world war) has 8 chapters, the first two of which are concerned with the period before the creation of Austria-Hungary in 1867. The second part: Slováci vo Veľkej vojne (The Slovaks in the Great War) has three chapter, dealing with the initial phase of operations of the Austro-Hungarian army. The basic thematic and content structure of the publication is reflected in the titles of the individual chapters, which can be grouped into internally connected sections.

The introduction states the author’s aim to emphasize the fact that research in the field of the military history of Slovakia makes it possible to present to expert scientific circles basic data, which form organic parts of a conceptual view of the overall character and stable factors, which determined the specific nature of the history of Slovakia.

The chapter: Military aspects of the expedition of September 1848 points to an important armed action of the Slovaks during the revolution of 1848 – 1849 from the point of view of fulfillment of the first national political programme and building of a tradition of emancipation efforts. The author evaluates the objective conditions for the activity of the Slovak Volunteer Corps as part of the Imperial army, as well as its preparedness and internal disposition for carrying out military actions against the Hungarian armed forces. He also explains the function of the Slovak National Council in this power struggle. It was the first national representative body, formed as a directing centre for political and military activities in a crucial period of power-political and social changes in the Monarchy.

On the basis of two important battles in the Prussian – Austrian war of 1866: at Hradec Králové and Lamač (now part of Bratislava), the author confronts the power-political and strategic ambitions of the Habsburg Monarchy and Prussia. On the basis of the results of the war, he evaluates the effect of these battles on weakening the power-political position of the Habsburg Monarchy in the international context, as well as sharpening the problems of its internal stability, which led to the dynasty accepting the dualist constitutional organization of the state in 1867. Special attention is devoted to the participation of Slovak soldiers in the fighting and to the perception of the military situation by the Slovak population, since it had to overcome the accompanying fears and hardships, which directly effected especially the western part of the territory of Slovakia.
The next three chapters are devoted to explaining the purpose and application of the so-called defence laws of 1868, which introduced universal military service in the Kingdom of Hungary, defined the role and structure of all the armed forces, constituted “homeland-defence” as a supplementary part of the armed forces and a “home-guard” with the task of supporting the armed forces in the event of a threat to the state by an external enemy. On this basis, he presents the basic questions concerning the recruitment of the army and the organizational development of the infantry and cavalry units with regard to Slovakia. Data about the territorial division of recruiting districts and military education are instructive in this context. The author gives a summary of the structure of the army, of the numerous types of unit and especially about the location of commands and units in Slovakia. Data of this character are especially important from the point of view of understanding the context in which individual components of Slovak society perceived the army. It is clear that in the towns with military bases there was the widest direct contact between the civilian population and members of the army. The presence of the army clearly had an influence on the building up of infrastructure and shaping of the public, social and economic life of the whole urban community, and the outward signs of urbanization. Thus, the population came into direct contact with the army, and in their specific environment they assessed the army with its comprehensive function inseparably connected with the state and its policy towards the Slovaks. The conclusions presented by the author about the significant attitude of the Slovak population, are important in the given context. Various arguments supported by research show that the Slovaks maintained some distance from the armed forces and did not regard the army as an appropriate area for the professional application of men.

The chapter with the title: The problem of the nationality question in the army and the reaction of Slovak society, explains the symptoms of increased militarization in the policy of the Hungarian government from the end of the 19th century, in connection with the ambitions of the Hungarian political forces and state institutions to use the army as an important and essential instrument for transforming the historic Kingdom of Hungary into a homogeneous ethnic Hungarian or Magyar nation state. Precisely these aims evoked negative reactions and expressions of passive resistance to military service and militarism among the Slovaks and other non-Magyar nations. In the period of the Balkan Wars of 1912 – 1913, this led to open anti-war agitation and sympathy for the Slavonic nations. The author clearly expresses the conclusion that the Hungarian political elite saw the army as an effective means for assimilationist aims in the interest of applying the idea of the “united and indivisible Hungarian nation” as the one state forming unit in the multi-national Kingdom of Hungary. It was a course similar to that applied in the cases of education and culture, where education “in a patriotic spirit” had priority in nationality policy with a directly negative impact on the non-Magyar population. In this area, the author deals with the views of the Slovak political representatives and especially of the members of the Hungarian Parliament, who clearly expressed public criticism of the militarization of the state and of the efforts of the Hungarian political elite to strengthen its influence in the armed forces of the Monarchy, a trend also rejected by the representatives of the other non-Magyar nations. The significant activity of the Slovak political groups at the beginning of the century also included the extension of their interest into a
sphere, that was gaining increased importance at this time for achieving the power-political ambitions of the Monarchy.

Two chapters: *The military diplomatic background to the preparations for the First World War after the Sarajevo assassination* and *The military plans of Austria-Hungary on the eve of the First World War*, immediately precede the explanation of the problem in the second part, because they are directly connected with the expected military conflict. The author explains the steps of the Habsburg Monarchy in the phase immediately before the outbreak of war. In particular he evaluates the open campaign against Serbia with power-political pressure on the diplomatic level and the presentation of ultimatum demands. He also reveals the position of the Entente powers and the efforts of Serbia to gain support for its decisions from this bloc. On the basis of the genesis of the power-political strategy of Austria-Hungary towards the position and interest of Russia, and the orientation towards the Balkans in harmony with the military plans of Germany towards France, the author concentrates on analysis of up to date modifications of the war aims of the Monarchy. He shows that in this period, Germany and Austria-Hungary underestimated the counter-weight and potential of Russia on the Galician front, as well as the forces on the southern, Serbian front, which thwarted the possibility of waging an aggressive type of so-called Blitzkrieg, leading to the achievement of a decisive dominance.

The second part is conceptually based on evaluation of the first results of war-fighting by the Austro-Hungarian army. The author presents the problems of the Monarchy in the initial phases of the Great War on the north-eastern front in Galicia and in the battles at Kraśnik and Komarów in the summer of 1914. Austria-Hungary launched a general offensive, to which Russia reacted with its own strategic-tactical plans. Although from the military point of view, these actions were among the greatest and firmest in the history of the Austro-Hungarian army, their results reflected the insufficient securing of material, technical and moral preparation of the participating armed forces of the Habsburg Monarchy. This approach is also productive because it deals with the activities of the Bratislava and Košice army corps, which included units with their bases in Slovakia and significant numbers of Slovak soldiers.

It is necessary to emphasize that in this publication the military historical approach overlaps with an evaluative analysis of the socio-political atmosphere and public opinion in relation to the phenomenon of the army. It not only considers the function of the armed forces as a decisive instrument in the security situation within the state, but above all the role of the army and its components in asserting the foreign policy influence of Austria-Hungary, and especially its territorially defined power-political interests. This methodological conception is important for research, because it organically connects with the conceptual-political constants of the time, and the socio-economic processes in the Monarchy.

V. Dangl’s publication shows that it is based on the results of long-term, purposeful and conceptual research. The author has proved the value of this form of publication. The synthesizing approach to explaining a problem does not have to concern only more extensive works of a summary character, but can also be productive and stimulating in the context of chapters, which are connected by the subject of study, methodology,
research and consistent interpretative concept. The contribution of the publication of V. Dangl needs to be seen not only in the limited field of research into the military history of Slovakia, because he places this problem in the context of the development of Slovak society with its conceptual, political and socio-economic factors. The work provides a series of stimuli for deeper research into various aspects with application of different approaches, since the author points out which questions still require research.

The book includes a brief summary in English and an index of names. The different parts are supplemented with drawings, maps, tables and diagrams.

Milan Podrimavský


Miroslav Michela belongs to the new generation of young historians working at the Institute of History of the Slovak Academy of Sciences. His works are devoted to the problems of nationalism, collective identities, the political history of Central Europe in the first half of the 20th century and Slovak – Hungarian relations. His first monograph is devoted to the last of these themes.

The geopolitical changes in Central Europe as a result of the end of the First World War had a substantial influence on the relations between the successor states formed after the disintegration of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy. The loss of extensive territories, signing of the Treaty of Trianon and the obligations derived from it placed the Hungarian political elite in a new situation. M. Michela’s work is concerned with attempts to change this situation.

He maps the chronological succession of the individual conceptions of Hungarian governments and selected institutions during the relatively short period of three years. He considers foreign policy, the development of Czechoslovak – Hungarian relations, and the question of revision of frontiers with special regard for the use of the minority or “Slovak question” in this area. It is necessary to emphasize here that there were various views on the problem of revision in this period. Therefore, the author follows the principle of not speaking of “Hungarian policy”, but of the specific conceptions associated with particular governments or institutions. On the basis of these criteria, the work is divided into six chapters with distinct sub-chapters, concerned with the activities of the governments from that of Mihály Károlyi up to István Bethlen.

The basic starting point of the individual Hungarian governments was the question of preserving territorial integrity, and later revision of the peace treaties with the resulting diplomatic activities in relation to the great powers and neighbouring states. From the point of view of internal politics it was a matter of working out a conception of minority policy in the form of proposals for legislation. However, the author does not direct his
main attention to the position and activity of the Hungarian or Magyar minorities in the territories of the successor states, although they played an important role in the plans for revision. He traces this problem in the context of policy towards the non-Magyars within the new frontiers of Hungary and especially in the context of the former Kingdom of Hungary. M. Michela considers the specific proposed solutions presented on the levels of the council of ministers, the peace talks in Paris, their impact on the domestic political scene and the possibilities of their use in solution of the “Slovak question”.

The author deals with the problem of nationality policy in detail. Individual Hungarian governments worked out various conceptions for its solution, involving granting of minority rights in the fields of administration, education, culture and the law courts or the gradual curtailment of these rights. After the signing of the peace treaty and its ratification in the Hungarian parliament there was a change in the view of the solution of nationality policy. There was a clear inclination to the Nationality Act from 1868, which granted rights in the fields of language, tradition and religion. However, from the point of view of the Hungarian political elite, the solution of this question was limited by the incompatibility of the two basic principles, which directly opposed each other: granting rights to minorities while also maintaining the united character of the state. These efforts to find a solution in the field of minority rights were also perceived by society as harmful, anti-Hungarian and treacherous. However, the extent of the rights that the ruling elite was willing to offer and guarantee no longer satisfied the demands of the time.

Apart from the efforts of the official government institutions, the formation of various organizations, societies and leagues concerned with the solution of the “Slovak question” was characteristic of the development of Hungary from the time of the establishment of Károlyi’s government. Although the activity of these organizations was often personally linked with the ruling elite, it was uncoordinated and it was negatively perceived abroad. The author devotes special attention to the efforts of individual governments to co-ordinate and unify the activities of individual organizations developing activities in the territory of Hungary or abroad. Pro-Hungarian Slovaks, working directly in the individual ministries in Budapest or in various societies played an important role in them.

Signing of the Treaty of Trianon had a direct impact on Hungarian politics on various levels. The author is concerned with the efforts of Hungary to break out of its international isolation by means of possible direct military support for Poland in its conflict with Soviet Russia. On the question of revision, various plans were worked out, to regain control of Slovakia in cooperation with the Poles. Slovak exiles active in the territory of Poland and various separatist tendencies within Czechoslovakia, such as the autonomist programme of the Slovak People’s Party, played an important role here. Using the example of the activities of Slovak exiles and talks with Polish representatives, the author points to the limited room for manoeuvre of the Hungarian government where the question of revision was concerned. Although various plans for armed action against Czechoslovakia or Slovakia arose with its knowledge, the Hungarian government did not directly support them because of the international political risk.

From the point of view of internal politics, the Hungarian government emphasized the consolidation of the economy. At the same time, there were substantial changes in the relationship of the government to various irredentist organizations, with the government
striving to gain as much control as possible over their activities at home and abroad. In the end, the possibility of solving the “Slovak question” through its representatives active in Budapest or abroad remained only one of the alternatives for Hungarian policy.

M. Michela’s work naturally does not exhaust the question of revision, the activities of the irredentist organizations, Czechoslovak – Hungarian relations and the related problem of the solution of the “Slovak question”, as the author already states in the introduction to the book. However, he offers a rounded picture of key events from the years 1918 – 1921, which substantially influenced and finally became basic pillars of Hungarian foreign policy during the whole of the inter-war period.

Maroš Hertel

The extensive and extraordinarily detailed work of the young Slovak historian Dušan Segeš brings a comprehensive view of the extensive political connections of the attitude of Polish diplomacy to the Slovak question during the Second World War. The work, based on knowledge of material from more than twenty different archive collections, gives a detailed reflection of the atmosphere created by the activities of the exiled political representatives of Poland and Czechoslovakia, when forming an up to date view of independent but German dominated Slovakia. The book can be regarded as a true embodiment of the present possibilities of modern historiography. A selection from the accessible archives and the varied range of available materials gives evidence of the starting points, views, approaches and conceptions of various political groups. The most serious limitation threatening the author in the given situation is the financial possibilities of the publisher, and this has been successfully solved in this case.

The theme of the book, defined mainly by the politically conditioned existence of the specific events and connections, is a detailed analysis of events during a little less than six years. The chapters offering six coherent sections during the period from October 1939 to June 1945, are internally divided into shorter sections. The heterogeneity of content determines the extent and division of these chapters, which have four to six sub-chapters. Only the concluding part, in which, according to the author, “the government of Poland became a mere spectator of events” is extraordinarily brief and without internal divisions, but outlining the cruel reality. The introductory passage, conceived in detail and with an overview, explains in depth not only the approach to the given theme, but also the rich literature and source material.

The action of the extensive monograph opens in the first chapter, with a brief account of the German invasion of Poland of September 1939, in which three division of the
Slovak army participated. We come to the centre of the relevant events in October, when the Polish government in exile began to consider the Slovak question. The basic motif of the introductory chapter is the attitude of the Polish leadership to the competition between Milan Hodža and Edvard Beneš up to November 1940. The author also points to the attitude of the Polish government to the rivalry between the various exiled Czechoslovak representatives. The interesting but not very long second chapter gives an analysis of the Slovak question in the relations between the Polish and Czechoslovak governments in exile up to December 1941.

The author outlines the overall depth and breadth of events in the third chapter, directed to the period from January 1942 to May 1943. The basic motif of the factual content is the development of the Slovak question from the Polish – Czechoslovak Declaration to the Soviet vetoing of the Confederation of Poland and Czechoslovakia. The author points out that from the turn of the years 1941 – 1942 “all the negative results for Poland of the entry of the USSR into the war on the side of the Allies came to the surface”. Even Great Britain showed great willingness to accept Soviet territorial demands, which included the eastern part of pre-war Poland, as well as the Baltic states. The rich source material and detailed analysis of the various conceptions of the participants in the historic events, enrich an extensive subchapter. The considerations of the author on the reactions of the Polish government to the efforts of Milan Hodža to gain the support of the American Slovaks, and the analysis of the contacts of the Polish government with Štefan Osuský after he left the Czechoslovak government, are instructive. Support for opposition currents and anti-government groups was part of the tactics of the Polish government in its rivalry with the Czechoslovak government. The author also gives details of Polish financial assistance for these groups. From the other side, Dušan Segeš also traces the activities of Slovak members of the Czechoslovak government in exile and State Council in cooperation with the Polish government bodies.

Thanks to the extensive archive information, which the author has conscientiously studied, we encounter in the description of historical events, a ramified structure of facts and to some degree also the inter-weaving of events. The reader gets a picture of an almost incredible number of details, and if he is not careful, there is a danger of getting entangled and drowned in the mass of facts. The author does not omit the representative of the exiled Slovak opposition Petr Prínavok, who was vehemently condemned by the regime in Bratislava. An important finding of the author is the fact that the representatives of the Slovak opposition abroad could not unite because of mutual enmity and great differences in their political programmes. The considerations of the place of the Slovaks in post-war Europe are interesting. They include, among others, the considerations of Karol Šidor. Every material taken from the rich archive sources, is cited by the author and analysed in great detail. On the one hand, this provides the reader with a large number of findings, but on the other, it has a rather tiring effect. In this case, we can recall the old saying that less is sometimes more, and the historian has an obligation to select which of his studied material to place before the reader. However, it is still necessary to appreciate the extraordinary effort of the young author and his attempt to place before the reader as many as possible of the available facts.
The development of historic events in the period from May to December 1943, during the advance of the Nazi armies deep into Soviet territory, is considered by the author in his fourth chapter. An extensive political analysis is devoted to the problem of orientation against the two totalitarianisms, and the Slovak question is analysed in the Polish conception of an anti-German and anti-Bolshevik bloc. A gradation of political assumptions and extensive orientations of the position of the Polish government in exile was initiated in April 1943 by a stunning event: the discovery of a mass grave near Smolensk containing Polish victims, murdered on orders from J.V. Stalin. The Polish government asked the International Red Cross to investigate the crime, and the Soviet government broke off diplomatic relations with the Polish representatives. In Soviet policy, this step meant the culmination of preparation of the so-called leftist alternative solution to the Polish question. As the author emphasizes, it started a process “in which the Polish government gradually ceased to be a subject of international laws and became an object of power politics”. In the given circumstances, the contacts and mutual relations of the Polish and Czechoslovak representatives in exile were complicated and worsened. On the Czech and Slovak side the “communizing elements” became more prominent, and declarations appeared about the greater value of “friendship with the Soviet people” compared to “an alliance with some Polish officers”. The author traces the impact of the strained Polish – Czechoslovak relations on political assessment of the Slovak question. The work analyses this circles of problems from the contacts of the Polish government with exiled Slovak politicians after the interruption of talks about a confederation, through consideration of the Polish view of the activity of adherents of Slovak independence, the analysis of the question of Slovakia in Polish – Hungarian considerations about the organization of Central Europe, to the reaction of the Polish government and exiled Czechoslovak politicians to the signing of the Czechoslovak – Soviet treaty of 12 December 1943.

The year 1944 brought not only the definitive turn in the military situation and the advance of the Soviet forces into Europe, but also, as Dušan Segeš emphasizes, the end of the hope of a federalized Central Europe. In the fifth chapter, the author traces this theme from the Stalin – Beneš Pact to the resignation of Stanislaw Mikołajczyk, that is from January to November 1944. The analysis of the given questions starts from the fact that Stalin’s plan to solve the Polish problem was based on three basic pre-conditions: the expected military occupation of Poland by the Red Army, the formation of Polish representation subordinate to the Soviet Union and the removal of the Polish government in exile, including the structures subordinate to it in occupied Poland. The author emphasizes that the Soviet leader carried out this plan “very consistently and with full brutality”. It is also interesting to observe the inconsistent and hesitant approach of the Western powers towards the deliberate political steps of the Soviets. In the given circumstances, the Polish government no longer had much space for pursuing the Slovak question, but its contacts with the exiled Slovak politicians and Karol Sidor did not entirely end. The following subchapters are devoted to five basic problems. These are: the role of Polish exiles in the conflict of Petr Pridavok with the conceptions of the Czechoslovak Republic conceived in London, and analysis of the positions of personalities such as Karol Sidor, Kazimierz Papée, Milan Hodža, JozeF Rudinský and Štefan Osuský, when faced with the major events of the later part of the war. The chapter culminates in an analysis of the
The sixth and final chapter of the book deals with the period from November 1944 to June 1945, face to face with cruel reality. It examines the Polish government in exile and the exiled Slovak politicians at the beginning of the Sovietization of Central Europe. The author immediately points to the decisive finding that the Slovak question as a subject of considerations “fell into the shadow of the basic problems of the existence of the exiled Polish politicians in London”. This chapter is extraordinarily brief in comparison with the others, and clearly expresses what the author describes as the “sad denouement for the supporters of a free and democratic Poland”. In the rather entangled final consideration of this chapter, the author summarizes the development of the political views of the Polish government, including its ideas on the role of Poland in the geopolitical space between Germany and the Soviet Union. He emphasizes that the Polish government gradually lost influence not only in Central Europe, but also within Poland itself. This development also directly influenced the formulation of official Polish views on the Slovak question during the Second World War.

In conclusion, Dušan Segeš unambiguously states that the Slovak question represented an important factor in the political relations of the Polish government in exile and the exiled representatives of Czechoslovakia during the Second World War. The author applies his own approach to the problem, in which he emphasizes his initial aim “of clarifying the general view of the Polish government in exile on the Slovak problem”. The author has succeeded in achieving his aim of confronting the various views with the contemporary documents, by means of an unusually wide and well-considered selection. The extensive concluding considerations make clear to the reader the overall approach and the scientific starting points of the young author. The detailed analysis of the theme is followed by the usual supplements: a list of abbreviations, extensive bibliography of source literature, brief summary in English, index of names and collections of illustrations.

The extensive monograph by Dušan Segeš documents the significant effort of the author to give the reader the widest possible range of views, conceptions, approaches and ideas of the exiled representatives of Poland, in their complex relationship with the Slovak political exiles and the Czechoslovak government in exile. The book is intended for the knowledgeable reader with an interest in a theme that is little researched and almost unknown in Slovakia. In the conclusion, the author expresses the hope that the monograph will move the knowledge of the expert and lay public about the Slovaks and Poles, authors and participants in the considerations and projects “at least a small step forward”. The monograph can be warmly recommended to students of history as a source of material for various possible seminar works. It is to be hoped that other young researchers, interested in previously unresearched themes will follow the example of their colleague in their approach and processing of their chosen range of problems.

Dagmar Čierna-Lantayová
Although with some delay since publication, I wish to draw the attention of the expert public to the collective monograph prepared by an inter-disciplinary team of authors from various academic institutions in Slovakia and the Czech Republic under the leadership of historians from the Institute of History of the Slovak Academy of Sciences in Bratislava, on the occasion of the 40th anniversary of the events of 1968 known as the Prague Spring.

In an effort to create the most comprehensive possible picture of the events of 1968, the authors of the monograph have striven to include all the important processes that preceded it, were part of it or resulted from it, as well as reminiscences. For this reason, the monograph is conceived as a multi-disciplinary work, and its composition is extraordinarily generous.

The monograph is divided into three parts. The first and most extensive part is devoted to the political and economic problems of the former Czechoslovak Socialist Republic, also in the period before 1968. In an attempt to uncover the causes of a reform movement unprecedented in the Soviet Bloc of the time, the authors start from the assumption that the main cause was not economic collapse in society, but an effort to create the conditions for scientific-technical revolution, which was not possible without consistent democratization of the economic and political spheres, that is without the creation of space for initiatives “from below”. The idea is interesting, although it would be possible to argue against it, considering the deep structural crisis of the Czechoslovak economy at the beginning of the 1960s, the disintegration of the five year plan as a result of the exhaustion of extensive resources and so on, but this found only unclear expression in the composition of this part of the monograph. Three chapters are devoted to this problem of the period before 1968, but either they do not deal with the problem as posed above, or they do not extend to the above mentioned consequences. Specifically, the chapter by J. Pešek with the title: Political development in Slovakia: from the 1948 coup to the beginning of 1968, gives erudite information on the struggles within the leadership of the Communist Party of Slovakia, but lacks an attempt to analyse the political situation in Slovakia. The space provided here clearly prevented the author devoting attention to the problem in its wider context. The chapter by Miroslav Londák entitled: The Slovak economy on the threshold of 1968 – twenty years after February 1948, was included to supplement the political analysis with consideration of the economic situation. However, it is mainly a precise statistically based comparison of the economic development of the Czech Lands and Slovakia. The interpretation of these results at the time only confirmed the economic disadvantages of the united, centrally directed state for the Slovaks. However, this also does not approach the search for other routes to more rapid economic growth. It is clear that in Slovakia, the key to economic growth was seen exclusively in solution of the constitutional position of Slovakia. In this way, the author indirectly explains why the question of constitutional organization became the dominant feature.
of the reform process in Slovakia. A further chapter devoted to this period by the author Zdenek Jirásek with the title *1968 and economic reform in Czechoslovakia* deals with the problem more directly. It shows the continuity of the effort to achieve economic reform pursuing the relaxation of bureaucratic centralism and the creation of space for initiatives from below. Unfortunately it only points out and does not explain the conflict between the effort to create a new organization of the economy and the political obstacles to this effort. This ever-present schizophrenia was the cause of the inability of the communist regime to start a viable economy, even in the period after January 1968.

Further chapters in this part of the monograph are already devoted to the period after January 1968, extending to the coming of Normalization. Consideration of problems dominates rather than the chronological approach. Priority is given to seeking answers to the question of what was the content of the reform process, what were its moving forces and where was it heading, but also to clarifying specific questions, such as definition of the different priorities of the Czechs and Slovaks, of the Hungarian minority in Slovakia, the content of the talks in Moscow and the activities of civil society in the democratization process. The chapters by Jitka Vondrová: *The Prague Spring of 1968*, Ivan Lalhia: *A description of one program vision (A proposed report for the Fourteenth Congress of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia – 9 September 1968)*, Ondrej Felcman: *The share of the National Assembly in disrupting the Soviet model of socialism in Czechoslovakia*, Michal Šťefanský: *The Moscow protocol and talks about the stationing of Soviet troops*, Štefan Štutaj: *The Hungarians of Slovakia and 1968*, and other authors of the total of 17 chapters, are interesting for the depth of their penetration into the problem.

The second part of the monograph is devoted to the international context of the events in Czechoslovakia. The chapters placed here survey the attitudes of some European states to the Czechoslovak experiment, and paradoxically point to the unfavourable influence of the policy of relaxation between the blocs for the successful development of the reform process. This problem is the subject of six chapters: Slavomír Michálek, *The limits of détente and the policy of Moscow during the attempt to reform Czechoslovakia*; Ľudovít Hallon, *Forms of economic cooperation between Slovakia and the countries with free market economies in the period 1968 – 1970*; Jindřich Dejmek, *Great Britain and reform communist Czechoslovakia (1964 – 1968)*; Radek Soběhart, *The German Federal Republic and the Prague Spring of 1968*; Zuzana Poláčková, *The attitude of Austria to the August invasion of 1968*; Heikki Larmola, *The Czechoslovak Crisis of 1968 and Finland*.

The third and final part of the monograph is devoted to reflection of the events of 1968 and the subsequent Normalization in the fields of culture, social sciences, philosophy, journalism and the everyday life of the citizens. It consists of eight chapters: Elena Londákov, *The Slovak cultural community in spring 1968*; Dagmar Podmaková, *Slovak theatre in the power lines of society at the end of the sixties and beginning of the seventies*; Jan Mervart, *Relations between the Union of Czechoslovak writers and the representatives of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia in the first months of the Prague Spring*; Miloslav Blahynka, *The picture of 1968 in Slovak opera*; Jozef Leikert, *The position of the writer Ladislav Mňačko in 1968*; Vladimir Bakoš, *The reformism of the sixties and the vicissitudes of the structuralist school*; Zuzana
It is notable that such a comprehensive and many-layered study of the problem of the events of 1968 has no parallel up to now in the history of Slovak and Czech historiography. Apparently, the ambition of the authors was not to exhaust and conclude the problem. Instead, the editors of the monograph left the authors of the chapters free to interpret events and so create space for further research. There are also themes not included in the monograph. For example, an account of the positions of the individual protagonists of the reformist policy in the Presidium of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia and elsewhere would certainly be interesting. It is important that the above mentioned heterogeneity of interpretation and contradictions between different contributions should not become obstacles to further historical research. It appears that without the intention to express a view on this question, the editors of the monograph accept the fact that so-called “pure history” does not exist. There are only interpretative narratives by historians. Precisely this subjective aspect of historiography causes the endless variety of the historical picture. This also applies to the year 1968. Such an understanding of history cannot strive to achieve ultimate truth, but to produce the most comprehensive possible depiction of the events of 1968 on three or four research levels.

As a result of the relatively short period of time since the events of 1968, and perhaps also because of the personal experiences of the authors, it is entirely natural that various chapters show considerable euphoria or nostalgia about events, with a political subtext in their interpretation. They are expressed especially in the form of surviving enthusiasm for the effort of Dubček’s leadership of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia to reform socialism, suppressed during the years of Normalization. Without intervention from outside, it could have led to the so-called Czechoslovak model of socialism. According to the author of the chapter The Czechoslovak Spring of 1968 and Slovakia Stanislav Sikora the whole of this process of seeking the Czechoslovak model of socialism was striving to overcome the totalitarian social system and in this direction there was cooperation with civil society (p. 96). The chapter by Ivan Laluha A description of one program vision (A proposed report for the Fourteenth Congress of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia – 9 September 1968), also points to the cooperation between the moving forces of the reform process in the search for a new model of socialism. With the help of data obtained by research in May 1968, he shows that the enthusiasm and hyperactivity of the citizens had its basis in the pro-socialist orientation of the majority, while interest in the restoration of capitalism was only exceptional, and the leadership of the Communist Party did not consider it substantial at the time (p. 108). Such an idyllic interpretation of the events of 1968 is also supported by Jozef Žatkuliak’s chapter Autumn 1968 in the preparations for the federalization of the state, because it nourishes the myth of the reality of the so-called third way, which, without external intervention, “could” have had a chance “to receive legal form in legal norms in a systematic and elevated spirit” (p. 223).

Undoubtedly, precisely the above mentioned expressions of glorification of the reformist leadership of the Communist Party and its ideas about achieving the so-called third way lead to the editors in the conclusion of the monograph excusing the leadership of the Communist Party for “sounding the retreat” at the plenary session of the Central
Committee on 29 May – 1 June 1968, because they justify the turn in the evaluation of the political situation in the country by the increasing pressure from the representatives of the Warsaw Pact. It is as if the leadership of the Communist Party both before and after the plenary session did not perceive any civil activities as a threat to its own ideas about the content and direction of the reform process. I think that such an interpretation only strengthens the idyllic, but in many ways inaccurate picture of the identity of interests of the moving forces of the reform process and the overall direction of the reform process.

Thanks to the depth of their penetration into the problems, the authors of the above mentioned and other chapters show that the situation was much more complicated. Above all, it is necessary to say that Dubček’s leadership of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia really made a systematic effort to find a so-called third way, which they perceived as the Czechoslovak model of socialism. However, as Ivan Laluha indicates in his already mentioned chapter, they never connected this way with the removal of the basic pillars of the totalitarian regime, or with a return to the situation before February 1948. This meant that the leading role of the Communist Party, the Marxist-Leninist ideology and the associated class interpretation of development and social ownership of the means of production had to remain unchanged. The new element would be the combination of these achievements of February 1948 with a higher form of democracy, namely the so-called socialist democracy. Its class interpretation predetermined that it would be directed from above. It would be a democracy that expected initiative from below, but selectively if it was not in harmony with the political ideas of the leading force in society.

These last thoughts are confirmed by the chapter from the Czech author Ondrej Felcman, The share of the National Assembly in disrupting the Soviet model of socialism in Czechoslovakia, although this apparently was not the author’s intention. He especially points to the significantly increased legislative activity of parliament, but also indicates that the limiting factor in this activity was the still valid leading role of the Communist Party. This limiting factor appeared already in connection with the prepared proposal of the new president, the act on the National Front or in connection with discussion of foreign policy towards the USSR. There is no doubt that the Communist Party, even before August 1968 had no interest in enabling the National Assembly to use its rights guaranteed by the constitution, because in that case, it would have had to defend its decisions before parliament. It seems that the main purpose of allowing increased space for legislative activity by parliament was to renew the confidence of the public in the Communist Party and the secondary aim was to spread responsibility.

Various chapters point to the already mentioned chronic schizophrenia of the leadership of the Communist Party in the theoretical preparation of a new model of socialism. It was present in all the attempts at reform both earlier and later. The key problem was undoubtedly the attempt not only to declare, but also to apply universal democratic rights – freedom of expression, criticism and assembly – in the conditions of an unchanged political system. An analysis of this problem from the point of view of political science is presented in the chapter by the author Norbert Kmet under the title: The approach to democracy in the reform process. The author describes the specific features, supposed to form the content of socialist democracy and the method of their application. There is less consideration of the extent to which such a vision was realistic.
In reality, by increasing the hitherto very limited space for initiative from below, the reformist leadership of the Communist Party created the conditions for the formation of a civil society, which became a partner in moving the reform process forward, but also for the emergence of an unwanted opposition. Civil society gradually increased its activity: from criticism of individuals in the Communist Party, it progressed to consideration of the justification for the communist monopoly of power. According to Jitka Vondrová, author of the chapter *The Prague Spring of 1968*, the process of democratization gradually escaped from the control of the Communist Party and civil society began to provide the dynamics of the whole movement. It already demanded democracy without limitations. The reformist leadership of the CPCS was very disturbed by this unwanted initiative, and perceived it as a threat. It considered using coercive measures several times, but did not find support for this in society or in the party. However, this did not prevent it adopting secret measures with the aim of pacifying some civil initiatives. Interesting information in this direction is provided by Robert Letz in the chapter with the title *Activities of the Slovak Organization for the Protection of Human Rights in 1968*. This contribution indirectly confirms that the reformist leadership of the CPCS, fearing for its power, secretly monitored civil activities by means of the State Security Service. Letz specifically mentions the example of the effort of the leadership of the CPCS to penetrate the leadership of the organization K 231 and its Slovak associate — the Slovak Organization for the Defence of Human Rights, and pacify their activities (p. 178-179). This led to a paradoxical situation. The reformist leadership of the CPCS allowed more democracy, which widened the space for initiatives from below, but it was alarmed by the growth of initiatives and sought ways to limit them. It seems that there could not even be discussion of harmony and cooperation between the moving forces of the reform process. On the contrary, the widening democratic space in an unchanged political system produced a latent conflict between the reformist leadership of the CPCS and the emerging civil society. History does not allow us to know how this conflict would have developed further. The military intervention stopped the process, and so paradoxically helped to create the myth of the possibility of reforming the totalitarian system.

The varied interpretations to be found in the collective monograph reviewed here give the readers a variety of perspectives on the significance of the events of 1968 in our history. However, I think that the most important finding from the events of 1968 was that a totalitarian regime is un-reformable. Later historical development confirmed this.

Finally, it is necessary to appreciate the important work of the editors of this volume. Creating the conception and finding a group of authors to fulfill it from various fields of research, including some from abroad, required great effort. I will add that unified technical adjustment of the chapters published in the monograph, especially use of the STN ISO 690/1998 norm for bibliographic citations valid in Slovakia, would contribute to the perfection of this splendid effort.

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TRADÍCIA A DEJINY

VYBRANÉ OTÁZKY
ZO SLOVENSKO-MAĎARSKÝCH
A SLOVENSKO-RUSKÝCH VZťAHÔV
(1934 – 1949)

DAGMAR ČIERNÁ-LANTAYOVÁ